Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C.
2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817
(732) 572-0500 www.njlaws.com
Kenneth Vercammen was included in the “Super Lawyers” list published by Thomson Reuters

Sunday, June 26, 2022

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JAIME CAMBRELEN (20-01-0031 AND 20-08-0539, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1008-20)

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JAIME CAMBRELEN (20-01-0031 AND 20-08-0539, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-1008-20)

In this appeal, the court considered the propriety of a negotiated plea agreement provision, permitting the State to revoke its sentencing recommendation if the defendant is arrested on new charges that are not adjudicated prior to sentencing. Because the court concluded a no-new-arrest or no-new-charges provision violates a defendant's right to due process and is fundamentally unfair, the court vacated defendant's conviction and remanded the matter to allow the parties to negotiate a new plea agreement or permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. The court's decision does not affect those plea agreement provisions that limit the State's right to revoke its sentencing recommendation or recommend a harsher sentence if a defendant fails to appear at sentencing, provided the defendant is afforded a fair hearing pursuant to established case law.

State v. Abayuba Rivas (086051) (Union County & Statewide) (A-15-21

 State v. Abayuba Rivas (086051) (Union County & Statewide) (A-15-21; 086051)

Once Rivas invoked his right to counsel on March 18, however ambiguously, the detectives were required to clarify the ambiguity or cease questioning. The detectives did neither. Instead, the detectives interrogated Rivas for nearly six hours, eliciting a confession. After the improper interrogation and Rivas’s tainted confession -- a confession Rivas had reason to believe was lawful -- Rivas asked to see the detectives again. Those remarks cannot be fairly characterized as Rivas voluntarily initiating further communications with the detectives because the questioning never truly ceased. The interrogation and the request to speak again with the detectives were inextricably intertwined.

State v. Ashley D. Bailey (085342) (Camden County & Statewide) (A-60-20

 State v. Ashley D. Bailey (085342) (Camden County & Statewide) (A-60-20; 085342)

The crime-fraud exception cannot be properly applied to marital communications that preceded the Legislature’s amendment of N.J.R.E. 509. The Court finds no evidence that the Legislature intended that amendment to retroactively apply to otherwise privileged marital communications that occurred prior to that amendment. The trial court’s admission of the text messages therefore constituted error. However, that error was harmless given the extensive evidence presented by the State in support of defendant’s official misconduct convictions.

Monday, June 20, 2022

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION OF B.B. (ML-19-01-0027, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (RESUBMITTED) (A-1496-20)

 IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION OF B.B. (ML-19-01-0027, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (RESUBMITTED) (A-1496-20)

The court affirmed the provisions of the trial court order designating registrant B.B. as a Tier II offender under the Registration and Community Notification Laws, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, commonly known as Megan's Law, and ordering notification of schools and community organizations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2). However, the court: (1) concluded it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to give a score of nine on factor six of the Risk Assessment Scale, "duration of offensive behavior," because the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that B.B.'s sexual offenses took place over two years and held that a score of three, applicable to sexual offenses that took place over one or two years was appropriate; and (2) vacated a provision of the trial court order excluding B.B.'s personal identifiers from the Sex Offender Internet Registry, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-12 to -18. The court found that the evidence on which the trial court relied for that determination was not expert testimony or other evidence specific to the unique aspects of B.B.'s offenses or character relevant to his risk of re-offense. The court noted, but did not decide, the question of whether Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution and its implementing statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(c), preclude a court from excluding the personal identifiers of a Tier II offender subject to community notification pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2) from the State Offender Internet Registry.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RICHARD GOMES STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MOATAZ M. SHEIRA STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JASON CHIRIBOGA STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MAJU D. BARRY (S-2020-1306-1225, S-2021-0016-1421, 21-08-0745,

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RICHARD GOMES STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MOATAZ M. SHEIRA STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JASON CHIRIBOGA STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MAJU D. BARRY (S-2020-1306-1225, S-2021-0016-1421, 21-08-0745, and 21-06-0575, MIDDLESEX AND MORRIS COUNTIES AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-3477-20/A-0198-21/A-0581-21/A-0697-21)

In these appeals, trial courts in two vicinages reached opposite conclusions regarding whether, pursuant to the enactment of the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, N.J.S.A. 54:47F-1, N.J.S.A. 40:48I-1, N.J.S.A. 18A:61F-1, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-23.1, and N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6.1,1 a defendant may be admitted into pretrial intervention (PTI) where they have a prior conditional discharge for marijuana charges. One court concluded the defendant could not be admitted into PTI, finding the Legislature did not end the PTI eligibility bar where a defendant received a conditional discharge. The other court held that while the Legislature did not amend the PTI statute, the legislative intent of CREAMMA included removing the statutory bar to PTI eligibility where a defendant obtained a conditional discharge.

