The new rule stated in Cain and Simms was intended to apply prospectively to guide future trials, not retroactively to proceedings conducted prior to those decisions. At the time of defendant’s trial, the governing law authorized the use of hypothetical questions such as the questions posed to the State’s experts in this case. And in light of the distinctions between Melendez and the present case, there was no error in the trial court’s admission of defendant’s notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification.
In the Matter of the Investigation of Burglary and Theft A-61-18; 082243)
In light of the federal and state requirements to obtain a follow-up sample, the State has shown that the physical characteristics sought in this case cannot practicably be obtained by any means other than investigative detention pursuant to Rule 3:5A-1. The Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division.
State of New Jersey in the Interest of A.A. (A-50-18) (081793) Argued October 23, 2019 -- Decided January 15, 2020 RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. In State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 316 (2000), the Court directed law enforcementofficers to “use their best efforts to locate a parent or legal guardian” before starting tointerrogate a juvenile in custody. In an otherwise intimidating setting, parents can help juveniles understand they have the right not to incriminate themselves and the right to have an attorney present -- and can help juveniles decide whether to waive their rights.Parents essentially serve “as a buffer” between juveniles and the police. Id. at 315. In this appeal, the Court considers whether incriminating statements a fifteen-year- old made to his mother at a police station can be used against him. On July 7, 2016, Officer Joseph Labarbera saw three black males on bicycles head east on Wilkinson Avenue in Jersey City. About fifteen seconds later, he and his partner heard eight to ten gunshots from the east. They transmitted over the radio what they had heard along with a description of the three men on bicycles. Soon after, two victims were found in front of 135 Wilkinson Avenue, in the direction the cyclists were seen riding. A.A. was stopped nearby and, based on Labarbera’s identification, was taken into custody, brought to a juvenile facility, and placed in a holding cell. In accordance with Presha, the police contacted his mother, who was taken to an interview room where Detective Joseph Chidichimo and another officer told her why A.A. was under arrest.A.A.’s mother was visibly emotional and asked to speak with her son; the officers tookher to where A.A. was detained. The police allowed A.A. and his mother to speak through the gate of the holding cell. Five officers were in the room within ten to fifteen feet of A.A. Chidichimo testified at a pretrial hearing that he overheard the conversation between A.A. and his mother. According to the detective, A.A.’s mother asked if he hadbeen on Wilkinson Avenue, and he confirmed that he had. When she asked why, A.A.responded, “because they jumped us last week.” At that point, A.A.’s mother began tocry and left the room.
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A.A.’s mother testified at the hearing. She explained that the police told her A.A. had “shot somebody” and that she asked to speak with her son. She said she was crying and spoke in a loud voice, and that she and her son could see multiple officers in theroom at the time. She testified that A.A. denied “do[ing] that” and said nothing about “being jumped.” A.A. was charged with two counts of attempted murder as well as weapons offenses. At the delinquency hearing, the State introduced A.A.’s statements to his mother, which the Family Part judge had found admissible; testimony from Labarbera, Chidichimo, and another officer; photos and physical evidence from the shooting; and video surveillance. The video was not clear enough to identify any of the cyclists. And none of the physical evidence directly connected A.A. to the shooting. The judge adjudicated A.A. delinquent on two counts of aggravated assault and all weapons charges, relying heavily on Officer Labarbera’s testimony that he observed A.A.riding a bicycle on Wilkinson Avenue just before the shooting; the surveillance video;and Detective Chidichimo’s account of A.A.’s statement to his mother. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new hearing. 455 N.J. Super. 492, 506-07 (App. Div. 2018). The Court granted certification. 236 N.J. 602 (2019). HELD: The actions of the police amounted to the functional equivalent of interrogation. As a result, A.A. should have been advised of his Miranda rights in the presence of his mother. To hold otherwise would turn Presha and the safeguards it envisioned on their head. To address the special concerns presented when a juvenile is brought into custody, police officers should advise juveniles of their Miranda rights in the presence of a parent or guardian before the police question, or a parent speaks with, the juvenile. Officers should then let the parent and child consult in private. That approach would afford parents a meaningful opportunity to help juveniles understand their rights and decidewhether to waive them. Because A.A.’s inadmissible statements comprised a substantialpart of the proofs against him, a new hearing is necessary. 1. Federal and state law provide protections against self-incrimination. Suspects can waive their rights and make incriminating statements to law enforcement. To be admissible at trial, the State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a suspect’swaiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to assess the voluntariness of a statement. (pp. 11-12) 2. In Rhode Island v. Innis, officers arrested the defendant for robbery with a sawed-off shotgun. 446 U.S. 291, 293-94 (1980). Innis received three sets of Miranda warnings but declined to waive his rights. Id. at 294. While Innis was being transported to the central police station, two officers discussed the risk that students who attended a nearby schoolfor “handicapped children” “might find a weapon” and “hurt themselves.” Id. at 294-95.Innis interrupted the conversation and told the officers to “turn the car around so he could
