Restraining Order reserved where Judge no findings as to whether an FRO was necessary to provide protection for plaintiff "from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse. Y.B.M. vs. O.G.

 Restraining Order reserved where Judge no findings as to whether an FRO was necessary to provide protection for plaintiff "from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse. Y.B.M. vs. O.G. 

    Defendant O.G. appealed from the October 10, 2024 final restraining order entered against him in favor of plaintiff Y.B.M. pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The trial judge concluded that the plaintiff had met her burden of proof and proved assault. He found the defendant's grabbing and pulling on the plaintiff's shirt constituted an attempt to cause her bodily injury. The judge found the defendant knowingly and purposefully grabbed plaintiff's shirt. The judge noted the plaintiff was "clearly scared" of defendant. On appeal, the defendant contended the judge's findings were contrary to the weight of the evidence, and relied, in part, on evidence that was not admitted during the hearing. The Appellate Division was persuaded by defendant's arguments, vacated the final order and remanded. unreported source   Daily Briefing - 10-23-25 

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0650-24

Y.B.M.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

O.G.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted September 18, 2025 ─ Decided October 22, 2025

Before Judges Marczyk and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County,

Docket No. FV-18-0270-25.

Roberts & Teeter, LLC, attorneys for appellant

(Michael B. Roberts, on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

1 We use initials to protect the identity of victims of domestic violence and to

preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).Defendant O.G. appeals from the October 10, 2024 final restraining order

(FRO) entered against him in favor of plaintiff Y.B.M. pursuant to the

Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. For

the reasons that follow, we vacate the FRO, reinstate the temporary restraining

order (TRO), and remand for further proceedings.

I.

The record on appeal is limited. While defendant filed the transcript of

the FRO hearing, he omitted the initial TRO and the complete amended TRO.

Accordingly, we derive these essential facts from the sparse record.

At the hearing, plaintiff appeared self-represented. Defendant was

represented by counsel. The parties had a three-year dating relationship, which

ended around August 12, 2024. Each party alleged the other subsequently

entered a relationship with another individual. On August 27 at 11:12 p.m.,

defendant went to plaintiff's home because she had stopped responding to his

calls. As defendant arrived at plaintiff's home, she was exiting a car driven by

a male friend in front of her home. Defendant began to verbally confront

plaintiff and called her a "whore." He also grabbed plaintiff's shirt, forcibly

"yanked" her out of the car, and continued "yelling" at her. Plaintiff

2 A-0650-24subsequently drove away to "calm down and feel better." She produced video

footage from that night; however, the altercation was not captured on video.

Plaintiff described other prior incidents of domestic violence perpetrated

by defendant. She recounted defendant threatening her with knives and an

incident involving a beer bottle. She did not testify about the specific locations

or dates of these incidents. Plaintiff further recalled that, on April 24, 2024,

defendant choked her until she lost consciousness. She produced several

photographs depicting redness around her neck after she was choked, which

supported her testimony and were admitted into evidence.

Plaintiff testified she sought an FRO because her "life ha[d] been in

danger a few times" during her relationship with defendant. She further stated

she was "afraid that one day he [was] going to be under the influence of alcohol

and do something to [her]."

Plaintiff's friend, K.S., testified plaintiff told her about the choking

incident, although K.S. was unable to recall the date. K.S. observed scratch

marks on plaintiff's neck. On cross-examination, K.S. acknowledged she did

not witness defendant injure plaintiff. However, when K.S. visited plaintiff, she

was "always scared [and] always worried." According to K.S., plaintiff stayed

3 A-0650-24at K.S.'s home because she was "too scared" to return to her own home, as she

was "terrified" of defendant.

Defendant testified on his own behalf, describing his relationship with

plaintiff as contentious after their initial interaction on Facebook. He claimed

their relationship had not ended; she simply blocked his calls and messages

without providing him with a reason.

Defendant stated on the night of August 27, he went to plaintiff's home in

an effort to "try to fix things" because she had not responded to any of his calls

or text messages. He claimed he found her outside at approximately 10:10 p.m.

