IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT J.S. A-3541-14T1

IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT J.S.
          A-3541-14T1

On the State's appeal, we interpret N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), which allows termination from the registration requirements of the Registration and Community Notification Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, also known as Megan's Law, and the related requirements for Community Supervision for Life "upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction." The judge adopted petitioner's position he was "convicted" on January 14, 2000, the date he entered his guilty plea. The State disagreed and asserted petitioner was "convicted" on November 13, 2000, the date the judgment of conviction was imposed.

Following our review, we reverse and conclude the import of the statutory language requires, as a prerequisite for requesting termination from the registration requirements, an offender demonstrate a fifteen-year period of being offense-free and Megan's Law compliant, following the date the judgment of conviction is issued. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. L.S. A-2523-13T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. L.S.
          A-2523-13T2

In this case, we construe the elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:28- 4(b)(1), which at the time of trial, provided that a person commits a disorderly persons offense if he "[r]eports or causes to be reported to law enforcement authorities an offense of other incident within their concern knowing that it did not occur[.]" The legislature has since made the offense a fourth- degree crime. See L. 2015, c. 175 (eff. Jan. 11, 2016).
Defendant reported that she was the victim of a sexual assault committed by an unknown assailant on her college campus. During the investigation, she admitted supplying false details of the events, such as the location of the crime and the identity of the assailant. Neither the municipal court judge nor the Law Division judge, however, concluded that the sexual assault had not occurred. Instead, based upon case law developed prior to enactment of our Criminal Code, the judge at the trial de novo concluded that the supplying of false details was sufficient to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
We reversed. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOHN N. MAHONEY A-5320-14T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOHN N. MAHONEY
          A-5320-14T4

We granted leave to appeal from an order denying the State's motion to preclude two deliberating jurors from addressing the court at defendant's sentencing hearing. We reversed and remanded for sentencing without input from the jurors.
We held that a judge may not consider for sentencing purposes any comments from a deliberating juror to identify applicable aggravating or mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). Consequently, deliberating jurors are precluded from participating at a defendant's sentencing

proceeding. To allow juror participation would unnecessarily create a substantial risk of distracting the jurors from their primary purpose – serving as judges of the facts – and would indubitably undermine the sanctity of the jury's deliberative process in our system of jurisprudence. 

Sundiata Acoli v. New Jersey State Parole Board (A-52- 14

Sundiata Acoli v. New Jersey State Parole Board (A-52-
          14; 075308)

          The administrative scheme for parole envisioned that a
          convicted murderer would undergo a full hearing before
          the Parole Board prior to securing release from
          incarceration. In Acoli’s circumstances, the
          appropriate remedy is a remand to the full Parole
          Board for completion of the administrative parole
          process. That process in its totality requires a full
          hearing before the Parole Board on his suitability for
          parole release and shall permit the victims of his
          criminal acts to be heard, if they wish, by the Board
          prior to a decision on his parole.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF C.F. A-2718-12T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF C.F.
          A-2718-12T2

In 2012, C.F. was charged and tried as a juvenile for a felony murder committed in 1976. He was found guilty and given a ten-year sentence, the maximum permitted by a law enacted in 1983 and still in effect. The State appealed, arguing the judge should have applied the law in effect when the offense was committed — that repealed law permitted the imposition of an indeterminate life sentence.
The court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not violate the savings statute, N.J.S.A. 1:1-15, which generally bars retroactive application of new laws, because the triggering date for application of the savings statute was the date the juvenile "incurred" a "penalty," not the date he "committed" the "offense." The juvenile here did not incur a penalty until found guilty in 2012; the trial judge properly applied the sentencing law on the books at that time and not the law discarded by the Legislature decades earlier. 

State v. Raymond Daniels (A-90-13

State v. Raymond Daniels (A-90-13; 073504)

          In the context of a trial record that contains
          evidence of an incomplete affirmative defense and
          where the potential for jury confusion exists, a trial
          court may, over a defendant’s objections, issue a
          modified jury charge on the affirmative defense in
          order to elucidate legal principles pertinent to the
          evidence.  In so doing, the court must balance the
          need to educate the jury and the need to protect the
          defendant’s rights.  Here, the trial court’s
          affirmative defense charge on renunciation unfairly
          prejudiced the defense, requiring reversal and remand
          for a new trial.