After reviewing CREAMMA, the PTI statute, the expungement statute, and considering extrinsic evidence, including the legislative histories of each enactment, the court found no evidence the Legislature intended to repeal, amend, or supersede the bar to PTI eligibility following the completion of a supervisory program and granting of a condition discharge. If, in fact, the Legislature intended such a modification, the remedy should be left to it rather than the court, which declines to insert language that is unsupported by the extant legislative evidence and intent. As a result, the court reversed the trial court decisions granting three defendants' admission into PTI and upheld the trial court's ruling barring the fourth defendant PTI admission.

________________________________________________________________
1 L. 2021, c. 16.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. QUINTIN D. WATSON (18-02-0234, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0235-19)

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. QUINTIN D. WATSON (18-02-0234, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-0235-19)

The court affirms defendant's jury trial conviction for second-degree robbery of a bank. The court first addresses defendant's contention that the trial judge erred by permitting the jury to hear testimony that the investigating police officer had been contacted by and "consulted" with another police department immediately before filing criminal charges. Defendant contends that such testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. After reviewing New Jersey's Confrontation Clause case law, the court concludes that the police officer's brief answer to the prosecutor's leading question concerning the consultation with the other police department violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights because it created an inescapable inference that the other department possessed and shared incriminating evidence about the current offense that was not presented to the jury. The court nonetheless concludes that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court next addresses defendant's contention that the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing a police witness to narrate surveillance video as it was being played to the jury. The court surveys the law in New Jersey explaining when a police witness may offer a lay opinion. The court also surveys cases in other jurisdictions that specifically address the admissibility of video narration testimony. The court declines to adopt a rule that would categorically prohibit such testimony, holding instead that a trial court has discretion to permit a witness to offer descriptive comments while a video is being played if the court finds that those specific comments would be helpful to the jury. To assist trial judges in making that determination, the court compiles a list of six factors to consider. In this instance, the court declines to second-guess the trial judge's rulings that sustained some objections to the video narration testimony and overruled others.

The court notes that the use of surveillance video evidence at trial is becoming more common because of the proliferation of government, commercial, and residential surveillance cameras. To improve the process by which the admissibility of police narration testimony is determined, the court recommends a new practice and procedure whereby the trial judge would conduct an in limine hearing when the prosecutor intends to present narration testimony in conjunction with playing a video to the jury. At that hearing, the court should rule upon the specific narration comments that will be permitted and those that will be foreclosed, providing clear instructions for the witness to follow. That in limine procedure would obviate the need for a series of spontaneous objections in the presence of the jury.

The court also notes that there presently is no model jury instruction pertaining to lay opinion testimony. The court recommends that the Model Jury Charge Committee consider whether it would be appropriate to draft a model instruction specifically tailored to address video narration testimony.

The court next considers defendant's contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the trial court erred by allowing the bank teller to make an in-court identification after having selected the photograph of another person from a photo array. After reviewing the foundational principles that undergird New Jersey's eyewitness identification jurisprudence, the court rejects defendant's request to categorically ban "first-time" in-court identifications. The court declines to impose new bright-line preconditions on when an eyewitness may identify the perpetrator at trial. Rather, the court retains the rule that the decision to allow an in-court identification is made on a case-by-case basis, mindful that suppression of identification testimony is rarely warranted and that the reliability of an identification and the weight to give to it is generally for the jury to decide with the benefit of cross-examination and appropriate jury instructions.

The court also addresses defendant's contention that the trial court should have revised the model jury charge sua sponte to explain the inherent suggestiveness of the in-court identification procedure. The court concludes that the trial judge did not commit plain error by relying on the current model jury charge. The court acknowledges, however, that the time has come to reexamine that instruction. After reviewing the case law and scientific literature, the court accepts that the inherent suggestiveness of in-court identifications is comparable to the suggestiveness of one-on-one show-up identifications. And yet, the court notes, the model jury instructions pertaining to in-court identifications are less detailed and precise than the model instruction that explains the risk of misidentification in a show-up procedure. The court recommends that the Model Jury Charge Committee consider revising the model instruction pertaining to in-court identifications, for example, by incorporating language currently used to explain the suggestiveness of one-on-one show-up identifications.

