STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DEXTER L. HUBBARD,
Defendant-Respondent.
___________________________
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GUSTAVO ARENAS,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KYANAZIA DOBSON,
Defendant.
_________________________
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KAHDAR HOLMES,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARCUS MORALES,
Defendant.
_________________________
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMAH GOODWIN, a/k/a
JAMARSCU RUSSELL,
Defendant.
_________________________
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
2
JOSEPH PEREZ,
Defendant-Respondent.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0223-25
– Decided August 5, 2026
Before Judges Currier, Smith and Jablonski.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County,
Indictment Nos. 25-02-0111, 24-12-0898, 24-02-0071,
23-04-0311, 25-01-0065, 24-12-0864, and 24-09-
0678.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JABLONSKI, J.A.D.
This appeal requires us to determine, as an issue of first impression,
whether a county prosecutor must disclose substantive details about a police
department's pending internal affairs ("IA") investigation to a defendant in a
criminal case in which the investigating officer was involved before that
investigation is completed.
By leave granted, the State appealed the trial court's order requiring it to
release substantive information about pending IA investigations of officers to
defense counsel, and vacating protective orders accompanying the disclosure
letters the State sent to defendants as required by Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and the Off. of the Att'y Gen., Law Enf't Directive No.
2019-6, Directive Establishing County Policies to Comply with Brady v.
Maryland and Giglio v. United States (Dec. 4, 2019) (the "Directive"). Those
letters summarily notified defense counsel that an officer involved in the case
was the subject of an "allegation of misconduct that bears upon [that officer's]
truthfulness, bias, or integrity . . . ."
We conclude the motion court mistakenly exercised its discretion by
requiring disclosure of this confidential information while the IA
4
A-0223-25investigations were pending. Therefore, we reverse those orders. However,
because we agree with the trial court's determination to vacate the protective
orders as being overly broad, we affirm those orders.
I.
In 2019, Attorney General Gurbir S. Grewal issued Directive No. 2019-6
to address and to standardize the affirmative obligation of county prosecutors
to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence to defense counsel as
required by Giglio, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and State v.
Carter, 91 N.J. 86 (1982). Each county prosecutor was required to implement
local policies to comply with the Directive and to use a "non-exhaustive list of
potential Giglio material as it relates to civilian and investigative State
witnesses" when considering what specific information should be disclosed.
Law Enf't Directive No. 2019-6, at 4. The Directive also explicitly noted this
material, regardless of category, "does not necessarily mean the information
will be disclosed." Ibid.
The categories included "sustained" findings of evidence of an
"investigative employee's" dishonesty, false reporting, criminal charges or
convictions, intentional mishandling of evidence, or bias. Id. at 4-6. The
Directive also specifically noted disclosure must be made as to "[a]ny
5
A-0223-25allegation of misconduct bearing upon truthfulness, bias, or integrity that is the
subject of a pending investigation." Id. at 5.
In its written guidelines essentially mirroring the Attorney General's
directive, the Passaic County Prosecutor's Office ("PCPO") implemented a
policy requiring
[d]isclosure of confidential Giglio material should
only be done under [a] protective order. Examples of
confidential Giglio material include: 1) when there is
an allegation of misconduct against an officer that
bears upon truthfulness, bias, or integrity that is the
subject of a pending investigation or 2) when there is a
sustained finding as to candor against an officer that is
not publicly reported. To obtain a protective order,
the Assistant [P]rosecutor must make an ex parte
application to the court under R[ule] 3:13-3(e). This
application must include both a statement to the court
and a proposed form or order.
[Passaic Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., Policy and
Procedures to Comply with Brady v. Maryland and
Giglio v. United States 7 (rev. 2025) (emphasis in
original).]
To establish "a comprehensive process to address complaints of police
misconduct," the Attorney General issued the Attorney General's Internal
Affairs Policy and Procedures manual ("IAPP"). Rivera v. Union Cnty.