2
show them where the gun was located.” Id. at 295. The United States Supreme Court held that Miranda’s safeguards applied not only to express interrogation of a suspect in custody but also to “its functional equivalent.” Id. at 300-01. (pp. 12-15) 3. The New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503 to grant broader protection than the federal privilege against self-incrimination. The Court has adopted the Innis standard and embraced the view that interrogation includes not only direct questioning but also any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. (pp. 15-16) 4. Juveniles receive heightened protections when it comes to custodial interrogations for obvious reasons. Without guidance from an adult relative, friend, or lawyer, juveniles are on an unequal footing with their interrogators and are not able to know, let alone assert, their constitutional rights. In State in Interest of S.H., the Court “emphasize[d that]whenever possible and especially in the case of young children no child should beinterviewed except in the presence of his parents or guardian.” 61 N.J. 108, 114-15 (1972). (pp. 16-17) 5. The Court built on S.H. in Presha, 163 N.J. at 314. Noting that “[p]arents are in a position to assist juveniles in understanding their rights, acting intelligently in waiving those rights, and otherwise remaining calm in the face of an interrogation,” id. at 315, the Court imposed a bright-line rule for juveniles under the age of fourteen that statementsmade “when a parent or legal guardian is absent from” the interrogation are not admissible “unless the adult was unwilling to be present or truly unavailable,” ibid. Forall juveniles, the Court instructed that “police officers must use their best efforts to locatea parent or legal guardian before” an interrogation begins. Id. at 316. (pp. 18-19) 6. The Court’s recent ruling in State in Interest of A.S., 203 N.J. 131 (2010), underscored the supportive role parents have in the context of a custodial interrogation. In A.S., the police enlisted the mother of a fourteen-year-old girl, A.S., to help during the interrogation process. They asked the mother to recite the Miranda warnings and did not correct her misstatements. Id. at 136. A.S.’s mother repeatedly badgered her into answering the officer’s questions. The Court concluded that A.S.’s confession was involuntary and confirmed that a parent’s “presence alone” is not what Presha contemplated. Id. at 148, 152. To serve as a buffer between the police and the juvenile, aparent must act “with the interests of the juvenile in mind.” Id. at 148. The Court affirmed that the purpose of Presha -- to have a parent present during interrogation --“was to assist the child in the exercise of his or her constitutional rights; it was not toprovide the police with an assistant.” Id. at 137. (pp. 19-20) 7. Here, the police contacted A.A.’s mother and summoned her to the police station. The reason to summon A.A.’s mother was for her to help her son understand his rights and actintelligently in deciding whether to waive them. See Presha, 163 N.J. at 315. But before
3
mother and son began to speak, the police did not advise A.A. of his rights in hismother’s presence. Neither A.A. nor his mother had been made aware that anything A.A.might say could be used against him, among other important rights. A.A. made critical admissions to his mother that the Family Part judge later relied on. He was subjected tothe “functional equivalent” of express questioning while in custody, and his statements, obtained without the benefit of Miranda warnings, are thus inadmissible. What took place here upended the Presha model. Instead of serving as a buffer to help a juvenileunderstand his rights, the child’s mother unwittingly assisted the police and helped gatherincriminating evidence. The Court bases its ruling on state law. (pp. 20-22) 8. The protections outlined in Presha remain good law. The Court adds the following guidance. The police should advise juveniles in custody of their Miranda rights -- in the presence of a parent or legal guardian -- before the police question, or a parent speaks with, the juvenile. Officers should then give parents or guardians a meaningful opportunity to consult with the juvenile in private about those rights. That approach would enable parents to help children understand their rights and decide whether to waive them -- as contemplated in Presha. If law enforcement officers do not allow a parent and juvenile to consult in private, absent a compelling reason, that fact should weigh heavilyin the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the juvenile’s waiver andstatements were voluntary. See ibid. If legitimate security concerns require the police to observe a private consultation, the police can monitor the interaction without listening to the words spoken between parent and child. (pp. 22-23) 9. The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that a new hearing is required. 455 N.J. Super. at 506. The Family Part judge pointedly relied on A.A.’s statements to establishhis whereabouts at the time of the offense as well as his motive. The pivotal admissionswere “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. (p. 24)