He further stated they had a conversation while he was standing in front of his

car, and she was standing near the sidewalk with a male friend. This friend, who

identified himself as plaintiff's boyfriend, became angry and confrontational

with defendant. Defendant subsequently left and drove away. He denied

touching or calling plaintiff names.

In considering the parties' testimony and evidence, the Family Part judge

rendered an oral decision on the record. The judge found both plaintiff and K.S.

credible because they "did not avoid questions[,] . . . were willing to answer

questions[,] and . . . provided good explanations." Overall, there were no

contradictions in their testimony.

4 A-0650-24In contrast, the judge found defendant's credibility was "undermined" by

the circumstances that led to plaintiff obtaining a TRO. He further found there

were contradictions in defendant's testimony, which he deemed "not believable"

and lacking in straightforward answers.

The judge cited Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006) and

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a), the statute defining assault. He concluded plaintiff had

met her burden of proof and proved assault. He found defendant's grabbing and

pulling on plaintiff's shirt constituted an attempt to cause her bodily injury. The

judge further found defendant knowingly and purposefully grabbed plaintiff's

shirt. The judge noted plaintiff was "clearly scared" of defendant.

II.

On appeal, defendant argues a single issue for our review. He argues there

was an insufficient basis for the entry of the FRO. He contends the judge's

findings were contrary to the weight of the evidence, and relied, in part, on

evidence that was not admitted during the hearing. We are persuaded by

defendant's arguments.

Our scope of review of Family Part orders is limited. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463

N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). We owe substantial deference to the

Family Part's findings because of its special expertise in family matters. Cesare

5 A-0650-24v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). We must "accord substantial deference to

Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are

'specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and more

ordinary differences that arise between couples.'" C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 428

(quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). That deference is

particularly strong when the evidence is largely testimonial and rests on a judge's

credibility findings. Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015).

We will not disturb a trial judge's factual findings unless "they are so

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154

N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.

474, 484 (1974)). However, we do not accord such deference to legal

conclusions and review those conclusions de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme,

227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016).

"In adjudicating a domestic violence case, the trial judge has a 'two-fold'

task." J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306, 313 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting

Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125). "The judge must first determine whether the

plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant

committed one of the predicate acts referenced in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)." Ibid.

6 A-0650-24If plaintiff proves a predicate act of domestic violence was committed, the

second inquiry is whether the judge should enter an FRO "to protect the victim

from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver, 387 N.J. Super.

at 127. "The second prong of Silver requires the [judge] to evaluate the factors

set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -(6) to determine whether an FRO should

be issued." A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J. Super. 402, 416 (App. Div. 2016).

Here, plaintiff alleged and testified to a prior history of domestic violence,

as well as the verbal and physical confrontation with defendant. We are satisfied

the judge properly concluded plaintiff established defendant committed simple

assault.

After finding defendant committed the predicate act, the judge was

required to "determine whether a domestic violence restraining order [was]

necessary to protect plaintiff from immediate danger or further acts of domestic

violence." Silver, 387 N.J. Super at 128. However, the judge did not evaluate

the statutory factors and made no findings as to whether an FRO was necessary

to provide protection for plaintiff "from an immediate danger or to prevent

further abuse." Id. at 127 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)). Consequently, we are

constrained to vacate the FRO, reinstate the TRO, and remand for the judge, to

7 A-0650-24determine whether an FRO is necessary under Silver and the factors set forth in

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -(6).

Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

8 A-0650-24

Requests for adjournments in municipal court are governed by Rule 7:8- 3, which provides courts "may adjourn the trial" and that "additional adjournments may be granted, or may be denied State v Lynch

Requests for adjournments in municipal court are governed by Rule 7:8-

3, which provides courts "may adjourn the trial" and that "additional

adjournments may be granted, or may be denied

 

State v Lynch

Defendant Amber D. Lynch appealed from the Law Division's June 4, 2024 order finding her guilty, following de novo review of the municipal court appeal, of failing to yield to a pedestrian, N.J.S.A. 39:4-36(a). The sole issue on appeal was whether the Law Division acted within its discretion in denying defendant's request for an adjournment. The Appellate Division affirmed. DOCKET NO. A-3442-23 Unreported  source Daily Briefing - 10-15-25        

 

Full opinion at Criminal Law- Recent Cases Vercammen Law http://njcriminallaw.blogspot.com/ 

 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3442-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AMBER D. LYNCH,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued September 25, 2025 – Decided October 14, 2025

Before Judges Marczyk and Puglisi.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Monmouth County, Municipal Appeal No.

24-009.

Peter M. O'Mara argued the cause for appellant (The

O'Mara Law Firm, attorneys; Peter M. O'Mara, on the

brief).

Michael A. Cricchi, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the

cause for respondent (Raymond S. Santiago,

Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Monica do

Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the

brief; Ryan Corbin, Legal Assistant, on the brief).PER CURIAM

Defendant Amber D. Lynch appeals from the Law Division's June 4, 2024

order finding her guilty, following de novo review of the municipal court appeal,

of failing to yield to a pedestrian, N.J.S.A. 39:4-36(a). The sole issue on appeal

is whether the Law Division acted within its discretion in denying defendant's

request for an adjournment. Following our review of the record and the

applicable legal principles, we affirm.

I.

On December 15, 2023, defendant was exiting Top Plaza onto Union Hill

Road in Marlboro Township. She stopped her vehicle at the plaza's exit stop

sign. Immediately past the stop sign is an intersection with a marked crosswalk,

parallel to Union Hill Road. Bernhard Sokal was standing on the right side of

the intersection, waiting to cross to defendant's left. After defendant's vehicle

stopped at the stop sign, Sokal began to cross the intersection. Defendant then

proceeded through the stop sign, striking Sokal and knocking him to the ground.

The front passenger tire of defendant's vehicle ran over part of Sokal's right foot.

Marlboro Township Police issued defendant a summons for failing to

yield to a pedestrian. Defendant's first appearance was scheduled for December

29, 2023, in the Marlboro Township Municipal Court, but for reasons unknown

2 A-3442-23to the Law Division, defendant did not appear on that date. On January 18,

2024, defendant appeared, self-represented, and pled not guilty. On February 7,

2024, the court scheduled trial for March 14. Defendant retained counsel on or

about March 7, 2024, who then filed a notice of appearance.

Defense counsel asserts he requested an adjournment of the trial when he

was retained, but the Marlboro Municipal Clerk denied the request. On the day

of trial, defendant appeared in person and again requested an adjournment,

which was denied. Following trial, the municipal court found defendant guilty

of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-36(a) and ordered her to pay a $207 fine and $33 in

court costs.

Defendant appealed to the Law Division, and her sentence was stayed

pending appeal. The Law Division heard the de novo appeal on June 3, 2024.

On June 4, 2024, the Law Division also found defendant guilty and imposed the

same fines.

II.

Defendant raises the following point on appeal:

THE COURT'S FAILURE TO ADJOURN TRIAL IN

THIS MATTER AND ALLOW THE STATE TO

PROVIDE DISCOVERY WAS AN ABUSE OF

DISCRETION.

3 A-3442-23Appellate review of a de novo proceeding in the Law Division, following

an appeal from the municipal court, is exceedingly narrow. See State v. Locurto,

157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999). It is "limited to the action of the Law Division['s

decision] and not that of the municipal court." State v. Palma, 219 N.J. 584,

591-92 (2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

A motion for an adjournment, in criminal and civil cases, is addressed to

the sound discretion of the trial court, and a denial of an adjournment will not

lead to reversal on appeal, unless the defendant suffered a manifest wrong or

injury. See State v. Miller, 216 N.J. 40, 66-67 (2013); State v. Hayes, 205 N.J.

522, 537 (2011); Escobar-Barrera v. Kissin, 464 N.J. Super. 224, 233 (App. Div.

2020).

