Police false promise of no jail and leniency required suppression of Confession State v. L.H.(A-59-17) July 22, 2019
ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the interrogation techniques that included false promises of leniency induced defendant L.H. to confess to two alleged sexual assaults and one alleged attempted sexual assault and overbore defendant’s will. In this context, the Court must determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s confession was voluntary.
Defendant, who was suspected of committing the alleged offenses, was stopped and brought to the Bloomfield police headquarters on August 6, 2011, at about 2:30 a.m. After being held for three hours, he was brought to an interview room. For the first fifty- five minutes, Detective Lieutenant Joseph Krentz and Detective Thomas Fano secured information from defendant about his education, employment, prior residences, family, and his reason for driving in Bloomfield that evening. Almost an hour into the interrogation, Detective Fano told defendant that he had a “problem.” For the next twenty minutes, while defendant deflected questions that would have implicated him in a crime, the two detectives suggested that, if defendant cooperated and incriminated himself, he would receive counseling and help, not go to jail, and remain free to raise his child. Indeed, defendant was told that the truth would set him free. The detectives’ assurances and suggestions that defendant would receive help and counseling, stay out of jail, and be there for his daughter if he cooperated were aimed at assuaging the reluctance defendant repeatedly expressed about giving up the right to remain silent.
For example, Detective Krentz stated, “I just need to hear your side of the story so I can find out exactly where you are as far as getting the help you need, the right help.” Defendant asked, “The help I need is not sending me to jail is it?” Detective Krentz: “Not at all. Nobody gets rehabilitated in jail.” Detective Fano: “Yeah, I agree.” The detectives, moreover, continually minimized the nature of the assaults of which defendant was suspected, telling him, “You’re not a bad guy,” and “You didn’t hurt anybody.”
One hour and fourteen minutes into the interrogation, defendant began to make admissions about his involvement in the charged offenses. The interrogation ended at 8:51 a.m. -- more than three hours after it had begun. In his testimony at the hearing, Detective Krentz conceded that “[e]very time [defendant] expressed hesitancy, [the detectives] talked about the help he was going to get,” and that “it was clear . . . that ‘help’ meant counseling.” The trial court rejected defendant’s argument that his will was overborne by false promises and declined to suppress his confession.
Defendant also moved for an evidentiary hearing because of the failure of the police to record, electronically or otherwise, the identification procedure that led to M.H. identifying defendant as her assailant. During the fourteen earlier identification procedures, M.H. was unable to make a positive identification of her assailant. On August 8, 2011, two days after defendant’s arrest, M.H. viewed a fifteenth photographic array. In the report from that identification, the position of each photograph is given a sequential number from one to six. Next to photo position number three -- designating defendant’s photograph -- is the word “SUSPECT.” The report does not explain why the word “SUSPECT” was used rather than the six-digit number and letter assigned to every other photograph.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a hearing, and defendant entered guilty pleas to five counts in the indictment, preserving his right to appeal the denial of both his motion to suppress his confession and his motion for an evidentiary hearing. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, vacating defendant’s convictions and remanding for further proceedings. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 233 N.J. 24 (2018).
HELD: The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s statement was voluntary. Defendant may withdraw his guilty plea. The failure to record the identification procedure as required by Delgado requires a remand to allow defendant the benefit of a hearing to inquire into the reliability of the identification and any other remedy deemed appropriate by the trial court.
1. Due process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s confession was voluntary and was not made because the defendant’s will was overborne. A confession which is the product of physical or psychological coercion must be considered to be involuntary and is inadmissible in evidence regardless of its truth or falsity. The voluntariness determination weighs the coercive psychological pressures brought to bear on an individual to speak against his power to resist confessing. Relevant factors include the suspect’s age, education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and whether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved, as well as previous encounters with law enforcement. The ultimate determination of voluntariness depends on the totality of the circumstances.
2. Because a suspect will have a natural reluctance to furnish details implicating himself, an interrogating officer may attempt to dissipate this reluctance and may even tell some lies during an interrogation. Certain lies, however, may have the capacity to overbear a suspect’s will and to render a confession involuntary. Thus, a police officer cannot directly or by implication tell a suspect that his statements will not be used against him because to do so is in clear contravention of the Miranda warnings. Other impermissible lies are false promises of leniency that, under the totality of circumstances, have the capacity to overbear a suspect’s will. A court may conclude that a defendant’s confession was involuntary if interrogating officers extended a promise so enticing as to induce that confession.
3. The video-recorded interrogation here reveals that the detectives made (1) representations that directly conflicted with the Miranda warnings, (2) promises of leniency by offering counseling as a substitute for jail, and (3) statements that minimized the seriousness of the crimes under investigation -- all relevant factors under the totality- of-the-circumstances test. In the totality of the circumstances, given the combination of all the relevant evidence and factors, the State failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the interrogators’ representations to defendant did not overbear his will and induce him to confess. The detectives secured an involuntary confession. Because defendant preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the confession, defendant’s guilty plea must be vacated.
