NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4086-09T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TARIK MADISON and ANDRE
STANLEY,
Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________________________________________
Submitted February 15, 2011 - Decided
Before Judges Payne and Koblitz.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division,
Union County, Indictment No. 09-07-00669.
Theodore J. Romankow, Union County
Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Sara B.
Liebman, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the brief).
Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,
attorney for respondent Tarik Madison (Alan
I. Smith, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,
attorney for respondent Andre Stanley
(Alison Perrone, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
April 11, 2011
2 A-4086-09T2
We granted the State's motion for leave to appeal the trial
court's order of April 5, 2010, which granted defendants' motion
to suppress the evidence found as a result of an unlawful
search. On July 29, 2009, a Union County Grand Jury returned
Indictment No. 09-07-00669, charging defendant Andre Stanley
with third-degree possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)
(count one); and charging defendant Tarik Madison with thirddegree
distribution of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) (count four); third-degree distribution
of heroin and/or cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A
2C:35-5(b)(3) (count five); second-degree distribution of heroin
within 500 feet of a public housing facility, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1
(count six); second-degree distribution of heroin and/or cocaine
within 500 feet of a public housing facility, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1
(count seven); and fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A.
2C:29-2(a) (count eight). Co-defendant Geraude Stewart was
charged with third-degree possession of heroin and/or cocaine,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count two), and co-defendant Michael
Walsh was charged with third-degree possession of cocaine,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (count three).1 After reviewing the record
1 Neither Stewart nor Walsh joined in the motion to suppress and
thus did not participate in this appeal.
3 A-4086-09T2
in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we reverse the
trial court's order suppressing the evidence.
Plainfield Police Officer Adam Green, the only witness at
the pre-trial hearing, testified to the following facts. At
approximately 2:00 p.m. an April 2, 2009, Green and Sergeant
Kevin O’Brien began performing surveillance of the Elmwood
Gardens Public Housing Complex, which Green testified was “a
high crime, high narcotics area.” At approximately 3:40 p.m.,
Green and O’Brien saw co-defendant Stewart enter the complex and
stop in front of 528 West Second Street. O’Brien “immediately
recognized him and related to [Green] that he recognized that
male from an earlier narcotic[s] investigation” at the same
location.
Defendant Madison approached Stewart. O’Brien “immediately
recognized” Madison as well. O’Brien told Green “that he had
received numerous complaints about Mr. Madison conducting
narcotic activity, distribution of narcotics, from . . . 544
West Second Street." O'Brien said he had dealt with Madison
"several times in the past regarding distribution of narcotics
and other related offenses." After Madison approached Stewart,
they engaged in a brief conversation before walking towards the
building located at 544 West Second Street and entering it.
Green was unable to see the men once they entered the building.
4 A-4086-09T2
A minute after the two men entered the building, Stewart exited
and walked over to a white Ford Explorer. A short time later,
Madison exited the building and entered the building located at
536 West Second Street. Green testified that based on his
experience people frequently engage in drug transactions in
common hallways. Based on his observations and the information
related to him by O’Brien, Green believed Madison had sold drugs
to Stewart.
When Green noticed that Stewart was about to enter the Ford
Explorer, he called for backup. Lieutenant Newman,2 accompanied
by additional police officers, stopped the Explorer after it
exited the housing complex. While approaching the Explorer,
Newman saw the driver, Walsh, put something in his mouth. Green
explained that it was not uncommon for people to ingest drugs to
avoid arrest.
Newman grabbed Walsh's mouth and recovered “one clear
plastic knot which contained . . . crack cocaine." Walsh was
arrested, and Stewart was then searched. Police found crack
cocaine and heroin in Stewart’s pocket. The heroin was stamped
“Bentley” on the packaging. Neither Stewart nor Walsh disclosed
the source of the drugs.
2 Lieutenant Newman's first name was not in the record.
5 A-4086-09T2
At 6:10 p.m. that same day, the officers saw Madison exit
the 544 West Second Street building. He walked east while
talking on his cell phone until he met defendant Andre Stanley.