State v. Eugene C. Baum (A-107-13

State v. Eugene C. Baum (A-107-13; 073056)

          The jury instructions, taken as a whole, are neither
          ambiguous nor misleading because they did not blend,
          and explicitly distinguished, the concepts of mental
          disease or defect and self-induced intoxication, in
          charges that reflected an accurate statement of the
          law.  The sequence of instructions given by the court,
          addressing the diminished capacity defense followed by
          the self-induced intoxication instruction, did not
          negate the diminished capacity defense.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KASON D. HOCKETT A-2820-13T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KASON D. HOCKETT 

A-2820-13T2 

The trial judge excluded defendant's offer and use of evidence that would have challenged the credibility of the State's chief eyewitness to the alleged murder because the judge believed the evidence was obtained through questionable or unscrupulous means. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that how defendant acquired the evidence had no bearing on its admissibility and that its exclusion — and the limitation the ruling placed on cross-examination of the eyewitness — was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. IRIS QUINTERO A-2186-13T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. IRIS QUINTERO 

A-2186-13T4 

We affirm defendant's de novo conviction for refusal to submit to a breath test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. Defendant argues that the Attorney General's current standard statement under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) is fundamentally deficient for not specifying the mandatory minimum penalties for refusal. In State v. O'Driscoll, 215 N.J. 461, 479-480 (2013), the Supreme Court noted, but declined to address, the sufficiency of the standard statement. 

We hold that the current standard statement satisfies the statutory mandate — that is, informing motorists and impelling compliance — by adequately informing drivers of the maximum potential license revocation and fine, and the possibility of ignition interlock, that they face for refusal. In so ruling, we note that adding other details, including the differing mandatory minimum and maximum penalties for first offenders, second offenders, and certain third offenders, may run the risk of submerging the most significant penalties in those details. 

State v. Howard Jones (A-112-13

State v. Howard Jones (A-112-13; 073827) 

In determining the reliability of evidence obtained through a suggestive showup identification procedure, extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no role in the determination of the evidence’s admissibility. A reliability assessment must restrict its focus to the accuracy and trustworthiness of the specific identification. In this matter, the showup was impermissibly suggestive, and evidence from that showup was assessed for reliability under an erroneous analysis. Defendant’s conviction is reversed and the matter is remanded for new proceedings. 

DWI Refusal notice withstands challenge State v Quintero

DWI Refusal notice withstands challenge  

State v Quintero __ NJ Super __(App. Div. 2016)

The court affirm defendant's de novo conviction for refusal to submit to a breath test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. Defendant argues that the Attorney General's current standard statement under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) is fundamentally deficient for not specifying the mandatory minimum penalties for refusal. In State v. O'Driscoll, 215 N.J. 461, 479-480 (2013), the Supreme Court noted, but declined to address, the sufficiency of the standard statement.

The court hold that the current standard statement satisfies the statutory mandate — that is, informing motorists and impelling compliance — by adequately informing drivers of the maximum potential license revocation and fine, and the possibility of ignition interlock, that they face for refusal. In so ruling, The court note that adding other details, including the differing mandatory minimum and maximum penalties for first offenders, second offenders, and certain third offenders, may run the risk of submerging the most significant penalties in those details.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2186-13T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

IRIS QUINTERO,

Defendant-Appellant.

——————————————————————————————

Before Judges Hoffman, Leone and Whipple.1

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Union County, Municipal Appeal

No. 6050.

The opinion of the court was delivered byHOFFMAN, J.A.D.

1 Judge Whipple did not participate in oral argument. She joins

the opinion with counsel's consent. R. 2:13-2(b).

January 27, 2016

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

January 27, 2016

APPELLATE DIVISION

A-2186-13T4 2

Defendant appeals from her de novo conviction for refusal

to submit to a breath test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. Defendant

argues that her conviction should be vacated because the

Attorney General's current standard statement under N.J.S.A.

39:4-50.2(e) is fundamentally deficient for not specifying the

mandatory minimum penalties for refusal. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.

I.

On December 7, 2012, defendant consumed several vodka and

cranberry juice cocktails before driving her vehicle in Roselle

Park. Defendant's tire blew out, but she continued driving on

the tire rim until the Roselle Park Police finally stopped her.