State v. Rahee Lane (085726) (Essex County & Statewide) (A-17-21

 State v. Rahee Lane (085726) (Essex County & Statewide) (A-17-21; 085726)

The Court construes N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) to be prospective, finding in the statutory language no indication that mitigating factor fourteen applies to defendants sentenced prior to the provision’s effective date. The Court views N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14)’s legislative history to confirm the Legislature’s intent to authorize sentencing courts to consider the new mitigating factor in imposing a sentence on or after the date of the amendment.

Sunday, June 19, 2022

State v. Mykal L. Derry; State v. Malik Derry (085795) (Atlantic County & Statewide) (A-13/14-21;

 State v. Mykal L. Derry; State v. Malik Derry (085795) (Atlantic County & Statewide) (A-13/14-21; 085795)

Based on the differences between the federal and state proceedings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. Like the Appellate Division, the Court finds that Special Agent Kopp’s interpretations were expert rather than lay opinions, but that the error in admitting them as lay opinion testimony was harmless. The Court bases its finding of harmless error, however, upon the overwhelming evidence of defendants’ guilt presented at trial, rather than on the hypothetical qualifications of the agent.

State v. Bradley C. Thompson (085260) (Camden County & Statewide) (A-41-20

 State v. Bradley C. Thompson (085260) (Camden County & Statewide) (A-41-20; 085260)

A plain reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) reveals that the Legislature intended the statute of limitations to begin to run once the State was in possession of both the physical evidence from the crime and the suspect’s DNA. To hold otherwise would contradict the language of the statute which directs the statute of limitations to begin when the State is in possession of both items needed to generate a match. To find that the statute of limitations begins when a match is confirmed would render the second half of the provision superfluous. Here, the statute of limitations began to run in 2010, when the FBI’s updated scientific guidance rendered the Lab capable of generating a match based on the DNA samples in its possession.

Sunday, May 22, 2022

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. YVES M. MARCELLUS (16-11-0791, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4102-19)

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. YVES M. MARCELLUS (16-11-0791, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-4102-19)

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence taken by police from an opaque bag and closed shoebox located in his mother's room in a home owned by his aunt; his aunt had previously barred defendant from the home. Police did not seek a warrant but instead sought and obtained the consent of defendant's aunt to search her home. No effort was made to obtain defendant's mother's consent to search her room, even though the trial judge found she was a tenant, because she spoke only Creole. Notwithstanding questions about the validity of the consent to search defendant's mother's room, the court concluded in reversing that there was no evidence to support a finding that police had a reasonably objective belief that either defendant's aunt or his mother had the authority to consent to a search of the opaque bag and closed shoebox because the record revealed this property belonged only to defendant, who did not consent. That defendant had no possessory interest or reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises where the closed containers were found was irrelevant to the analysis about the validity of the search of the containers.

State v. Rashaun Bell (084657) (A-75-20

 State v. Rashaun Bell (084657) (Statewide) (A-75-20; 084657)

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 applies to the act of fleeing from the scene of an accident. The number of fatalities that may result from the accident is not an element of the offense and thus only one count of the offense may be charged per accident, regardless of the number of victims. Although the Appellate Division correctly reversed the trial court’s judgment with regard to the number of counts that could be charged, the appellate court should have remanded the case to the trial court to permit the parties to negotiate a new plea agreement or go to trial rather than amend the sentence in a manner not contemplated by the plea agreement.

Monday, May 16, 2022

Arrest and search for ordinance violation not permitted

Arrest and search for ordinance violation not permitted


                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION

                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0033-19


STATE OF NEW JERSEY,


          Plaintiff-Respondent,


v.


LEANDER WILLIAMS,

a/k/a LEELEE WILLIAMS,

and SHALIK WILLIAMS,


     Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________


                   Submitted March 1, 2022 – Decided April 21, 2022


                   Before Judges Fisher and Currier.


                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos. 16-11-

                   1717, 16-12-1832 and 18-01-0097.


                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.



                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM


      New Brunswick police arrested defendant after they witnessed him with a


group of men playing a game of dice and exchanging money with others on the


sidewalk in violation of New Brunswick municipal ordinance § 9.04.010. A


subsequent search of defendant revealed he had 102 bags of cocaine hidden


down the front of his pants. The court denied defendant's motion to suppress


the narcotics, finding it was a lawful search incident to arrest.    Defendant


pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment with four years


of parole ineligibility.


