Driver suspended for out of state DWI DIGIOIA v. NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION,

 Driver suspended for out of state DWI

  DIGIOIA v.

NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION,

Respondent-Respondent. __________________________

Submitted March 16, 2021 – Decided March 30, 2021 Before Judges Haas and Natali.

On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

PER CURIAM

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3587-19

Appellant Christopher DiGioia appeals from a final determination of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (Commission) that denied his request for an administrative hearing and upheld the two-year suspension of his driving privileges. We affirm.

On March 2, 2017, appellant was convicted in New Jersey of driving under the influence of alcohol contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. He was similarly convicted on October 9, 2019 in New York, which the New York authorities characterized as a first-time offense. New York notified New Jersey of appellant's conviction consistent with the Interstate Driver License Compact, N.J.S.A. 39:5D-1 to -14 (Compact).

The Commission issued a scheduled suspension notice to appellant indicating its intention to suspend his driving privileges for two years under N.J.S.A. 39:5D-4, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30, and N.J.A.C. 13:19-11.1. Appellant requested a hearing to challenge the proposed suspension, and relying on State v. Davis, 95 N.J. Super. 19 (Law Div. 1967), contended that N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 does not expressly permit the Commission to consider an out-of-state conviction as a predicate act for enhanced penalties. He also argued that it was improper to consider his New York conviction as a second offense when determining the

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extent of his suspension, as New York convicted him as a first-time offender, which New Jersey was obligated to recognize under the Compact.

The Commission rejected appellant's arguments, and, in a May 4, 2020, Final Agency Decision issued an Order of Suspension. In that decision, the Commission's Chief Administrator first denied appellant's request for a hearing as there were no disputed facts regarding his New York conviction. Instead, the Chief Administrator explained that appellant sought only consideration of the specific "mitigating circumstance[]" that the Commission consider him a first- time offender consistent with New York's characterization of his offense. The Chief Administrator disagreed and explained that under the Compact, N.J.S.A. 39:5D-4, and N.J.A.C. 13:19-11.1, out of state convictions are considered as if the offenses occurred in New Jersey and accordingly suspended appellant's driving privileges for two years. This appeal followed.

Appellant raises the following single point for our review, which incorporates and reprises the same arguments he raised before the Commission:

THE [COMMISSION'S] CONCLUSION THA T [APPELLANT'S] LICENSE MUST BE SUSPENDED FOR 730 DAYS IS UNREASONABLE AND NOT LEGALLY GROUNDED IN LIGHT OF ALL THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH IT IS FOUNDED.

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We have carefully considered appellant's contentions and conclude that they are clearly without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We provide the following comments to amplify our decision.

Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999). "[A]n appellate court ordinarily should not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp., 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008); Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210-11 (1997). We also must determine "whether in applying legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors." In re Hermann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).

The Compact provides for cooperation among states in reporting driving offenses and disciplining licensees. The underlying policy of the Compact, "is to encourage the reciprocal recognition of motor vehicle violations that occurred in other jurisdictions, thereby increasing the probability that safety on highways

     

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would improve overall." State v. Colley, 397 N.J. Super. 214, 219 (App. Div. 2007).

When the Commission receives a report of a licensee's conviction for "[d]riving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug," the statute mandates the agency "shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, . . . as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home State," and contemplates the agency may impose either the penalty of New Jersey or the penalty required by the state of conviction. N.J.S.A. 39:5D-4(a)(2); see also N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles v. Egan, 103 N.J. 350, 355-56 (1986) (under both N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.1 and N.J.S.A. 39:5D-4, the Commission may impose either the penalty of New Jersey or that of the state where the offense occurred).

First, we agree with the Commission that appellant presented no disputed issues of material fact requiring a hearing. N.J.A.C. 13:19-1.2(d). Moreover, he provided no legal basis to set aside the Commission's decision to impose a suspension of his driving privileges, authorized by N.J.S.A. 39:5D-4 and N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and supported by the undisputed evidence in the record. Failure to do so obviated the need for an evidentiary hearing. N.J.A.C. 13:19- 1.2(e); Frank v. Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 98 (1990).