Prosecutor's Off., 250 N.J. 124, 142 (2022). Under the IAPP, "[t]he nature and
source of internal allegations, the progress of [IA] investigations, and the
6
A-0223-25resulting materials are [designated as] confidential information . . . ."1 IAPP §
9.6.1.
In this consolidated appeal, seven defendants2 were separately indicted
by a Passaic County Grand jury for various crimes. Each defendant, through
counsel, received correspondence, termed a Giglio letter, from the PCPO
notifying them that specified officers of the Paterson Police Department, who
might testify at trial, were accused of "misconduct that bears upon [the
officer's] truthfulness, bias, or integrity that is the subject of a pending
investigation."
A protective order accompanied that letter, granted ex parte under Rule
3:13-3(e)(1) and (2) by various judges to whom these cases were assigned.
Under those orders, defendants' counsel were limited to discussing the
information contained in the letter only with counsel's client. Third parties,
even within counsels' offices, were not permitted to have this information.
Arguing the State's "bare bones" notification of the pending
investigation hampered their ability to prepare for their trials, each defendant
1 Both the Directive and the IAPP carry the "force of law for State and local
law enforcement." State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 333, 356 (2023) (quoting In re.
Att'y Gen. Law Enf't Directive Nos. 2020-5 & 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462, 487-88
(2021)).
2 After oral argument in this appeal, the PCPO notified us that four of the
seven defendants resolved their pending matters.
7
A-0223-25moved to compel the State to "produce the underlying materials related to the
allegation and the investigation of [the reported] misconduct." They also
asked the motion court to vacate or to amend the protective order to expand the
scope of those who could view the produced IA information.
Separately, one defendant, Kahdar Holmes, moved under the protocol
established by our Supreme Court in Higgs,
3 for an in camera review of "any
open internal affairs complaints and their investigations" pertaining to the
officer involved in Holmes's arrest. The same motion judge granted the
application and ordered a "complete copy" of the officer's file to be submitted
to the court for an in camera review. Consequently, Holmes's counsel was able
to obtain a "significant number" of IA files pertaining to that officer under the
protective order. The remaining defendants in this appeal did not take this
additional step.
In a written opinion, the motion court granted defendants' motion to
compel disclosure of the IA investigations and vacated each protective order.
Recognizing the convergence of significant policy concerns at the "intersection
of public safety, transparency, due process, and the evolving standards of
criminal justice practice" this matter triggered, the motion judge framed the
controversy by identifying two central issues: (1) "whether the State's current
3 253 N.J. at 357-59.
8
A-0223-25practice of providing [defendants] with only . . . generic notification[s] of . . .
pending [IA] investigation[s] satisfies [its] disclosure obligations" under
Giglio; and (2) "whether the protective order imposed [was] procedurally and
substantively deficient."
Addressing the first inquiry, the motion court characterized the PCPO's
Giglio letter as a "template" containing only basic biographic information and
notification of a pending IA investigation concerning the officers'
"truthfulness, bias, or integrity" without specifying the nature of the
allegations, or providing any details. The court recognized no sustained
findings had taken place nor had any disciplinary dispositions been reached as
of the motion argument date. The court also acknowledged the State's
representation that it would provide full and detailed disclosure, including
supporting evidence, if the IA investigation resulted in a sustained finding.
The court interpreted the Directive to require any allegation of
misconduct relating to truthfulness, bias, or integrity that was the subject of a
pending investigation constituted Giglio material and required release of any
materials relating to those accusations to defendants, regardless of the status of
IA's investigation. The court substantiated its conclusion by finding the letter
offered "no usable facts" and did not identify either the nature nor the context
of the alleged misconduct. This, it found, deprived defendants of opportunities
9
A-0223-25to assess the relevance of the information for investigation, to prepare for
cross-examination, or to intelligently begin plea negotiations.