None of the police officers had any previous information about
Stanley. Stanley and Madison engaged in a brief conversation
and walked to 544 West Second Street where they entered the
front of the building and came out a minute later. Green could
not see what the men did inside the building. Stanley then
walked west quickly, and Madison headed east slowly, while
looking back at Stanley. Green believed that he "had just
observed a second narcotics transaction."
Green directed that Stanley be stopped and searched. The
police kept Stanley in sight until they stopped him and found
heroin on his person with the marking “Bentley” on the
packaging.
Madison was arrested approximately three months later
pursuant to an arrest warrant. In a written decision, the trial
court found that the evidence should be suppressed because "the
totality of the circumstances fail[ed] to support a finding of
probable cause." The decision was based primarily on State v.
Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004).
The State raised the following arguments on appeal,
6 A-4086-09T2
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
A. The Trial Court Incorrectly Found
That Defendant Madison had Standing To
Challenge the Seizure of Narcotics From
Walsh, Stewart, and Stanley; Further
The Court Erred in Failing to Examine
Madison's Expectation of Privacy in the
Drugs he Sold and in the Persons of
Those To Whom he Sold Those Drugs.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Use the
Totality of the Circumstances Test to
Determine Whether the Police had
Probable Cause, Ignored Facts
Establishing Probable Cause,
Incorrectly Concluded that the Police
Lacked Probable Cause to Arrest and
Search The Buyers, Including Defendant
Stanley; Further, the Court Ignored the
Fact that Defendant Madison was
arrested Pursuant to a Warrant.
I
The State concedes that Stanley has standing to challenge
the search of his person and subsequent seizure of the heroin on
his person. The State argues, however, that Madison does not
have standing to challenge the searches and seizure of drugs
from his three co-defendants as he was not searched personally
and abandoned his interest in the drugs when he sold them.
A defendant must have standing to challenge the validity of
a search and seizure of evidence. State v. Bruns, 172 N.J. 40,
43 (2002). In Bruns, the defendant sought to suppress evidence
7 A-4086-09T2
seized from a vehicle that was subject to a warrantless stop and
search for reasons unrelated to the robbery defendant allegedly
committed. Id. at 43. The defendant had no connection with the
vehicle, but the evidence seized from it implicated him in the
robbery. Id. at 44-45. The Court found that the defendant did
not have standing, stating:
In order to contest at trial the admission
of evidence obtained by a search or seizure,
a defendant must first demonstrate that he
has standing. Generally speaking, that
requires a court to inquire whether
defendant has interests that are substantial
enough to qualify him as a person aggrieved
by the allegedly unlawful search and
seizure.
[Id. at 46.]
The Court noted that the standing requirement is broader
under the New Jersey Constitution, Article I, ¶ 7, than under
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Ibid.
In New Jersey, standing depends upon "whether that defendant has
a proprietary, possessory or participatory interest in the place
searched or the items seized." Ibid. The Court explained that
"in most cases in which the police seize evidence implicating a
defendant in a crime that defendant will be able to establish an
interest in the property seized or place searched." Id. at 59.
The term "participatory"
connotes some involvement in the underlying
criminal conduct in which the seized
8 A-4086-09T2
evidence is used by the participants to
carry out the unlawful activity . . . . It
thus provides standing to a person who,
challenging the seizure and prosecutorial
use of incriminating evidence, had some
culpable role, whether as a principal,
conspirator, or accomplice in a criminal
activity that itself generated the evidence.
[State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 339-40
(1989).]
The Court in Bruns noted that a defendant's basis for
challenging the search will be diminished if "substantial time
passes between the crime and the seizure of the evidence and a
proprietary connection between defendant and the evidence no
longer exists." Bruns, supra, 172 N.J. at 59. The Court also
explained that "a showing that the search was not directed at
the defendant or at someone who is connected to the crime for
which he has been charged also will diminish a defendant's
interest in the property searched or seized.” Ibid. (citing
United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1980)).