   

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Second, the Commission's decision to impose a two-year suspension as a result of appellant's multiple convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Indeed, it is undisputed that appellant's conduct in New York in operating a motor vehicle while impaired is a similar offense under New Jersey's driving under the influence statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), just as it was in New York. See also N.J.A.C. 13:19- 11.1(a). In such circumstances, defendant's suspension is explicitly authorized by N.J.S.A. 39:5D-4(a)(2) which provides that a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol is to be given the same effect as "if such conduct had occurred in the home state". See also N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles v. Pepe, 379 N.J. Super. 411, 419 (App. Div. 2005) (A New Jersey licensed driver who drives while impaired in a Compact party state violates the sovereignty of New Jersey). Thus, appellant's mandatory suspension was fully supported by applicable law and enforces and effectuates strong public policy set forth by the Legislature.

We reject appellant's reliance on Davis. There, defendant was convicted of violating N.J.S.A 39:4-50 in New Jersey and was convicted of a similar offense in Pennsylvania four years earlier. Davis, 95 N.J. Super. at 20. Defendant argued that as he had no previous offenses in New Jersey he should

     

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be considered a first-time offender. Ibid. The court agreed and reasoned that N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 did not expressly state that a "previous violation may be one committed outside this State, or that a subsequent violation in this State may be predicated on a prior conviction in another jurisdiction." Id. at 23 (quotations omitted). The court therefore held that a "conviction under the laws of another State can have no effect by way of penalty beyond the limits of the State in which the judgment is rendered." Id. at 23-24 (citations omitted).

The reasoning of the Davis court was rejected in State v. Regan, 209 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1986). In Regan, defendant maintained his prior New York conviction for driving under the influence should not be considered as a predicate offense for purposes of treating him as a third-time offender as he had only one conviction for the same offense in New Jersey. 209 N.J. Super. at 598- 99.

The court rejected defendant's arguments and stated that defendant's out of state conviction was properly considered a prior offense for both criminal sentencing and administrative penalties. Id. at 604. The court held that the Commission clearly had the authority to suspend defendant's driving privileges in light of his New York conviction and it would be "illogical to consider defendant as a subsequent offender for administrative purposes only." Ibid.; see

  

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also State v. Luzhak, 445 N.J. Super. 241, 244 (App. Div. 2016) ("enhanced penalties pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 or N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 may be triggered by a DWI conviction from another state."); State v. Cromwell, 194 N.J. Super. 519, 522-23 (App. Div. 1984) (expressly rejecting Davis and concluding that "defendant was subjected to the mandatory license suspension of N.J.S.A. 39:4- 50 following his New York drunk driving conviction").

Additionally, in 1997, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) to provide that a conviction of a similar driving under the influence charge in another jurisdiction is considered a prior conviction, even with respect to those states who do not participate in the Compact. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) provides:

A conviction of a violation of law of a substantially similar nature in another jurisdiction, regardless of whether that jurisdiction is a signatory to the [Compact] . . . shall constitute a prior conviction . . . unless the defendant can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the conviction in the other jurisdiction was based exclusively upon a violation of a proscribed blood alcohol concentration of less than 0.08%.

Finally, we reject appellant's claim that because New York considered him a first-time offender, New Jersey was bound to accept that characterization when assessing his license suspension. The Compact simply requires that New Jersey consider appellant's New York conviction as if the offense occurred in New Jersey, which the Commission indisputably did. Nothing in the language of the

  

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Compact required the Commission to ignore defendant's 2017 New Jersey conviction.

In sum, the Commission appropriately considered defendant's New York driving conviction and its resulting imposition of a two-year driving suspension was not an abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

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Municipal Courts -- Time Payment Plans and Payment Alternatives April 30, 2021

 

Municipal Courts -- Time Payment Plans and Payment Alternatives 

April 30, 2021 

As approved by the Supreme Court, this directive provides an overview and update of policies regarding time payment plans – plans that allow a defendant to make monthly payments towards a legal financial obligation – and payment alternatives in the municipal courts. The goals are to provide greater statewide consistency and efficiency and ensure that time payment plans and alternatives are widely available to defendants when needed and appropriate. 

At the time of a guilty plea or verdict in the municipal courts, legal financial obligations – fines, fees, restitution, and surcharges – are expected to be paid in full upon sentencing. However, there are a variety of options available to certain qualifying municipal defendants that allow for a relaxation of this requirement. Those options are broadly grouped into two general categories: time payment plans and payment alternatives. 