State v. Randy K. Manning (A-10-18) (080834) Argued September 23, 2019 -- Decided January 13, 2020 ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. The primary issue in this appeal is whether, during the interim period between passage of the amendment to the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic SurveillanceControl Act (Wiretap Act) in 2010 and the effective date of the Court’s decision in State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564 (2013), the constitutional warrant requirement and corresponding suppression remedy applied to securing cell-phone location information. This appeal also presents the issues of whether exceptions to the warrant requirement applied to securing that information and whether those same exceptions also applied to securing call-detail records under State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338 (1982). Here, in 2011, after the Wiretap Act amendment went into effect but before theCourt’s decision in Earls, law-enforcement officers -- without a warrant or court order -- obtained defendant Randy K. Manning’s cell-phone records by submitting an exigent- circumstances request to a cell-phone service provider. Thus, the constitutional propriety of the police conduct depends on the application of the exigent-circumstances doctrine. On August 16, 2011, shortly after 8:00 a.m., the Bergen County Prosecutor’sOffice investigated the grisly murder of a victim who had died from multiple gunshot wounds and whose charred body was found in the rear of his Chevy. Detectives secured a judicially authorized warrant to search the vehicle. By the late afternoon or early evening of August 16, Detective John Frazer had two pieces of information that madedefendant “a person of interest”: defendant’s fake California license was found in theChevy owned by his friend, the victim, and defendant’s timeline of his claimed whereabouts seemingly conflicted with the victim’s cell-phone records. Despite the securing of a search warrant earlier for the Chevy, Detective Frazer bypassed the warrant/court-order process and, that evening, submitted an exigent-circumstances request form to AT&T for defendant’s cell-phone records. Detective Frazer admittedly used the exigent-circumstances request “as an investigatory tool.”Although the detective stated that applying for a search warrant “was not practical at that time,” he conceded that he could have applied for a telephonic warrant. He gave noestimate of the time that it would have taken to apply for a telephonic warrant or to
1
prepare an affidavit for a search warrant. Nor did he estimate the time it would have taken to secure a warrant, given that a Superior Court judge was on call. Based on the cell-phone records, defendant became the target of the investigation. The next day, Detective Frazer submitted three separate and detailed affidavits in support of three warrants, including one for a wiretap of, and another for further communicationsdata from, defendant’s cell phone. According to Detective Gary Boesch, on August 17, defendant called the Bergen County Police Department and inquired whether the policewanted to speak with him. The next day Detective Boesch returned defendant’s call. OnAugust 19, defendant took public transportation to the Hackensack bus terminal, where Detective Boesch picked him up for questioning. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the warrantless search of hiscell-phone records based on the exigent-circumstances exception. Defendant was convicted of murder, desecration of human remains, and related crimes. In anunpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed defendant’s convictions on two grounds and remanded for a new trial. First, the Appellate Division held that the trial court erred in not granting defendant’s request for jury instructions on aggravatedmanslaughter and reckless manslaughter -- lesser-included offenses to the charge of murder. Second, the Appellate Division held that the failure of the police to secure a warrant or court order for defendant’s cell-phone records should have resulted in the suppression of those records. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification “limited to the issue of theadmissibility of the defendant’s cell phone records.” 235 N.J. 311 (2018). HELD: During the three-year interim period between passage of the amendment to theWiretap Act in 2010 and the effective date of the Court’s Earls decision in 2013, individuals possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone location information cognizable under our State Constitution. As in other contexts, exceptions to the constitutional warrant requirement -- such as consent or exigent circumstances -- apply to securing cell-phone records. Therefore, in 2011, our Constitution required law-enforcement officers to obtain either a warrant or court order for cell-phone location information in accordance with the standards of N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29 or to satisfy one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. It also follows that, under Article I, Paragraph 7, the exclusionary rule applies to unconstitutional searches and seizures of cell-phone records. Here, the State did not obtain a warrant or court order and failed to satisfy its burden of proving that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search, requiring suppression of defendant’s cell-phone records. 1. In 2013, in Earls, the Court held that Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution afforded individuals a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell-phone location information. 214 N.J. at 588. In light of the constitutional right to privacy safeguarded