The defendant in Bruns was found not to have standing
because
the passage of seven days between the crime
and the seizure of the evidence, defendant's
lack of any physical proximity to the
evidence when it was seized, as well as the
lack of any connection between defendant and
the events leading to the initial motor
vehicle stop or the arrest that eventually
resulted in the search of the vehicle
preclude[d] him from having standing to
challenge the vehicle search.
9 A-4086-09T2
[Ibid.]
The State is correct that Madison does not have a
possessory or proprietary interest in the drugs seized because
the drugs were not found in his constructive or actual
possession. Madison is charged, however, with selling the drugs
to his co-defendants immediately before the men were searched.
The State intends to use the drugs seized from the other
individuals as evidence of Madison's guilt. Under these
circumstances, as the trial court found, Madison has a
sufficient participatory interest to challenge the
constitutionality of the seizure of the drugs.
II
Both Madison and Stanley allege that the police searches
and subsequent arrests of Stanley, Walsh and Stewart violated
the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. The Fourth
Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also N.J.
Const. art. I, ¶ 7. Not all police-citizen encounters implicate
the Fourth Amendment. For instance, police may approach a
person in a public place and ask him if he is willing to answer
questions without any grounds for suspicion. State v.
Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 125-26 (2002). However, when a person
10 A-4086-09T2
is temporarily detained by police and feels his right to move
has been restricted, it constitutes a "seizure" of his person
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 126. Thus,
the Fourth Amendment requires that such detentions be
reasonable. Ibid.
"It is well-settled that the police may arrest only if they
have probable cause; may stop for brief investigatory
questioning if they have an articulable, reasonable basis for
suspicion; and they may make an inquiry without any grounds or
suspicion." State v. Sirianni, 347 N.J. Super. 382, 387 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 172 N.J. 178 (2002) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). “Brief, non-intrusive encounters
with individuals on the street or in parked cars implicate none
of the privacy or security concerns engendered by discretionary
police spot checks of moving vehicles.” Ibid.
"Probable cause exists if at the time of the police action
there is a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is
being committed." State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 211 (2001).
The determination "requires nothing more than a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances . . .
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found . . . ." State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192,
214 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In
11 A-4086-09T2
making this determination, consideration is given to any
reasonable inference that the officer draws from the facts in
light of his experience. Id. at 215 (citation omitted).
The trial court found that the police had reasonable
suspicion to stop Walsh, Stewart and Stanley based on Stewart
and Stanley's interactions with Madison, but that these
interactions did not give the police probable cause to arrest or
search the men. In finding that the police lacked probable
cause to search Walsh, Stewart and Stanley, the trial court
analogized the facts in this case to those in Pineiro, supra,
181 N.J. at 18, where the Court found that the police did not
have probable cause to search an individual known to the police
as a drug user after seeing him receive a pack of cigarettes
from the defendant who was a suspected drug dealer. The Court
found that "the passing of the cigarette pack just as easily
could have been nothing more than the transfer of a cigarette
pack between two adults." Id. at 29. In relying on the
reasoning in Pineiro, the trial court did not address the
additional factor for consideration present here, that the
police saw Walsh make a furtive gesture towards his mouth, which
afforded the police probable cause to retrieve the crack
cocaine.
12 A-4086-09T2
We agree with the trial court that the police had
reasonable suspicion to stop the Explorer. The police received
numerous complaints from members of the Elmwood Gardens
community that Madison was selling narcotics from an apartment
located at 544 West Second Street. "There is an assumption
grounded in common experience that [an ordinary citizen] is
motivated by factors that are consistent with law enforcement
goals." State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 506 (1986). Therefore,
"an individual of this kind may be regarded as trustworthy and
information imparted by him to a policeman concerning a criminal
event would not especially entail further exploration or
verification of his personal credibility or reliability before
appropriate police action is taken." Ibid. (quoting State v.