Historically, defendants were afforded time payment plans in the municipal courts only after first demonstrating either indigency or a logistical inability to access funds at the time of sentencing.1 Both situations required that the defendant complete 

1 These were required by Administrative Directive #02-10, “Implementation of L. 2009, c. 317, Authorizing Municipal Courts to Provide Payment Alternatives” (March 2, 2010) and Memorandum 

the Financial Questionnaire to Establish Indigency (“financial questionnaire”) and discuss the contents of the completed form in open court. This directive supersedes those prior procedures and policy documents. 

These changes will provide greater convenience to court users, standardize policies statewide, and limit the open court discussion of defendant’s finances to only when necessary, which will preserve valuable court session time. Changes include the following: 

• -  Time payments are to be made broadly available to defendants upon request without a detailed inquiry into a defendant’s finances. 
• -  This includes both delayed payments (formerly known as a “short-term time payment plan”) and time payment plans that fall within the structured guidance provided below. This structured guidance is particularly relevant to legal financial obligations totaling less than $500, which constitute close to 90% of time payment plans. 
• -  Only those defendants who need more individualized time payment plans, due to indigency or otherwise, will be required to complete a financial questionnaire for court review. 
• -  Courts and defendants will be guided through this process by way of a post- sentencing colloquy promulgated under separate cover by the Administrative Director.
  The details of these new processes are discussed below.
  I. Time Payment Plans (Available at Sentencing)
  Time payment plans give defendants the opportunity to make monthly payments towards a legal financial obligation over a period of time. They are available to defendants unable to pay a fine in full at a court session for a variety of reasons, including indigency. N.J.S.A. 2B:12-23.1a.
  To determine whether a time payment plan is appropriate for a defendant, the municipal court judge should engage in a discussion with the defendant, using the post-sentencing colloquy, to establish the appropriate option: to pay in full at the time of sentencing; to pay within 30 days (a delayed payment); payment in accordance with the structured guidance provided below; or an individualized time payment plan. Only
  from Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D., Completion of the Financial Questionnaire to Establish Indigency Form when Authorizing Time Payments, to Municipal Court Judges, Municipal Court Directors and Administrators (May 9, 2011). 

 

Directive # 12-21 April 30, 2021 Page 3 

the latter, the individualized plan, will require completion of the financial questionnaire. This means fewer defendants will have to complete financial questionnaires. 

Therefore, as an initial matter, and as guided by the post-sentencing colloquy, courts should continue to liberally authorize delayed payments when a defendant indicates that they do not have the ability to pay that day but can make full payment within 30 days. 

For defendants who indicate that more than 30 days is needed to make payment, judges should continue through the colloquy to determine whether a plan that falls within the structured guidance provided below would be appropriate, and what the specifics of that plan should be. 

Range of Financial Obligation

$0 to $100 $100.01 to $200 $200.01 to $300 $300.01 to $400 $400.01 to $500 Greater than $500 

Monthly Installments 

3 equal payments
Up to 6 equal payments
Up to 9 equal payments
Up to 12 equal payments
Up to 15 equal payments
Up to 20 equal payments, whenever possible 

Defendants who indicate that they are unable to satisfy either of the above but still desire a time payment plan must complete the Financial Questionnaire to Establish Indigency, if they have not already done so. This, along with a discussion with the defendant, where necessary, will provide the municipal court judge with adequate information to set an appropriate time payment plan that takes into careful consideration the defendant’s ability to pay. There are no restrictions as to the length of time for payment or the minimum dollar amount of monthly payments. 

For all time payment plans, efforts should be made to place defendants on a balanced payment plan that can be satisfied with minimal court involvement. Judges should remain guided by the maxim to provide payment plans that are reasonable and achievable under the circumstances presented by the defendant, particularly when working with indigent defendants. This must be balanced with courts giving due consideration to establishing a payment plan that ensures satisfaction of an outstanding legal financial obligation while also minimizing defendant involvement with the court. Unnecessarily extending time payments may only set the defendant up to default. Courts should work to strike a careful balance. 

