Emergency aid exception permitted police to act. State v. Hathaway ___NJ ___ 2015 (A-69-13 )
Viewing the events as they
appeared to an objectively reasonable police officer, and based on the evidence
presented by the State at the suppression hearing, the police acted within the
scope of the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, and the gun
should not have been suppressed.
Argued February 2, 2015 -- Decided August 4, 2015
ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court determines whether the
warrantless search of a room in a casino hotel, where the police reasonably
believed an armed robbery had recently occurred, violated the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution.
Defendant Dontae Hathaway was charged with
second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon following the discovery of a
handgun in his room at the Taj Mahal Hotel and Casino in Atlantic City.
Defendant moved to suppress the gun, arguing that its discovery was the product
of an unconstitutional search. At the suppression hearing, Officer James
Armstrong of the Atlantic City Police Department testified that, on March 28,
2012, while providing additional security at the Taj Mahal, he was called to
the casino security podium. Several security officers conveyed that an
unidentified hotel patron, who was no longer present at the podium, had
reported that two black males robbed him at gunpoint in a room on the 70th
floor.
Officer Armstrong did not believe that he had time to
walk to the surveillance department and review footage from the alleged
robbery. Instead, he asked the security team to have the department confirm the
patron’s report. While awaiting a response, he requested assistance from the
police department’s special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team. About five minutes
later, a four-member SWAT team arrived, and Officer Armstrong was told that
video footage showed the unidentified patron on an elevator with a white male,
a black male, and two females. The elevator stopped on the 70th
floor, the five individuals proceeded to Room 7023, and the unidentified patron
later left in what appeared to be a panicked state. Concerned that there could
be an armed gunman in the casino or barricaded in the room, possibly with
hostages or victims, Officer Armstrong, the SWAT team, and casino security
officers set themselves up outside Room 7023. When calls to the room, via
telephone and orally through the slightly open door, went unanswered, the
officers entered with guns drawn. They found neither victims nor a gunman.
However, an open duffel bag was on a cabinet by the bed, in which an automatic
black Beretta handgun was readily visible. Security determined that the room
was registered to defendant, whose name was found on documents inside the bag.
After hearing Officer Armstrong’s testimony, the trial
court reviewed over an hour’s worth of video footage, noting several
inconsistencies between it and the information conveyed to Officer Armstrong.
The court asserted that Officer Armstrong should have viewed the footage
himself prior to taking action. It also deemed the unidentified patron’s report
unreliable, and found that Officer Armstrong improperly relied on hearsay
filtered through untrained security personnel. The court further reasoned that
the open hotel room door suggested that a person had left the room and would
return soon, and not that a gunman may have been hiding inside. Consequently,
the court determined that the officers lacked probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion or articulable belief to conclude that there was an ongoing crime or
victims in the room. It found that no exigency excused the officers’ failure to
apply for a warrant, which may have been obtained telephonically within half an
hour.
The State moved for leave to appeal, and the Appellate
Division affirmed the suppression. The panel agreed that the unverified
information reported by the alleged victim was insufficient to establish
probable cause. It noted that Officer Armstrong failed to corroborate the
report and relied on what was ultimately discovered to be an inaccurate
description of the surveillance footage. The panel concluded that the State did
not demonstrate exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the search, noting
that the room could have been secured while a telephonic warrant was obtained.
The Court granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal. 217 N.J. 289
(2014).
HELD: Viewing the events as
they appeared to an objectively reasonable police officer, and based on the
evidence presented by the State at the suppression hearing, the police acted
within the scope of the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, and
the gun should not have been suppressed.
1. In order to determine whether the search of
defendant’s hotel room comported with the dictates of both the Federal and
State Constitutions, the Court asks whether the trial court applied the proper
legal principles governing New Jersey’s search and seizure jurisprudence and
whether its factual findings are supported by the record. Legal matters are
reviewed de novo, while factual findings are entitled to deference and must be
upheld when supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. (pp.
