NJ adopted same-elements
test as the sole test for determining what constitutes the “same offense” for
purposes of double jeopardy. More difficult for double
jeopardy State v. Rodney J. Miles (A-72-15) (077035)
In this appeal, the Court clarifies the
methodology to be used in analyzing whether two offenses are the “same offense”
for double jeopardy purposes. Since the 1980s, New Jersey courts have applied
both the same-evidence test and the same-elements test articulated in Blockburger
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), in double jeopardy
determinations. A finding that offenses met either test resulted in double
jeopardy protection for the defendant.
A grand jury returned an indictment-charging
defendant with the offenses in the warrant complaint. Defendant then appeared
pro se in municipal court to resolve the disorderly-persons offense. At some
point before that video proceeding, the original municipal charge was amended
to a different disorderly-persons offense—loitering to possess marijuana.
Defendant asked the municipal court judge, “why they got me going to Superior
Court for this, Your Honor?” The judge then responded that defendant was “not
going to Superior Court for this,” but rather for an unrelated child support
issue. Defendant then pled guilty to loitering to possess marijuana.
Thereafter, defendant moved
to dismiss the Superior Court indictment on double-jeopardy grounds, arguing
that prosecution on the possession charges was barred because he had already
pled guilty to an offense that arose from the same conduct. The Superior Court
denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that prosecution on the
indicted charges was not barred because it required proof of an additional
element—proximity to a school. Defendant pled guilty to possession of CDS with
intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school (the school-zone charge), but
preserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the Appellate
Division remanded for a finding on the circumstances surrounding the amendment
of the disorderly-persons offense. The panel noted that a plea to the original
municipal charge, instead of the amended one, could have led to a different
result after applying the double-jeopardy analysis.
On remand, the Superior
Court found no direct evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the
amendment, and the prosecutor represented that his office was not informed of
defendant’s municipal court proceedings. Despite defendant’s expressed
confusion during the municipal court plea hearing, the Superior Court concluded
that the school-zone prosecution was not precluded by notions of fundamental
fairness.
Defendant appealed again,
arguing that double jeopardy barred prosecution on the school-zone charge. The
Appellate Division agreed, finding that, although the second prosecution was
not barred under the same-elements test, it was barred under the same-evidence
test. 443 N.J. Super. 212, 220, 225-27 (App. Div. 2015).
The Court granted the State’s
petition for certification. 225 N.J. 339 (2016).
HELD:
New Jersey now joins the majority of jurisdictions in returning to the Blockburger same-elements
test as the sole test for determining what constitutes the “same offense” for
purposes of double jeopardy. In the interest of justice, the Court applied both
the same-elements test and the now-replaced same-evidence test in this case;
going forward, for offenses committed after the issuance of this opinion, the
same-elements test will serve as the singular framework for determining whether
two charges are the same offense for purposes of double-jeopardy analysis.
1. Here, the municipal
court had jurisdiction to resolve defendant’s disorderly-persons charge
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:12-17, and failure to join does not
automatically bar subsequent prosecution. For judicial efficiency and fairness
to defendants, the Court urges careful coordination between the municipal
courts and county prosecutors.
2. The Court has
consistently interpreted the State Constitution’s double-jeopardy protection as
coextensive with the guarantee of the federal Constitution. A prime concern
when reviewing a double-jeopardy claim is whether the second prosecution is for
the same offense involved in the first.
3. The United States
Supreme Court first announced its test for determining whether a second
prosecution is for the same offense in Blockburger, supra,
284 U.S. at 304: If each statute at issue requires proof of an
element that the other does not, they do not constitute the same offense and a
second prosecution may proceed. This has come to be known as the same-elements
test.
4. The Court read the
language in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 421
(1980), as creating an alternative to Blockburger’s same-elements
test—the same-evidence test. The United States Supreme Court reached the same
conclusion in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S.508, 510 (1990),
but revised its position in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688,
704, 708-09 (1993), in which it deemed the same-evidence test unworkable and
reinstated the Blockburger same-elements test as the sole
measure of whether two offenses constitute the same offense.
5. Since Dixon,
the majority of states have similarly ruled that the Blockburger same-elements
test sets forth the proper test for determining whether two charges are the
same offense. Until this case, the Court has not had occasion to reevaluate
double-jeopardy jurisprudence in light of Dixon’s return to the
same-elements test. As a result, appellate panels have split over whether the
same-evidence test still applies in New Jersey.
6. The Court now adopts the
same-elements test as the sole double-jeopardy analysis, thereby realigning New
Jersey law with federal law. The same-elements test is effortlessly applied at
early stages of prosecution; it is capable of producing uniform, predictable
results; and it aids defendants by reducing multiple court appearances. Rule 3:15-1(b)
bars subsequent prosecutions for indictable offenses, and failure by the
prosecution to properly join indictable offenses bars a subsequent prosecution. State
v. Williams, 172 N.J. 361, 368 (2002). The Court
recognizes a narrow circumstance where it is possible that neither the
same-elements test nor the rule in Williams would prevent a
second prosecution; if those unlikely events unfolded, the second prosecution
might well be barred on joinder or fundamental fairness grounds. As a further
safeguard, the Court invites the Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice
to review the joinder rule and consider adding non-indictable offenses to it.
7. Because the decision establishes
a new rule of law, the Court applies the new singular same-elements standard
prospectively to offenses committed after the date of this opinion. In fairness
to defendant, the Court conducts double-jeopardy analysis using both the
same-elements test and the now-removed same-evidence test. Application of the Blockburger same-elements
test would lead to the conclusion that loitering to possess marijuana is not
the same offense as possession within a school zone. Each offense contains at
least one element not required to prove the other. Under the same-evidence
test, however, successive prosecution for the school-zone offense is prohibited
because it is based on the same evidence that supported the plea and conviction
on the loitering offense.
8. For offenses committed
after the issuance of this opinion, the same-elements test will serve as the
singular framework for determining whether two charges are the same offense for
double-jeopardy analysis. (p. 23)
The judgment of the
Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. Defendant’s conviction and sentence
on the school-zone offense are vacated.
JUSTICE ALBIN, DISSENTING, expresses
the view that majority’s new rule cannot be squared with the principles of
fairness that previously animated New Jersey’s double-jeopardy jurisprudence.
According to Justice Albin, the majority’s reversion to the same-elements test
will allow the State to pursue repeated prosecutions for the same offense
despite an earlier conviction or acquittal.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES
PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.
JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA
joins.