 

Directive # 12-21 April 30, 2021 Page 4 

Finally, defendants should always be advised that in the event they become unable to satisfy their time payment plan, they should immediately contact the court. Judges should stress with the defendant that the court’s role is to work with defendants when issues arise, not to punish those who default. Judges are further reminded that a failure to pay should not trigger issuance of a warrant. Defendants who fail to satisfy their financial obligation are to be scheduled for court, where the judge is to speak with the defendant about their obligation and, as appropriate, commence an ability to pay hearing. 

II. Payment Alternatives (Available After Default) 

Payment alternatives are available after sentencing where a defendant defaults on a time payment plan and does not have the ability to pay. For purposes of these alternatives, a default occurs if a failure to pay notice was issued to the defendant. Please note that this definition has been modified from the prior standard promulgated by this office. Previously, a defendant was considered to be in default only if their driver’s license was suspended for a failure to pay or if a warrant had been issued for defendant’s arrest after a failure to pay. 

The ability to pay determination should be informed by the court’s review of the defendant’s completed Financial Questionnaire to Establish Indigency, and, where necessary, a discussion with the defendant in open court. Judges may use a previously completed questionnaire. However, if the defendant did not complete the questionnaire previously, or if the defendant has indicated that their financial status has changed, the defendant should be asked to complete a new form. It is always within the judge’s discretion to determine whether a new questionnaire must be completed. The ability to pay analysis is captured in the Bench Card – Lawful Collections of Legal Financial Obligations. 

If a person defaults on any payment and the court finds that the defendant does not have the ability to pay, the court may: 

• (1)  reduce the penalty, suspend the penalty, or modify the installment plan; 
• (2)  order that credit be given against the amount owed for each day of confinement, if the court finds that the person has served jail time for the default; 
• (3)  revoke any unpaid portion of the penalty, if the court finds that the circumstances that warranted the imposition have changed or that it would be unjust to require payment; 

 

Directive # 12-21 April 30, 2021 Page 5 

• (4)  order the person to perform community service in lieu of payment of the penalty; 
• (5)  impose any other alternative permitted by law in lieu of payment of the penalty; or 
• (6)  order community service in lieu of incarceration or other modification of the sentence with the person’s consent. 

[N.J.S.A. 2B:12-23; N.J.S.A. 2B:12-23.1.] 

These payment alternatives may not be used to reduce, revoke, or suspend payment of restitution or of the $250 surcharge assessed for operating a vehicle in an unsafe manner under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(f). N.J.S.A. 2B:12-23.1. Moreover, when engaging in a colloquy with a defendant regarding payment alternatives, judges should take into consideration the possibility that certain options, such as community service, may be more onerous than a monetary obligation. 

In determining whether a payment alternative is appropriate, judges should consider the financial circumstances of the defendant, the defendant’s practical ability to pay an assessed amount, and how to meet the interests of justice. The judge must place on the record the basis for modifying or vacating any financial penalties, and all changes of sentence must be made on the record in open court. R. 1:7-4(a), R. 7:9-4. 

Finally, judges are strongly urged to use their statutory authority when appropriate to revoke all or a portion of a penalty if continuing payment of even a modest amount would cause a hardship to the defendant or the circumstances warranting the imposition of the sentence have changed, and it is in the interest of justice to do so. 

III. Modification of Payment Plans and Payment Alternatives 

Courts should work liberally with defendants who provide justification to modify their time payment plan, seek a payment alternative, or seek to modify their payment alternative to ensure that they are reasonable, achievable, and meet the needs of the defendant and the interests of justice. Additionally, pursuant to guidance and approval from their municipal court judge, authorized municipal court administrators may modify time payment plans for the convenience of defendants without the need to schedule a court event. 

Supreme Court rules against warrantless seizure of guns while man is in hospital for suicide evaluation CANIGLIA v. STROM

 Supreme Court rules against warrantless seizure of guns while man is in hospital for suicide evaluation

CANIGLIA v. STROM  

No. 20–157 Decided May 17, 2021 

               During an argument with his wife, petitioner Edward Caniglia placed a handgun on the dining room table and asked his wife to “shoot [him] and get it over with.” His wife instead left the home and spent the night at a hotel. The next morning, she was unable to reach her husband by phone, so she called the police to request a welfare check. The responding officers accompanied Caniglia’s wife to the home, where they encountered Caniglia on the porch. 

