In this appeal,
the Court considers the validity of a warrantless search, which was consented
to by the homeowner and which occurred while the defendant was unlawfully
detained.
The defendant was already in patrol
car. His aunt let police into his locked bedroom.
Under the circumstances presented here, a
third party’s consent to conduct a warrantless search of a defendant’s living
space is insufficient to justify the search when the defendant is unlawfully
detained by police.
If Defendant
detained, third person’s consent to search no good. State v. Coles 217
NJ 467 (2014)
Decided May 19, 2014
LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a majority of the Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers the validity of a
warrantless search, which was consented to by the homeowner and which occurred
while the defendant was unlawfully detained.
Thelma Coles, the homeowner and defendant’s aunt,
confirmed that defendant lived in the house. James wanted to view defendant’s
room since he believed defendant had stopped home after the robbery. After
repeatedly asking Ms. Coles for permission to enter the room, she agreed. The
door to defendant’s room was ajar a few inches and a locked padlock was hanging
from it. Other doors on the floor also were fitted with padlocks, and Ms. Coles
explained that the locks were primarily intended to keep younger children from
rummaging through other people’s belongings. In his search of the room, James
discovered a shotgun and three rifles.
Defendant was indicted on multiple weapons charges,
including second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons. He moved to
suppress the evidence found in his bedroom. The trial court denied the motion,
finding that defendant was lawfully detained because police had reasonable
suspicion to stop him and pat him down. The court also concluded that James
reasonably believed that Ms. Coles had authority to consent to the search of
defendant’s bedroom and that her consent was voluntarily given since she signed
the consent form and admitted that she saw no reason why she should not do so.
Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree certain persons not to possess
weapons and was sentenced to a five-year prison term with five years of parole
ineligibility.
The Appellate Division reversed the denial of
defendant’s motion to suppress and his conviction. The panel focused on whether
the third-party consent search was legitimate, determining that Ms. Coles’s
consent was invalid since her familial and informal landlord status did not
suffice to give her common authority over defendant’s bedroom. Thus, the
failure of the police to seek defendant’s consent, particularly in light of his
nearby retention under what the panel viewed as questionable circumstances,
rendered the search unlawful. The panel noted that reasonable suspicion to
continue defendant’s detention likely ceased to exist when the victim could not
identify him. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 212 N.J.
432 (2012).
HELD: Under the circumstances presented here, a third
party’s consent to conduct a warrantless search of a defendant’s living space
is insufficient to justify the search when the defendant is unlawfully detained
by police.
1. The New Jersey and Federal Constitutions guarantee freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, viewing the warrantless entry into a
person’s home as presumptively unreasonable. In order to sustain the validity
of a warrantless search, the State must demonstrate that it fits within an accepted
exception to the warrant requirement, such as the consent-to-search exception.
In consent-based searches, the State bears the burden of proving that proper
consent was freely and voluntarily given. In a series of cases dating back
forty years, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the right of police
officers to conduct warrantless searches of homes based on consent given by a
third party. In Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122-23 (2006),
the Supreme Court considered the validity of an occupant’s consent in the face
of an objecting co-occupant, holding that it is objectively unreasonable for
police to rely on a consenting occupant when faced with a present and objecting
co-occupant. However, the search may be deemed objectively reasonable where a
potentially objecting co-occupant is not present for the threshold colloquy, so
long as there is no evidence that the co-occupant was deliberately removed by
police to avoid the objection. Id. at 121. In the Supreme Court’s most
recent opinion on this issue, Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S.
___, ___ (2014), it reaffirmed that the objective-reasonableness test prevails
and clarified that a potentially objecting occupant whose absence is due to a
lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is
absent for any other reason.
2. Like federal law, New Jersey law recognizes a third party’s ability to
consent to a search when the consenter has common authority for most purposes
over the searched space. Although a police officer need not be ultimately
correct about a party’s ability to consent, the officer’s belief must have been
objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances known at the
time of the search.
3. Here, turning first to the seizure of defendant’s person, the Court
notes that it is undisputed that a police officer may conduct an investigatory
stop where the officer has a particularized suspicion based on an objective
observation that the person has engaged, or is about to engage, in criminal
wrongdoing. The stop must be reasonable and justified by articulable facts. The
duration of a properly-conducted stop may be extended for a reasonable, limited
period for investigative purposes. In order for a continued detention to be
deemed reasonable, it must have been reasonable at its inception and throughout
its entire execution. When the duration of the detention is at issue, courts
must determine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation
that was likely to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicions, during which
time the defendant’s detention was necessary.
4. The Court agrees with the trial court and the Appellate Division that
the initial stop and detention of defendant was reasonable. However, once
defendant was not identified as the perpetrator during the showup, his
continued detention was unreasonable. Once a detention becomes unreasonable, a
de facto arrest occurs, requiring that the police have probable cause that the
defendant has committed or is committing an offense. Here, defendant’s
detention continued even though the showup failed to develop probable cause for
his arrest. However, in light of James’s suspicion and defendant’s lack of
identifying documents, the Court allows that James had the flexibility to
detain defendant while seeking confirmation of his identity from his relatives.
Once the officers confirmed defendant’s identity, they no longer had sufficient
legal reason to continue his detention.
5. Applying Fernandez, the aunt Ms. Coles’s consent was invalid
since it was manufactured through defendant’s unlawful detention. Thus, based
on the protection afforded by Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution against unreasonable searches of one’s home and living space and
under the totality of these circumstances, the warrantless search of
defendant’s bedroom was not objectively reasonable. This holding is bolstered
by Fourth
Amendment principles and the Supreme Court’s holding in Fernandez.
In light of this conclusion, there is no need to address whether Ms. Coles’s
authority was sufficient to grant access to defendant’s room.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
