Police use of GPS device on car violates 4th Amendment United State v Jones

Police use of GPS device on car violates 4^th Amendment

United State v Jones __ US ___

January 23, 2012 No. 10–1259.

The Government’s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.

(a) The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Here, the Government’s physical intrusion on an “effect” for the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a “search.” This type of encroachment on an area enumerated in the Amendment would have been considered a search within the meaning of the Amendment at the time it was adopted.

(b) This conclusion is consistent with this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which until the latter half of the 20th century was tied to common-law trespass. Later cases, which have deviated from that exclusively property-based approach, have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, which said that the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” id., at 360. Here, the Court need not address the Government’s contention that Jones had no “reasonable expectation of privacy,” because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, the Court must “assure preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27. Katz did not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56. United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, and United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705—post-Katz cases rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to “beepers,” electronic tracking devices representing another form of electronic monitoring—do not foreclose the conclusion that a search occurred here. New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, and Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, also do not support the Government’s position.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. S.K. A-1488-10T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. S.K.
 
A-1488-10T1
 
Defendant's conviction for violating a domestic violence
 
restraining order is vacated and the complaint dismissed because
 
the provision of the order prohibiting defendant from "any other
 
place where plaintiff is located" is overly broad and not
 
authorized by the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, and also
 
because defendant did not provide a sufficient factual basis for
 
his guilty plea and conviction.

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR EXPUNGEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL RECORDS OF MARINO LOBASSO A-3577-10T4

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR EXPUNGEMENT OF           THE CRIMINAL RECORDS OF MARINO LOBASSO 

A-3577-10T4

     We affirmed an order denying expungement of a third-degree eluding conviction after five years.  Appellant relied on L. 2009, c. 188, § 1, codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2a(2), which reduced the waiting period for expunging certain criminal convictions from ten to five years provided the court finds "in its discretion that expungement is in the public interest, giving due consideration to the nature of the offense, and the applicant's character and conduct since conviction."  Construing the new law, we concluded that expungement before ten years is reserved for compelling but not necessarily rare or unusual cases.  We held that a trial court should weigh case-specific facts regarding the nature of the offense, the offender's character and conduct, and other relevant factors.  Related to an "offender's character and conduct," a trial court may consider facts of an arrest that did not result in conviction, if supported by cognizable evidence.  Regarding the "nature of the offense," a trial court may consider the grade of the offense, and related circumstances.  Additionally, a trial court may consider:  whether the petitioner engaged in activities post-conviction to limit the risk of re-offending; the petitioner's character and conduct before conviction; and the conviction record's impact on the petitioner's "reentry" efforts.   01-10-12  

State v. Roy Friedman (066332; A-18/19-10)

State v. Roy Friedman (066332; A-18/19-10) 

          When a defendant has been sentenced to consecutive           custodial terms under NERA, the periods of parole           supervision that follow must be served consecutively.           There is no need to determine whether Hess applies           here because the trial court recognized its inherent           sentencing authority, engaged in its own Yarbough           analysis, and did not abuse its discretion in           concluding that it was appropriate to impose           consecutive sentences for three separate assaults           defendant admitted committing upon his wife during           three separate periods of time.  1-24-12   

State v. James J. Mauti (067006; A-48-10)

  State v. James J. Mauti (067006; A-48-10) 

          The wife of defendant James J. Mauti was entitled to           exercise the spousal privilege of refusing to testify           in his criminal trial because there was no conflict           between her exercise of the privilege and a           constitutional right, and she did not waive her right           to exercise the privilege.  1-23-12 

State v. Demetrius Diaz-Bridges

State v. Demetrius Diaz-Bridges (067065; A-49/50-10) 

          Because neither defendant’s statements about his           desire to speak with his mother nor any of his other           statements were assertions of his constitutionally-           protected right to silence, the suppression of any           portion of his confession was in error.  1-12-12   

Right to counsel not established by desire to speak with mother State v. Demetrius Diaz-Bridges

Right to counsel not established by desire to speak with mother

State v. Demetrius Diaz-Bridges (067065; A-49/50-10)

Because neither defendant’s statements about his

desire to speak with his mother nor any of his other

statements were assertions of his constitutionallyprotected

right to silence, the suppression of any

portion of his confession was in error. 1-12-12

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAVID BAYLOR A-0054-09T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAVID BAYLOR

A-0054-09T1

The life sentences without parole imposed in this matter do

not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Federal and State

Constitutions because defendant was convicted of murders that he

committed in 2005, and the murder statute in effect at that time

required the imposition of life sentences without parole where,

as here, the jury found at least one statutory aggravating

factor. 12-29-11

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHAFFONA MORGAN A-4468-08T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHAFFONA MORGAN

A-4468-08T4

In this appeal, we hold that a series of ex parte

communications between the trial judge and the jury did not

compromise the integrity of the jury deliberations requiring the

reversal of defendant's conviction. We also hold that, under

the circumstances of this case, the court did not violate

defendant's right to a fair trial or impugn the integrity of the

jury's deliberative process by permitting the jurors to take

copies of sections of the charge with them over a weekend. We

nevertheless caution trial courts against engaging in such a

practice without expressed authority and guidance from the

Supreme Court. We refer this issue to the Civil and Criminal

Practice Committees to develop recommendations to the Supreme

Court to either explicitly forbid the practice, or permit it

under specific guidelines.

12-29-11