               The officers called an ambulance based on the belief that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others. Caniglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation on the condition that the officers not confiscate his firearms. But once Caniglia left, the officers located and seized his weapons. Caniglia sued, claiming that the officers had entered his home and seized him and his firearms without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to the officers. The First Circuit affirmed, extrapolating from the Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, a theory that the officers’ removal of Caniglia and his firearms from his home was justified by a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement. 

               Held: Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justifies such warrantless searches and seizures in the home. Cady held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not vio- late the Fourth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the officers who patrol the “public highways” are often called to discharge noncriminal “community caretaking functions,” such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents. 413 U. S., at 441. But searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different, as the Cady opinion repeatedly stressed. Id., at 439, 440– 442. The very core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee is the right of a person to retreat into his or her home and “there be free from un- reasonable governmental intrusion.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6. A recognition of the existence of “community caretaking” tasks, like rendering aid to motorists in disabled vehicles, is not an open-ended license to perform them anywhere. 

 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. W.C. (FO-08-0264-20, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-0800-20)

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. W.C. (FO-08-0264-20, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-0800-20)

Defendant's firearms were seized following entry of a temporary restraining order against him pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The court entered a final restraining order (FRO) following a trial, but later granted defendant's motion for reconsideration, vacated the FRO, and, following a second trial, dismissed the domestic violence complaint because the plaintiff did not sustain her burden of proving an entitlement to an FRO.

Following entry of the FRO, the State moved for forfeiture of defendant's weapons under the PDVA. Notwithstanding the subsequent dismissal of the FRO, the State argued it was entitled to forfeiture under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(d)(3) because N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b), which requires that domestic violence FROs include a minimum two-year bar on a defendant's possession and ownership of a firearm, resulted in a disability under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(6), which prohibits the issuance of a handgun purchase permit or firearms purchaser identification card to a person who is "subject to" a PDVA restraining order prohibiting possession of a firearm. The motion court denied the State's forfeiture application, and the State appealed.

The court affirms the motion court's denial of the forfeiture application. The court holds an FRO that is vacated as improvidently granted in the first instance does not support the otherwise mandatory bar under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b), and therefore does not result in a disability under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(6) permitting forfeiture under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(d)(3).

J.K. v. New Jersey State Parole Board (084035) (Statewide) (A-76-19; 084035)

 J.K. v. New Jersey State Parole Board (084035) (Statewide) (A-76-19; 084035)

The denial of J.K.’s application was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. J.K’s submissions to the Parole Board were inadequate to secure the relief sought. To the extent that J.K. has refined and updated his application, his recourse is before the Parole Board, which has the necessary expertise to assess the quality of his new submissions under its Policy # 09.821.

State v. Craig Szemple (A-70-19; 084182)

 State v. Craig Szemple  (A-70-19; 084182)

Because defendant was aware of the letter and the circumstances relevant to this appeal for nearly twenty-five years, yet provides no evidence -- and made almost no effort to uncover evidence -- that police interviewed Theresa after production of the letter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s post-conviction discovery request.

State v. Zakariyya Ahmad (083736) (Essex County & Statewide) (A-54-19

 State v. Zakariyya Ahmad (083736) (Essex County & Statewide) (A-54-19 

Pursuant to the facts of this case, a reasonable 17-year-old in defendant’s position would have believed he was in custody and not free to leave, so Miranda warnings were required. It was harmful error to admit his statement at trial.

Remove & Expungement of NJ Criminal Arrests and Convictions- Free Seminar

 July 28, 2021   Remove & Expungement of NJ Criminal Arrests and Convictions- Free Seminar from 12:15-1pm   Location: Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen, 2053 Woodbridge Ave, Edison, NJ 08817

New  Expungement Law took effect 2020, revised again 2021

    COST: Free if you pre-register. Complimentary materials provided. This program is limited to 15 people. Please bring a canned food donation, which will be given to the St. Matthews Food Bank. Please email us if you plan on attending or if you would like us to email the materials. Attorneys- If space exists you can attend if you want to learn more about expungements.

SPEAKER: Kenneth Vercammen, Esq.