2
by Article I, Paragraph 7, the Court declared that law enforcement “must obtain a warrant based on a showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrantrequirement,” to secure cell-phone location information. Ibid. The Court determined that the Earls decision represented a new rule of law and therefore applied the warrant requirement for cell-phone location information prospectively. Id. at 591. The Court recognized, however, that since the 2010 amendment to the Wiretap Act, state law had required law enforcement to secure a court order or a warrant to obtain cell-phone location information from a service provider. Id. at 589 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29). (pp. 18-23) 2. The Court now holds that the constitutional warrant requirement applied to cell-phone location information during the three-year interim period between passage of theamendment to the Wiretap Act in 2010 and the effective date of the Court’s Earls decision in 2013. However, in light of Earls and the legitimate expectations of law enforcement under the Wiretap Act, the Court also determines that the standard for securing a court order for those records during the three-year interim period was the one set forth in the Act. That is, in the absence of an exception to the warrant requirement, to secure cell-phone location information from a service provider, law enforcement wasrequired, at the very least, to obtain a court order based on “specific and articulable factsshowing that there [were] reasonable grounds to believe that the record or other information . . . [was] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” See N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29(e). The Court also expressly holds that following the 2010 amendment to the Wiretap Act, law-enforcement officers were justified in relying on well-established exceptions to the State Constitution’s warrant requirement for securingcell-phone records, including the exigent-circumstances exception. Cell-phone records seized in violation of our State Constitution are subject to the exclusionary rule. (pp. 24-25) 3. When the State invokes the exigent-circumstances exception to justify a warrantless search it must prove that law-enforcement officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that securing a warrant was not practicable because immediate action was necessary to stop the flight of a suspect, to safeguard members of the public from a threat of harm, or to prevent the destruction of evidence. The Court has never held that a generalized concern about public or police safety or the preservation of evidence would justify a warrantless search or seizure. (pp. 25-31) 4. Detective Frazer was unable to articulate anything more than a generalized concern for public safety and the preservation of evidence as reasons for not complying with the warrant requirement. He did not identify an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was a threat to the public or police, or that evidence might be destroyed, in the time it would have taken to obtain a warrant. After reviewing defendant’s cell-phone records and determining that defendant was clearly a suspect, the next day Detective Frazer prepared three separate and detailed affidavits for search warrants. The Prosecutor’s
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Office did not make any concerted effort to immediately interrogate or detain defendant.A review of the totality of the evidence reveals that the Prosecutor’s Office was able tocomply with the dictates of the warrant requirement of our State Constitution during the murder investigation. The State failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the warrantlesssearch of defendant’s cell-phone records was objectively reasonable to meet the type of exigency recognized in our jurisprudence. For the reasons expressed, the Court affirmsthe judgment of the Appellate Division vacating defendant’s convictions and remands the matter to the trial court. (pp. 31-36) AFFIRMED. The matter is REMANDED for further proceedings.
The court rejects defendant's argument that the imposition of an eight-year custodial sentence after serving almost five years of special probation was an unconstitutional judicial extension of the statutory ten-year maximum custodial sentence, contrary to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). Years served on special Drug Court probation are not equivalent to incarceration. Special Drug Court probation is an extraordinary rehabilitative opportunity, provided to defendants who choose to accept it with the clear explanation that a violation could result in the imposition of the maximum term of incarceration.
The court considered whether it was proper pre-trial for the trial court to review in camera a statement taken by defendant's investigator of a State's witness and redact inculpatory portions. Defendant requested this procedure as he only wanted to use the portions of the statement that were favorable to him. The State was only provided with the redacted statement.
The court concluded the process employed by the trial court was contrary to the intent established under Rule 3:13-3 and State v. Williams, 80 N.J. 472 (1979). The panel stated if a defendant wishes to use a statement or information taken from a State's witness, he or she must decide prior to trial, advise the State, and produce the statement.
