State v. Brian
Tier (A-73-15)
(077328)
In this appeal,
the Court considers a question of first impression: What are a defendant’s
post-indictment reciprocal discovery obligations to the State regarding a
defense witness’s oral statements?
At
a status conference, the State took issue with the witness list defendant
produced because it listed the names of three men but did not provide
identifiers, addresses, or synopses of their anticipated testimony—which the
State alleged was in violation of Rule 3:13-3(b)(2)(C). In
response, defendant agreed to produce identifiers and addresses but argued
against providing synopses. Defendant asserted that the Rule requires
that synopses be produced only if they have already been reduced to writing.
Defense counsel affirmed that no witness statement summaries had been prepared.
The
trial court ordered the defense to produce witness synopses and to create them
if they had not been previously drafted. The court specifically ordered defense
counsel to provide the State with the reason why the witnesses are on the list.
The Appellate Division summarily reversed the trial court’s order, reasoning
that a criminal defendant’s disclosures are carefully limited by the strictures
of Rule 3:13-3(b)(2).
The
trial court granted a motion to stay defendant’s trial pending the Court’s
ruling on the motion. The Court granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal.
226 N.J. 205 (2016).
HELD: A
plain reading of Rule 3:13-3(b)(2)(C) requires production of
witness statements only if those statements have already been reduced to
writing. Nothing in the rules precludes a trial court from ordering a defendant
to designate witnesses as either character or fact witnesses, however. The
Court encourages practitioners to participate in cooperative discovery in order
to ease the burden on all parties involved.
1. Rule 3:13-3(b)(2)(C)
reads, in pertinent part: “A defendant shall provide the State with all relevant
material, including, but not limited to . . . the names, addresses, and
birthdates of those persons known to defendant who may be called as witnesses
at trial and their written statements, if any, including memoranda reporting or
summarizing their oral statements.” This Rule has not seen
much review.
2.
In State v. DiTolvo, 273 N.J. Super. 111 (Law Div.
1994), the State moved to bar a witness’s testimony after the defendant refused
to provide a written summary of the proposed testimony. The court reasoned that
the criminal justice system had a strong interest in “broad and extensive
discovery.” Finding no competing interest in favor of defendant, and failing to
discuss a criminal defendant’s special constitutional status, the court ordered
the defendant to produce a summary of the witness’s proffered testimony or the
court would bar the testimony.
3. State v.
Williams, 80 N.J. 472 (1979), dealt with a collateral
issue: whether summaries already in existence were required to be disclosed if
the defendant had no intention of using them at trial. Because the request
related to inculpatory evidence, the defendant had no duty to produce those
documents. The Court recognized that “[evidential materials obtained in the
exercise of [defense counsel’s] professional responsibility are so interwoven
with the professional judgments relating to a client’s case, strategy and
tactics that they may be said to share the characteristics of an attorney’s
‘work product,’” and that “[blanket discovery of the fruits of this kind of
legal creativity and preparation may impact directly upon the freedom and
initiative which a lawyer must have in order to fully represent his
client.” Id. at 479.
4.
In addition to the confidentiality concerns raised by disclosure of work
product, one of the underlying principles on which our criminal justice system
is based is that a defendant “has a fundamental right to remain
silent.” Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
112, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1912, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446,
483 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This
defendant agreed to reciprocal discovery, implicating the Rule and
necessitating its review. See R. 3:13-3(b)(1).
5. Rule 3:13-3(b)(2)(C)
plainly requires a defendant to produce “the names, addresses, and birthdates
of those persons known to defendant who may be called as witnesses at trial.”
Written statements, however, need only be produced if they exist. This result
is unquestionably mandated by the language “if any,” which modifies “written
statements.” The language following “if any” does not alter that result; it
merely indicates that memoranda either reporting or summarizing a witness’s
oral statements constitute discoverable written statements for purposes of Rule 3:13-3(b)(2)(C).
6.
The trial court’s order was based upon a mistaken understanding of the
applicable law, requiring reversal. However, the Court stops short of finding
that the entire order was an abuse of discretion. Nothing in the court rules
prevents the trial court from obligating defendant to identify a witness as
either a character or fact witness. To the contrary, requiring a defendant to
identify the category of witness not only alleviates some of the State’s
concern regarding the burden of investigating a never-ending list of potential
witnesses, but falls in line with the Court’s policy encouraging cooperation in
the discovery process.
The
judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED.
The matter is REMANDED to the trial court for entry of a
discovery order consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.
