STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. A.S.-M. A-4682-14T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. A.S.-M.
          A-4682-14T2

We held that a defendant terminated from the pre-trial intervention (PTI) program may be reinstated upon reconsideration. Such a reconsideration, which is not expressly precluded by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(g)(1) and Guideline 3(g) of Rule 3:28, is especially permissible when circumstances show the initial order terminating a defendant from PTI failed to adhere to the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13(e), including the obligation to undertake a "conscientious judgment" to (1) adequately consider whether the participant willfully violated the PTI conditions; and (2) determine whether the defendant remains a viable candidate for PTI under the original or modified PTI terms. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. HORACE BLAKE A-5695-13T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. HORACE BLAKE
          A-5695-13T4

In this PCR appeal, defendant contends his plea counsel failed to provide effective assistance of counsel as outlined in Padilla and Gaitan. Although counsel and the court discussed immigration consequences at the plea hearing, defendant argues counsel failed to convey the likelihood of removal with sufficient precision. Defendant claims counsel misled him to think he might resist deportation, because counsel did not say defendant faced "presumptively mandatory deportation" or "mandatory deportation."
We hold that an attorney need not use "magic words" found in Padilla or Gaitan to convey immigration consequences. Also, the judge's statements, including the "may result in your removal" language of the plea form, may not be imputed to counsel in the ineffectiveness determination. A PCR court must review the totality of the advice counsel has given to decide if an attorney has effectively informed his client of immigration consequences. Under these circumstances, we conclude counsel provided effective assistance, and affirm the denial of PCR. 

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY VS. K.M. I/M/O G.G. A-3662-13T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY VS. K.M. I/M/O G.G.
A-3662-13T3
The biological mother of an infant born showing signs of withdrawal from opioid addiction appeals from the Family Part’s

finding that she neglected her child under N.J.S.A. 9:6- 8.21(c)(4)(a). We affirm. Defendant was addicted to opioid- based pain medication and illicitly obtained the opioid analog Suboxone to treat her withdrawal symptoms during her pregnancy. She waited three days after she gave birth to disclose this to the neonatal staff monitoring the infant. This delayed the treatment that could have alleviated the child’s suffering.
We hold defendant's conduct was grossly negligent under G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161 (1999). Defendant neglected her infant son when she failed to disclose key medical information in a timely manner to the neonatal staff after the child was born. These facts are distinguishable from the approach endorsed by the Court in New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanency v. Y.N., 220 N.J. 165 (2014). 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KEITH DRAKE A-1514-14T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KEITH DRAKE
          A-1514-14T4

The No Early Release Act (NERA) applies to a list of crimes including "subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:14-2 and paragraph (1) of subsection c. of N.J.S. 2C:14-2, sexual assault." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d)(8). Defendant argues that the Legislature's use of the word "and" means that NERA only applies to second-degree sexual assault by penetration using physical force and coercion under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1) if a defendant is simultaneously sentenced for violating N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), which covers sexual contact with a victim who is less than 13 years old and the actor is at least four years older than the victim. The Appellate Division rejects that argument, and finds that NERA applies to a conviction for either N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) or N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1). 

IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT J.S. A-3541-14T1

IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT J.S.
          A-3541-14T1

On the State's appeal, we interpret N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), which allows termination from the registration requirements of the Registration and Community Notification Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, also known as Megan's Law, and the related requirements for Community Supervision for Life "upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction." The judge adopted petitioner's position he was "convicted" on January 14, 2000, the date he entered his guilty plea. The State disagreed and asserted petitioner was "convicted" on November 13, 2000, the date the judgment of conviction was imposed.