Defendant argues the municipal court's denial of her adjournment request

under Rule 7:8-3 was an abuse of discretion. She further claims the State failed

to provide her with discovery in a timely manner.

"A court may exercise broad discretion in controlling its calendar." State

v. Kates, 426 N.J. Super. 32, 45 (App. Div. 2012). In exercising that discretion,

"[a] trial court must strike a balance between its inherent and necessary right to

control its own calendar and the public's interest in the orderly administration

4 A-3442-23of justice." Ibid. (quoting State v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 402 (App.

Div. 1985)).

Defendant's attorney received an email the day before trial advising

discovery was available for his review. Counsel then appeared at trial and

requested an adjournment to obtain discovery. The municipal court denied

defendant's request for an adjournment but gave defense counsel an opportunity

to obtain and review the discovery during a recess. Counsel declined to review

the discovery. He stated he believed it "would be fruitless."

Before the Law Division, defense counsel argued he was unaware Sokal

had been injured, and the discovery would have assisted in his preparation in

that regard. Counsel also stated he was not prepared for the municipal trial

because he did not have discovery but conceded he could not state how he was

prejudiced, despite having subsequently received the discovery following the

trial.1

1 Defendant now asserts the discovery received after the municipal court trial,

but before the de novo appeal was heard, showed a discrepancy between the

accident report and the testimony of one of the police officers. This issue was

not raised before the Law Division and was only raised for the first time on

appeal. We decline to consider an issue not properly presented to the trial court

unless the jurisdiction of the court is implicated or the matter concerns an issue

of great public importance. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234

(1973). Neither circumstance is present in this matter.

5 A-3442-23In addressing defendant's adjournment request, the Law Division noted:

During the trial de novo this court questioned [defense

counsel] as to how he was prejudiced by the municipal

court's denial of his request for adjournment made on

the day of trial. He candidly conceded that he could not

point to any prejudice but claimed he was not aware of

. . . Sokal's injuries and, had he known about them, he

would have made further inquiries. However, . . .

Sokal's injury was not an element of this offense and

defendant could have been convicted with a mere

showing that defendant failed to yield to Sokal while he

was in the crosswalk without any showing he was

injured or even struck b[y] her vehicle.

The court went on to conclude, "[d]efendant [did] not demonstrate[] prejudice

from the denial of the request for an adjournment."

We conclude the Law Division did not misapply its discretion in denying

the adjournment request. Again, we will only reverse a trial court for failing to

grant an adjournment if the trial court abused its discretion, causing a party a

"manifest wrong or injury." Hayes, 205 N.J. at 537 (quoting State v.

McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242, 259 (App. Div. 1998)).

Counsel ably represented defendant during the municipal court trial, and

he could not articulate any identifiable prejudice let alone any "manifest wrong

or injury" suffered by defendant as a result of the Law Division's ruling.

Counsel failed to point to any relevant information in the requested discovery

that would have changed the outcome of the case. Moreover, he was given an

6 A-3442-23opportunity to review the discovery during a court recess in a matter he

characterized as a "relatively simple traffic infraction," but declined to do so.

Had counsel attempted to view the discovery and been denied access, or if he

had discovered something significant that would have warranted an

adjournment, he could have properly raised the issue before the court. Instead,

he assumed it would have been a "fruitless" venture and decided not to review

the discovery.

Requests for adjournments in municipal court are governed by Rule 7:8-

3, which provides courts "may adjourn the trial" and that "additional

adjournments may be granted" when the court deems it "reasonably necessary

in the interest of justice." Under the circumstances in this matter, we determine

the Law Division did not err in exercising its discretion by denying the

adjournment.

We by no means suggest that reasonable requests for adjournments should

not be entertained by municipal courts when an attorney is retained, through no

fault of their own, close to trial as was the case here. However, our review in

this case is confined to the Law Division's decision, and we discern no reason

to disturb the court's conclusions, given defendant's failure to demonstrate a

manifest wrong or injury to herself.

7 A-3442-23Affirmed.

8 A-3442-23