cannot consider Sup Mt testimony unless agreed by defendant
State v Gibson __ NJ __
A-11-13
Due to the
fundamental differences between a pre-trial motion to suppress and a trial on
the merits, the best practice is to conduct two separate proceedings. However,
the motion record may be incorporated into the trial record if both parties
consent and counsel are given wide latitude in cross-examination. Where the
evidence from a pre-trial hearing is improperly admitted at the trial on the
merits, the correct remedy is remand for a new trial.
fundamental differences between a pre-trial motion to suppress and a trial on
the merits, the best practice is to conduct two separate proceedings. However,
the motion record may be incorporated into the trial record if both parties
consent and counsel are given wide latitude in cross-examination. Where the
evidence from a pre-trial hearing is improperly admitted at the trial on the
merits, the correct remedy is remand for a new trial.
State of New Jersey v. Bruno Gibson (A-11-13) (072257)
Argued March 31, 2014 -- Decided September 16, 2014
CUFF, P.J.A.D. (temporarily assigned), writing for a
unanimous Court.
unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court determines the correct
remedy when a municipal court convicts a defendant solely based on evidence
adduced in a pre-trial suppression hearing, without defendant’s consent but
without objection.
remedy when a municipal court convicts a defendant solely based on evidence
adduced in a pre-trial suppression hearing, without defendant’s consent but
without objection.
Defendant appeared before the municipal court for a
pre-trial hearing to suppress the fruits of the stop and subsequent arrest.
Following Mueller’s testimony at the suppression hearing and review of video
footage of the stop, the municipal court determined that reasonable suspicion
for the stop and probable cause for defendant’s arrest existed, and denied
defendant’s motion to suppress. After the suppression hearing, the State
inquired whether it was necessary for Mueller to testify again at trial since
the State would be relying strictly on Mueller’s physical observations. The
court asked defense counsel whether there was sufficient basis for the court to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was intoxicated. In response,
defense counsel commenced his summation, arguing that the State’s evidence
failed to satisfy its burden of proof. The court did not ask whether defense
counsel wanted to conduct further cross-examination of Mueller, and counsel did
not object. Relying on the observational evidence, the municipal court found
defendant guilty of DUI and failing to signal.
pre-trial hearing to suppress the fruits of the stop and subsequent arrest.
Following Mueller’s testimony at the suppression hearing and review of video
footage of the stop, the municipal court determined that reasonable suspicion
for the stop and probable cause for defendant’s arrest existed, and denied
defendant’s motion to suppress. After the suppression hearing, the State
inquired whether it was necessary for Mueller to testify again at trial since
the State would be relying strictly on Mueller’s physical observations. The
court asked defense counsel whether there was sufficient basis for the court to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was intoxicated. In response,
defense counsel commenced his summation, arguing that the State’s evidence
failed to satisfy its burden of proof. The court did not ask whether defense
counsel wanted to conduct further cross-examination of Mueller, and counsel did
not object. Relying on the observational evidence, the municipal court found
defendant guilty of DUI and failing to signal.
Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, the
court found that the State carried its burden of proof to establish that
defendant drove while intoxicated, describing the evidence as “overwhelming.”
The Law Division noted that Mueller’s testimony was credible, unrebutted and
corroborated by the videotape. With respect to defendant’s argument that the
municipal court violated his right to procedural due process by deciding the
merits of the case based on the suppression motion record, the Law Division
recognized that the municipal court did not follow normal procedures, but noted
that defense counsel neither objected, sought to admit additional evidence, nor
sought additional cross-examination. The Law Division concluded that defendant
failed to show he was prejudiced.
court found that the State carried its burden of proof to establish that
defendant drove while intoxicated, describing the evidence as “overwhelming.”
The Law Division noted that Mueller’s testimony was credible, unrebutted and
corroborated by the videotape. With respect to defendant’s argument that the
municipal court violated his right to procedural due process by deciding the
merits of the case based on the suppression motion record, the Law Division
recognized that the municipal court did not follow normal procedures, but noted
that defense counsel neither objected, sought to admit additional evidence, nor
sought additional cross-examination. The Law Division concluded that defendant
failed to show he was prejudiced.
