Car stop not permitted for simple plastic cover over part of license plate State v. Darius J. Carter (A-66-19) (083221) State v. Miguel A. Roman-Rosado (A-67-19) (084074)
Argued April 27, 2021 -- Decided August 2, 2021 RABNER, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In recent years, more than 100,000 drivers annually have been ticketed for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 (section 33), which includes a prohibition against “driving] a motor vehicle which has a license plate frame . . . that conceals or otherwise obscures any part of any marking imprinted upon the vehicle’s registration plate.” The defendants in these consolidated appeals were stopped while driving. The stops were pretextual: officers stopped each defendant because part of their license plates were covered, but the purpose was to try to develop a criminal investigation. The police found contraband in both cases, which formed the grounds for defendants’ convictions.
Defendants argue that if section 33 is read expansively, the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad, and also invites discriminatory enforcement. The State opposes those arguments and relies in the alternative on Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014), for the proposition that a stop and conviction based on an officer’s reasonable but mistaken interpretation of the law should be upheld.
Defendant Darius Carter was stopped in September 2014. The words “Garden State” were covered on his car’s license plate, and the basis for the stop was a suspected violation of section 33. Carter was driving without a license, and the police learned that he had two outstanding arrest warrants. The police arrested Carter and later found heroin and a small amount of cocaine on him. Carter moved to suppress the drugs seized. The parties did not dispute that a license plate frame covered the words “Garden State” on the plate, and neither party argued that any other part of the plate was covered.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding the stop was pretextual but that the law unambiguously barred concealing any markings on a license plate, not just the plate’s registration numbers. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the statute’s plain language “expressly prohibits even the partial concealment of any marking on the license plate,” including the words “Garden State.”
In April 2016, a police officer stopped the car Miguel Roman-Rosado was driving. The officer testified he “was on a proactive detail” -- “stop[ping] a lot of cars for motor vehicle infractions and . . . then try[ing to] develop criminal investigations from that.” While driving right behind Roman-Rosado, the officer noticed a bracket around the rear license plate that covered about ten or fifteen percent of the words “Garden State.” The officer stopped the car based on a suspected violation of section 33 and learned that Roman-Rosado had two outstanding arrest warrants. After spotting a garment wrapped around something bulky, the officer found an unloaded handgun. Roman-Rosado moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful stop.
The trial court denied the motion. The court acknowledged there were minimal obstructions on the plate -- a portion of the bottom of “Garden State” as well as the top of the “N” and the “J” in New Jersey -- but found that the statute barred the “obstruction of any marking on the” plate. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the plate’s markings were not concealed or obscured within the meaning of the statute. 462 N.J. Super. 183, 190 (App. Div. 2020). The court found that there was no reasonable basis for the police to stop Roman-Rosado’s car, that the subsequent search of the car was unconstitutional, and that the handgun should have been suppressed. Id. at 199-200.
The Court granted certification. 241 N.J. 498 (2020); 241 N.J. 501 (2020).
HELD: *To avoid serious constitutional concerns, the Court interprets the statute narrowly and holds that N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 requires that all markings on a license plate be legible or identifiable. If a frame conceals or obscures a marking in a way that it cannot reasonably be identified or discerned, the driver would be in violation of the law. In practice, if a registration letter or number is not legible, the statute would apply; but if a phrase like “Garden State” is partly covered but still recognizable, there would be no violation.
*Under that standard, defendant Darius Carter’s license plate frame, which covered the phrase “Garden State” entirely, violated the law, so the stop was lawful. In contrast, defendant Miguel Roman-Rosado’s plate frame did not cover “Garden State.” It partially covered only ten or fifteen percent of the slogan, which was still fully legible, so the stop was unlawful.
*The Court declines to adopt the standard set forth in Heien under the New Jersey Constitution. The State Constitution is designed to protect individual rights, and it provides greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment. Under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the State Constitution, it is simply not reasonable to restrict someone’s liberty for behavior that no actual law condemns, even when an officer mistakenly, although reasonably, misinterprets the meaning of a statute. Because there was no lawful basis to stop Roman-Rosado, evidence seized as a direct result of the stop must be suppressed.
1. The Court reviews the text of section 33 and notes that violations of that section carry a fine and imprisonment for failure to pay the fine. A related provision in Title 39 requires that the words “Garden State” “be imprinted” on license plates for passenger cars. N.J.S.A. 39:3-33.2. Yet other statutes authorize specialty plates, which do not contain the phrase “Garden State.” A companion statute to section 33 addresses groups that supply license plate frames or holders and prohibits the distribution of merchandise “knowing that such merchandise is designed or intended to be used to conceal or degrade the legibility of any part of any marking imprinted upon a vehicle’s license plate for the purpose of evading law enforcement.” N.J.S.A. 39:3-33c (section 33c). The police issue more than 100,000 violation notices for section 33 in a year. Not a single violation notice was issued for section 33c from 2012 to 2019.
2. The Court reviews principles of statutory construction and the parties’ arguments about the meaning of section 33. The State contends that the statute’s words are clear: a license plate frame cannot cover any part of any marking on a license plate. Defendants stress that section 33 bars the use of license plate frames only insofar as they conceal or otherwise obscure certain markings. The Court notes first that the term “marking” in section 33 extends to any impressions on a license plate, not just the registration numbers and letters. But, after reviewing the ordinary definitions of the key terms of section 33 -- “conceal” and “obscure” -- the Court understands those terms to focus on legibility, not on every minor covering of otherwise recognizable markings. Reading the statute in that way avoids absurd results and comports with the view that the Legislature “writes motor- vehicle laws in language that can be easily grasped by the public so that every motorist can obey the rules of the road.” State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 34 (2016). (pp. 17-22)
Noting that section 33 -- unlike section 33c -- does not expressly include language about legibility, the Court considers the statute’s legislative history. That history sheds little light on the scope of the provision at issue here or the meaning of its key terms, but amendments to other portions of N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 reflect the Legislature’s concern about the legibility of license plates.
