State v. Randy K. Manning (A-10-18) (080834) Argued September 23, 2019 -- Decided January 13, 2020
ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.
The primary issue in this appeal is whether, during the interim period between passage of the amendment to the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic SurveillanceControl Act (Wiretap Act) in 2010 and the effective date of the Court’s decision in State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564 (2013), the constitutional warrant requirement and corresponding suppression remedy applied to securing cell-phone location information. This appeal also presents the issues of whether exceptions to the warrant requirement applied to securing that information and whether those same exceptions also applied to securing call-detail records under State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338 (1982).
Here, in 2011, after the Wiretap Act amendment went into effect but before theCourt’s decision in Earls, law-enforcement officers -- without a warrant or court order
-- obtained defendant Randy K. Manning’s cell-phone records by submitting an exigent- circumstances request to a cell-phone service provider. Thus, the constitutional propriety of the police conduct depends on the application of the exigent-circumstances doctrine.
On August 16, 2011, shortly after 8:00 a.m., the Bergen County Prosecutor’sOffice investigated the grisly murder of a victim who had died from multiple gunshot wounds and whose charred body was found in the rear of his Chevy. Detectives secured a judicially authorized warrant to search the vehicle. By the late afternoon or early evening of August 16, Detective John Frazer had two pieces of information that madedefendant “a person of interest”: defendant’s fake California license was found in theChevy owned by his friend, the victim, and defendant’s timeline of his claimed whereabouts seemingly conflicted with the victim’s cell-phone records.
Despite the securing of a search warrant earlier for the Chevy, Detective Frazer bypassed the warrant/court-order process and, that evening, submitted an exigent-circumstances request form to AT&T for defendant’s cell-phone records. Detective Frazer admittedly used the exigent-circumstances request “as an investigatory tool.”Although the detective stated that applying for a search warrant “was not practical at that time,” he conceded that he could have applied for a telephonic warrant. He gave noestimate of the time that it would have taken to apply for a telephonic warrant or to
ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.
The primary issue in this appeal is whether, during the interim period between passage of the amendment to the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic SurveillanceControl Act (Wiretap Act) in 2010 and the effective date of the Court’s decision in State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564 (2013), the constitutional warrant requirement and corresponding suppression remedy applied to securing cell-phone location information. This appeal also presents the issues of whether exceptions to the warrant requirement applied to securing that information and whether those same exceptions also applied to securing call-detail records under State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338 (1982).
Here, in 2011, after the Wiretap Act amendment went into effect but before theCourt’s decision in Earls, law-enforcement officers -- without a warrant or court order
-- obtained defendant Randy K. Manning’s cell-phone records by submitting an exigent- circumstances request to a cell-phone service provider. Thus, the constitutional propriety of the police conduct depends on the application of the exigent-circumstances doctrine.
On August 16, 2011, shortly after 8:00 a.m., the Bergen County Prosecutor’sOffice investigated the grisly murder of a victim who had died from multiple gunshot wounds and whose charred body was found in the rear of his Chevy. Detectives secured a judicially authorized warrant to search the vehicle. By the late afternoon or early evening of August 16, Detective John Frazer had two pieces of information that madedefendant “a person of interest”: defendant’s fake California license was found in theChevy owned by his friend, the victim, and defendant’s timeline of his claimed whereabouts seemingly conflicted with the victim’s cell-phone records.
Despite the securing of a search warrant earlier for the Chevy, Detective Frazer bypassed the warrant/court-order process and, that evening, submitted an exigent-circumstances request form to AT&T for defendant’s cell-phone records. Detective Frazer admittedly used the exigent-circumstances request “as an investigatory tool.”Although the detective stated that applying for a search warrant “was not practical at that time,” he conceded that he could have applied for a telephonic warrant. He gave noestimate of the time that it would have taken to apply for a telephonic warrant or to
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prepare an affidavit for a search warrant. Nor did he estimate the time it would have taken to secure a warrant, given that a Superior Court judge was on call.