Lakomy, 126 N.J. Super. 430, 435 (App. Div. 1974)). After
receiving the citizen complaints, the police observed Stewart
suspiciously interact with Madison at the suspected location and
then enter the Explorer. The police had sufficient grounds to
conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle at that time.
We find that the police subsequently obtained probable
cause to search Walsh once they saw him move his hand to his
mouth after being pulled over because he was with Stewart, who
they suspected had just participated in a drug transaction.
13 A-4086-09T2
The courts have recognized that associating with known drug
offenders is a legitimate factor in assessing probable cause,
especially where corroborating circumstances are present. State
v. Williams, 117 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div.), aff’d, 59 N.J. 535
(1971). In Williams, while investigating reports of illegal
drug activity in a known high-drug area, the police observed
Williams talking to a drug offender. Id. at 376. The police
pulled up behind Williams, exited their patrol car and
approached him. Ibid. After looking in the officers'
direction, Williams discarded a package on the floor of his car,
which was seized and found to contain illegal drugs. Ibid. We
found that the police had probable cause to believe that the
package contained evidence of a crime. Ibid. In this matter,
the police knew Stewart, the passenger in the vehicle Walsh was
driving, from prior drug investigations and also had just seen
Stewart interact suspiciously with another individual suspected
of distributing drugs.
The fact that Walsh, the driver, appeared to place
something in his mouth after being stopped by the police coupled
with the passenger's, Stewart, recent interaction with Madison
gave the police probable cause to search Walsh. See State v.
Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 447 (1973); State v. Harris, 384 N.J.
Super. 29, 48 (App. Div. 2006). The facts in Sheffield and
14 A-4086-09T2
Harris relate to those present here because both cases involved
individuals attempting to conceal drugs in their mouths after
being confronted by the police.
In Sheffield, supra, the police observed the defendant, "a
known narcotics' pusher and dealer," who the police had
previously arrested on a narcotics charge and who the officer
conducting surveillance had seen in the area approximately forty
times. 62 N.J. at 443-44. When the police approached the
defendant in an unmarked car, he did not respond and walked
quickly in the opposite direction of the police car. Id. at
444. The officer then exited the car and followed the defendant
while calling his name. As he did so, the officer saw the
defendant put his hand to his mouth. Ibid. Once the officer
caught up with the defendant, he pushed the officer away. Ibid.
The officer proceeded to attempt to arrest the defendant for
assault and a struggle ensued during which the defendant fell to
the ground and drugs fell out of his mouth. Ibid. The Court
found that after seeing the defendant "make a gesture to his
mouth," the officer had probable cause to "suspect criminal
activity on defendant's part." Id. at 445. The officer in
Sheffield also said that "based on his experience on the
narcotics squad [the] defendant's gesture indicated he was
15 A-4086-09T2
attempting to conceal narcotics evidence." Id. at 444. The
Court explained that:
A narcotics officer is especially qualified
to detect traffic in narcotic drugs. He
learns through experience how to spot an
addict or pusher, how an addict or pusher
acts and reacts, and where the areas of
narcotics activity are. When an officer
applies his expertise in a narcotics
situation, it should not be given grudging
recognition when assaying the existence of
cause to take police action.
[Id. at 445.]
In Harris, supra, while one police officer went inside to
investigate an unrelated crime in a bar, the police officer who
remained in the unmarked car saw two men walking down the
street. One man, the defendant, was counting money. 384 N.J.
Super. at 40. The men reversed direction after they saw the
uniformed police officer exit the bar. Ibid. The officers then
went to a nearby alleyway that one officer, based on his
experience in conducting narcotics investigations, knew was
often used for drug transactions. Ibid. The officers parked
outside of the alleyway, exited the car and entered the alleyway
from opposite sides to prevent the men from running away. Id.
at 41. The officers saw both men and "[a] torn up piece of a
cigar and tobacco, which [one officer] suspected to be a 'blunt'
- - a hollowed out cigar use for smoking marijuana," at their
feet. Ibid. One officer attempted to speak with the defendant,
16 A-4086-09T2
whom he recognized from previous arrests on narcotics charges,
but noticed that he was having difficulty speaking, "as if he
were concealing something in his mouth." Ibid. The officer
then proceeded to ask the defendant to spit out whatever was in
his mouth, and the defendant complied, spitting out a plastic
bag of marijuana. Ibid. Probable cause to inspect the object
in the defendant's mouth developed in large part because he
seemed to be hiding something in his mouth and was
"uncharacteristically friendly" to the police officers. Ibid.
