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Wednesday, June 27, 2012

STATE VS. DIANA M. PALMA A-3473-10T3


STATE VS. DIANA M. PALMA  A-3473-10T3

On appeal from a trial de novo in the Law Division, we reverse and remand for resentencing consistent with the principles established in State v. Moran, 202 N.J. 311 (2010).  We hold that the imposition of a custodial sentence for careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97, requires a finding of aggravating circumstances evincing as "a matter of degree" more than mere carelessness, and that the tragic death of the victim, resulting from a motor vehicle violation, is not dispositive of whether a custodial sentence is appropriate under the circumstances. 06-26-12

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT PETITION OF J.B. A-1564-11T2


IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT PETITION OF J.B.
 A-1564-11T2

In this appeal from the denial of a petition to expunge juvenile adjudications and an adult conviction, we construe the 1980 statute permitting expungement of juvenile adjudications.  L. 1980, c.  163, codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1.  We conclude the trial court misinterpreted the unnumbered paragraph in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1(a), "For purposes of expungement, any act which resulted in a juvenile being adjudged a delinquent shall be classified as if that act had been committed by an adult." In view of the legislative history of the 1980 statute, and canons of statutory construction, we construe the quoted
sentence to apply only to applications to expunge juvenile  adjudications under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1(a).  The 1980 law was intended to allow expungement of juvenile adjudications, which was not otherwise permitted; there was no evidence the Legislature intended to make expungement of adult convictions more difficult by treating juvenile adjudications as if they were adult convictions.

Applying our reading of the statute, petitioner was entitled to expungement of his entire record of multiple juvenile adjudications under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1(b).  Also, although the court mistakenly applied the quoted sentence to render petitioner's juvenile adjudications equivalent to adult convictions, the court correctly denied the petitioner to expunge the adult conviction because it was filed less than ten years after completion of the sentence, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), and petitioner failed to establish that expungement after just five years was "in the public interest," N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a)(2). 06-21-12

STATE VS. THOMAS NEVIUS A-5438-07T4


STATE  VS. THOMAS NEVIUS
 A-5438-07T4

At issue is the admissibility under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) (declarations against interest) of an out-of-court statement by a defendant's non-testifying confederate that supposedly implicated the declarant in a felony murder and exculpated defendant by naming another as the co-perpetrator of the crime.

 We upheld the trial court's exclusion of the statement, finding no abuse of discretion in the evidentiary ruling or due process violation.  We concluded that the so-called inculpatory portion was actually self-serving and unreliable as it tended to dilute or excuse the declarant's criminal culpability by placing the blame on another.  But even if considered self- incriminating, the so-called exculpatory portion of the statement neither strengthened nor bolstered the inculpatory effect of the declarant's allow it to be admissible. 06-18-12

STATE VS. MARLTON PLAZA ASSOCIATES A-2164-10T4


STATE  VS. MARLTON PLAZA ASSOCIATES
 A-2164-10T4

 As to the scope of damages awardable to condemnees at a just compensation trial where a highway improvement project involves both a modification of highway access and a
condemnation, we held that a claim for damages arising from the internal effects of the access modification, (i.e., diminution in value due to impacts caused by poor vehicle maneuverability), which the property owners consented to and left them with
reasonable alternate access, may not be appropriately considered in the condemnation trial concerning the State's acquisition phase. 06-08-12

STATE VS. PATRICK DEFRANCO A-2054-10T4


STATE VS. PATRICK DEFRANCO A-2054-10T4

 We held that a defendant school teacher, who had previously sexually assaulted a student, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone number when, at an earlier time, he had given his prior number to the student, did not seek to hide the new number from him, and had disclosed the number to the school for inclusion in its Staff Directory and to multiple parents and students in connection with a school trip
that defendant was chaperoning.  We found further that the school's Resource Officer, a policeman functioning in that dual capacity, who was aware of the student's allegations of sexual assault, acted reasonably in requesting the number from the secretary to the school's principal, and that the school acted reasonably in disclosing the number to the officer.  As a consequence, we affirmed the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress the transcript of a telephone call between him and the student that was intercepted by the police as a means for corroborating the student's claim of sexual assault while a juvenile. 06-08-12

