AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY VS. COUNTY PROSECUTORS ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY

 

         In this appeal, plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) contended defendant County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (CPANJ) is a public agency subject to records requests under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and the common law right of access.  The ACLU requested CPANJ to produce documents regarding CPANJ's funding, the context and contents of its meetings and events (including dates, times, and locations), and the people performing its operating functions.  CPANJ denied the records request in its entirety, contending it is "not a public agency subject to the dictates of OPRA or requests made under the common law right of access." 

         The court held CPANJ is not a public agency subject to OPRA and is not a public entity subject to the common law right of access.  Therefore, disclosure of the requested records was properly denied.  

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ERIC A. BURNHAM

 This case addresses the issue of whether sales tax should be included when calculating the "full retail value" of merchandise under New Jersey's shoplifting gradation statute.  N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c).  Defendant pled guilty to shoplifting an Xbox One with an advertised price of $499.99.  Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the third degree "if the full retail value of the merchandise exceeds $500 but is less than $75,000" and a crime of the fourth degree "if the full retail value of the merchandise is at least $200 but does not exceed $500."  N.J.S.A. 2C:20–11(c)(2) and (c)(3).    The State utilized sales tax in grading defendant's offense, and he was therefore charged with a third-degree offense.  

The court analyzed the theft statute, which specifically utilizes sales tax to calculate the "amount involved" in its statutory gradation scheme.  However, the court observed the shoplifting statute contains no such provision.  The court concluded because the Legislature did not determine sales tax should be included in the valuation of full retail value in enacting the shoplifting gradation statute, it was improper for sales tax to have been utilized to increase defendant's charge to a third-degree offense.  

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHAREEF O. GRAY (19-10-1681,

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHAREEF O. GRAY (19-10-1681, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

Defendant's car was subjected to a warrantless search incident to an unrelated sting operation planned and carried out by New Jersey State Police.  The State Police detained defendant after a parking lot melee involving three other persons, including the target of the sting operation.  Due to the cold weather, state troopers detained defendant in his car.  After a state trooper opened defendant's car door and placed him inside, the trooper smelled the odor of marijuana.  Based on the trooper's detection of marijuana, the State Police sought defendant's consent to search the car.  After initially refusing, defendant consented, and the State Police conducted a search of the car.  The State Police found no marijuana in the car, but they recovered an illegal gun.  Defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun, arguing the initial entry into his vehicle constituted an unconstitutional search.  The trial court denied the motion, finding the State Police's justification that it was too cold to detain defendant outside was sufficient under the totality of the circumstances.

The Court held that the trial court mistakenly applied State v. Woodson, 236 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 1989), and State v. Conquest, 243 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 1990), and that the opening of the car door constituted an impermissible search.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WELDER D. MORENTE-DUBON

  Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, two weapons offenses, and hindering apprehension.  Tried to a jury, defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second-degree passion-provocation manslaughter, third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and not guilty of hindering apprehension.  The trial court found aggravating factors one, three, four, and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), (3), (4), and (9), and mitigating factor seven N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), but rejected mitigating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9).  Following merger of the weapons counts, he was sentenced to a nine-and-one-half-year term, subject to the parole ineligibility and parole supervision imposed by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.  

The court addressed the judicial factfinding undertaken by the trial court as part of its sentencing analysis.  The court concluded that the trial court's findings regarding the degree of provocation and sufficient time to cool off before delivering the fatal blows were contrary to the jury's verdict and violated the doctrine of fundamental fairness.  
The court also held that aggravating factor four applies to a defendant taking "advantage of a position of trust or confidence" relating to the victim "to commit the offense," not to a minor's subsequent participation in an attempted coverup of the homicide.  

The court also addressed the need for a trial court to provide a detailed explanation of how it reconciles its application of aggravating factor three and mitigating factor seven, the weight assigned to those factors, and how those factors are balanced with respect to a defendant who had no prior juvenile or criminal history and no subsequent criminal history in the decade that elapsed before his arrest.  

 The court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to not consider whether defendant was adequately provoked or had adequate time to cool off before inflicting the fatal blows, to not apply aggravating factor four, and to apply mitigating factor fourteen.  The court further directed that the trial court reconsider whether aggravating factor three applies and if so, the weight to be given to it.