We said "in light of all the facts and circumstances that gave
rise to reasonable suspicion, it was reasonable for the officers
to believe further that [the] defendant was concealing evidence
of illegal drug activity." Ibid.
The circumstances here are similar to those in Sheffield
and Harris because the police had reasonable suspicion to stop
the Explorer based on their observations in a high-crime area
known for drug activity. Probable cause to believe that Walsh
was concealing evidence of illegal drug activity developed after
he moved his hand to his mouth. The police then had a "wellgrounded
suspicion that a crime has been or [was] being
committed." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515 (2003).
Although the police did not recognize Walsh or see him interact
with Madison, they recognized the passenger, Stewart, from
17 A-4086-09T2
previous investigations, received tips from the community that
Madison was selling drugs and observed the two men conduct what
they believed to be a drug transaction. The police had
reasonable suspicion to stop the car after Stewart entered it,
and subsequently acquired probable cause after seeing Walsh move
his hand towards his mouth. Therefore, based on the officers'
knowledge and observations of Walsh's association with Stewart,
they had probable cause to search him when he motioned towards
his mouth after being stopped by the police. We must, however,
still consider whether exigent circumstances were present.
A warrantless search is justified by exigent circumstances
where "the search is supported by probable cause and is
necessary to prevent the disappearance of the suspect or of
evidence, and where the circumstances fail to permit the
searching officer sufficient time to obtain a warrant.” State
v. Guerrero, 232 N.J. Super. 507, 511 (App. Div. 1989).
However, "the destructible nature of drug evidence, in and of
itself, does not constitute an exigency sufficient to avoid the
warrant requirement." State v. De La Paz, 337 N.J. Super. 181,
198 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 295 (2001).
The following factors are to be considered when determining
whether exigent circumstances are present:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the
amount of time necessary to obtain a
18 A-4086-09T2
warrant; (2) reasonable belief that the
contraband is about to be removed; (3) the
possibility of danger to police officers
guarding the site of contraband while a
search warrant is sought; (4) information
indicating the possessors of the contraband
are aware that the police are on their
trail; (5) the ready destructibility of the
contraband and the knowledge that efforts to
dispose of narcotics and to escape are
characteristic behavior of persons engaged
in narcotics traffic; (6) the gravity of the
offense involved; (7) the possibility that
the suspect is armed; (8) the strength or
weakness of the facts establishing probable
cause[;] and (9) the time of entry.
[State v. Alvarez, 238 N.J. Super. 560, 568
(App. Div. 1990).]
Regardless of the disposability of the evidence, if a search is
undertaken solely for investigative purposes and without
probable cause, its results will be suppressed. See, e.g.,
State v. Baker, 112 N.J. Super. 351, 358 (App. Div. 1970).
We find that exigent circumstances were present justifying
the warrantless searches of Walsh and Stewart because Walsh was
concealing the drugs in his mouth and could have swallowed them,
and because exigent circumstances are generally present when an
officer has probable cause to believe that an individual
possesses drugs in the officer's presence. See Nishina, supra,
175 N.J. at 517; Guerrero, supra, 232 N.J. Super. at 512.
In Guerrero, supra, we found that there were exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless search of the defendant
19 A-4086-09T2
because the police had probable cause to believe that the
defendant had just "engaged in a narcotics transaction and . . .
there was insufficient time in which to procure a warrant
because of the likelihood that evidence on the defendant's
person would be consumed, hidden or sold." 62 N.J. at 443-44.
