The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to hear the defendant’s waiver motion before considering his suppression motion. The Court declines, however, to adopt a preference that the Family Part hear suppression motions before waiver motions, holding instead that it is within the discretion of the Family Part to determine its schedule of proceedings and manage its calendar. The Court sets forth factors that Family Part judges should take into consideration in exercising their discretion as to the order in which to hear waiver and suppression motions.
Tuesday, November 22, 2022
State v. Oscar Ramirez
After reviewing the relevant statutes and authorities that must be considered in balancing the competing interests and rights of a sexual assault victim and the person accused of the sexual offense, the Court sets forth a framework of procedures and considerations to apply going forward when a prosecutor seeks to withhold from discovery a sexual assault victim’s address. Because neither the ruling of the trial court nor that of the Appellate Division sufficiently addresses the competing interests explored in the Court’s opinion, the Court remands the matter for a more fulsome balancing of the competing interests.
State v. Jamal Wade Summary - A-31-21 It was error to admit defendant’s statements after detectives failed to honor his invocation of the right to counsel, and that error was not harmless in light of the circumstantial nature of the evidence against defendant and his statements’ capacity to undermine his credibility before the jury.
Saturday, November 12, 2022
If not charged, police could ask questions here State v. Flores Defendant appealed the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Daily briefing September 27, 2022 A-3726-20
If not charged, police could ask questions here State v. Flores Defendant appealed the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Daily briefing September 27, 2022 A-3726-20
Defendant appealed the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Defendant was indicted in 2005 for arson, theft and conspiracy to commit arson and theft. She pled guilty to the conspiracy charge, entered PTI, successfully completed it in 2007 and all charges were dismissed. She moved to withdraw her guilty plea in 2021 but not to vacate her PTI program completion and the dismissal of all charges. She asserted she did not understand the legal definition of "conspiracy" when she pled guilty and she now realized she did not engage in criminal activity. She was also unaware of the possible collateral consequences to a guilty plea. Trial court found there was an adequate factual basis for her plea when she admitted she agreed her brother would illegally dispose of her car and, when she learned the car had been burned, she reported it stolen. Trial court applied the post-sentence manifest injustice standard and the four-factor analytical paradigm in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145. Defendant argued her guilty plea was not supported by an adequate factual basis. Court affirmed trial court because defendant sought a remedy not authorized for a plea withdrawal motion, the retention of her PTI program completion and the withdrawal of all charges, and agreed her plea was supported by an adequate factual basis.
Wednesday, November 09, 2022
NJ recently made Magic mushroom use or possession now only a disorderly offense, was previously a 3rd degree crime.
NJ recently made Magic mushroom use or possession now only a disorderly offense, was previously a 3rd degree crime.
This missed the newspapers articles on legal weed
New 2C :35-10 . Possession
P.L. 2021, CHAPTER 9, approved February 4, 2021
Senate, No. 3256
An Act concerning psilocybin and amending N.J.S.2C:35-10.
Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:
1. N.J.S.2C:35-10 is amended to read as follows:
2C:35-10. Possession, Use or Being Under the Influence, or Failure to Make Lawful Disposition.
a. It is unlawful for any person, knowingly or purposely, to obtain, or to possess, actually or constructively, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog, unless the substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order form from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-1 et seq.). Any person who violates this section with respect to:……
…… or
(5) Possession of one ounce or less of psilocybin is a disorderly persons offense.
Any person who commits any offense defined in this section while on any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of any such school property or a school bus, or while on any school bus, and who is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall, in addition to any other sentence which the court may impose, be required to perform not less than 100 hours of community service.
b. Any person who uses or who is under the influence of any controlled dangerous substance, or its analog, for a purpose other than the treatment of sickness or injury as lawfully prescribed or administered by a physician is a disorderly person.
In a prosecution under this subsection, it shall not be necessary for the State to prove that the accused did use or was under the influence of any specific drug, but it shall be sufficient for a conviction under this subsection for the State to prove that the accused did use or was under the influence of some controlled dangerous substance, counterfeit controlled dangerous substance, or controlled substance analog, by proving that the accused did manifest physical and physiological symptoms or reactions caused by the use of any controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.
c. Any person who knowingly obtains or possesses a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog in violation of subsection a. of this section and who fails to voluntarily deliver the substance to the nearest law enforcement officer is guilty of a disorderly persons offense. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude a prosecution or conviction for any other offense defined in this title or any other statute.
(cf: P.L.1997, c.181, s.6)
2. This act shall take effect immediately.
STATEMENT
Currently, pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:35-10, possession of any amount of psilocybin, a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance, is a crime of the third degree. This bill would reclassify possession of psilocybin as a disorderly persons offense, punishable by up to up to six months imprisonment, a fine of up to $1,000, or both.
Reclassifies possession of psilocybin as disorderly persons offense.
State v. Briggs IP Address Data Did Not Require Warrant Because It Could Not Show Person's Movements
State v. Briggs IP Address Data Did Not Require Warrant Because It Could Not Show Person's Movements
Defendant moved to suppress IP address data proffered by the state in defendant's criminal case. Police had issued an emergency disclosure request to a cell service provider seeking information relating to a certain phone number, including the customer name, email address, and recent IP addresses. In response to the request, police received subscriber information and an IP address log for the number.
Police issued a subsequent subpoena to an ISP provider, which turned over information showing that the IP addresses in the log belonged to various casinos in Las Vegas. The state also issued grand jury subpoenas to Google seeking subscriber information and IP address data for several Gmail addresses. Google turned over information that included IP address data for several hotels and casinos in Las Vegas.
In support of his motion to suppress the IP address data, defendant argued that such data was equivalent to cell site location information, which the U.S. Supreme Court, in Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S.Ct. 2206, had ruled could only be obtained by law enforcement via a warrant. In opposition to defendant's motion, the state argued that IP address data was not analogous to CSLI and therefore did not require a warrant to request. Specifically, the state contended that a person did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her location when they shared their location information by logging into an ISP's network.
The court denied defendant's motion. The court first noted that multiple federal circuit courts had declined to extend Fourth Amendment protection to IP address data as the Supreme Court had for CSLI. The court agreed with the state that CSLI was distinct from IP address data since CSLI could provide law enforcement with information about both a person's location and their movements. Conversely, IP address data could not provide information about a person's movement, as the address data only showed the discrete locations where a person had logged into the internet. Thus, the court ruled that a warrant was not required for law enforcement to request IP address data from internet and cell data service providers.
source Daily briefing October 03, 2022 at 12:00 AM DOCKET
Case Number: 18-08-647 CASE DIGEST SUMMARY