Based on the cell-phone records, defendant became the target of the investigation. The next day, Detective Frazer submitted three separate and detailed affidavits in support of three warrants, including one for a wiretap of, and another for further communicationsdata from, defendant’s cell phone. According to Detective Gary Boesch, on August 17, defendant called the Bergen County Police Department and inquired whether the policewanted to speak with him. The next day Detective Boesch returned defendant’s call. OnAugust 19, defendant took public transportation to the Hackensack bus terminal, where Detective Boesch picked him up for questioning.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the warrantless search of hiscell-phone records based on the exigent-circumstances exception. Defendant was convicted of murder, desecration of human remains, and related crimes. In anunpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed defendant’s convictions on two grounds and remanded for a new trial. First, the Appellate Division held that the trial court erred in not granting defendant’s request for jury instructions on aggravatedmanslaughter and reckless manslaughter -- lesser-included offenses to the charge of murder. Second, the Appellate Division held that the failure of the police to secure a warrant or court order for defendant’s cell-phone records should have resulted in the suppression of those records.
The Court granted the State’s petition for certification “limited to the issue of theadmissibility of the defendant’s cell phone records.” 235 N.J. 311 (2018).
HELD: During the three-year interim period between passage of the amendment to theWiretap Act in 2010 and the effective date of the Court’s Earls decision in 2013, individuals possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone location information cognizable under our State Constitution. As in other contexts, exceptions to the constitutional warrant requirement -- such as consent or exigent circumstances
-- apply to securing cell-phone records. Therefore, in 2011, our Constitution required law-enforcement officers to obtain either a warrant or court order for cell-phone location information in accordance with the standards of N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29 or to satisfy one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. It also follows that, under Article I, Paragraph 7, the exclusionary rule applies to unconstitutional searches and seizures of cell-phone records. Here, the State did not obtain a warrant or court order and failed to satisfy its burden of proving that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search, requiring suppression of defendant’s cell-phone records.
1. In 2013, in Earls, the Court held that Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution afforded individuals a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell-phone location information. 214 N.J. at 588. In light of the constitutional right to privacy safeguarded
Based on the cell-phone records, defendant became the target of the investigation. The next day, Detective Frazer submitted three separate and detailed affidavits in support of three warrants, including one for a wiretap of, and another for further communicationsdata from, defendant’s cell phone. According to Detective Gary Boesch, on August 17, defendant called the Bergen County Police Department and inquired whether the policewanted to speak with him. The next day Detective Boesch returned defendant’s call. OnAugust 19, defendant took public transportation to the Hackensack bus terminal, where Detective Boesch picked him up for questioning.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the warrantless search of hiscell-phone records based on the exigent-circumstances exception. Defendant was convicted of murder, desecration of human remains, and related crimes. In anunpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed defendant’s convictions on two grounds and remanded for a new trial. First, the Appellate Division held that the trial court erred in not granting defendant’s request for jury instructions on aggravatedmanslaughter and reckless manslaughter -- lesser-included offenses to the charge of murder. Second, the Appellate Division held that the failure of the police to secure a warrant or court order for defendant’s cell-phone records should have resulted in the suppression of those records.
The Court granted the State’s petition for certification “limited to the issue of theadmissibility of the defendant’s cell phone records.” 235 N.J. 311 (2018).
HELD: During the three-year interim period between passage of the amendment to theWiretap Act in 2010 and the effective date of the Court’s Earls decision in 2013, individuals possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone location information cognizable under our State Constitution. As in other contexts, exceptions to the constitutional warrant requirement -- such as consent or exigent circumstances
-- apply to securing cell-phone records. Therefore, in 2011, our Constitution required law-enforcement officers to obtain either a warrant or court order for cell-phone location information in accordance with the standards of N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29 or to satisfy one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. It also follows that, under Article I, Paragraph 7, the exclusionary rule applies to unconstitutional searches and seizures of cell-phone records. Here, the State did not obtain a warrant or court order and failed to satisfy its burden of proving that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search, requiring suppression of defendant’s cell-phone records.