The police in Guerrero saw the defendant exchange money for a
small object that they believed to be drugs, but they did not
recognize the defendant or the individual who sold the drugs
from any previous investigations nor did they receive any tips
that the defendant or the other individual were involved in drug
activity.
In support of finding exigent circumstances in Guerrero, we
discussed our decision in State v. Smith, 129 N.J. Super. 430
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 66 N.J. 327 (1974), where an
experienced police officer was conducting surveillance of an
alleged drug distribution location. The defendant, who the
officer recognized as having committed previous narcotics
offenses, exited a car parked in front of the building, entered
the building and returned to the car moments later. Id. at 432-
33. The police stopped the car, ordered defendant out of the
vehicle and searched him, recovering heroin in one of his shoes.
Id. at 33. We found that the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement applied because the officers had
20 A-4086-09T2
probable cause to believe that the defendant had just purchased
narcotics and thus was in possession of them at the time of the
stop. Id. at 435.
The Court in Nishina cited Guerrero with approval and
applied its exigency rationale to a search of an individual
after the officer had probable cause to believe the individual
possessed contraband in the officer's presence. Nishina, supra,
175 N.J. at 517. The rationale of Nishina and Guerrero is
applicable to Walsh, since in attempting to hide the drugs from
police, he could have swallowed them and destroyed the evidence.
Although the police did not witness a drug transaction
between Stewart and Madison because their interaction took place
inside a building, the police discovered crack cocaine on Walsh,
heightening their reasonable suspicion of Stewart to probable
cause to search him. The police reasonably linked the two men
together as sharing a joint purpose because Stewart was the
passenger in the Explorer driven by Walsh. In Smith, supra, the
police received an anonymous phone call and a tip from a
reliable informant that drugs were being dispensed from a
particular location. 129 N.J. Super. at 434. Although the
police did not witness any drug transaction, we found that the
"[d]efendant's known narcotics record; his recent presence in
areas being investigated for narcotics activity; his presence at
21 A-4086-09T2
[the specific address indicated by the two sources] for a period
just long enough to make a narcotics purchase and his furtive
glances after exiting under the circumstances" gave the police
probable cause to search him. Id. at 434-35. We noted that
although none of these factors alone would have provided the
police with probable cause, the combination of factors justified
the search of the defendant. Id. at 434. Here, the police
received anonymous complaints from members of the community that
Madison was selling drugs at 544 West Second Street and saw
Stewart, who they recognized from a prior drug investigation at
the same location, enter that building with Madison and leave
after approximately one minute. These factors coupled with the
discovery of drugs on Stewart's companion, Walsh, minutes later,
gave the police probable cause to search Stewart.
Under Nishina, once the police had probable cause to
believe that Stewart had drugs on his person in their presence,
exigent circumstances permitted an immediate search without a
warrant because "evidence could have been consumed, hidden or
sold by the time . . . a warrant was issued." Nishina, supra,
175 N.J. at 517 (quoting Guerrero, supra, 232 N.J. Super. at
512).
Although the police did not know anything about Stanley
before observing him interact with Madison, the police had
22 A-4086-09T2
probable cause to believe that Stanley had just purchased drugs
from Madison before searching him. After observing Stewart's
interactions with Madison, lawfully seizing drugs from Stewart
and Walsh and then observing Stanley's interactions with Madison
only a few hours later, the police had probable cause to believe
that Stanley had purchased drugs from Madison. Both Stanley and
Stewart entered the same building with Madison and exited it
after a very short period of time. Additionally, after exiting
the building, Stanley proceeded to walk very quickly away from
the building in the opposite direction of Madison.
Not only did the police have probable cause, but they also
had exigent circumstances to search Stanley, given that he could
have discarded or destroyed the evidence if the police had
waited to secure a warrant.
We therefore reverse the trial court's order suppressing
the drugs seized from Walsh, Stewart and Stanley.
Reversed.