After defendant failed street sobriety tests, the officer

transported her to police headquarters. There, defendant

refused to submit to a breath test, even after the officer read

the standard statement2 indicating the consequences if she did

not take the breath test.

The officer charged defendant with driving while

intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, refusal to submit to a

2 The full text of the "N.J. Attorney General's Standard

Statement for Motor Vehicle Operators (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e))

(rev. & eff. July 1, 2012)" can be found at

http://www.njsp.org/divorg/invest/pdf/adtu/070912_dwi_standardst

atement.pdf.

A-2186-13T4 3

breath test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a,3 and careless driving, N.J.S.A.

39:4-97. In the Roselle Park Municipal Court on February 28,

2013, defendant pled guilty to DWI and entered a conditional

guilty plea to the refusal charge, reserving her right to

challenge the sufficiency of the standard statement on appeal.4

On the DWI charge, the court imposed a $406 fine, $33 in court

costs, a $200 DWI assessment, a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services

Fund assessment, a $50 Violent Crimes Compensation Board

penalty, twelve hours of Intoxicated Driver Resource Center

classes, and a three-month license suspension to run concurrent

with the refusal sentence. On the refusal charge, the court

sentenced defendant to a $506 fine, a $100 DWI assessment, $33

in court costs, seven-month loss of license, and six months with

an ignition interlock. The court stayed the refusal portion of

the sentence pending de novo appeal to the Law Division.

On October 28, 2013, Judge Regina Caulfield found defendant

guilty and imposed the same sentence for defendant's refusal

conviction. The judge memorialized her decision in a November

27, 2013 order, which further stayed the refusal sentence

pending this appeal.

3 The e-ticket for this charge incorrectly listed the violated

statute as N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2; however, this mistake has not

been raised as an issue in the instant appeal.

4 The court dismissed the careless driving charge.

A-2186-13T4 4

Defendant presents the following issue in this appeal:

THE CHARGE OF REFUSAL TO SUBMIT IS

FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED. THE NEW JERSEY MOTOR

VEHICLE STANDARD STATEMENT READ TO QUINTERO

FAILED TO "INFORM [QUINTERO] OF THE

CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO SUBMIT" AS

REQUIRED BY [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e)].

II.

On this appeal, we do not review the fact-findings of the

Law Division, which are generally entitled to our deference.

State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 158-59 (1964). Rather, we review

the court's legal determination regarding the sufficiency of the

standard statement. Where, as here, the issues turn on purely

legal interpretations, our review is plenary. State v. Adubato,

420 N.J. Super. 167, 176 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied, 209

N.J. 430 (2012).

A.

New Jersey's drunk-driving legislation is designed "to curb

the senseless havoc and destruction caused by intoxicated

drivers." State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485, 496 (2010) (quoting

State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 512 (1987)). "To improve

enforcement efforts and address the high rate of refusal by

motorists who declined to submit to blood-alcohol tests, the

Legislature in 1966 enacted the implied consent law, N.J.S.A.

39:4-50.2, and the refusal law, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a." State v.

O'Driscoll, 215 N.J. 461, 472-73 (2013) (citing Marquez, supra,

A-2186-13T4 5

202 N.J. at 497). Accordingly, all motorists on New Jersey

roads are "deemed to have given . . . consent" to a breath test

under the implied consent law. Id. at 473 (citing L. 1966, c.

142, § 2 (codified as amended at N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2)).

The implied consent law was amended in 1977 to require that

"[a] standard statement, prepared by the chief administrator,

shall be read by the police officer to the person under arrest"

to inform him or her of the consequences of refusing to submit

to a breath test. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e). In 2009, the

responsibility for the promulgation of that statement was

transferred to the Attorney General. 41 N.J.R. 2825(a). Our

Supreme Court has explained that "the refusal statute requires

officers to request motor vehicle operators to submit to a

breath test; the implied consent statute tells officers how to

make that request." Marquez, supra, 202 N.J. at 501. Marquez

also identified the elements of a refusal conviction:

(1) the arresting officer had probable cause

to believe that defendant had been driving

or was in actual physical control of a motor

vehicle while under the influence of alcohol

or drugs; (2) defendant was arrested for

driving while intoxicated; (3) the officer

requested defendant to submit to a chemical

breath test and informed defendant of the

consequences of refusing to do so; and (4)

defendant thereafter refused to submit to

the test.

