STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHRISTOPHER HARRIS

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHRISTOPHER HARRIS STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DONALD J. FALCONE STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOELL A. FOGG STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. GARY R. NELSON STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MANUEL SANTIAGO STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. THOMAS EDGER STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAVINE J. RICE STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. FRANK R. MATLACK (19-12-0713, 18-08-0615, 19-08-0419, 19-10-00570, 20-01-0041, 17-10-0731, 19-10-0561, 19-12-0734, and 18-06-0455, CAPE MAY COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (A-2256-19/A-2876-19 /A-3509-19/A-4629-19/A-0075-20/A-0234-20/A-0237-20 /A-0547-20/A-3509-19/A-0075-20)

In this appeal, which consolidates eight cases, the court addressed the criteria for admission to Drug Court, which is a nationally acclaimed program that combats the hopelessness of addiction with the hopefulness of treatment. Defendants are admitted via two separate and distinct "tracks." A Track One defendant can only be admitted if he or she meets all of the eligibility criteria for special probation set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a). For Track Two candidates, the criteria enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a) are relevant considerations but are not prerequisites to admission. The court ruled that a defendant is a Track One candidate if, and only if, a present offense for which he or she is to be sentenced is subject to the presumption of imprisonment set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) or to a mandatory term of parole ineligibility. The court rejected the State's contention that a defendant is a Track One candidate because he or she has previously been convicted of a crime subject to the presumption of imprisonment or has previously been sentenced to State prison. The court also held that once it is determined that a defendant is legally eligible for Drug Court, the decision to grant or deny admission rests in the discretion of the sentencing court and that decision is entitled to substantial deference in view of the specialized expertise, training, and experience of Drug Court judges

In the Matter of the Request to Release Certain Pretrial Detainees (085186)(Statewide) (M-550-20;

 In the Matter of the Request to Release Certain Pretrial Detainees (085186)(Statewide) (M-550-20; 085186)

*Section 19(f) of the CJRA offers a path for potential relief under the present circumstances. Under that provision, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f), individual defendants can apply to reopen detention hearings if they can present information that was not known at the time of the initial hearing and that “has a material bearing” on the release decision.

State v. Herby V. Desir (083584)(Union County & Statewide) (A-43-19;

 State v. Herby V. Desir (083584)(Union County & Statewide) (A-43-19; 083584)

A defendant seeking discovery in connection with a Franks hearing may -- in the trial court’s discretion and on showing a plausible justification that casts reasonable doubt on the veracity of the affidavit -- be entitled to limited discovery described with particularity that is material to the determination of probable cause. The Court affirms and modifies the Appellate Division’s judgment and remands to the trial court for consideration under the standard adopted in this decision.

STATE V. ANTHONY SIMS, JR., (A-2641-17T1)

 STATE V. ANTHONY SIMS, JR., (A-2641-17T1)

In this appeal, the court determined as a matter of first impression that the Supreme Court's holdings in State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56 (2003), and State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122 (2019), requiring that police inform a defendant subject to custodial interrogation of specific charges filed against him before he can waive his Miranda rights, also applies to an interrogee who was arrested and questioned prior to any charges being filed, where the arrest was based upon information developed through an earlier police investigation

The court also concluded that the trial court erred by admitting the victim's statement to police through a police officer's hearsay testimony at trial because defendant was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to challenge the victim's statement through cross examination at a pretrial hearing or before the jury,where at the pretrial hearing the victim could not recall ever giving the statement to police and he later refused to appear at trial to testify before the jury

In a separate opinion concurring with the result but dissenting from the majority's extension of A.G.D. to custodial interrogations where neither a complaint-warrant nor arrest warrant have been issued, a member of the panel expressed concern that the new rule announced in the majority opinion has the potential to introduce subjectivity, ambiguity, and uncertainty to the administration of Miranda warnings.

The opinion that the court originally issued on January 4, 2021, is being withdrawn and replaced by the accompanying opinion based upon the court having granted the State's motion to correct the record relating to two trial transcripts, and its motion to reconsider in light of those corrections. Specifically, the transcripts were corrected to reflect that defendant, in response to his pre-interrogation inquiry, was not told of any charge that supported his arrest, rather than a lie about the charge as described in the earlier opinion.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. COREY PICKETT (17-07-0470, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4207-19T4)

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. COREY PICKETT (17-07-0470, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4207-19T4)

In this case of first impression addressing the proliferation of forensic evidentiary technology in criminal prosecutions, this appeal required the court to determine whether defendant is entitled to trade secrets of a private company for the sole purpose of challenging, at a Frye hearing, the reliability of science underlying novel DNA analysis software and expert testimony. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). At the hearing, the State produced an expert who relied on his company's complex probabilistic genotyping software program to testify that defendant's DNA was present, thereby connecting defendant to a murder and other crimes. So long as the State utilized the expert, this court held that defendant is entitled to the discovery of the software's proprietary source code and related documentation under a protective order.