Defendants argue that a broad reading of section 33 does not pass constitutional muster. They argue that a law that criminalizes de minimis obstructions of phrases like “Garden State” fails under the permissive rational basis test. They contend as well that the statute, as interpreted by the State, is both unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. Vague laws are constitutionally deficient under principles of procedural due process because they leave people guessing about their meaning and do not provide fair notice of conduct that is forbidden. Overly broad statutes suffer from a different flaw, one that rests on principles of substantive due process: they invite excessive governmental intrusion into protected areas by extending too far. Rather than strike down a law as unconstitutional, however, if the “statute is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to an interpretation that will render it constitutional,” courts construe the law narrowly to remove any doubts about its constitutional validity. State v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257, 277 (2017).
5. The Court agrees that section 33, if read broadly, raises serious constitutional concerns. Roman-Rosado was stopped for a license plate frame that covered ten to fifteen percent of the bottom of the phrase “Garden State.” But the words, like the rest of the markings on the plate, were fully recognizable. Most people would have no idea that section 33 might apply in such a situation. If the proposed broad reading of section 33 were the standard, tens if not hundreds of thousands of New Jersey drivers would be in violation of the law. Further, limitless discretion can invite pretextual stops, like the stops in both cases here. It can also lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. It is cause for concern, as well, that despite the State’s frequent use of section 33 to stop drivers, no summonses were issued under section 33c from 2012 through 2019. Law enforcement commonly attacks problems at their source, yet here, rather than take any action against the source of the offending frames, motorists by the thousands are pulled over each year. To the extent section 33 has two meanings -- a narrow one that focuses on whether a license plate is legible, and a broader one that raises serious constitutional issues -- the doctrine of constitutional avoidance calls for a narrow interpretation. State v. Pomianek, 221 N.J. 66, 90-91 (2015).
The Court holds that section 33 requires that all markings on a license plate be legible or identifiable. That interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the statute’s wording. If a license plate frame or holder conceals or obscures a marking such that a person cannot reasonably identify or discern the imprinted information, the driver would be in violation of the law. In other words, a frame cannot cover any of the plate’s features to the point that a person cannot reasonably identify a marking. So, for example, if even a part of a single registration letter or number on a license plate is covered and not legible, the statute would apply because each of those characters is a separate marking. If “Garden State,” “New Jersey,” or some other phrase is covered to the point that the phrase cannot be identified, the law would likewise apply. But if those phrases were partly covered yet still recognizable, there would be no violation. When applying the above test, trial courts will be asked to evaluate whether license plate markings are legible or identifiable from the perspective of an objectively reasonable person. That judgment can be based on still photos or videos.
Applying the above test here, Roman-Rosado did not violate the statute. In Carter’s case, however, it is undisputed that “Garden State” was entirely covered. As a result, the plate violated the statute, and law enforcement officers had the right to stop Carter. The Court does not find persuasive Carter’s argument that the statute violated his rights under the First Amendment by requiring him to display the state motto, “Garden State.” The case on which Carter bases his argument, Wooley v. Maynard, involved two components: (1) compelled speech by the government; and (2) content a party disagreed with. See 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). Unlike in Wooley, the record before this Court does not include any statement or certification that Carter disagrees with the expression “Garden State” or finds it “morally objectionable.” See ibid. (pp. 30-33)
8. Because Roman-Rosado did not violate the statute, the Court evaluates the reasonable mistake of law doctrine. The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the State Constitution guarantee individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. A motor-vehicle stop by the police constitutes a seizure and requires reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a motor-vehicle violation or some other offense. The sole basis for Roman-Rosado’s stop was his alleged violation of section 33. But, for reasons explained in the Court’s ruling, he did not violate the law. The State relies on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Heien, which it asks the Court to adopt. In Heien, the Supreme Court held that a police officer’s mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion needed to justify a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. 574 U.S. at 57. The Court reviews Heien in detail.
The United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Federal Constitution. Here, the Court considers whether the reasonable mistake of law doctrine comports with the State Constitution. In our federalist system, state constitutions can be a source of more expansive individual liberties than what the Federal Constitution confers. On a number of occasions, the Court has found that the New Jersey Constitution affords greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment does. In State v. Novembrino, for example, the Court declined to adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established under federal law in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See 105 N.J. 95, 157-58 (1987).
. The State Constitution favors the protection of individual rights and is designed to vindicate them. The key issue under New Jersey’s Constitution is not whether an officer reasonably erred about the meaning of a law. It is whether a person’s rights have been violated. If a law does not establish an offense, the reasonable nature of an officer’s mistake cannot transform an officer’s error into reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. If officers could search and seize a person under those circumstances, reasonable, good faith errors would erode individual rights that the State Constitution guarantees. Although officers may need to make difficult judgment calls when enforcing laws that are not entirely clear, they suffer no penalty if they make a reasonable mistake. That cannot be said of individuals who are stopped or searched based on a mistaken interpretation of the law. They cannot tailor their behavior in advance to abide by what an officer might reasonably, but mistakenly, believe the law says. And if they are then stopped -- without notice -- for conduct that no law proscribes, they suffer real harm. The Court declines to adopt a reasonable mistake of law exception under the New Jersey Constitution. The seizure of the handgun in Roman-Rosado’s case -- following an unjustified car stop -- must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
