STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BRANDON M. WASHINGTON A-1780-17T6

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BRANDON M. WASHINGTON 

A-1780-17T6/A-2051-17T6(CONSOLIDATED) 

The Appellate Division ruled that the State Police Lab's draft DNA report was not "within the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor" until the lab sent it to the county prosecutor, and in any event was not discoverable until the report was reviewed and approved by the lab. R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(C). Regardless of the speedy trial provisions, the court abused its discretion by excluding the DNA evidence rather than granting a continuance of trial under Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I) and -3(f), given the evidence's importance and the absence of surprise, prejudice, or a design to mislead. 

Under the speedy trial rule and statute, a case may be "complex" if it has "complicated evidence," but time is excludable only if the complexity makes it unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for trial in the speedy trial period. R. 3:5-4(i)(7); N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(g). The provision addressing failures to produce discovery is a limit on excludable time. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(2). The court properly excluded time sua sponte under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(c), and retained jurisdiction to do so after the State sought and obtained leave to appeal. That provision excludes the time while an emergent relief request, or interlocutory appeal, is pending in this court. Time while the trial is stayed is excludable under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(l). 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. R.J.M. A-5306-15T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. R.J.M. 

A-5306-15T1 

The court construed N.J.R.E. 609(b), which addresses the admissibility, for impeachment purposes, of remote convictions, i.e., those over ten years old. The ten-year period is calculated from the date of the conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later. The court held that civil commitment, pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, is not "confinement for" a criminal conviction. Therefore, a period of civil commitment may not be excluded in calculating whether a conviction is more than ten years old. 

Defendant, a resident of the Special Treatment Unit (STU), was on trial for assaulting a corrections officer at the STU. Defendant had been convicted of a sexual assault in 1990, completed his sentence in 2000, and was then civilly committed to the STU. The trial court erred in determining that, due to defendant's ongoing civil commitment, his 1990 sexual assault conviction was not remote under N.J.R.E. 609(b). 

State v. Melvin T. Dickerson (A-1-17; 079769)

 State v. Melvin T. Dickerson (A-1-17; 079769) 

The affidavit supporting a search warrant disclosed in discovery need not be disclosed as a matter of course, and no particular circumstances necessitated disclosure of that affidavit here. To the extent that the trial court’s order of release served as a “sanction” for the State’s failure to meet what the court viewed to be the State’s discovery requirements, that release order was improper. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM T. LIEPE A-4431-14T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM T. LIEPE
          A-4431-14T4

Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of twenty, seven, and five years, for first-degree aggravated manslaughter and two counts of second-degree aggravated assault, resulting from his having caused, while intoxicated, an auto accident that killed a nine-year old and seriously injured two others.
In State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 429 (2001), a divided Court determined that in multiple-victim vehicular-homicide matters, sentencing judges should "ordinarily" impose "at least two consecutive terms." The Court, however, also emphasized that it had not "adopt[ed] a per se rule" and the decision to impose

consecutive terms remained in the discretion of sentencing judges. Id. at 419. In considering Carey's influence here, the court remanded for resentencing because, among other things, the sentencing judge appeared to have viewed Carey as imposing a presumption in favor of consecutive terms and because the judge did not fairly consider the real-time consequence of the aggregate thirty-two year sentence, all subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility, imposed on an offender who was fifty-eight at the time of the incident and sixty-two at the time of sentencing. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. A.M. A-2090-13T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. A.M.
          A-2090-13T2

Defendant pled guilty to second degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4), reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the inculpatory statement. This court reverses the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress his inculpatory statement. The evidence presented by the State at the N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing does not support the motion judge's findings that the State satisfied "the heavy burden" of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to waive his constitutional rights under Miranda. The motion judge's decision upholding the methods used by the interrogating detectives improperly shifted this burden of proof to defendant.
Judge Fuentes wrote a separate concurrence addressing the use of police officers as interpreters when interrogating a suspect who is limited English proficient. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAKEVIS A. STEWART A-0562-17T6

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAKEVIS A. STEWART
          A-0562-17T6

At a detention hearing held pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to 2A:162-26 (the CJRA), the State proceeded by proffer. Defendant subpoenaed the police officer, who prepared the affidavit of probable cause as a witness, and sought to subpoena other officers. Over the State's objection, the judge entered an order that permitted defendant "to subpoena the [police] officers at the scene of the incident to testify at the [d]etention [h]earing." The court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal and reversed.
The CJRA provides that at a pretrial detention hearing, a "defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, and . . . shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise." N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 19(e)(1) (emphasis added). However, federal courts interpreting the Bail Reform Act that contains similar language have recognized the defendant's right to produce adverse witnesses is conditional, not absolute.
The court adopts the reasoning of the majority of federal courts, which require a defendant make a proffer as to how the anticipated testimony of an adverse witness, i.e., police officers, victims, and State's witnesses, would 1) negate the State's evidence as to probable cause; or 2) rebut or diminish the State's proffered clear and convincing evidence supporting detention. 

State v. Melvin T. Dickerson (A-1-17; 079769)

State v. Melvin T. Dickerson (A-1-17; 079769)

          The affidavit supporting a search warrant disclosed in
          discovery need not be disclosed as a matter of course,
          and no particular circumstances necessitated disclosure
          of that affidavit here.  To the extent that the trial
          court’s order of release served as a “sanction” for the
          State’s failure to meet what the court viewed to be the
          State’s discovery requirements, that release order was
          improper.

State v. Tormu E. Prall (A-28-16; 078169)

State v. Tormu E. Prall (A-28-16; 078169)

          The court erred by allowing evidence that defendant
          threatened to burn down his girlfriend’s homes and by
          admitting John’s hearsay statements that defendant was
          responsible for the arson.  However, the errors were not
          capable of producing an unjust result because of the
          overwhelming weight and quality of the evidence against
          defendant.

State v. S.N. (A-60-16; 079320)

State v. S.N. (A-60-16; 079320)

          The proper standard of appellate review of pretrial
          detention decisions is whether the trial court abused
          its discretion by relying on an impermissible basis,
          by relying upon irrelevant or inappropriate factors,
          by failing to consider all relevant factors, or by
          making a clear error in judgment.  Here, the trial
          court abused its discretion.