Redaction of the statement prior to disclosure is only appropriate for any asserted work product privileged information. If defendant refuses to declare his or her intentions prior to trial regarding a statement, a trial court must consider the appropriate remedy under Rule 3:13-3(f). The procedure employed here deprived the State and its witness of the opportunity to assess the veracity of the statement.
State v. Luis Melendez (081246) (Hudson County & Statewide) (A-22/23-18; 081246) Under the reasoning of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), a defendant’s statements in an answer to a civil forfeiture action cannot be introduced in a parallel criminal proceeding in the State’s case in chief. Like the Appellate Division, the Court finds the error was harmless in light of other strong evidence connecting defendant to the apartment. The Court also agrees that criminal defendants who have been served with civil forfeiture complaints are entitled to enhanced notice of certain issues. The Court outlines several points about notice and refers the matter to the Civil and Criminal Practice Committees for further review.
2C:39-5 Unlawful possession of weapons
d. Other weapons. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may have is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
for 3rd degree max 3- 5 years $15,000 1 year- 5 year
4th degree 0- 18 months $10,000 1 year- 5 year
There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter. Read www.njlaws.com/jail_for_crimes_and_disorderly_conduct.html
If you or a family member are charged with a criminal offense, you should retain an experienced criminal attorney to argue to reduce the penalties!
Unlawful possession of weapons. a. Machine guns. Any person who knowingly has in his possession a machine gun or any instrument or device adaptable for use as a machine gun, without being licensed to do so as provided in N.J.S.2C:58-5, is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
b. Handguns. (1) Any person who knowingly has in his possession any handgun, including any antique handgun, without first having obtained a permit to carry the same as provided in N.J.S.2C:58-4, is guilty of a crime of the second degree. (2) If the handgun is in the nature of an air gun, spring gun or pistol or other weapon of a similar nature in which the propelling force is a spring, elastic band, carbon dioxide, compressed or other gas or vapor, air or compressed air, or is ignited by compressed air, and ejecting a bullet or missile smaller than three-eighths of an inch in diameter, with sufficient force to injure a person it is a crime of the third degree.
c. Rifles and shotguns. (1) Any person who knowingly has in his possession any rifle or shotgun without having first obtained a firearms purchaser identification card in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.2C:58-3, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
(2) Unless otherwise permitted by law, any person who knowingly has in his possession any loaded rifle or shotgun is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
d. Other weapons. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may have is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
e. Firearms or other weapons in educational institutions.
(1) Any person who knowingly has in his possession any firearm in or upon any part of the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university or other educational institution, without the written authorization of the governing officer of the institution, is guilty of a crime of the third degree, irrespective of whether he possesses a valid permit to carry the firearm or a valid firearms purchaser identification card.
(2) Any person who knowingly possesses any weapon enumerated in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection r. of N.J.S.2C:39-1 or any components which can readily be assembled into a firearm or other weapon enumerated in subsection r. of N.J.S.2C:39-1 or any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful use as it may have, while in or upon any part of the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university or other educational institution without the written authorization of the governing officer of the institution is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
2C 28-7 Fake ID called Tampering with public records or information
Disorderly person criminal offenses- ex Simple Assault, shoplifting & cases in Municipal Court
Jail 2C: 43- 8 jail 6 month maximum
probation 1-2 year max
community service 180 days maximum
Disorderly- fines: $1,000 Fine maximum under 2C: 43- 3
plus mandatory costs, VCCO and other penalties
There are many other penalties that the court must impose in criminal cases, including DNA testing. There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter.
a. Offense defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(1) Knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any record, document or thing belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for information or record, or required by law to be kept by others for information of the government;
(2) Makes, presents, offers for filing, or uses any record, document or thing knowing it to be false, and with purpose that it be taken as a genuine part of information or records referred to in paragraph (1); or
(3) Purposely and unlawfully destroys, conceals, removes, mutilates, or otherwise impairs the verity or availability of any such record, document or thing.
b. Grading. An offense under subsection a. is a disorderly persons offense unless the actor's purpose is to defraud or injure anyone, in which case the offense is a crime of the third degree.
c. A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if he purposely and unlawfully alters, destroys, conceals, removes or disables any camera or other monitoring device including any videotape, film or other medium used to record sound or images that is installed in a patrol vehicle.