STATE VS. RENARD JOSEPH A-5651-09T1


STATE VS. RENARD JOSEPH A-5651-09T1
 
In this appeal of a defendant's triple armed robbery convictions where identification was a principal issue, we held that despite the lack of expert testimony, a proper foundation
was laid for the computer-based photo retrieval system used to obtain the three victims' out-of-court identifications and that such a procedure, akin to a mug shot book, was not invalidated by police failure to record and retain the photographs viewed by the witnesses. 06-04-12

STATE VS. RAYMOND D. KATES A-3907-10T1


STATE VS. RAYMOND D. KATES
A-3907-10T1

We conclude the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion in denying defendant a continuance to enable him to retain counsel of his choice, after he learned on the eve of
trial that the assistant deputy public defender who had been representing him was about to deployed for active military service.  Although the right to counsel of choice is not
absolute and may be balanced against the court's interest in managing its calendar, the trial court failed to weigh the appropriate factors governing the discretionary decision whether
to grant the requested continuance.  The availability of competent counsel not of defendant's choice was an insufficient basis for denying the continuance.  As deprivation of counsel of choice is a structural error not subject to harmless error analysis, reversal of defendant's conviction and a new trial is mandated. 05-25-12

STATE VS. EDWARD RONALD ATES A-2308-09T3


STATE  VS. EDWARD RONALD ATES
  A-2308-09T3

Defendant appealed his conviction for the murder of his ex-son-in-law, arguing the unconstitutionality of the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to -34, because it permitted the interception of telephone calls between individuals located entirely outside New Jersey.  The court rejected this argument, finding no infirmity so long as the listening post was located in New Jersey.

 Defendant also argued that the State should have been barred from using all intercepted telephone calls because the State recorded a telephone call between defendant and his
attorney.  The trial judge precluded the use only of the calls intercepted after the recording of the attorney-client communication and the court concluded this was an appropriate remedy for the reasons expressed in the trial judge's written opinion, State v. Ates, __ N.J. Super. __ (Law Div. 2009). 05-17-12

STATE VS. RYAN L. HODGE A-5961-10T1


STATE  VS. RYAN L. HODGE
 A-5961-10T1

In this appeal, we granted leave to the State to consider the trial court's interlocutory order suppressing a statement taken from defendant, a juvenile at the time, shortly after his arrest for murder.  Neither an attorney nor defendant's legal guardian were present at the time the statement was taken.  Nor had defendant had the opportunity to consult with an attorney in advance of providing the statement.  The motion judge accorded
pipeline retroactivity to State in the Interest of P.M.P., 200 N.J. 166 (2009).  We reverse and hold that P.M.P. is to be applied prospectively.

P.M.P. announced a new rule; its purpose is not furthered by retroactive application; law enforcement officials, in good faith, have relied upon the old rule in conducting custodial
interrogations of juveniles; and retroactive application would have a significant impact upon the administration of justice. 05-15-12

STATE VS. JAMES CRAFT A-5022-10T2


STATE  VS. JAMES CRAFT
  A-5022-10T2

The primary issue in this case is whether the police violated defendant's constitutional rights when they entered a bedroom in his mother's apartment without a search warrant.  We conclude that the police officers' actions were objectively reasonable because the officers had reason to believe defendant was in the bedroom, they knew he was potentially armed and dangerous, and it was impracticable to obtain a search warrant. We therefore reverse the order granting defendant's motion to suppress a handgun and cocaine that were in plain view when the police entered the bedroom. 05-14-12

STATE VS. KIWANIE SALTER A-4410-10T2


STATE VS. KIWANIE SALTER  A-4410-10T2

Defendant was indicted for, among other crimes, two counts of aggravated sexual assault by oral penetration and two counts of criminal sexual contact.  Each count alleged the conduct occurred between September 2nd and September 5th, 2006, and the language in each was identical.  

