STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DANIEL A. BORJAS
A-6292-11T2
Defendant was found guilty by a jury of three counts
of knowingly making false government documents, second-
degree offenses proscribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(b), and
four counts of knowingly possessing false government
documents, fourth-degree offenses proscribed by N.J.S.A.
2C:21-2.1(d). The incriminating items were created or
stored in hard drives on computers at defendant's
residence. The items were discovered by law enforcement
officers pursuant to a search warrant, although the
officers found no printouts of the false items.
We reject defendant's argument that subsections (b) and (d) of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1 are unconstitutionally overbroad because they allegedly infringe too much upon protected forms of expression. In doing so, we do not foreclose a future "as-applied" challenge to the statute by an artist, student, or other person who, unlike the present defendant, makes or stores false images for benign reasons involving constitutionally-protected speech.
Additionally, we reject defendant's argument that the statute is void for vagueness because it lacks an express element requiring the State to prove a defendant's specific intent to use the false items for illicit purposes. We also reject defendant's criticisms of the trial judge's jury instruction defining the term "document" under the statute to encompass items or images stored on a computer. The instruction is consistent with the broader meaning associated with the term "document" in common modern usage.
In an unpublished portion of the opinion, we uphold defendant's seventy-eight-month flat custodial sentence.
We reject defendant's argument that subsections (b) and (d) of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1 are unconstitutionally overbroad because they allegedly infringe too much upon protected forms of expression. In doing so, we do not foreclose a future "as-applied" challenge to the statute by an artist, student, or other person who, unlike the present defendant, makes or stores false images for benign reasons involving constitutionally-protected speech.
Additionally, we reject defendant's argument that the statute is void for vagueness because it lacks an express element requiring the State to prove a defendant's specific intent to use the false items for illicit purposes. We also reject defendant's criticisms of the trial judge's jury instruction defining the term "document" under the statute to encompass items or images stored on a computer. The instruction is consistent with the broader meaning associated with the term "document" in common modern usage.
In an unpublished portion of the opinion, we uphold defendant's seventy-eight-month flat custodial sentence.