The motion court also found the protective order accompanying each
Giglio letter was "categorical and overbroad." Holding the "[S]tate's
generalized confidentiality and reputational interests [were] not enough to
override the defendants' due process rights and the constitutional imperative
for open discovery," the motion court found the order to be "excessively
broad" and the restrictions it created could not be justified without a specific
showing of harm.
We granted the State leave to appeal and it raises these issues for our
consideration:
Point I
The substance of pending [IA] investigations are
confidential and should not be subject to automatic
discovery provisions.
A. There is no legal basis to support [the motion
court]'s decision.
B. [The motion court]'s decision unduly disregarded
the risk of labeling as a "Giglio" officer.
C. The existing PCPO process works in compliance
with constitutional and ethical requirements.
D. A rational analysis of Directive 2019-6 stands
firmly against [the motion court]'s reasoning.
10
A-0223-25E. [The motion court]'s decision is at odds with recent
caselaw.
Point II
The protective orders entered by four different
Superior Court Judges were appropriately tailored to
prevent unnecessary disclosure of confidential
information.
Point III
The State's concerns about the stigma of being a
"Giglio" officer are well-founded.
Point IV
[The motion court]'s ruling creates an unworkable
discovery process.
Amicus the New Jersey Attorney General supports the PCPO's position,
and maintains there was no basis for the discovery of pending IA
investigations, and that neither the Attorney General's Directive nor existing
precedent require disclosure before any allegations were substantiated.
Defendants argued evidence from ongoing IA investigations related to
an officer's truthfulness, bias, or integrity definitionally qualifies as
impeachment evidence and, therefore, must be disclosed under Giglio even
before the IA investigation was concluded. They assert the motion court
correctly vacated the protective orders since they were overly broad and
infringed on defendants' preparatory and due process rights.
11
A-0223-25In support of this position, the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"), as amicus, argues defendants' rights established in Brady and
Giglio set a constitutional minimum that could neither be diminished nor
restricted by state law. Without additional details, the ACLU contends the
PCPO's Giglio letter was constitutionally infirm, and the protective order's
prohibition on sharing information within the Office of the Public Defender
("OPD") was too broad and improperly discriminated against the OPD as
compared to private law firms.
II.
We defer to a trial court's decision related to pre-trial discovery and will
reverse it only if we conclude the court mistakenly exercised its discretion.
State v. Ramirez, 252 N.J. 277, 298 (2022). We also apply this standard to a
"trial court's ruling on a motion for disclosure of privileged or confidential
records . . . ." N.J. Div. of Child. Prot. & Perm. v. M.C., 456 N.J. Super. 568,
585 (App. Div. 2018). A court exercises its discretion incorrectly if it decides
a matter "without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from
established policies, or [rests the issue] on an impermissible basis." State v.
R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020).
"Whether evidence is material and . . . subject to disclosure under the
Brady rule is a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J.
12
A-0223-2589, 185 (1997). We defer to the factual findings of the court, provided they
are substantiated by the record. State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 577 (2015)
(quoting State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 416 (2004)). Our review of a trial
court's application of the Brady rule, however, is de novo. Marshall, 148 N.J.
at 185.
A.
The State argues the trial court misapplied its discretion by ordering
disclosure of the IA files before the underlying investigation was completed,
without considering or properly balancing defendants' right to discovery
against the State's confidentiality concerns. We agree.
These jurisprudential principles are fundamental and govern our
analysis. Criminal defendants are afforded "broad" pre-trial discovery to
"guarantee fair and just trials and promote the search for truth . . . ." State v.
Morgan, 479 N.J. Super. 420, 429 (App. Div. 2024) (citing State v. Scoles, 214
N.J. 236, 251-52 (2013)). The tenor of our Court Rules reflects these tenets
and, therefore, requires "an open-file approach to pretrial discovery in criminal
matters post-indictment." Scoles, 214 N.J. at 252. The right to obtain
discovery is not unfettered and there are limits to defendants' "automatic right
to broad discovery to keep the process from 'transform[ing] . . . into an
unfocused, haphazard search for evidence.'" Morgan, 479 N.J. Super. at 429
13
A-0223-25(alteration and omission in original) (quoting State v. Arteaga, 476 N.J. Super.