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, concluding
that the municipal court was not empowered to consider the pre-trial hearing
evidence in the trial on the merits, and to proceed to closing argument without
expressly asking defense counsel if he intended to call witnesses. The panel
emphasized that the suppression hearing and trial are governed by different
rules and determine discrete issues. Moreover, differing standards of proof
influence the scope of cross-examination and presentation of witnesses in each
proceeding, and suppression hearings may include evidence that is inadmissible
at trial. The panel also noted that a person charged with DUI has broad
procedural rights, including the right to confront the witnesses and evidence
against him. Determining that the State presented no evidence to permit either
the municipal court or the Law Division to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant operated a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, the panel
directed the Law Division to enter a judgment of acquittal. This Court granted
the State’s petition for certification. 215 N.J. 488 (2013).
that the municipal court was not empowered to consider the pre-trial hearing
evidence in the trial on the merits, and to proceed to closing argument without
expressly asking defense counsel if he intended to call witnesses. The panel
emphasized that the suppression hearing and trial are governed by different
rules and determine discrete issues. Moreover, differing standards of proof
influence the scope of cross-examination and presentation of witnesses in each
proceeding, and suppression hearings may include evidence that is inadmissible
at trial. The panel also noted that a person charged with DUI has broad
procedural rights, including the right to confront the witnesses and evidence
against him. Determining that the State presented no evidence to permit either
the municipal court or the Law Division to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant operated a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, the panel
directed the Law Division to enter a judgment of acquittal. This Court granted
the State’s petition for certification. 215 N.J. 488 (2013).
HELD: Due to the
fundamental differences between a pre-trial motion to suppress and a trial on
the merits, the best
fundamental differences between a pre-trial motion to suppress and a trial on
the merits, the best
practice is to conduct two separate proceedings.
However, the motion record may be incorporated into the trial record if both
parties consent and counsel are given wide latitude in cross-examination. Where
the evidence from a
However, the motion record may be incorporated into the trial record if both
parties consent and counsel are given wide latitude in cross-examination. Where
the evidence from a
pre-trial hearing is improperly admitted at the trial
on the merits, the correct remedy is remand for a new trial.
on the merits, the correct remedy is remand for a new trial.
1. Municipal court proceedings are quasi-criminal
proceedings in which defendants are entitled to due process of law. A defendant
charged with a DUI enjoys a broad array of procedural rights, including a trial
in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and the right to confront
witnesses. State v. Allan, 283 N.J. Super. 622 (Law Div. 1995) is
the only reported opinion addressing the practice of incorporating the evidence
from a suppression motion into the trial record. There, the Law Division
cautioned against the continued use of this common practice, finding that the better
practice is to conduct two separate proceedings. However, the Law Division
noted that the motion testimony and exhibits could be incorporated in the trial
record if both counsel consented and defense counsel had been given wide
latitude during cross-examination.
proceedings in which defendants are entitled to due process of law. A defendant
charged with a DUI enjoys a broad array of procedural rights, including a trial
in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and the right to confront
witnesses. State v. Allan, 283 N.J. Super. 622 (Law Div. 1995) is
the only reported opinion addressing the practice of incorporating the evidence
from a suppression motion into the trial record. There, the Law Division
cautioned against the continued use of this common practice, finding that the better
practice is to conduct two separate proceedings. However, the Law Division
noted that the motion testimony and exhibits could be incorporated in the trial
record if both counsel consented and defense counsel had been given wide
latitude during cross-examination.
