TODD B. GLASSMAN, ETC. VS. STEVEN P. FRIEDEL, M.D., ET AL. (L-2383-18, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4042-19T3)

 TODD B. GLASSMAN, ETC. VS. STEVEN P. FRIEDEL, M.D., ET AL. (L-2383-18, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4042-19T3)

In Ciluffo v. Middlesex General Hospital, the court adopted a framework for trial courts to follow when a plaintiff settles a negligence claim with the original tortfeasor and proceeds to trial against medical professionals whose subsequent negligent treatment resulted in additional injuries and damages. 146 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1977). To avoid a windfall to the plaintiff, the court explained that after a plaintiff settled her claim with the first of successive independent tortfeasors, the medical defendants were entitled to a full pro tanto credit for the settlement amount if that amount exceeded the total "provable damages" suffered by the plaintiff as determined by a jury; the medical defendants would receive a partial credit against any verdict if the settlement amount exceeded the difference between the total provable damages minus the amount of damages the jury apportioned to the malpractice. Id. at 482–83.

In this case, plaintiff's decedent suffered a fractured ankle resulting from a fall at a restaurant. She came under the care of medical defendants, who performed surgery on the fracture five days later. Plaintiff's decedent allegedly suffered additional injuries, and subsequently died from a pulmonary embolism, allegedly the result of defendants' medical malpractice.

While discovery was ongoing, plaintiff settled her claim with the restaurant for $1.15 million. The medical defendants moved for a declaration entitling them to the Ciluffo pro tanto settlement credit, and the motion judge entered orders to that effect.

The court granted plaintiff leave to appeal and reversed. After examining caselaw developments in the years since Ciluffo was decided, including enactment of the Comparative Negligence Act, the court concluded that awarding pro tanto settlement credits is a vestige of the common law without support in our current jurisprudence.

MELISSA KNIGHT VS. VIVINT SOLAR DEVELOPER, LLC, ET AL. (L-2852-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-2258-19T3)

 MELISSA KNIGHT VS. VIVINT SOLAR DEVELOPER, LLC, ET AL. (L-2852-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-2258-19T3)

At issue on this appeal is the validity of an arbitration provision contained within a purported agreement between a consumer and a solar energy company. Plaintiff consumer acknowledges she memorialized her understanding of the overall agreement by affixing her signature to the signature line of an otherwise blank iPad screen, displayed to her by defendant salesperson. Plaintiff maintains, however, that she did not check any boxes on the iPad screen that would otherwise indicate her assent to arbitration.

Relying on our Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Goffe v. Foulke Management Corporation, 238 N.J. 191 (2019), the trial judge granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration and stay plaintiff's Law Division action. In doing so, the trial judge determined the arbitrator must decide threshold issues concerning the overall validity of the parties' purported written agreement, which contained the arbitration provision.

The court disagrees, concluding there exist questions of fact concerning the mutuality of assent to the arbitration provision, which is necessary to bind both parties to arbitration, thereby distinguishing this matter from Goffe. Because it is unclear from the record whether plaintiff agreed to arbitrate disputes under the agreement, the court vacates the trial court's order and remands for a plenary hearing for the judge to first make that threshold determination.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. IAN P. STEINGRABER (14-08-0867, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-3781-19T3)

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. IAN P. STEINGRABER (14-08-0867, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-3781-19T3)

This appeal requires the court to decide whether the terms of a negotiated plea agreement waived the prosecutor's requirement to move for imposition of parole supervision for life (PSL) under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. By leave granted, the State appealed from a Law Division order that granted defendant's amended petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), as further amended by the PCR court sua sponte to a motion for reduction of sentence.

The PCR court concluded the trial court's imposition of PSL – in the absence of a motion by the prosecutor as required under the PSL statute – constituted an illegal sentence. This court, however, determined the sentence was not illegal, but remanded for the trial court to consider whether PSL should have been imposed.