      We conclude that the arrest and subsequent search were not valid under


 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152, because the violation of the ordinance was not a


disorderly persons offense or a breach of peace. However, the State did raise an


alternative argument for the admission of the evidence: that police lawfully


seized the narcotics under the plain view exception. Because the trial court did


not consider that argument, we vacate the order of suppression and remand for


the court to consider whether the factual record permits the finding of a lawful


search and seizure under an alternate basis.





                                                                          A-0033-19

                                       2

                                         I.


        We derive our facts from evidence elicited during the suppression hearing.


New Brunswick Detective Brandt Gregus received information from a


confidential informant that defendant was distributing narcotics at a specific


location from "a bag attached to his belt." Gregus drove to the address in an


unmarked vehicle wearing plain clothes. When he arrived, he saw a group of


men, including defendant with whom he was familiar. Gregus parked his car


and surveilled the group for ten to fifteen minutes. He testified he saw the group


illegally gambling—playing a game of dice. Defendant was collecting money


from the men. Gregus did not see any drug transactions.


        Gregus called for backup, and after other officers arrived, they approached


the group. When the men began to walk away, Gregus told them to stop and


asked who had the dice. All of the men raised their hands, showing they were


not holding the dice. When defendant raised his arms, Gregus stated he saw the


top of a plastic bag tied to defendant's belt, with the remainder of the bag


"sticking into his pants."1 Gregus said it was "common for drug dealers to . . .


conceal drugs inside their pants."





1

    Defendant described the bag tied to his belt as a "sandwich baggie."

                                                                             A-0033-19

                                         3

      Gregus and another officer walked defendant to a nearby car. Gregus


testified that he stuck his finger under the bag and "plop[ped]" it out. He denied


putting his hand into defendant's pants. Gregus said he was able to put his


fingers under the knot of the bag, which was still tied to defendant's belt, and


pull it out. At that point, the detective said the bag "was still connected to


[defendant's] belt" and Gregus "was able to see that it contained a significant


amount of bags of crack cocaine." The bag contained 102 smaller bags of crack


cocaine.


      The search also uncovered money in defendant's front pocket.           Only


defendant was issued a summons for illegal gambling. The other men were


released.


                                       II.


      Defendant later moved to suppress the narcotics, contending they were


illegally seized after an invalid arrest. The State opposed the motion, asserting


the search was incident to a valid arrest and, in the alternative, the narcotics


were in plain view, therefore justifying their seizure without a warrant. During


the ensuing hearing, in addition to Gregus, the court heard from two defense


witnesses. The two men testified they were present at the time of this incident


and saw police put their hands down defendant's pants and pull something out.



                                                                            A-0033-19

                                        4

      In its February 11, 2019 order denying the motion to suppress, the trial


court found Gregus was credible and the defense witnesses were not. The judge


stated: "Detective Gregus observed the defendant violating a municipal


ordinance and was within his authority to arrest the defendant and search his


person" under  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152. Because the court found the search was


incident to a lawful arrest, it did not consider the plain view exception.


                                       III.


      Defendant presents the following issues for our consideration:


            I. THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE

            BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE SEARCH OF

            WILLIAMS WAS NEITHER A VALID SEARCH

            INCIDENT TO ARREST NOR A VALID PLAIN-

            VIEW SEARCH.


            A. As a Matter of law, the Detective Could not Conduct

            a Custodial Arrest for a Violation of a Municipal

            Ordinance That did not Involve a Breach of the Peace.


            B. The State Failed to Establish Probable Cause That

            Williams Violated a Municipal Ordinance.


            C. The Detective Exceeded the Permissible Scope of a

            Search Incident to Arrest by Reaching Down Williams's

            Pants on a Public Street in View of Other People.


            D. The Plain-View Exception does not Apply Because

            the Detective Lacked Probable Cause That the Partially

            Visible Bag Contained Drugs.




                                                                             A-0033-19

                                        5

            II. RESENTENCING IS WARRANTED BECAUSE

            THE TRIAL COURT MISTAKENLY BELIEVED IT

            WAS BOUND BY THE PLEA AGREEMENT AND

            FAILED TO MEANINGFULLY WEIGH THE

            AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS.


                                        A.


      In our review of an order granting or denying a motion to suppress


evidence, we uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision if


they are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v.