              (Author- Criminal Law Forms by the American Bar Association)

The NJ statute on expungement was revised effective June 15.  Nothing is automatically erased yet. If someone has been arrested or even had a private criminal complaint signed against them in the Municipal Court, they have a criminal record, even if the charges were dismissed or received a Conditional Discharge Under NJ Law past criminal arrests and convictions can be expunged/ erased under certain instances. This program will discuss the expungement process. I served as a Municipal Prosecutor and was amazed how minor criminal guilty pleas and even dismissed charges can affect someone’s ability to get a job or advance a career. Do you have children or someone you know or work with that needs an expungement?

    To attend email VercammenLaw@Njlaws.com

https://www.facebook.com/events/714526569340533

        Can’t attend?  We can email you materials

Send email to VercammenLaw@Njlaws.com

    More info: The Petition for expungement is filed in the Superior Court. It takes a minimum of three months for the court to grant the expungement. The requirements are very formal. There can be a waiting period between 6 months up to 10 years after the criminal case is finished. For someone who had a drug charge, they can hire an attorney apply for Expungement 6 months after the Conditional Discharge is complete. The statute requires detailed notices served by the attorney on the State Police, Attorney General and numerous other government entities.

    Typical Court costs and Legal fees for expungement range from $1,500-$2,500.

https://www.facebook.com/events/2552232138434263/

Kenneth Vercammen is an Edison, Middlesex County, NJ trial attorney where he  handles Criminal, Municipal Court, Probate, Litigation and Estate Administration matters. Ken is author of the American Bar Association's new book “Criminal Law Forms” and often lectures to trial lawyers of the American Bar Association, NJ State Bar Association and Middlesex County Bar Association.  As the Past Chair of  the Municipal Court Section he has served on its board for 10 years.

Awarded the Municipal Court Attorney of the Year by both the NJSBA and Middlesex County Bar Association, he also received the NJSBA- YLD Service to the Bar Award and the General Practitioner Attorney of the Year, now Solo Attorney of the Year.

Ken Vercammen is a highly regarded lecturer on both Municipal Court/ DWI and Estate/ Probate Law issues for the NJICLE- New Jersey State Bar Association, American Bar Association, and Middlesex County Bar Association. His articles have been published by NJ Law Journal, ABA Law Practice Management Magazine, YLD Dictum, GP Gazette and New Jersey Lawyer magazine.  He was a speaker at the past ABA Annual meeting program “Handling the Criminal Misdemeanor and Traffic Case” and serves as is the Editor in Chief of the NJ Municipal Court Law Review.

For nine years he served as the Cranbury Township Prosecutor and also was a Special Acting Prosecutor in nine different towns. Ken has successfully handled over one thousand Municipal Court and Superior Court matters in the past 27 years.

His private practice has devoted a substantial portion of professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. Appearing in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on Criminal and Municipal Court trials, civil and contested Probate hearings.  Ken also serves as the Editor of the popular legal website and related blogs. In Law School he was a member of the Law Review, winner of the ATLA trial competition and top ten in class.

    Throughout his career he has served the NJSBA in many leadership and volunteer positions. Ken has testified for the NJSBA before the Senate Judiciary Committee to support changes in the DWI law to permit restricted use driver license and interlock legislation. Ken also testified before the Assembly Judiciary Committee in favor of the first-time criminal offender “Conditional Dismissal” legislation which permits dismissal of some criminal charges. He is the voice of the Solo and Small firm attorneys who juggle active court practice with bar and community activities. In his private life he has been a member of the NJ State champion Raritan Valley Road Runners master’s team and is a 4^th degree black belt.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN

ATTORNEY AT LAW

2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. OSCAR RAMIREZ (20-01-0071, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)(A-1298-20)

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. OSCAR RAMIREZ (20-01-0071, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)(A-1298-20)

A grand jury indicted defendant with first degree kidnapping, four counts of first degree aggravated sexual assault, and other related offenses. At the victim's request, the State sought a protective order pursuant to Rule 3:13-3(e)(1) to exclude her home address from the discovery made available to defendant. The trial court ordered the State to disclose the victim's home address to his counsel and investigators.

By leave granted, this court holds that the disclosure of the victim's home address in this case violates the public policy of this State, as reflected in The Victims' Rights Amendment to our State Constitution. N.J. Const., art. I, ¶ 22. This disclosure also violates the Sexual Assault Victim's Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-60.1 to 60.3, which gives a victim of sexual violence the right "[t]o choose whether to participate in any investigation of the assault[.]" N.J.S.A. 52:4B-60.2(7).