2. Error in a pre-trial proceeding or trial may
require reversal of a conviction and remand for a new trial, particularly in
the case of an error that impacts a fundamental right affecting the framework
of the trial. Here, incorporation of the motion record into the municipal court
trial record deprived defendant of his right to complete cross-examination of
the arresting officer, thereby implicating his fundamental right to confront
the witnesses against him. Although the error contravened a fundamental right,
it did not undermine the legitimacy of the trial itself, and the prejudice it
caused was readily assessed. Therefore, the remedy for such an error is
reversal of the conviction and a new trial.
require reversal of a conviction and remand for a new trial, particularly in
the case of an error that impacts a fundamental right affecting the framework
of the trial. Here, incorporation of the motion record into the municipal court
trial record deprived defendant of his right to complete cross-examination of
the arresting officer, thereby implicating his fundamental right to confront
the witnesses against him. Although the error contravened a fundamental right,
it did not undermine the legitimacy of the trial itself, and the prejudice it
caused was readily assessed. Therefore, the remedy for such an error is
reversal of the conviction and a new trial.
3. In certain circumstances, an error that interferes
with a defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him may also produce
a factual record that provides insufficient evidence to support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby implicating a defendant’s double
jeopardy guarantee and preventing the State from retrying the case. However,
the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a retrial when evidence, without which a
conviction cannot be supported, is erroneously admitted against a defendant.
Reversal for such trial error is appropriate because it implies nothing about a
defendant’s guilt or innocence, but rather that the judicial process by which
the defendant was convicted was defective in some fundamental respect. Under
those circumstances, a retrial merely recreates the situation that would have
been obtained had the trial error not occurred.
with a defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him may also produce
a factual record that provides insufficient evidence to support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby implicating a defendant’s double
jeopardy guarantee and preventing the State from retrying the case. However,
the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a retrial when evidence, without which a
conviction cannot be supported, is erroneously admitted against a defendant.
Reversal for such trial error is appropriate because it implies nothing about a
defendant’s guilt or innocence, but rather that the judicial process by which
the defendant was convicted was defective in some fundamental respect. Under
those circumstances, a retrial merely recreates the situation that would have
been obtained had the trial error not occurred.
4. With respect to incorporation of the record of the
motion to suppress into the trial record, the Court subscribes to the rule set
forth in Allan. In light of the separate nature of each proceeding, the
limited scope of a suppression motion, and the different standards of proof
governing each proceeding, the better practice is to conduct two separate
proceedings. On the other hand, if both counsel stipulate that testimony and
exhibits from the pre-trial motion may be incorporated into the trial record
and counsel are given wide latitude in cross-examination in connection with the
issues raised, the trial court may use the pre-trial record. Here, without the
improperly-admitted video evidence and testimony from the suppression hearing,
the State could not meet its burden of proof. Since this error was procedural
and did not affect the sufficiency of the evidence, the proper remedy is a
remand to the municipal court for a trial based on the observational evidence,
with defendant being afforded the full opportunity to cross-examine Mueller and
test the State’s proofs. Under these circumstances, a new trial does not
violate defendant’s double jeopardy right.
motion to suppress into the trial record, the Court subscribes to the rule set
forth in Allan. In light of the separate nature of each proceeding, the
limited scope of a suppression motion, and the different standards of proof
governing each proceeding, the better practice is to conduct two separate
proceedings. On the other hand, if both counsel stipulate that testimony and
exhibits from the pre-trial motion may be incorporated into the trial record
and counsel are given wide latitude in cross-examination in connection with the
issues raised, the trial court may use the pre-trial record. Here, without the
improperly-admitted video evidence and testimony from the suppression hearing,
the State could not meet its burden of proof. Since this error was procedural
and did not affect the sufficiency of the evidence, the proper remedy is a
remand to the municipal court for a trial based on the observational evidence,
with defendant being afforded the full opportunity to cross-examine Mueller and
test the State’s proofs. Under these circumstances, a new trial does not
violate defendant’s double jeopardy right.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and
the matter is REMANDED to the municipal court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
the matter is REMANDED to the municipal court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-VINA; and JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (temporarily assigned) join
in JUDGE CUFF’s opinion.
PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-VINA; and JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (temporarily assigned) join
in JUDGE CUFF’s opinion.
