State
v. Dion E. Robinson (A-40-15) (076267)
Patterson,
J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In
this appeal as of right, the Court considers whether the protective sweep
exception to the warrant requirement applies to a police officer’s search of a
vehicle’s passenger compartment in the wake of a traffic stop.
After
observing a driving pattern he considered unsafe in an area associated with
drug activity, Officer Ceci conducted a motor vehicle stop. The driver was
defendant Dion Robinson, the front seat passenger was Catilya Carson, the
left-rear-seat passenger was Marcus Sanders, and the right-rear-seat passenger
was Terron Henderson.
Officer
Ceci asked defendant for his license, registration, and insurance. Defendant
misidentified himself, stated that his license was suspended, and provided the
registration and insurance. Henderson misidentified himself as defendant.
Carson and Sanders accurately identified themselves and presented
identification cards but no driver’s licenses. Defendant said that the car was
owned by his friend, but that he did not know the friend’s name.
Officer
Ceci was advised by the dispatcher that defendant and Henderson each had an
outstanding warrant and that defendant was known to carry weapons. Officer Ceci
confirmed that information and found that Henderson also had a “caution for weapons.”
He called for backup; a sergeant and three officers joined him at the scene.
The
officers directed defendant and Henderson out of the car, handcuffed them, and
arrested them. A search incident to arrest revealed no weapons on either. Some
of the officers were assigned to watch defendant and Henderson, who stood
handcuffed on the side of the highway and were not permitted to return to the
vehicle.
Next,
the officers detained, but did not arrest, Carson and Sanders, on whom the
officers found no weapons. Carson and Sanders were then directed to stand on
the side of the road, monitored by officers. Officer Ceci did not observe
Carson or Sanders make any motion that suggested that either was reaching for a
weapon, attempting to hide any object, or resisting the directions of the
officers. Carson and Sanders were not allowed access to the vehicle. They were
not licensed drivers and would not have been permitted to drive the vehicle
home.
Officer
Ceci then conducted a sweep of the interior of the vehicle to check for
weapons. He searched the front-seat passenger area, where Carson had left her
purse. When he touched the bottom of the purse, Officer Ceci felt the outline
of a handgun, which he retrieved and brought to his patrol vehicle. He then asked
the other officers to place Carson and Sanders in custody, summoned a tow
truck, and applied for a search warrant.
Defendant
was charged with two weapons offenses, hindering apprehension, and four drug
offenses, which were the subject of the outstanding warrant. Defendant moved to
suppress the handgun found by Officer Ceci during his search of the car. The
trial court denied the motion, finding that the traffic stop was properly based
on the officer’s articulable and reasonable suspicion that defendant had
committed traffic offenses and that the search constituted a reasonable and
lawful protective sweep. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to
second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun and third-degree possession of a
CDS.
Defendant
appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The majority of
the Appellate Division panel concluded that Officer Ceci’s search of the motor
vehicle was not a lawful protective sweep and reversed the trial court’s
determination. 441 N.J. Super. 33, 46-47 (App. Div. 2015). The
panel rejected the State’s assertion that the community-caretaking exception
governs this case and noted that the “plain-feel” doctrine was irrelevant. One
member of the panel dissented, finding that the search was justified as both a
valid protective sweep and an exercise of police community-caretaking
functions. The State appealed as of right. R. 2:2-1(a)(2).
HELD:
Although the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that there was a
weapon in the vehicle, the five officers’ swift and coordinated action
eliminated the risk that any of the four occupants would gain immediate access
to the weapon. Accordingly, the protective sweep exception to the warrant
requirement does not govern this case. The community-caretaking exception to
the warrant requirement is irrelevant. However, the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule may be pertinent to this case.
1.
The Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution guarantee “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,”
and set forth the requirements for warrants. Warrantless searches are
permissible only if justified by one of the few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. It is the State’s burden
to prove that a warrantless search falls within one or more of those
exceptions.
2.
The protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement derives from Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the
Supreme Court held that a police officer may initiate an investigatory stop in
the presence of “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at
21. Terry stops are narrowly drawn to permit a
reasonable search for weapons.
3.
The United States Supreme Court applied the protective sweep exception to an
automobile setting in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1049 (1983). The Court adopted that standard in State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35,
48 (1990), but rejected the State’s claim that the search reviewed in that case
was a valid protective sweep. In State v. Gamble, the Court upheld
an automobile search as a lawful protective sweep. 218 N.J.412,
431-33 (2014).
4. Long and
the Court’s opinions in Lund and Gamble define
the standard for a valid protective sweep of an automobile following a traffic
stop: the State must present specific and articulable facts that, considered
with the rational inferences from those facts, warrant a belief that an
individual in the vehicle is dangerous and that he or she may gain immediate
control of weapons. The protective sweep exception in the automobile setting
does not turn solely on the potential presence of a weapon in a vehicle.
Instead, it addresses the imminent danger to police when a driver or passenger
will be permitted access to a vehicle that may contain a weapon or may be in a
position to evade or overpower the officers at the scene. That standard governs
this appeal. (p. 22)
5.
In light of Officer Ceci’s observations of defendant’s driving, there were
specific and articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion that
defendant had committed motor vehicle violations and that the traffic stop was
therefore lawful. However, Officer Ceci’s search of the car was not a valid
protective sweep. There is no doubt that Officer Ceci’s concerns that defendant
and Henderson could be armed were justified, but Officer Ceci addressed the
potential danger with prompt and effective action. None of the four occupants
was given an opportunity to return to the car or was in a position to gain
access to any weapon. The record did not reveal specific and articulable facts that,
at the time of Officer Ceci’s search of the vehicle, would reasonably warrant
the conclusion that any of the vehicle’s four occupants was potentially capable
of gaining immediate control of weapons. The search of the car was not within
the protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement.
6.
This case does not fit within the narrow parameters of the community-caretaking
doctrine as applied to the search of a motor vehicle. There was no potential
threat to any person’s safety warranting application of the doctrine at the
time that the search took place. The Court does not reach the “plain-feel”
exception.
7.
In light of the officers’ continued control over the vehicle, their reasonable
concern that one or more occupants could have been armed, and the uncertain
status of the vehicle’s owner, it may have been inevitable that the handgun
would have been discovered. Consequently, the inevitable discovery exception to
the exclusionary rule is potentially relevant to this case. The Court explains
that exception and provides guidance for evaluating its applicability on
remand, but offers no view on the resolution of any issues raised on remand.
The
judgment of the Appellate Division is MODIFIED and AFFIRMED,
and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA,
SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.