Scriven,  226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016). In addition, we "defer to trial courts' credibility


findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the


character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are


not transmitted by the record." State v. Locurto,  157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999). Such


deference is given to credibility findings because the trial judge had the


"opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Hubbard,  222 N.J. 249, 269 (2015) (citation omitted).


      The judge's findings should be overturned "only if they are so clearly


mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State


v. Elders,  192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson,  42 N.J. 146, 162


(1964)). However, we owe no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law.


Instead, our review is de novo. State v. Watts,  223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015).



                                                                              A-0033-19

                                         6

      Defendant contends the search incident to arrest was unconstitutional


because: (1) an officer cannot conduct a warrantless, custodial search of an


individual for violating a municipal ordinance if that individual has not breached


the peace; (2) there was no probable cause that defendant violated the ordinance;


(3) the detective exceeded the scope of his search incident to arrest when


reaching into defendant's pants; and (4) the detective lacked probable cause that


the bag in defendant's waistband contained drugs, therefore the plain-view


doctrine does not justify the search.


                                        B.


      Law enforcement was not authorized under the controlling statute to arrest


defendant for a breach of the municipal ordinance forbidding gambling. Under


 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152, a police officer "shall have all the powers of peace officers


and upon view may apprehend and arrest any disorderly person or any person


committing a breach of the peace." Under the statute's plain language, a police


officer may only arrest an individual committing a disorderly persons offense or


for a breach of peace.


      Defendant was only stopped for violating a municipal ordinance. We have


stated that the violation of a municipal ordinance is not a disorderly persons


offense. Marion v. Borough of Manasquan,  231 N.J. Super. 320, 330 (App. Div.



                                                                            A-0033-19

                                        7

1989); see also  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(1) (stating a disorderly persons offense is


only an offense as so defined in the New Jersey Criminal Code or by statute).


Moreover, Gregus testified that defendant was not charged with a disorderly


persons offense. Therefore, defendant could only be arrested for a breach of


peace.


      In State v. Hurtado,  113 N.J 1 (1988), rev'g on dissent,  219 N.J. Super. 12


(App. Div. 1987), the Supreme Court reversed this court's decision and adopted


the dissenting judge's opinion that found police had no authority to arrest the


defendant for violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting littering.  113 N.J. at

 2 (citing  219 N.J. Super. at 23-28 (Skillman, J., dissenting)).


      Because the defendant was only cited for violating a municipal ordinance,


Judge Skillman stated defendant could only be arrested for a breach of the peace,


and littering was not such an offense. Id. at 25. Referring to Wharton's Criminal


Law, the judge cited examples of circumstances rising to a breach of the peace,


such as "public brawling," "being intoxicated and yelling on a public street,"


"discharging a weapon on a public street," and "entering the dwelling house of


another with weapons in such manner as to cause terror and alarm to the


occupants." Ibid. (quoting 4 Wharton's Criminal Law § 522 at 176-77 (14th ed.


1981)). The judge stated that littering "had a much lesser impact on public order



                                                                           A-0033-19

                                        8

than any of [the] illustrations," and "cannot reasonably be found to have


constituted a 'breach of the peace.'" Ibid. Therefore,  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152 did


not authorize the warrantless arrest and rendered the subsequent search invalid.


Ibid.


        In reviewing the testimony presented during the suppression hearing, there


was no evidence that rises to the level of the circumstances described by Judge


Skillman to warrant a breach of the peace. Detective Gregus did not arrest


defendant because he was breaching the peace. Gregus merely observed several


men rolling dice. Defendant was standing on the edge of the group collecting


money. Gregus conceded he did not see any drug transactions.


        The validity of the search turns on the validity of the arrest. Because it


was unlawful to arrest defendant under  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152, the ensuing


warrantless search was not justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest.


                                        C.


        The State also presented an alternative argument to uphold the search and


seizure of the evidence—that the plain view exception to the warrant


requirement was satisfied because Gregus saw the plastic baggie tied to


defendant's belt when he raised his hands. The trial court did not consider this


argument because it found the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Therefore,



                                                                            A-0033-19

                                         9

we remand for the court to consider whether the factual record permits


admission of the narcotics evidence under any other legal theory.


                                     IV.


      Because we are remanding for further proceedings regarding the


suppression motion, we do not address defendant's contentions regarding his


sentencing. Defendant may raise those arguments again in a future appeal.


      The February 11, 2019 order is vacated.         We remand for further


proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.





                                                                         A-0033-19

                                     10