 The juvenile victim testified to the various incidents that allegedly occurred and formed the basis of the individual counts, although his testimony was somewhat inconsistent with that given before the Grand Jury.  In her jury instructions, the judge did not differentiate what alleged conduct was charged in each count.  After an extended sidebar discussion, and the prosecutor's ultimate assent, the judge submitted a jury verdict sheet that similarly did not differentiate what conduct was alleged in each of the four counts.  The jury found defendant guilty of one count of aggravated sexual assault, but not guilty
of the other.  It also found defendant guilty of both counts of criminal sexual contact. 05-08-12

STATE VS. DAVID M. GIBSON A-1513-10T4


STATE VS. DAVID M. GIBSON
A-1513-10T4

In this appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from him following his arrest for defiant trespass.  The
court rejected this argument, concluding that the arresting officer possessed probable cause that defendant had engaged in a defiant trespass even though the property owner posted a "no loitering" instead of a "no trespassing" sign. 05-08-12

STATE VS. JENNIFER LEE LOCASCIO A-5119-09T1


STATE VS. JENNIFER LEE LOCASCIO
 A-5119-09T1

Defendant was convicted of vehicular manslaughter after a jury trial.  The indictment stemmed from a one-car accident in which defendant's boyfriend was killed after the car veered off the road and struck a tree.  The pivotal issue at trial was whether, as the State contended, defendant was the driver or whether, as the defense and its expert contended, the boyfriend was the driver. 

 The State presented expert testimony from the county medical examiner opining that defendant was the driver.  During the course of his testimony, the medical examiner rendered opinions, over defendant's objection, about the probable movements of the occupants within the car as it decelerated and crashed, including an analysis of how the passenger's body allegedly "cushioned" the driver's body during the accident.

 We reverse defendant's conviction and order a new trial because the testimony of the medical examiner, who the State concedes is not qualified as an expert in biomechanics or accident reconstruction, prejudicially went beyond the scope of his expertise on a crucial disputed issue.  The examiner's testimony should have been confined to the aspects of his expertise as a pathologist concerning the nature and causes of bodily injury, and should not have delved into the biomechanical forces and movements within the automobile. 05-04-12

STATE VS. ANTHONY ROSE A-0192-11T2


STATE VS. ANTHONY ROSE
A-0192-11T2

We hold that the newly enacted forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 804(b)(9), applies retroactively to wrongdoing that occurred before the new Rule's effective date of July 1, 2011, and therefore to all trials conducted thereafter. 05-03-12

TOWNSHIP OF NEPTUNE VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY A-5573-09T3


TOWNSHIP OF NEPTUNE VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY
 A-5573-09T3

   In this case, the Township of Neptune sought a judgment declaring that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) was required to dredge the State navigational channels in Shark River Bay by a date certain and identify a
site for the temporary placement of the dredged materials. We conclude that: (1) the Appellate Division has exclusive jurisdiction to consider this claim of agency inaction and a
remand is not required to compile a factual record; (2) mandamus will not lie to compel the NJDEP to exercise its discretion in the specific manner requested; and (3) relief is not warranted on the basis of implied contract, equitable estoppel, the public trust doctrine, or public nuisance. 04-26-12

STATE VS. PAULO BARROS A-1288-10T2


STATE VS. PAULO BARROS
A-1288-10T2

In this case, the court previously applied Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), and affirmed the grant of post-conviction relief based on defendant's assertion that his attorney did not advise him that his guilty plea in 2008 to drug distribution charges subjected him to mandatory deportation.  The Supreme Court
granted the State's petition for certification and remanded for the court's reconsideration in light of State v. Gaitan, __ N.J. __ (2012), which held that Padilla announced a new rule
applicable only to guilty pleas entered after Padilla was decided.  In light of Gaitan, the court reversed the grant of post-conviction relief but also stayed its judgment to allow
defendant to seek habeas corpus relief in federal court in light of the Third Circuit's determination in United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011), that Padilla does not constitute a new rule. 04-20-12

TATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RONALD L. JONES, JR. A-5186-10T2


STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RONALD L. JONES, JR.  A-5186-10T2

We reverse defendant's drug distribution conviction, concluding that:1) the testimony provided by the State's drug distribution expert, on whether defendant possessed the cocaine
for personal use or instead for distribution, ran afoul of the proscriptions in State v.McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011), and State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65 (1989); and 2) the admission of evidence that defendant possessed Oxycodone denied him a fair trial, as he was not charged with that offense, and the State should not have been permitted to use such N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence to bolster its contention that defendant possessed the cocaine with the intention of selling it. 04-17-12

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BRIAN RICE A-3777-09T4


STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BRIAN RICE
 A-3777-09T4

Defendant, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of second-degree official misconduct, conspiracy to commit official misconduct, and tampering with physical evidence.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(a), defendant faced a mandatory minimum term of five-years' imprisonment.  The judge sentenced defendant as a third-degree offender, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), reduced the mandatory minimum pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(c)(2), and
imposed a sentence of three years with a three-year period of parole ineligibility.

 The State appealed and defendant cross-appealed.  We affirmed defendant's conviction of official misconduct and tampering but reversed and remanded for reconsideration of the sentence imposed.  

 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5 was enacted in 2007 as part of a comprehensive legislative scheme affecting the pension rights of public employees, as well as the forfeiture and sentencing
provisions of the Code.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(c)(2) permits the judge to "waive or reduce the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment required by" the statute if he "finds by clear and
convincing evidence that extraordinary circumstances exist such that imposition of a mandatory minimum term would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct in others."  This portion of the statute has not been the subject
of a reported case.

 We conclude the statute requires application of a different standard than that which governs the exercise of the judge's discretion in downgrading the offense pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(f)(2) (permitting the judge to impose a sentence "one degree lower than that of the crime for which [the defendant] was convicted" if "clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and . . . the interest of justice demands"). 4-16-12

Thursday, June 21, 2012

BURLINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES VS. G.W. A-5974-09T2


BURLINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES VS. G.W.
 A-5974-09T2

The issue raised in this appeal is whether a county board
of social services may terminate a recipient's General
Assistance (GA) and Emergency Assistance (EA), which is provided
pursuant to the Work First New Jersey Program, N.J.S.A. 44:8-107
to -145.5, based on the recipient's eligibility for, rather than
actual receipt of, Social Security Disability benefits (SSD). 
The Board of Social Services determined that the anticipated SSD
benefits placed his monthly "countable income" above the maximum
limit to be eligible for GA and EA benefits.  Appellant did not
receive his first SSD check until after termination of his GA
and EA benefits.  We hold that, upon receiving notification that
a GA or EA recipient has been approved for SSD benefits,
pursuant to the "prospective budgeting methodology" prescribed
in N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.11, the Board of Social Services need not
wait until the recipient is in actual receipt of SSD benefits
before adding the amount of those benefits to the recipient's
countable income, and determining whether GA or EA benefits
should be terminated. 03-27-12

State v. Reynaldo Galicia (A-79-10; 067018)


State v. Reynaldo Galicia (A-79-10; 067018)

The facts of this case, as developed in the trial
record, do not support a passion/provocation finding
under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2). 6-19-12

State v. Buddy Randolph (A-87-10; 067218)


State v. Buddy Randolph (A-87-10; 067218)

 When an appellate court orders reconsideration of
sentence or resentencing, the trial court should view
defendant as he stands before the court on that day
unless the remand order specifies a different and more
limited resentencing proceeding such as correction of
a plainly technical error or a directive to view the
sentencing issue from the vantage point of the
original sentencing.  The Court does not infer such a
limitation in the circumstances of this case; thus,
defendant is entitled to present evidence of his post-
sentencing rehabilitative efforts at resentencing. 6-18-12