Sometimes an experienced attorney can negotiate with the prosecutor to have the charges reduced to a Municipal Ordinance. Other times for first offenders we can make a motion for the first offenders program, Conditional dismissal.
New law finally establishes a Conditional Dismissal Program in Municipal Court. Ken Vercammen testified in favor of the passage before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
The Conditional Dismissal program in Municipal Court for certain first-time offenders permits defense counsel to make a Motion that the charge would be dismissed at the end of a one year probationary period.
“This initiative will give a broader range of first-time offenders who have committed a minor offense an opportunity to turn their lives around,” “The program will help foster participants’ rehabilitation and future success by giving them appropriate penalties without having the offense be a part of their permanent criminal record.” This law also helps Police and Prosecutors since it requires a guilty plea, thus reducing the need for trials and officer testimony.
The law allows future Dismissal for many non-drug offenses, such as disorderly person’s offenses, which have not been able to participate in similar programs before.
“First-time offenders who are screened to meet the eligibility requirements will be able to use the program to avoid having a record that cannot be expunged until years after the sentence is served
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.
2C:14-4. Lewdness
a. A person commits a disorderly persons offense if he does any flagrantly lewd and offensive act which he knows or reasonably expects is likely to be observed by other non consenting persons who would be affronted or alarmed.
Disorderly person criminal offenses- ex Simple Assault, shoplifting & cases in Municipal Court
Jail 2C: 43- 8 jail 6 month maximum
probation 1-2 year max
community service 180 days maximum
Disorderly- fines: $1,000 Fine maximum under 2C: 43- 3
plus mandatory costs, VCCO and other penalties
There are many other penalties that the court must impose in criminal cases, including DNA testing. There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter.
b. A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if:
(1) He exposes his intimate parts for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of any other person under circumstances where the actor knows or reasonably expects he is likely to be observed by a child who is less than 13 years of age where the actor is at least four years older than the child.
(2) He exposes his intimate parts for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of any other person under circumstances where the actor knows or reasonably expects he is likely to be observed by a person who because of mental disease or defect is unable to understand the sexual nature of the actor's conduct.
c. As used in this section:
"lewd acts" shall include the exposing of the genitals for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of any other person.
Amended 1992, c. 8, s.1.
2C:14-5. Provisions generally applicable to Chapter 14 a. The prosecutor shall not be required to offer proof that the victim resisted, or resisted to the utmost, or reasonably resisted the sexual assault in any offense proscribed by this chapter.
b. No actor shall be presumed to be incapable of committing a crime under this chapter because of age or impotency or marriage to the victim.
c. It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a crime under this chapter that the actor believed the victim to be above the age stated for the offense, even if such a mistaken belief was reasonable.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:14-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:14-6. Sentencing If a person is convicted of a second or subsequent offense under sections 2C:14-2 or 2C:14-3a., the sentence imposed under those sections for the second or subsequent offense shall, unless the person is sentenced pursuant to the provisions of 2C:43-7, include a fixed minimum sentence of not less than 5 years during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. The court may not suspend or make any other non-custodial disposition of any person sentenced as a second or subsequent offender pursuant to this section. For the purpose of this section an offense is considered a second or subsequent offense, if the actor has at any time been convicted under sections 2C:14-2 or 2C:14-3a. or under any similar statute of the United States, this state, or any other state for an offense that is substantially equivalent to sections 2C:14-2 or 2C:14-3a.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
2C:33-4 Harassment
-Petty Disorderly person - 30 days jail maximum
Petty DP $500 max Fine, VCCB and other penalties
And criminal conviction on your record
Except as provided in subsection e., a person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he:
a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;
b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or
c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.
A communication under subsection a. may be deemed to have been made either at the place where it originated or at the place where it was received.
d. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.443).
e. A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if, in committing an offense under this section, he was serving a term of imprisonment or was on parole or probation as the result of a conviction of any indictable offense under the laws of this State, any other state or the United States.
Sometimes an experienced attorney can negotiate with the prosecutor to have the charges reduced to a Municipal Ordinance. Other times for first offenders we can make a motion for the first offenders program, Conditional dismissal.
New law finally establishes a Conditional Dismissal Program in Municipal Court. Ken Vercammen testified in favor of the passage before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
The Conditional Dismissal program in Municipal Court for certain first-time offenders permits defense counsel to make a Motion that the charge would be dismissed at the end of a one year probationary period.