[Id. at 503 (citations omitted).]

A-2186-13T4 6

Pursuant to the implied consent law, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e),

the Attorney General's current standard statement (revised and

effective July 1, 2012), to be read to motor vehicle operators

to inform them of the consequences of refusing to submit to a

breath test, provides, in pertinent part:

5. If you refuse to provide samples of

your breath, you will be issued a

separate summons for the refusal. A

court may find you guilty of both

refusal and driving while intoxicated.

6. If a court finds you guilty of the

refusal, you will be subject to various

penalties, including license revocation

of up to 20 years, a fine of up to

$2000, installation of an ignition

interlock, and referral to an

Intoxicated Driver Resource Center.

These penalties may be in addition to

penalties imposed by the court for any

other offense of which you are found

guilty.

B.

Defendant contends that the Attorney General's standard

statement is defective because it does not inform motorists of

the mandatory minimum penalties. In particular, defendant

argues that the standard statement "does not adequately explain

and delineate the penalties for a refusal conviction" because

the statement explains the license loss exposure as "license

revocation of up to 20 years." This is problematic, defendant

argues, because "defendant was not told that she would face a

A-2186-13T4 7

license loss for a minimum of seven months" and that "up to 20

years can mean anywhere between 0 days to 20 years." Similarly,

defendant argues that the standard statement is flawed because

it explains that defendant will be subject to "a fine of up to

$2000" while failing to mention that a defendant's first refusal

offense is "not less than $300 or more than $500 for a first

offense." See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. The statement is similarly

flawed, defendant continues, because it merely mentions the

"installation of an ignition interlock," while the refusal

statute mandates an ignition interlock for a first offender for

"not less than six months or more than one year." See N.J.S.A.

39:4-50.17(a)(1).

Our Supreme Court has previously recognized that "as a

question of law, the authority to define the contents of the

Standard Statement vests in the Executive Branch, as delegated

by the Legislative Branch." State v. Schmidt, 206 N.J. 71, 87

(2011); see also Marquez, supra, 202 N.J. at 511 ("The executive

branch, and not the courts, is best-equipped to respond to those

concerns and still satisfy the statutory command to inform

. . . motorists of the consequences of refus[al] . . . .

We defer to the executive branch agency . . . to fashion a proper

remedy . . . .") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A-2186-13T4 8

Recently the issue of whether the standard statement was

defective, "because it does not inform drivers of the mandatory

minimum period of time their license will be suspended if they

refuse," was brought to our Court's attention. O'Driscoll,

supra, 215 N.J. at 480. However, because this issue was raised

by an amicus curiae, the Court in its discretion "[did] not

opine in any way on the content of the current statement." Id.

at 479-80. O'Driscoll, however, still can illuminate the

current issues and provide some guidance with respect to the

standard statement at issue.

In O'Driscoll, our Court reinstated a DWI defendant's

refusal conviction after determining that the misinformation

provided to him was inconsequential and consisted of minor

discrepancies that were not material to the defendant's decision

to refuse the breath test. Id. at 479-80. In particular, the

police officer mistakenly read from an outdated form and told

the defendant that if he refused, the minimum period of license

revocation was six months, not seven; the minimum fine was $250,

not $300; and the maximum fine was $1000, not $2000. Id. at

465. The officer, however, did correctly tell defendant that

his license could be revoked for up to twenty years. Ibid. The

Court held that the officer's mistakes were inconsequential, and

that the officer informed defendant "of the consequences of

A-2186-13T4 9

refusal in a manner that should have impelled a reasonable

person to comply." Id. at 479. In particular, the Court

continued, it was "difficult to see how the minor discrepancies

in this case could have influenced [defendant's] decision."

Ibid. As such, "courts are to examine whether a defendant

reasonably would have made a different choice and submitted to a

breath test had the officer not made an error in reciting the

statement. An immaterial variation from the standard form does

not require reversal of a conviction for refusal." Id. at 466.

