State v. Lori A. Hummel (A-36-16) (078476)
Argued
October 24, 2017 -- Decided March 13, 2018
TIMPONE,
J., writing for the Court.
The Court considers the legality of the police’s search and
seizure of the contents of defendant Lori Hummel’s handbag while she was
detained at the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office.
On December 5, 2010, Thomas Carbin was stabbed to death. On
December 7, 2010, Investigator Gary Krohn advised defendant that he was going
to bring her to the police station for two outstanding traffic bench warrants;
he drove her to the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office. There, he introduced
defendant to Detective Bryn Wilden and Sergeant James Ballenger. Detective
Wilden then escorted defendant into an interrogation room.
Defendant placed her purse on the table in front of her.
Around 1:56 pm., Detective Wilden and Sergeant Ballenger entered defendant’s
interrogation room to begin questioning her. The detectives took seats at the
table without removing defendant’s purse or frisking her. About a minute into
questioning, defendant reached into and rummaged through her purse to retrieve
her cell phone. She checked the time and advised the detectives that she had to
pick up her daughter by 3:20 pm. The detectives did not comment on her time
constraint. Detective Wilden then asked defendant to raise her right hand and
swore her in. The detectives began asking defendant substantive questions without
advising her of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In
response to questions from the detectives about her cell phone, defendant began
to look through her purse for a receipt showing her recent cell phone purchase.
The detectives kept questioning defendant about her relationship with the
victim.
The detectives left defendant alone in the room. She put
her belongings back into her purse and stepped outside, asking if she could
leave to pick up her daughter. The detectives did not permit her to leave. She
then asked, “Am I arrested?” Detective Wilden responded that “technically” she
had traffic warrants and that they still had questions for her. Defendant
stated that she thought she wanted to get a lawyer. After briefly asking questions
about defendant’s decision to retain a lawyer, the detectives ceased talking to
defendant and left the room.
Soon after, Detective Wilden cuffed defendant’s right ankle
to a bar on the floor and told defendant that she was being detained and that
she had an outstanding warrant. Defendant asked several times whether she could
make a phone call to her lawyer. Detective Wilden took defendant’s purse from
the table, and defendant stated that she did not like that he had her
pocketbook. Sergeant Ballenger responded that defendant was “in custody.” As
Detective Wilden began walking out, defendant said, “Hopefully that $500 ain’t
missing out of there.”
In response to defendant’s comment, the detectives began
taking everything out of her purse. They asked if she would rather search the
purse herself, but defendant declined. Detective Wilden found two electronic
benefits transfer (EBT) cards issued through New Jersey’s “Families First”
supplemental income program. He asked defendant if the cards were hers. She responded
that everything in the pocketbook was hers. Detective Wilden read her the name
of another individual on one of the cards. Defendant disavowed that she knew
that individual or how the card wound up in her purse. Detective Wilden then
put all the items back into the purse and left the room with it. The detectives
left defendant shackled for over two hours.
At one point she
asked why she could not get a lawyer, and the detectives failed to allow her to
call one. Around 5:48 p.m., the detectives unsecured defendant’s ankle and
escorted her out of the room to be released. Police arrested defendant three
days later.
Defendant moved to suppress her statements to police and
the physical evidence obtained during her interrogation. The trial court
granted defendant’s motion to suppress her statements to police but denied her
motion to suppress physical evidence. Defendant appealed from the trial court’s
denial of her motion to suppress physical evidence. The Appellate Division
panel found that the Families First EBT card should have been suppressed because the
detectives’ inventory search developed into a warrantless investigatory search.
The panel ruled that defendant could apply within thirty days to withdraw her
guilty plea and to have her conviction vacated and her case listed for trial.
The Court denied defendant’s petition for certification, 229 N.J. 3 (2017), but
granted the State’s cross-petition for certification, 229 N.J. 17 (2017).
HELD: The Court finds no valid
inventory search and therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s determination
that the evidence seized during the search should be suppressed.
1. One narrow exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement is the inventory search. An inventory search is
not an independent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step
following arrest and preceding incarceration. Police may search an arrestee
without a warrant and inventory the property in the arrestee’s possession
before he or she is jailed. Such searches “serve[] a three-fold purpose:
protection of the inventoried property while in police custody, shielding the
police and storage bailees from false property claims, and safeguarding the
police from potential danger.” State v. Mangold, 82 N.J. 575, 581-82
(1980).
2. An inventory search must be reasonable
under the circumstances to pass constitutional muster. In Mangold, the Court
explained that the propriety of an inventory search involves a two-step
inquiry: (1) whether the impoundment of the property is justified; and (2)
whether the inventory procedure was legal. Id. at 583. For there to be a lawful
inventory search, there must be a lawful impoundment. Courts need only analyze
the reasonableness of the inventory search if the impoundment is justified.
Several factors are relevant to the reasonableness inquiry. They include “the
scope of the search, the procedure used, and the availability of less intrusive
alternatives.” Id. at 584.
3. Under the first Mangold inquiry, the
detectives’ impoundment of defendant’s purse was not justified. The detectives
had not arrested defendant before seeking to impound her purse. Defendant kept
her purse open and within her reach for the entire interrogation. She rummaged
through her bag several times in front of the detectives. The detectives did
not frisk defendant at any point during her detention. They sought to remove
her bag from the interrogation room only after she asked for an attorney.
Crucially, they asked defendant if she would rather examine the contents of her
purse herself. It is clear that had valid safety concerns existed at the time
they sought to impound her bag, the officers would not have given defendant the
option to search her own purse.
4. Even if the initial impoundment was
justified under the first Mangold inquiry, the search would fail under the
balancing test required by the second. The detectives initiated the search to
find the $500 defendant claimed her purse contained. The scope of the search
should have been limited to that $500. The State concedes that the departmental
policy for inventory searches is unknown. There is no way then to determine
whether the detectives’ search was executed according to any purported policy
or practice. Finally, the detectives had reasonable, less intrusive
alternatives available to protect them against false theft claims that would
have simultaneously respected defendant’s constitutionally protected privacy
rights. The inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement does not apply, and the detectives’ search was unconstitutional.
5. The State concedes that the detectives
did not conduct a “traditional” inventory search. The record reveals that
nearly every aspect of the purported inventory search was not “traditional.”
They did not formally arrest her that day, but rather let her leave and
arrested her three days later. The Court remands to permit defendant to raise
issues she has preserved before a PCR court, or withdraw her guilty plea and
continue before the trial court.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED
and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