“This initiative will give a broader range of first-time offenders who have committed a minor offense an opportunity to turn their lives around,” “The program will help foster participants’ rehabilitation and future success by giving them appropriate penalties without having the offense be a part of their permanent criminal record.” This law also helps Police and Prosecutors since it requires a guilty plea, thus reducing the need for trials and officer testimony.
The law allows future Dismissal for many non-drug offenses, such as disorderly person’s offenses, which have not been able to participate in similar programs before.
“First-time offenders who are screened to meet the eligibility requirements will be able to use the program to avoid having a record that cannot be expunged until years after the sentence is served
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
33:1-81. Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor; disorderly person
fine 500-1,000
court costs and other penalties
33:1-81 It shall be unlawful for:
(a) A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or having served or delivered to him or her, any alcoholic beverage; or
(b) A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to consume any alcoholic beverage on premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages, or to purchase, attempt to purchase or have another purchase for him any alcoholic beverage; or
(c) Any person to misrepresent or misstate his age, or the age of any other person for the purpose of inducing any licensee or any employee of any licensee, to sell, serve or deliver any alcoholic beverage to a person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages; or
(d) Any person to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or to purchase alcoholic beverages, for another person who does not because of his age have the right to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages.
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed and adjudged to be a disorderly person, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500.00. In addition, the court shall suspend or postpone the person’s license to operate a motor vehicle for six months.
Upon the conviction of any person under this section, the court shall forward a report to the Division of Motor Vehicles stating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of license postponement, including a suspension or postponement of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period of six months after the person reaches the age of 17 years.
If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence has a valid driver’s license issued by this State, the court shall immediately collect the license and forward it to the division along with the report. If for any reason the license cannot be collected, the court shall include in the report the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person as well as the first and last date of the license suspension period imposed by the court.
The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement, the person shall be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S. 39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S. 39:3-40.
If the person convicted under this section is not a New Jersey resident, the court shall suspend or postpone, as appropriate given the age at the time of sentencing, the non-resident driving privilege of the person and submit to the division the required report. The court shall not collect the license of a non-resident convicted under this section. Upon receipt of a report by the court, the division shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction of the suspension or postponement.
In addition to the general penalties prescribed for an offense, the court may require any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who violates this act to participate in an alcohol education or treatment program authorized by the Department of Health for a period not to exceed the maximum period of confinement prescribed by law for the offense for which the individual has been convicted.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
2C:17-3 Criminal mischief
4th degree 0- 18 months $10,000 1 year- 5 year
3rd degree 3- 5 years $15,000 1 year- 5 year
Disorderly person criminal offenses- in Municipal Court
Jail 2C: 43- 8 jail 6 month maximum
probation 1-2 year max
community service 180 days maximum
Disorderly- fines: $1,000 Fine maximum under 2C: 43- 3
plus mandatory costs, VCCO and other penalties
ssly tampers with tangible property of another so as to endanger person or property, including the damaging or destroying of a rental premises by a tenant in retaliation for institution of eviction proceedings.
b. Grading. (1) Criminal mischief is a crime of the third degree if the actor purposely or knowingly causes pecuniary loss of $2,000.00 or more.
(2) Criminal mischief is a crime of the fourth degree if the actor causes pecuniary loss in excess of $500.00 but less than $2000.00. It is a disorderly persons offense if the actor causes pecuniary loss of $500.00 or less.
(3) Criminal mischief is a crime of the third degree if the actor damages, defaces, eradicates, alters, receives, releases or causes the loss of any research property used by the research facility, or otherwise causes physical disruption to the functioning of the research facility. The term "physical disruption" does not include any lawful activity that results from public, governmental, or research facility employee reaction to the disclosure of information about the research facility.