With this guidance, we agree with Judge Caulfield that the

standard statement is sufficient, and we affirm defendant's

refusal conviction. Defendant's argument that she was not given

an accurate picture of the penalties she faced as a first-time

offender lacks merit. Rather, as Judge Caulfield observed:

It defies logic to assume that defendant[,]

having refused a breath test knowing that

she could be fined up to $2,000 and lose her

license for 20 years[,] would have submitted

to a . . . breath test, if she was told her

license might be revoked for only seven

months with a fine of only $500.

We are satisfied that the current standard statement satisfies

the statutory mandate — that is, informing motorists and

impelling compliance — by adequately informing drivers of the

maximum potential license revocation and fine, and the

possibility of ignition interlock, that they face for refusal.

A-2186-13T4 10

In so ruling, we note that adding other details, including the

differing mandatory minimum and maximum penalties for first

offenders, second offenders, and certain third offenders, may

run the risk of submerging the most significant penalties in

those details. Such a statement could confuse persons who are

suspected of being under the influence, whose number of prior

offenses may be unclear, and dilute the persuasive effect that

is a central purpose of the standard statement.

Moreover, defendant, having refused after being informed of

the maximum penalties, has not shown that she "reasonably would

have made a different choice and submitted to a breath test" had

additional information been provided. O'Driscoll, supra, 215

N.J. at 466. It is implausible that defendant would have

submitted to the breath test if informed of mandatory minimums

for a first offender. Accordingly, we conclude that the current

standard statement is not defective for failing to inform

drivers of the mandatory minimum penalties for refusal. The

standard statement provides sufficient information for drivers

to make an objectively reasonable choice on whether to submit to

a breath test.

Affirmed.

Criminal Mischief 2C:17-3 damages tangible property of another

Criminal Mischief 2C:17-3 damages tangible property of another

Consequences of a criminal conviction

J.B. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD/ L.A. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD/ B.M. VS. NEW JERSE

J.B. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD/ L.A. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD/ B.M. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD/ W.M. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD/ R.L. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD 

A-5435-10T2/A-1459-11T2/A-2138-11T3/A-3256-11T2/ 

A-1385-15T2 

Appellants and intervenor Public Defender challenge the practices of the New Jersey State Parole Board in administering polygraph examinations periodically to released sex offenders who are subject to either parole supervision for life ("PSL") or its statutory predecessor, community supervision for life ("CSL"), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. The challengers argue that such polygraphs violate their rights under various provisions of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. They also contend that the agency's use of polygraphs, which have been declared unreliable evidence in our courts of law, is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. 

Based upon the extensive record of factual and expert testimony in hearings conducted before the trial court pursuant to our referral under Rule 2:5-5(b), we reject appellants' categorical attempt to invalidate all polygraph testing conducted by the Parole Board. We find ample support in the record for the trial court's finding that such testing reasonably can assist parole officers and treatment professionals in making better-informed decisions as to supervision and treatment. 

Our validation of polygraph testing in this discrete PSL/CSL context is subject to certain important provisos. Given persisting concerns about polygraph accuracy, we conclude that the Parole Board may not use machine-generated "technical" polygraph results in any evidential manner to support imposing sanctions or increased restrictions on the monitored individuals. That does not, however, preclude the evidential use of the substance of any admissions or other statements made by the offenders at a polygraph session. 

We also hold that the Parole Board must enhance its regulations and practices to safeguard an offender's right to invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in responding to any questions 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CECILIO DAVILA A-6302-11T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CECILIO DAVILA 

A-6302-11T3 

Defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal a pre-trial motion relating only to a dismissed count of the indictment. The majority holds that a defendant's appeal of a pre-trial motion relating only to a dismissed count is moot. To afford this defendant every benefit of his plea agreement, the merits of his claim that insufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury are nevertheless addressed and his conviction affirmed. 

Judge Gilson concurs with the majority, but disagrees with the mootness holding, reasoning that defendant properly reserved his right to appeal pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f). 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ERNEST JONES A-5383-13T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ERNEST JONES 

A-5383-13T1 

Defendant Ernest Jones was sentenced to community supervision for life (CSL) in 2000 following his conviction for second-degree sexual assault. After his release from prison in 2002, defendant was convicted eight times of violating the 

conditions of his CSL. Consequently, in 2012, the Parole Board subjected defendant to GPS monitoring as a condition of his CSL, pursuant to the Sex Offender Monitoring Act (SOMA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.89 to -123.95. SOMA was enacted effective August 6, 2007, and governs the continued monitoring of serious and violent sexual offenders. violent sexual offenders. 