Following our review, we reverse and conclude the import of the statutory language requires, as a prerequisite for requesting termination from the registration requirements, an offender demonstrate a fifteen-year period of being offense-free and Megan's Law compliant, following the date the judgment of conviction is issued. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. L.S. A-2523-13T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. L.S.
          A-2523-13T2

In this case, we construe the elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:28- 4(b)(1), which at the time of trial, provided that a person commits a disorderly persons offense if he "[r]eports or causes to be reported to law enforcement authorities an offense of other incident within their concern knowing that it did not occur[.]" The legislature has since made the offense a fourth- degree crime. See L. 2015, c. 175 (eff. Jan. 11, 2016).
Defendant reported that she was the victim of a sexual assault committed by an unknown assailant on her college campus. During the investigation, she admitted supplying false details of the events, such as the location of the crime and the identity of the assailant. Neither the municipal court judge nor the Law Division judge, however, concluded that the sexual assault had not occurred. Instead, based upon case law developed prior to enactment of our Criminal Code, the judge at the trial de novo concluded that the supplying of false details was sufficient to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
We reversed. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOHN N. MAHONEY A-5320-14T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOHN N. MAHONEY
          A-5320-14T4

We granted leave to appeal from an order denying the State's motion to preclude two deliberating jurors from addressing the court at defendant's sentencing hearing. We reversed and remanded for sentencing without input from the jurors.
We held that a judge may not consider for sentencing purposes any comments from a deliberating juror to identify applicable aggravating or mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). Consequently, deliberating jurors are precluded from participating at a defendant's sentencing

proceeding. To allow juror participation would unnecessarily create a substantial risk of distracting the jurors from their primary purpose – serving as judges of the facts – and would indubitably undermine the sanctity of the jury's deliberative process in our system of jurisprudence. 

Sundiata Acoli v. New Jersey State Parole Board (A-52- 14

Sundiata Acoli v. New Jersey State Parole Board (A-52-
          14; 075308)

          The administrative scheme for parole envisioned that a
          convicted murderer would undergo a full hearing before
          the Parole Board prior to securing release from
          incarceration. In Acoli’s circumstances, the
          appropriate remedy is a remand to the full Parole
          Board for completion of the administrative parole
          process. That process in its totality requires a full
          hearing before the Parole Board on his suitability for
          parole release and shall permit the victims of his
          criminal acts to be heard, if they wish, by the Board
          prior to a decision on his parole.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF C.F. A-2718-12T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF C.F.
          A-2718-12T2

In 2012, C.F. was charged and tried as a juvenile for a felony murder committed in 1976. He was found guilty and given a ten-year sentence, the maximum permitted by a law enacted in 1983 and still in effect. The State appealed, arguing the judge should have applied the law in effect when the offense was committed — that repealed law permitted the imposition of an indeterminate life sentence.
The court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not violate the savings statute, N.J.S.A. 1:1-15, which generally bars retroactive application of new laws, because the triggering date for application of the savings statute was the date the juvenile "incurred" a "penalty," not the date he "committed" the "offense." The juvenile here did not incur a penalty until found guilty in 2012; the trial judge properly applied the sentencing law on the books at that time and not the law discarded by the Legislature decades earlier. 

State v. Raymond Daniels (A-90-13

State v. Raymond Daniels (A-90-13; 073504)

          In the context of a trial record that contains
          evidence of an incomplete affirmative defense and
          where the potential for jury confusion exists, a trial
          court may, over a defendant’s objections, issue a
          modified jury charge on the affirmative defense in
          order to elucidate legal principles pertinent to the
          evidence.  In so doing, the court must balance the
          need to educate the jury and the need to protect the
          defendant’s rights.  Here, the trial court’s
          affirmative defense charge on renunciation unfairly
          prejudiced the defense, requiring reversal and remand
          for a new trial.

State v. Eugene C. Baum (A-107-13

State v. Eugene C. Baum (A-107-13; 073056)

          The jury instructions, taken as a whole, are neither
          ambiguous nor misleading because they did not blend,
          and explicitly distinguished, the concepts of mental
          disease or defect and self-induced intoxication, in
          charges that reflected an accurate statement of the
          law.  The sequence of instructions given by the court,
          addressing the diminished capacity defense followed by
          the self-induced intoxication instruction, did not
          negate the diminished capacity defense.