1. In 2013, in Earls, the Court held that Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution afforded individuals a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell-phone location information. 214 N.J. at 588. In light of the constitutional right to privacy safeguarded
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by Article I, Paragraph 7, the Court declared that law enforcement “must obtain a warrant based on a showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrantrequirement,” to secure cell-phone location information. Ibid. The Court determined that the Earls decision represented a new rule of law and therefore applied the warrant requirement for cell-phone location information prospectively. Id. at 591. The Court recognized, however, that since the 2010 amendment to the Wiretap Act, state law had required law enforcement to secure a court order or a warrant to obtain cell-phone location information from a service provider. Id. at 589 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29). (pp. 18-23)
2. The Court now holds that the constitutional warrant requirement applied to cell-phone location information during the three-year interim period between passage of theamendment to the Wiretap Act in 2010 and the effective date of the Court’s Earls decision in 2013. However, in light of Earls and the legitimate expectations of law enforcement under the Wiretap Act, the Court also determines that the standard for securing a court order for those records during the three-year interim period was the one set forth in the Act. That is, in the absence of an exception to the warrant requirement, to secure cell-phone location information from a service provider, law enforcement wasrequired, at the very least, to obtain a court order based on “specific and articulable factsshowing that there [were] reasonable grounds to believe that the record or other information . . . [was] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” See N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29(e). The Court also expressly holds that following the 2010 amendment to the Wiretap Act, law-enforcement officers were justified in relying on well-established exceptions to the State Constitution’s warrant requirement for securingcell-phone records, including the exigent-circumstances exception. Cell-phone records seized in violation of our State Constitution are subject to the exclusionary rule.
(pp. 24-25)
3. When the State invokes the exigent-circumstances exception to justify a warrantless search it must prove that law-enforcement officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that securing a warrant was not practicable because immediate action was necessary to stop the flight of a suspect, to safeguard members of the public from a threat of harm, or to prevent the destruction of evidence. The Court has never held that a generalized concern about public or police safety or the preservation of evidence would justify a warrantless search or seizure. (pp. 25-31)
4. Detective Frazer was unable to articulate anything more than a generalized concern for public safety and the preservation of evidence as reasons for not complying with the warrant requirement. He did not identify an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was a threat to the public or police, or that evidence might be destroyed, in the time it would have taken to obtain a warrant. After reviewing defendant’s cell-phone records and determining that defendant was clearly a suspect, the next day Detective Frazer prepared three separate and detailed affidavits for search warrants. The Prosecutor’s
2. The Court now holds that the constitutional warrant requirement applied to cell-phone location information during the three-year interim period between passage of theamendment to the Wiretap Act in 2010 and the effective date of the Court’s Earls decision in 2013. However, in light of Earls and the legitimate expectations of law enforcement under the Wiretap Act, the Court also determines that the standard for securing a court order for those records during the three-year interim period was the one set forth in the Act. That is, in the absence of an exception to the warrant requirement, to secure cell-phone location information from a service provider, law enforcement wasrequired, at the very least, to obtain a court order based on “specific and articulable factsshowing that there [were] reasonable grounds to believe that the record or other information . . . [was] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” See N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29(e). The Court also expressly holds that following the 2010 amendment to the Wiretap Act, law-enforcement officers were justified in relying on well-established exceptions to the State Constitution’s warrant requirement for securingcell-phone records, including the exigent-circumstances exception. Cell-phone records seized in violation of our State Constitution are subject to the exclusionary rule.
(pp. 24-25)
3. When the State invokes the exigent-circumstances exception to justify a warrantless search it must prove that law-enforcement officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that securing a warrant was not practicable because immediate action was necessary to stop the flight of a suspect, to safeguard members of the public from a threat of harm, or to prevent the destruction of evidence. The Court has never held that a generalized concern about public or police safety or the preservation of evidence would justify a warrantless search or seizure. (pp. 25-31)
4. Detective Frazer was unable to articulate anything more than a generalized concern for public safety and the preservation of evidence as reasons for not complying with the warrant requirement. He did not identify an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was a threat to the public or police, or that evidence might be destroyed, in the time it would have taken to obtain a warrant. After reviewing defendant’s cell-phone records and determining that defendant was clearly a suspect, the next day Detective Frazer prepared three separate and detailed affidavits for search warrants. The Prosecutor’s
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Office did not make any concerted effort to immediately interrogate or detain defendant.A review of the totality of the evidence reveals that the Prosecutor’s Office was able tocomply with the dictates of the warrant requirement of our State Constitution during the murder investigation. The State failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the warrantlesssearch of defendant’s cell-phone records was objectively reasonable to meet the type of exigency recognized in our jurisprudence. For the reasons expressed, the Court affirmsthe judgment of the Appellate Division vacating defendant’s convictions and remands the matter to the trial court. (pp. 31-36)
AFFIRMED. The matter is REMANDED for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED. The matter is REMANDED for further proceedings.