Shortly thereafter, defendant purposely removed his tracking device. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of fourth-degree violation of CSL, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4d. Defendant was not charged with third-degree offenses under statutes criminalizing violations of SOMA. 

For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that the GPS monitoring program retroactively enhances the penal consequences of his existing CSL sentence and thereby violates the Ex Post Facto clauses of the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions. Distinguishing Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 219 N.J. 270 (2014), we conclude that the GPS monitoring did not materially increase defendant's punishment, and that the Parole Board had the authority to impose it as a condition of his CSL sentence. We also find that defendant was afforded adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard before GPS monitoring was imposed. We therefore reject defendant's ex post facto and due process arguments and affirm his conviction. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. REGINALD ANTHONY A-2658-12T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. REGINALD ANTHONY 

A-2658-12T3 

Rule 3:17(a) provides that, "[u]nless one of the exceptions set forth in paragraph (b) are present, all custodial interrogations conducted in a place of detention must be electronically recorded when the person being interrogated is charged with" certain listed crimes, including murder. However, subsection (b)(vi) excepts from the recordation requirement "a statement . . . given at a time when the accused is not a suspect for the crime to which that statement relates while the accused is being interrogated for a different crime that does not require recordation[.]" 

In this case, defendant was arrested on an open motor vehicle warrant and interrogated regarding a homicide. The preliminary interrogation was not recorded, but, at some point, after concluding based on defendant's statements that he was a suspect in the homicide, investigators recorded his statement on video. The trial judge denied defendant's motion to suppress the statement and concluded there was no obligation to record the initial portion of the interrogation. 

We construe the somewhat ambiguous provisions of the Rule and conclude that an interrogation must be recorded if, taking into account the totality of the circumstances then known to the interrogator, a reasonable police officer would have a reasonable basis to believe defendant was a "suspect" in the crime about which he was being questioned. In this case, we conclude that the trial judge properly determined that the investigators reasonably concluded that defendant was not a suspect when the interrogation began. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. F.W. A-1635-13T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. F.W. 

A-1635-13T3  We affirmed defendant's conviction for fourth-degree violating Community Supervision for Life (CSL), a provision that existed at the time defendant committed the sex offenses for which he was sentenced to CSL. Because defendant committed the sex offenses before the Sex Offender Monitoring Act (SOMA) was enacted, the Ex Post Facto Clause barred defendant's prosecution for third-degree SOMA crimes. We did not decide defendant's alternate argument that imposing GPS monitoring for life was so punitive as to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause in his case. 

We noted that the CSL statute appears to authorize GPS monitoring as a means of enforcing CSL under appropriate circumstances, including where an offender violates the terms of his CSL. The Parole Board has adopted regulations which provide for GPS monitoring of CSL offenders under defined circumstances and limited time frames, and give offenders a due process right to challenge the monitoring requirement. Nothing in our opinion would preclude the Board from applying those regulations to defendant now that he has been released from prison. 

State v. Howard Jones (A-112-13;

State v. Howard Jones (A-112-13; 073827) 

In determining the reliability of evidence obtained through a suggestive showup identification procedure, extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no role in the determination of the evidence’s admissibility. A reliability assessment must restrict its focus to the accuracy and trustworthiness of the specific identification. In this matter, the showup was impermissibly suggestive, and evidence from that showup was assessed for reliability under an erroneous analysis. Defendant’s conviction is reversed and the matter is remanded for new proceedings. 

State v. Robert Goodwin (A-20-14

State v. Robert Goodwin (A-20-14; 074352) 

A person violates the insurance fraud statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.6(a), even if an insurance carrier is not induced by that person’s false statement to pay a damage claim. 

State v. Julius Smith (A-62-13; 073059)

 State v. Julius Smith (A-62-13; 073059) 

The trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial, particularly in light of the materiality of the evidence that surfaced midtrial, defendant’s inability to investigate it while the trial proceeded, and the nature and strength of the evidence against defendant.