Defendant asking to speak with uncle counts as
Miranda right to remain silent
State v. Maltese 221 NJ 611
(2015)
Decided August 17, 2015
SOLOMON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether
defendant’s requests to speak with a family member during interrogation were sufficient
to invoke his right to remain silent and, if so, whether his statements, and
the physical evidence recovered as a result of those statements, should be
suppressed.
Miranda rights, defendant told
police that he had last seen his parents on October 10, 2008 when he dropped
them off in Pennsylvania. After additional questioning, he told them that his
parents had disappeared and admitted using his mother’s bank card without her
permission. The police arrested defendant for obstruction of justice and false
swearing, but released him later that day.
2 On October 24, 2008, defendant returned to the
police station for a polygraph test. After being read his Miranda rights, defendant took the test, in which he denied
knowing his parents’ whereabouts. After scoring the test, Sergeant (Sgt.) Paul
Vallas told defendant that he had no doubt that he knew his parents’ location.
Defendant agreed to give a statement, but demanded that he talk to his uncle
first. Sgt. Vallas advised him that was not in his best interest, but defendant
continued to insist. Sgt. Vallas agreed, but before allowing them to speak,
privately informed defendant’s uncle that his nephew had failed the test, that
he knew where his parents were, and that although defendant requested that the camera
be turned off, the camera would actually be left on. Defendant’s uncle agreed
to help with the investigation. When Sgt. Vallas returned to the interview
room, defendant asked if the conversation with his uncle would be protected
under lawyer-client privilege. Sgt. Vallas replied that his uncle was not an
attorney, but told him that he would turn off the camera. Defendant told his
uncle that he knew where his parents’ bodies were buried and that one other
person was involved. After a short cigarette break, with a detective nearby,
defendant returned to the interview room and received Miranda warnings
for a second time. He admitted to police that, after a fight with his father on
October 8, 2008, he strangled his parents and buried them in the woods behind
Friendship Park. Defendant also said that Taylor helped dispose of their
bodies. Police found the bodies buried in a shallow grave in Friendship Park.
Defendant was charged with two counts of murder,
unlawfully disturbing, moving or concealing human remains, hindering
apprehension or prosecution, theft, fraudulent use of a credit card, attempted
theft, failing to dispose of human remains in a manner required by law, and
tampering with physical evidence. One count of murder was subsequently amended
to charge defendant with the passion/provocation manslaughter of his father.
Defendant moved to suppress his statements to his uncle and police, as well as
the evidence collected as a result of those statements. The trial court
suppressed the statement to his uncle, but did not exclude his statement to
police. At trial, the jury found defendant guilty of the manslaughter of his
father, the murder of his mother, hindering prosecution, fraudulent use of a
credit card, tampering with evidence, false swearing, and disturbing, moving,
or concealing human remains. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of
sixty-four years in prison, with an eighty-five percent period of parole
ineligibility, pursuant to the No Early Release Act.
Defendant appealed, arguing that his statement to
police should have been suppressed. The Appellate Division concluded that
defendant invoked his right to remain silent by requesting that he speak to his
uncle first, the police improperly recorded that conversation and, as such, the
trial court properly suppressed the recorded conversation with his uncle. The
Appellate Division further concluded, as did the trial court, that defendant’s
statement to police “was obtained voluntarily after the police re-administered
defendant’s Miranda rights.” The Court granted certification. 217 N.J.
623 (2014).
HELD: Because defendant’s
statement to his uncle occurred after officers violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, that statement is inadmissible. Defendant’s
subsequent statement to police was fruit of the unconstitutionally obtained
statement to his uncle and must also be suppressed. Thus, defendant’s
convictions for manslaughter and murder are reversed. His other convictions are
affirmed because they are supported by evidence independent of the suppressed
statements. On remand, the trial court shall conduct a pretrial hearing to
determine whether the physical evidence obtained as a result of defendant’s
suppressed statements is admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to
the exclusionary rule.
1. The privilege against self-incrimination includes
the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak of his
own free will. Efforts by police to persuade a suspect to talk are proper as
long as the will of the suspect is not overborne. The inquiry turns on whether
an investigator’s statements were so manipulative or coercive that they
deprived defendant of his ability to make an autonomous decision to confess.
Once a defendant unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent,
interrogation must cease. Further, even when the suspect’s invocation is
ambiguous, officers are required to stop the interrogation completely, or to
ask only questions narrowly directed to determine whether defendant is willing
to continue. Of particular relevance to this matter, in State v. Harvey,
121 N.J. 407 (1990), this Court addressed a situation in which a
defendant requested permission to speak with his father. There, the Court held
that the defendant’s request was sufficient to invoke his right to remain
silent, and therefore required the interrogation to cease. As in Harvey,
defendant here indicated that he wanted to speak with a family member to obtain
advice before proceeding with questioning. Considering the circumstances,
defendant affirmatively asserted his right to remain silent. Therefore, the
statement he made to his uncle was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and was properly suppressed by the trial court. (
2. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that
the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has
decided to remain silent depends on whether his right to cut off questioning
was scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104
(1975). There, the Court focused on four factors: (1) two hours passed after
the defendant first asserted his right to remain silent; (2) the defendant
received fresh Miranda warnings before the interrogation resumed; (3)
the defendant was questioned by a different police officer; and (4) the
defendant was questioned about a different crime. Here, the break in
questioning was less than seven minutes, defendant was always in the presence
of an officer, and the officers who took defendant’s statement were known by
defendant to be conducting the investigation. Additionally, after defendant
confessed to his uncle, police made it clear that they knew about that
confession. Considering these factors, the statement to police was the fruit of
the unconstitutionally obtained statement to his uncle.
3. As for whether the admission of defendant’s
statement to police constituted harmless error, the Court notes that all of his
convictions, with the exception of the convictions for manslaughter and murder,
were independently substantiated by evidence other than his statement to
police. However, because that statement was particularly relevant to the
manslaughter and murder convictions, the Court cannot conclude that the
statement’s admission was harmless. Therefore, while his other convictions are
affirmed, his manslaughter and murder convictions are reversed and the matter
is remanded for retrial. On retrial, the statements may be used for impeachment
purposes if defendant chooses to testify.
4. Finally, as the record now exists, the State has
not met its burden to establish that normal police procedures would have
inevitably led to discovery of the bodies. Therefore, on remand, the court must
determine whether the physical evidence discovered because of defendant’s
statements should also be suppressed.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED in
part and REVERSED in part. The matter is REMANDED to the trial
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
