Police should not have ordered
driver out of car on traffic stop. State v. Keaton Decided August 3, 2015
FERNANDEZ-VINA,
J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the
Court considers the circumstances under which a law enforcement officer may
legally enter a disabled vehicle to obtain the driver’s registration and
insurance information without first requesting the driver’s permission or
allowing the driver the opportunity to retrieve the documents himself.
In March 2009, New Jersey State Trooper William Jacobs was
patrolling I-295 when he was called to the scene of an automobile accident.
When he arrived, he saw a black sedan overturned in the median. Defendant Duran
Keaton, the vehicle’s driver, had already been removed from the car and
Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) were treating injuries to his face. In
addition to ensuring the safety of the driver, clearing the scene, and
restoring the flow of traffic, Trooper Jacobs was responsible for preparing a
mandatory accident report. To complete the report, he was required to obtain
the name of the driver, the vehicle’s registration, any insurance information,
the vehicle identification number (VIN), the driver’s license number, and the
owner’s address. The trooper did not ask defendant for the documents, but went
to the overturned vehicle to obtain them.
Once inside the vehicle, Trooper Jacobs observed a handgun
in an open backpack. He also saw a small bag of marijuana near the dashboard. He
then located defendant’s identification, insurance information, and
registration. Defendant was arrested and subsequently charged with multiple
weapons offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress in which he asserted
that the trooper’s entry into the vehicle indicated an intent to conduct a
search of the vehicle, not merely an intent to retrieve the documents. He
further asserted that the trooper should have spoken to him to discuss the
vehicle’s ownership prior to entering the car. In response, the prosecution
argued that the trooper satisfied the plain view exception to the warrant
requirement and lawfully viewed the items seized. The trial judge denied
defendant’s motion to suppress. The judge found the trooper’s testimony to be
credible and concluded that he properly seized the gun and marijuana after
discovering those items in plain view. The court noted that the trooper
immediately recognized the handgun and marijuana as contraband and found that
discovery of the contraband was inadvertent. Defendant entered a guilty plea
and was sentenced to a four-year term of non-custodial probation, along with
mandatory fees and penalties.
Defendant subsequently appealed. On
October 29, 2013, in an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed
the trial court and held that the search of defendant’s car violated the Fourth
Amendment. The panel held that the trooper could only enter the vehicle if
defendant was “unable or unwilling” to produce his license and registration.
Because defendant’s injuries were not life-threatening, the court found that
the trooper should have: (1) afforded defendant the opportunity on his own, or
with the help of another, to retrieve the documentation; (2) recovered the
documents or information from defendant at the hospital; or (3) waited until
defendant was released from the hospital to obtain the information. This Court
granted the State’s petition for certification. 217 N.J. 588 (2014).
HELD: The law enforcement officer was
required to provide defendant with the opportunity to present his credentials
before entering the vehicle. If after giving a defendant that opportunity, he
or she is unable or unwilling to produce the registration or insurance
information, only then may an officer conduct a search for those credentials.
Here, because defendant was never provided with such an opportunity, the
seizure of the contraband was unlawful under the plain view doctrine. Further,
the community-caretaking doctrine was inapplicable because there was no need
for an immediate warrantless search to preserve life or property.
1. The Fourth Amendment and Article I,
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect against warrantless
searches. Police are required to obtain a warrant to conduct a search unless an
exception to the warrant requirement applies. Here, the State argues that the
plain view exception and the community-caretaking doctrine apply. Under the
plain view exception, a police officer may seize evidence in plain view without
a warrant if the officer is lawfully in the viewing area when he discovers the
evidence and it is immediately apparent the object viewed is evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The officer must discover
the evidence inadvertently, meaning that he did not know in advance where
evidence was located nor intend beforehand to seize it.
2. Police officers who investigate a motor vehicle accident
are required to complete an accident report. The Commission of Motor Vehicles
(Commission) promulgates this report, which calls for sufficiently detailed
information including the cause, the conditions then existing, the person and
vehicles involved, if the parties were wearing seat belts or on cellular
phones, and other information. The report must be forwarded to the Commission
within five days after the investigation of the accident. A traffic violation
may justify a search for things relating to that stop. If the vehicle’s
operator is unable to produce proof of registration, the officer may search the
car for evidence of ownership. Such a search must be reasonable in scope and
tailored to the degree of the violation. A search to find the registration
would be permissible if confined to the glove compartment or other area where
registration might normally be kept in a vehicle.
3. The Appellate Division considered facts and circumstances
similar to those presented by this matter in State v. Jones, 195 N.J. Super.
119, 122 (App. Div. 1984). There, police arrived at the scene to find an
overturned vehicle. Officers approached the defendant, who only received minor
cuts and bruises, and requested he produce his license and vehicle
identification. While able to produce his license, the defendant also indicated
his vehicle credentials were still inside the overturned car. As such, one of
the responding officers entered the car through the driver’s side door in order
to obtain the necessary information. While inside the car, the officer observed
an open toiletry bag, which was found to contain a vial filled with a white
powdery substance and a razor blade. Suspecting the substance was cocaine, the
officer seized the items.
The trial judge granted the defendant’s motion to suppress
and the State appealed, contending the evidence was in the officer’s plain view
and, therefore, he had a right to enter the automobile to search for proof of
ownership and the insurance card. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial
court’s suppression of the evidence, finding that a defendant’s constitutional
right to privacy in his vehicle and personal effects cannot be subordinated to
mere considerations of convenience to the police short of substantial
necessities grounded in public safety. The panel noted the officer was obliged
to make an accident report, but did not have a right to enter the car to search
for the registration and insurance card before affording the defendant a
reasonable opportunity to obtain them himself. Thus, under settled law, the
warrantless search of a vehicle is only permissible after the driver has been
provided the opportunity to produce his credentials and is either unable or
unwilling to do so.
4. Here, defendant was never provided such an opportunity.
The trooper did not speak to defendant at the scene of the accident. The
trooper never asked the EMTs for help in determining whether defendant was able
to provide his credentials. Instead, the trooper made the decision to search
defendant’s car for credentials only for the trooper’s convenience and
expediency, without ever providing defendant the opportunity to present them.
Defendant was never provided a reasonable opportunity to present his
credentials, and therefore, the search of his vehicle cannot be justified under
the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.
5. Further, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, in
order to have otherwise inadmissible evidence admitted, the State is required
to show: (1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have
been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all
of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would
have inevitably resulted in discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of
the evidence through the use of such procedures would have occurred wholly
independently of such evidence by unlawful means.
The State must offer clear and convincing evidence to
sustain its burden. Here, the State has failed to demonstrate, by clear and
convincing evidence, that law enforcement officials would have inevitably
discovered the contraband in defendant’s vehicle. There is no evidence to
suggest that the police intended to impound or inventory defendant’s vehicle.
That logically indicates that the State did not demonstrate that proper,
normal, and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order
to complete the investigation of the case.
6. Finally, the State’s argument that the community-caretaking
doctrine permitted the trooper to enter the vehicle to complete the accident
report is also without merit. The community-caretaking doctrine is a narrow
exception to the warrant requirement. Here, the trooper’s role as a
community-caretaker did not permit him to conduct the search of defendant’s
vehicle because the trooper’s statutory duty to prepare an accident report is
not an exigent circumstance encompassed by the community-caretaker exception to
the warrant requirement.
The judgment of the Appellate
Division is AFFIRMED.
