No. 16-1027. Argued:
January 9, 2018 Decided: May 29, 2018
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
During the investigation of
two traffic incidents involving an orange and black motorcycle with an extended
frame, Officer David Rhodes learned that the motorcycle likely was stolen and
in the possession of petitioner Ryan Collins. Officer Rhodes discovered
photographs on Collins' Facebook profile of an orange and black motorcycle
parked in the driveway of a house, drove to the house, and parked on the
street. From there, he could see what appeared to be the motorcycle under a
white tarp parked in the same location as the motorcycle in the photograph.
Without a search warrant,
Office Rhodes walked to the top of the driveway, removed the tarp, confirmed
that the motorcycle was stolen by running the license plate and vehicle
identification numbers, took a photograph of the uncovered motorcycle, replaced
the tarp, and returned to his car to wait for Collins.
When Collins returned,
Officer Rhodes arrested him. The trial court denied Collins' motion to suppress
the evidence on the ground that Officer Rhodes violated the Fourth Amendment
when he trespassed on the house's curtilage to conduct a search, and Collins
was convicted of receiving stolen property. The Virginia Court of Appeals
affirmed. The State Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the warrantless search
was justified under the Fourth Amendment's automobile exception.
Held: The
automobile exception does not permit the warrantless entry of a home or its
curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein.
(a) This case arises
at the intersection of two components of the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence: the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and the
protection extended to the curtilage of a home. In announcing each of the
automobile exception's justifications--i.e., the "ready
mobility of the automobile" and "the pervasive regulation of vehicles
capable of traveling on the public highways," California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386, 390, 392--the Court emphasized that the rationales applied only to
automobiles and not to houses, and therefore supported their different
treatment as a constitutional matter. When these justifications are present,
officers may search an automobile without a warrant so long as they have
probable cause. Curtilage--"the area 'immediately surrounding and
associated with the home' "--is considered " 'part of the
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.' " Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6. Thus, when an officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to
gather evidence, a Fourth Amendment search has occurred and is presumptively
unreasonable absent a warrant.
(b) As an initial
matter, the part of the driveway where Collins' motorcycle was parked and
subsequently searched is curtilage. When Officer Rhodes searched the
motorcycle, it was parked inside a partially enclosed top portion of the
driveway that abuts the house. Just like the front porch, side garden, or area
"outside the front window," that enclosure constitutes "an area
adjacent to the home and 'to which the activity of home life
extends.' " Jardines, 569 U. S., at 6, 7.
Because the scope of the
automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself, it did not
justify Officer Rhodes' invasion of the curtilage. Nothing in this Court's case
law suggests that the automobile exception gives an officer the right to enter a
home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant. Such an expansion
would both undervalue the core Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home
and its curtilage and " 'untether' " the exception
" 'from the justifications underlying' " it. Riley v. California, 573
U. S. ___, ___. This Court has similarly declined to expand the scope of
other exceptions to the warrant requirement. Thus, just as an officer must have
a lawful right of access to any contraband he discovers in plain view in order
to seize it without a warrant--see Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128,
136-137--and just as an officer must have a lawful
right of access in order to arrest a person in his home--see Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573,
587-590--so, too, an officer must have a lawful right
of access to a vehicle in order to search it pursuant to the automobile
exception. To allow otherwise would unmoor the exception from its
justifications, render hollow the core Fourth Amendment protection the
Constitution extends to the house and its curtilage, and transform what was
meant to be an exception into a tool with far broader application.
(c) Contrary to
Virginia's claim, the automobile exception is not a categorical one that
permits the warrantless search of a vehicle anytime, anywhere, including in a
home or curtilage. Scher v. United States,305 U. S. 251; Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938, distinguished. Also unpersuasive is Virginia's proposed bright
line rule for an automobile exception that would not permit warrantless entry
only of the house itself or another fixed structure, e.g., a
garage, inside the curtilage. This Court has long been clear that curtilage is
afforded constitutional protection, and creating a carveout for certain types
of curtilage seems more likely to create confusion than does uniform
application of the Court's doctrine. Virginia's rule also rests on a mistaken
premise, for the ability to observe inside curtilage from a lawful vantage point
is not the same as the right to enter curtilage without a warrant to search for
information not otherwise accessible.
Finally, Virginia's rule
automatically would grant constitutional rights to those persons with the
financial means to afford residences with garages but deprive those persons
without such resources of any individualized consideration as to whether the
areas in which they store their vehicles qualify as curtilage.
292 Va. 486, 790 S. E. 2d 611, reversed and
remanded.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG,
BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH,
JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed
a concurring opinion. ALITO, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