36, 53 (App. Div. 2023)).
Rule 3:13-3(b)(1) sets forth the State's obligations to provide both
exculpatory and impeachment evidence to defendants and codifies the
principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Brady and Giglio.
Higgs, 253 N.J. at 354-55. The Brady rule is clear: "suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or . . . punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S.
at 87.
The Court expanded this principle in Giglio, concluding "[w]hen the
reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,
nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule."
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court advanced this
doctrine, concluding "the State's obligation to disclose is 'not limited to
evidence that affirmatively tends to establish a defendant's innocence but
would also include any information material and favorable to a defendant's
cause even where the evidence concerns only the credibility of a State's
witness.'" State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 111 (1982) (quoting State v. Carter, 69
14
A-0223-25N.J. 420, 433 (1976)). Both the release of impeachment evidence and
exculpatory material is encompassed by Brady's scope. State v. Hyppolite,
236 N.J. 154, 165 (2018). Prosecutors possess a special obligation to share
impeachment evidence within the prosecutor's control. State v. Nash, 212 N.J.
518, 544 (2013) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999)).
All aspects of IA investigations are confidential, including, specifically,
"the progress of . . . [the] investigations" and "the resulting materials." IAPP §
9.6.1. Often, unsubstantiated findings, rumors, conjecture, and speculation
form the basis of referrals, which an IA investigator must, nevertheless, accept
and evaluate regardless of their merit. As argued by the PCPO and its amicus,
premature disclosure of unsubstantiated allegations and the consequent
revelation of witness identities during an IA investigation can damage
reputations, hinder investigations, compromise disciplinary processes, unfairly
harm officers, and potentially expose complainants to negative consequences.
Conversely, recent New Jersey jurisprudence has underscored the critical
importance of transparency in law enforcement activities. See Rivera, 250
N.J. at 147 ("In general, the public has an interest in the disclosure of internal
affairs reports in order to hold officers accountable, to deter misconduct, to
assess whether the internal affairs process is working properly, and to foster
trust in law enforcement."). Since the credibility of any testifying witness is a
15
A-0223-25fundamental underpinning of the criminal trial process, the ability to obtain
this critical information is important to preserve defendants' right to a fair trial
and to build an effective defense as part of it. See State v. Chambers, 252 N.J.
561, 582 (2023) (noting that lack of "'access to the raw materials integral to the
building of an effective defense' is fundamentally unfair") (quoting State in
Int. of A.B., 219 N.J. 542, 556 (2014)).
The tension created between these two principles requires careful
consideration of both parties' positions and must result in a balanced approach
that satisfies both objectives.
Our Supreme Court addressed this issue in Higgs, 253 N.J. at 333.
Higgs was involved in a shooting with a police officer and sought the release
of the involved officer's IA file that included prior incidents of the officer
firing his weapon while on duty. Id. at 340. The Court, after reviewing the
pertinent jurisprudence regarding the disclosure of evidence, concluded
defendants "must be allowed, under certain circumstances, to access
documents in [the officer's IA] files." Id. at 357. "This is consistent with the
State's obligation to produce exculpatory and impeachment evidence . . . ."
Ibid. However, this entitlement does not mean that "defendants should have
unbridled access to [IA] records." Id. at 357-58.
16
A-0223-25"To appropriately balance the important interests involved," the Court
developed the following procedure to permit defendants to obtain access to
confidential information contained in IA files:
[A] defendant who seeks discovery of information
from an [IA] file must first file a motion with the trial
court requesting an in camera review of that file. The
motion shall identify the specific category of
information the defendant seeks and the relevance of
that information to the defendant's case. A general
allegation that the defendant is in search of
information relevant to a law enforcement officer's
credibility for impeachment purposes would be
insufficient to obtain review of the file. The
procedure should not be a fishing expedition into the
disciplinary records of law enforcement.
