25.
Right to Counsel Not Established by Desire to
Speak with Mother. State v.
Diaz-Bridges 208 NJ 544 (2012)
Because
neither defendant’s statements about his desire to speak with his mother nor
any of his other statements were assertions of his constitutionally-protected
right to silence, the suppression of any portion of his confession was in error.
1. To determine whether a defendant invoked the right
to remain silent, the Court employs a totality of the circumstances approach
that focuses on the reasonable interpretation of defendant’s words and
behaviors. If the suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent is clear
and unambiguous, it must be scrupulously honored. If, however, the invocation
is equivocal or ambiguous, leaving the investigating officer reasonably unsure
whether the suspect was asserting that right, the Court has not required that
the interrogation cease, but has instead permitted officers to clarify the
ambiguous words or acts. Because both the words used and the suspect’s
behaviors form part of the inquiry into whether the officer should have reasonably
believed that the right was being asserted, the inquiry demands a
fact-sensitive analysis. When the trial court’s factual findings are based only
on its viewing of a recorded interrogation that is equally available to the
appellate court, the appellate court may consider the recording itself and
deference to the trial court’s interpretation is not required.
2. Although
the mere request by an adult to speak with a parent does not equate to an
invocation of the right to remain silent, the totality of the circumstances
approach implicates considerations other than the suspect’s words, including
changes in demeanor and emotional responses to questions about a crime. There
is no basis on which to conclude, merely because a suspect responds to a question
by weeping or moaning, or with other changes in behavior, that he or she
intends to invoke the right to silence. Although those behaviors form part of
the larger mosaic of the circumstances to be considered, none of them taken
alone is a sufficient indication of a decision to invoke the right to silence
that the immediate cessation of the interrogation must follow.
3. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, defendant did not invoke his right to silence. Defendant
willingly agreed to speak with the police on multiple occasions. Although when
confronted with inconsistencies in his various stories, defendant’s demeanor
changed and he began to weep, one cannot reasonably equate that response with
the invocation of any right. Nor is his request to speak with his mother of
constitutional significance. Nothing in the words that defendant used suggested
that he was asking for the questioning to stop or intended to invoke his right
to silence. When defendant did clarify the reasons for the request, he told the
detectives that he wanted to be the first to tell his mother what he had done.
He repeatedly told them that he was willing to continue speaking with them. As
a result, his requests to speak with his mother cannot be interpreted to have
been a desire to secure her advice about the waiver of his rights or an
assertion of silence pending the grant of permission to speak with her.
4. Contrary to the trial court’s findings, the
record does not support a finding that defendant was overborne by exhaustion or
psychological stress, unfairly pressured, or told that he was required to
answer the interrogators questions. Although the appellate panel found that
defendant’s statement at six hours and five minutes sufficed to invoke the right
to silence, there is nothing in those words that differed from his earlier
assertions. Although the panel relied on defendant’s statement that he wanted
to go home, that assertion was made when he was alone in the interrogation room
and there is no indication that the detectives were aware of that statement.
5. Defendant’s requests to speak with his
mother sprang from the very understandable desire to tell her what he had done
before she heard it from the police and to hear her words of comfort. Those
requests, based on all of the circumstances, did not at any time constitute
defendant’s invocation of his right to silence.