State v. Alnesha Minitee State v. Darnell Bland (A-70/71-10; 066771)


State v. Alnesha Minitee
State v. Darnell Bland (A-70/71-10; 066771)

 Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court
correctly denied the defendants’ motion to suppress
because the warrantless search of the SUV that was
involved in the robbery fit within the scope of the
automobile exception to the search warrant
requirement. 6-14-12

State v. J.A.C. (A-102-10; 067520)


State v. J.A.C. (A-102-10; 067520)

   The content of the instant messages written by and to
the victim in this case constitutes “sexual conduct”
within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7(f), and that
content is therefore protected by New Jersey’s Rape
Shield Law.  Any probative value of the content of the
victim’s messages is substantially outweighed by its
prejudice. 6-14-12

State v. Juan Pablo Santos (067989; A-114-10)


State v. Juan Pablo Santos (067989; A-114-10)

 The grant of an evidentiary hearing in which defendant
was to be permitted to provide telephonic testimony
must be reversed and the matter remanded for full
reconsideration by the post-conviction relief (PCR)
court as to whether defendant can meet the standard
for entitlement to an evidentiary hearing under State
v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339 (2012). 5-8-12

State v. Derek J. Kaltner (068778; A-8-11)



State v. Derek J. Kaltner (068778; A-8-11)

 The decision of the Appellate Division is affirmed
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge
Parrillo’s opinion.  Because the police officers’
warrantless search of the home after they were called
to address a noise complaint was not objectively
reasonable, the evidence obtained during the search
was properly suppressed. 5-1-12

State v. Marcus King (067265; A-104-10)


State v. Marcus King (067265; A-104-10)

    The trial court’s examination was insufficient and, as
a result, its ultimate determination was flawed. 
Because the Supreme Court is satisfied that the record
created in response to defendant’s motion does not
support the denial of his right to represent himself,
his convictions must be reversed. 04-12-12

Wednesday, June 06, 2012

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. JOSEPH - 06/04/12- A-5651-09T1


STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RENARD JOSEPH
 (A-5651-09T1)
 
In this appeal of a defendant's triple armed robbery
convictions where identification was a principal issue, we held
that despite the lack of expert testimony, a proper foundation
was laid for the computer-based photo retrieval system used to
obtain the three victims' out-of-court identifications and that
such a procedure, akin to a mug shot book, was not invalidated
by police failure to record and retain the photographs viewed by
the witnesses. 06-04-12

S.K. VS. J.H. 06-06-12- A-1358-11T2


06-06-12 S.K. VS. J.H.  (A-1358-11T2)

     Plaintiff brought this suit pursuant to the Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, as a result of
being atrociously assaulted by defendant, who, along with
plaintiff, was on a trip to Israel with approximately forty
others.  In seeking to prove the existence of a "dating
relationship," plaintiff was able to show only that, on the
evening of the assault, she and defendant sat together, danced
together, and were together for a few hours at the bar.  The
trial court found a "dating relationship" and entered a final
restraining order.

     In considering defendant's appeal, the court deferred to
the trial judge's finding that the parties' interactions
constituted a "date" but rejected the argument that this one
date constituted the "dating relationship" required by the Act. 
Although the Legislature did not expressly define what it meant
by a "dating relationship," the court found from the majority of
those other states that have defined the term that a "dating
relationship" is a romantic social relationship, which is
further defined by its frequency and duration but which excludes
casual or ordinary fraternization between two individuals in a
business or social context.  As a result of this generally
accepted meaning of "dating relationship," the court held that a
single date was insufficient and reversed. - 06-06-12 

In the Matter of Kevin P. Wigenton, an Attorney at Law (068659; D-131-10)


In the Matter of Kevin P. Wigenton, an Attorney at Law
          (068659; D-131-10)
          Kevin P. Wigenton failed to safeguard and negligently
          misappropriated escrow and client trust funds,
          violated attorney recordkeeping rules, and acted with
          a conflict of interest.  For his unethical conduct, he
          is censured. 4-3-12