(4) Criminal mischief is a crime of the fourth degree if the actor damages, removes or impairs the operation of any device, including, but not limited to, a sign, signal, light or other equipment, which serves to regulate or ensure the safety of air traffic at any airport, landing field, landing strip, heliport, helistop or any other aviation facility; however, if the damage, removal or impediment of the device recklessly causes bodily injury or damage to property, the actor is guilty of a crime of the third degree, or if it recklessly causes a death, the actor is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
(5) Criminal mischief is a crime of the fourth degree if the actor interferes or tampers with any airport, landing field, landing strip, heliport, helistop or any other aviation facility; however if the interference or tampering with the airport, landing field, landing strip, heliport, helistop or other aviation facility recklessly causes bodily injury or damage to property, the actor is guilty of a crime of the third degree, or if it recklessly causes a death, the actor is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter. Read www.njlaws.com/jail_for_crimes_and_disorderly_conduct.html
If you or a family member are charged with a criminal offense, you should retain an experienced criminal attorney to argue to reduce the penalties!
Purposely
2C:2-2 . General requirements of culpability
a. Minimum requirements of culpability. Except as provided in subsection c.(3) of this section, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.
b. Kinds of culpability defined.
2C:2-2 b (1) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. "With purpose," "designed," "with design" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.
2C:2-2 b (2) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. "Knowing," "with knowledge" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.
Research by: KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
More information on Fines, jail and penalties on website: www.njlaws.com
[Copyright 2019 Vercammen Law Fines, Jail penalty criminal]
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2C:18-3 Unlicensed entry of structures; defiant trespasser; peering into dwelling places; defenses.
2C:18-3 . a. Unlicensed entry of structures. A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or surreptitiously remains in any research facility, structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, or in or upon utility company property, or in the sterile area or operational area of an airport. An offense under this subsection is a crime of the fourth degree if it is committed in a school or on school property. The offense is a crime of the fourth degree if it is committed in a dwelling. An offense under this section is a crime of the fourth degree if it is committed in a research facility, power generation facility, waste treatment facility, public sewage facility, water treatment facility, public water facility, nuclear electric generating plant or any facility which stores, generates or handles any hazardous chemical or chemical compounds. An offense under this subsection is a crime of the fourth degree if it is committed in or upon utility company property. An offense under this subsection is a crime of the fourth degree if it is committed in the sterile area or operational area of an airport. Otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.
4th degree max 18 months jail $10,000fine 1 year- 5 year probation
Disorderly person criminal offenses- ex Simple Assault, shoplifting & cases in Municipal Court
Jail 2C: 43- 8 jail 6 month maximum
probation 1-2 year max
community service 180 days maximum
Disorderly- fines: $1,000 Fine maximum under 2C: 43- 3
plus mandatory costs, VCCO and other penalties
There are many other penalties that the court must impose in criminal cases, including DNA testing. There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter.
Drug offenses: in addition to above penalties, mandatory minimum $500 DEDR penalty, mandatory lab fee and other court costs over $200, mandatory 6 month- 2 year loss of license, plus usual Probation, drug testing, DNA testing and other penalties. If attorney's Conditional Discharge motion is granted for first time offender. penalty can be reduced. In certain drug cases, the fine can be up to $75,000.
2C:18-3C
b. Defiant trespasser. A person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by:
(1) Actual communication to the actor; or
(2) Posting in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or
(3) Fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to exclude intruders.
c. Peering into windows or other openings of dwelling places. A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he peers into a window or other opening of a dwelling or other structure adapted for overnight accommodation for the purpose of invading the privacy of another person and under circumstances in which a reasonable person in the dwelling or other structure would not expect to be observed.
-Petty Disorderly person - 30 days jail maximum
Petty DP $500 max Fine, VCCB and other penalties & possible probation
d. Defenses. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that:
(1) A structure involved in an offense under subsection a. was abandoned;
(2) The structure was at the time open to members of the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the structure; or
(3) The actor reasonably believed that the owner of the structure, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him to enter or remain, or, in the case of subsection c. of this section, to peer.
Criminal Indictable and Disorderly Offense Penalties
Disorderly person criminal offenses- ex Simple Assault, shoplifting & cases in Municipal Court
Jail 2C: 43- 8 jail 6 month maximum
probation 1-2 year max
community service 180 days maximum
Disorderly- fines: $1,000 Fine maximum under 2C: 43- 3
plus mandatory costs, VCCO and other penalties
There are many other penalties that the court must impose in criminal cases, including DNA testing. There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter.
There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter. Read www.njlaws.com/jail_for_crimes_and_disorderly_conduct.html
If you or a family member are charged with a criminal offense, you should retain an experienced criminal attorney to argue to reduce the penalties!
Research by: KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