13-14)
2. Police are generally required to secure a warrant
prior to conducting a search. Searches conducted without a warrant are
presumptively invalid. The State bears the burden of demonstrating that a
warrantless search is justified by one of the few exceptions to the warrant
requirement, such as the exigent circumstances exception, which is applicable
when officers do not have sufficient time to obtain a warrant in light of the
urgent circumstances confronting them. Here, the Court focuses on the
emergency-aid doctrine, which is a subset of the exigent circumstances
exception. (pp. 14-16)
3. In order to justify a warrantless search under the
emergency-aid doctrine, the State must satisfy a two-prong test, showing that:
(1) the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an
emergency required the provision of immediate assistance to protect or preserve
life, or to prevent serious injury; and (2) there was a reasonable nexus
between the emergency and the place searched. When assessing the reasonableness
of an officer’s decision, courts must view events in real time, rather than
through the context provided by hindsight, recognizing that those who must act
in the heat of the moment do not have the luxury of lengthy deliberation.
Moreover, officers need only reasonably believe, not be certain, that a danger
exists requiring prompt action. The scope of the search under the emergency-aid
doctrine is limited to the reasons prompting the search. (pp. 16-18)
4. The applicability of the emergency-aid doctrine in
this case largely depends on whether Officer Armstrong had a reasonable basis
to credit the unidentified patron’s report as conveyed by security personnel.
An objectively reasonable police officer may assume that an ordinary citizen
reporting a crime is providing reliable information, which does not lose its
reliability when passed from one law enforcement officer to another. A review
of New Jersey jurisprudence shows that, when determining whether exigent
circumstances exist, the police may rely on information that may be classified
as hearsay in a courtroom setting. The ultimate test is whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, the officer’s actions were objectively
reasonable given the nature of the information at hand. Here, the unidentified
patron did not affirmatively attempt to hide his identity, and Officer
Armstrong was capable of gauging the reliability of the security personnel who
conveyed the report. Moreover, Officer Armstrong did not take the report at
face value, instead seeking confirmation of the allegations from the
surveillance department. Given the information available, and within the time
constraints pressed on him by the report of a gunman on the loose in the Taj
Mahal, Officer Armstrong had no objectively reasonable basis to doubt the
veracity of the report. (pp. 18-26)
5. Applying the two-prong test of the emergency-aid
doctrine, the Court first asks whether Officer Armstrong had an objectively
reasonable basis to believe that an emergency required that he provide
immediate assistance in order to protect or preserve life, or to prevent
serious injury. The Court finds that the trial court, which improperly viewed
the events through the prism of hindsight rather than as they were unfolding,
erred as a matter of law in dismissing the unidentified patron’s report as
unreliable. Officer Armstrong could not ignore the report of an armed robbery,
a potential grave danger to public safety, because the patron was unavailable
for questioning. In the heat of the moment, based on seemingly reliable
information, Officer Armstrong acted in an objectively reasonable manner.
Moreover, given the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable to infer
that Room 7023 contained an incapacitated victim or a hidden gunman.
Consequently, the second prong of the emergency-aid doctrine test was met
because there was a reasonable nexus between the emergency and the search.
Thus, the officers were not obligated to obtain a warrant prior to entering the
room. Although the scope of the search was limited to looking for possible
victims and the gunman, the handgun was in plain view, rendering its seizure
lawful. (pp. 26-30)
6. In light of the trial court’s misapplication of the
law governing exigent circumstances, which resulted in a number of clearly
mistaken factual findings, the Appellate Division’s affirmance of the
suppression must be reversed. The trial court’s decision was based on the
State’s presentation alone, relieving the defense of the need to call any
witnesses. On remand, defendant may call witnesses to show that the State did
not meet its burden. The trial court must make factual findings based on all of
the credible evidence. (pp. 30-31)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED
and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