[Id. at 358.]
If a trial court determines the requested information in the IA file is
relevant, for whatever purpose, including impeachment, the court "shall grant
the defendant's motion and conduct an in camera review of the [IA] records
outside the presence of the parties." Id. at 359. The review would be "solely
for the purpose of determining whether the category of identified information
exists in the [IA] file." Ibid. (emphasis in original). Then, if "the trial court
determines that the requested information is present in the file, both parties
shall be allowed to review the relevant portion of the file, subject to any
protective orders entered by the trial court." Ibid. (emphasis omitted). This
17
A-0223-25would, of course, all be subject to an ultimate determination that the evidence
is admissible at trial as relevant. Id. at 359-60.
We acknowledge the factual predicate in Higgs differs from that in the
present case. In Higgs, the requested disclosure pertained to fact-specific
evidence regarding prior shooting incidents. 253 N.J. at 340. Here, the issue
involves the disclosure of circumstances that led to the designation of IA files
as relevant to an officer's "truthfulness, bias, or integrity." Nonetheless, the
rule and the balancing test established in Higgs is equally applicable here and
permits a trial court to weigh the need to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the IA investigation process against defendants' right to obtain this
information, provided they make a proper showing.4
This approach is the most reasonable and equitable and aligns with
common sense. Premature disclosure of unsubstantiated information
undermines the trial's truth-finding function. It similarly creates significant
challenges for the fact-finder, whose responsibility is to determine the truth,
especially if they are presented with a range of incidents or referrals that may
not have been proven, particularly when these are introduced solely to question
a witness's credibility. This is particularly true since the Directive explicitly
4 The approach we adopt applies only when the IA investigation into the
subject officer's conduct remains open. If the allegations are substantiated, no
balancing test is necessary, since the State acknowledges its obligation to
release the material according to the Directive and Giglio.
18
A-0223-25states that "[a]llegations that cannot be sustained, are not credible, or have
resulted in the exoneration of an employee, including where the previous
Giglio finding has either been vacated, or overturned on the merits in any
subsequent action, generally are not considered to be potential impeachment
information . . . ." Law Enf't Directive No. 2019-6, at 3. On balance, this
approach preserves the integrity of the IA investigative process while
simultaneously safeguarding the due process rights of all parties involved.
Therefore, we reverse the orders compelling disclosure of the IA materials
before the investigation is concluded and any allegations are substantiated.
B.
We turn to the protective orders the motion court vacated when it
ordered the release of materials related to the pending IA investigation. The
State contends the various protective orders were appropriately tailored to
prevent the unnecessary disclosure of confidential information. We disagree.
We agree with the court's reasoning to vacate the protective orders as
overly broad, particularly the prohibition on defense counsel discussing or
sharing the evidence with other OPD employees and experts. However, in
light of our conclusions regarding the Giglio letters, since the consideration of
pre-substantiated IA materials will be addressed on a case-specific basis
through motion practice, any concerns regarding improper or proper use can be
19
A-0223-25specifically addressed by the motion court under a factually-tailored protective
order. Defense counsel will have the opportunity to be heard regarding the
scope of the release of the Giglio material, and the trial court will determine
whether the proposed use is appropriate. Consequently, the court can fashion
an order with detailed and precise safeguards to mitigate or eliminate the risk
of improper disclosure of sensitive information. Therefore, we affirm the
orders vacating the protective orders.
In sum, given the competing confidentiality and due process concerns
present in this nuanced matter, we conclude a case-by-case approach is
necessary to balance these legitimate and reasonable interests.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed the parties' remaining
arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Reversed in part and vacated in part. The parties may make appropriate
applications in accordance with this opinion upon remand to the trial court.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
20
A-0223-25
