Police could
not stop for only one broken taillight
State v. Sutherland (A-14-16)
Decided
January 11, 2018
LaVECCHIA,
J., writing for the Court.
The Court considers the constitutionality of an officer’s stop of a
motor vehicle under the belief that the vehicle was in violation of N.J.S.A.
39:3-61(a) and -66 because one of the vehicle’s taillights was not operational.
A Toyota Camry that appeared to have a malfunctioning taillight passed
Officer Carletta. Although the vehicle had four taillights in total, two on
each side, and although only one light on the rear passenger side was not
illuminated, Officer Carletta believed that the vehicle was in violation of the
motor vehicle code. He executed a motor vehicle stop. Officer Carletta asked
the driver, defendant Ryan Sutherland, for his driver’s license, motor vehicle
registration, and proof of insurance. Officer Carletta returned to his vehicle to
check defendant’s information. Upon confirming that defendant’s license was
suspended, Officer Carletta issued two summonses: driving with a suspended
license, and failure to maintain the vehicle’s “lamps” in violation of N.J.S.A.
39:3-66. A Morris County Grand Jury later indicted defendant and charged him
with fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license
suspension for a second or subsequent driving-while-intoxicated conviction.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop and to dismiss
the indictment, arguing that the traffic stop constituted an unreasonable
seizure because his vehicle had three operable taillights, in compliance with
the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66. The State countered that the
stop was lawful because the malfunctioning taillight provided Officer Carletta
with reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and because the stop was lawful
under the “community caretaking” function by which police officers engage in
protecting public safety. Officer Carletta testified at the hearing that he had
stopped the vehicle both because he believed that any malfunctioning taillight
constituted a violation of the statute and because he was engaging in community
caretaking by letting defendant know that his vehicle was not in proper working
order.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence
resulting from the motor vehicle stop, but the court denied his motion to
dismiss the indictment. On the motor vehicle stop, the trial court agreed with
defendant that Officer Carletta’s understanding of the maintenance-of-lamps
statute had been “incorrect” and that defendant had not violated the statute
because he had at least one functioning taillight on each side of the vehicle.
The court concluded that Officer Carletta’s erroneous interpretation of the law
could not pass constitutional scrutiny.
The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and reversed the trial
court. 445 N.J. Super. 358 (2016). Relying extensively on Heien v. North
Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014), the panel determined that “even
if the officer was mistaken that the inoperable tail light constituted a Title
39 violation, he had an objectively reasonable basis for stopping defendant’s
vehicle.” Id. at 360. In reaching that conclusion, the panel questioned the
continuing vitality of State v. Puzio, which had held “that where an officer
mistakenly believes that driving conduct constitutes a violation of the law,
but in actuality it does not, no objectively reasonable basis exists upon which
to justify a vehicle stop.” 379 N.J. Super. 378, 383 (App. Div. 2005). The
panel went on to conclude that the statute at issue here was ambiguous and that
even if Officer Carletta’s interpretation of the statute was an objectively
reasonable mistake of law, the stop was permissible pursuant to Heien. 445 N.J.
Super. at 368–70. The panel’s reasoning made it unnecessary to reach the
State’s argument about the applicability of the community caretaking doctrine.
Id. at 371.
The Court granted defendant leave to appeal. 228 N.J. 246 (2016).
HELD: The
Appellate Division erred in concluding that the holding in Heien is applicable
here. The motor vehicle statutes pertinent here are not ambiguous. The
officer’s stop of defendant’s motor vehicle was not an objectively reasonable
mistake of law that gave rise to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stop
was therefore unconstitutional.
1. Under previous
case law in this state, a police officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of
fact does not render a search or arrest unconstitutional. Consistent with
federal jurisprudence, the Court has held that Article I, Paragraph 7 of the
New Jersey Constitution provides room for some mistakes by police. However,
that principle applies only when the police behave reasonably.
2. Until the Appellate Division decision in this case,
the jurisprudence of New Jersey appellate courts had not held that reasonable
mistakes of law would pass constitutional muster. In fact, courts had reached
the opposite conclusion. See Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. at 382-83. The Puzio
decision noted “a clear distinction between the present situation and those
presented in cases where the officer correctly understands the statute but
arguably misinterprets the facts concerning whether a vehicle, or operator, has
violated the statute.” Id. at 382. In explaining its reasoning, the panel
stated that “[i]f officers were permitted to stop vehicles where it is
objectively determined that there is no legal basis for their action, ‘the potential
for abuse of traffic infractions as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless
and the costs to privacy rights excessive.’” Id. at 384. The panel also viewed
the creation of an exception for a mistake of law as inconsistent with the
exclusionary rule because “it would remove the incentive for police to make
certain that they properly understand the law that they are entrusted to
enforce and obey.” Ibid.
3. In Heien, the United States Supreme Court
considered a police officer’s reasonable but erroneous interpretation of a
motor vehicle statute. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion noted that “the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” 135 S. Ct. at
536. After explaining that “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect,” and that
the Fourth Amendment allows for reasonable mistakes of fact, the Chief Justice
went on to explain that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry applies to
mistakes of law just as it applies to mistakes of fact. Ibid. Based on the language
of the North Carolina statute involved in Heien, Chief Justice Roberts
concluded that the officer’s error of law was reasonable and thus provided the
officer with reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. Id. at 540.
Importantly, Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a concurrence
that has garnered support with states that have chosen to follow the Heien
approach in their own search and seizure analyses. Critical to her agreement
with the majority was her belief that erroneous interpretations of the law will
pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny only when the law at issue is “‘so doubtful in
construction’ that a reasonable judge could agree with the officer’s view.” Id.
at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring). Such cases must necessarily involve a “really
difficult” or “very hard question of statutory interpretation” and will thus be
“exceedingly rare.” Ibid.
4. A number of states have subsequently adopted
Heien’s holding. Importantly, however, a number of states have either followed
or acknowledged Justice Kagan’s narrow interpretation of an objectively
reasonable mistake of law. In State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20 (2016), the Court
did not reach the question of whether to adopt Heien. The officer’s mistake of
law in that case was not objectively reasonable and thus did not qualify as the
type of “rare” case that involves an objectively reasonable mistake of law.
5. Defendant’s traffic stop was premised on perceived
violations of two statutes. The statutes read together require that a motor
vehicle only have two working rear lamps, with at least one working lamp on
each side. See N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a); N.J.S.A. 39:3-66. N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 mandates
that the lamps “required by this article” must be kept in good working order.
The statutes require one working taillight on each side of a vehicle. Thus, if
a vehicle has two taillights on each side of the vehicle—more than the law
requires—and one of those multiple taillights on one side is not working, a
violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66, as was assumed and charged here, has
not occurred. The officer’s erroneous application of the functioning taillight
requirement was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law. This case does
not present a basis for considering the application of Heien. Simply put, this
was not a good stop. The judgment of the Appellate Division, premised on an
application of Heien to the stop in this matter, is reversed.
6. The State also asserted community caretaking as an
alternative basis to support the stop. The Appellate Division did not reach the
argument in light of the manner in which it resolved the case. Accordingly, a
remand is appropriate to allow the Appellate Division to address the unresolved
argument advanced by the State.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.
The matter is REMANDED to the Appellate Division for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, AND
TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
