Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C.
2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817
(732) 572-0500 www.njlaws.com
Kenneth Vercammen was included in the “Super Lawyers” list published by Thomson Reuters

Tuesday, January 19, 2021

The State of New Jersey v Wade

 


                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION

                                                        DOCKET NO. A-4388-18T4


STATE OF NEW JERSEY,


          Plaintiff-Respondent,


v.


JAMAL WADE, a/k/a

JAMAL WILLIAMS,


     Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________


                   Submitted October 21, 2020 รข€“ Decided November 23, 2020


                   Before Judges Alvarez and Geiger.


                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

                   Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 17-02-

                   0125.


                   Bruno & Ferraro, attorneys for appellant (John

                   Latoracca, of counsel and on the brief).


                   Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for

                   respondent (Amanda G. Schwartz, Deputy Attorney

                   General, of counsel and on the brief).


PER CURIAM

      Defendants Jamal Wade and Gyasi Allen were charged with murder and


related offenses for the fatal shooting in Paterson of Cosmeik Gee on


September 30, 2016.       Wade appeals:       the September 20, 2018 order


determining that his statement to police was admissible at trial; a September


24, 2018 order determining that the testimony of the State's historical cell-site


analysis expert regarding the location of Wade's cell phone was admissible at


trial; and an April 29, 2019 amended judgment of conviction. We affirm.


      We discern the following facts from the record. At around 11:43 p.m.


on September 30, 2016, a dark-colored Audi sedan pulled out from the


intersection of William Street and Twelfth Avenue in Paterson and stopped


next to Gee's vehicle.     Several shots were fired into Gee's car, fatally


wounding him.


      While investigating the shooting, Paterson Police Department (PPD)


detectives viewed several surveillance videos, eventually recovering footage


from a neighborhood liquor store that captured the faces of two men they


believed were involved. Footage taken by a city camera at the intersection of


East Twenty-Second Street and Twelfth Avenue recorded the victim walking


toward his vehicle, which was parked west of East Twenty-Third Street on


Twelfth Avenue, and a dark-colored Audi sedan pull out from the intersection


of William Street and Twelfth Avenue and stop next to the victim's vehicle. A




                                                                        A-4388-18T4

                                       2

man wearing a black jacket, a gray hooded sweatshirt, gray pants, and black


shoes exited the front passenger door and fired several shots into the victim's


vehicle. The shooter re-entered the sedan, and the vehicle sped off, traveling


northwest on Twelfth Avenue and turning right onto East Twenty-Second


Street. A detective identified Wade as the driver of the sedan and Allen as the


passenger and shooter.     The court granted the State's motion to admit the


identification at trial.


      Detectives recovered additional footage from the area.      The footage


showed the sedan traveling north on Twenty-Second Street for several blocks


from 11:47 to 11:48 p.m. that night and passing several buildings along East


Twenty-Second Street and Tenth Avenue before disappearing from view.


      The State Police Auto Theft Task Force (Task Force) conducted a large-


scale investigation into automobile theft in Paterson and surrounding areas.


As part of the investigation, the Task Force obtained a September 20, 2016


communications data warrant (CDW) authorizing installation of a signal


monitoring and GPS tracking device to "allow members of the New Jersey


State Police, the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, and members of any


law enforcement agencies assigned to this investigation ('the participating law


enforcement agencies'), to instantly and continuously track the position and


location of [a black 2012 Audi A6]" with New Jersey registration number




                                                                       A-4388-18T4

                                      3

H76GUD, for thirty days. The CDW was authorized to identify individuals


engaged in the crimes of Receiving Stolen Property, Fencing-Dealing in Stolen


Property, Theft by Unlawful Taking, and Conspiracy to commit those crimes.


The CDW stated that any "information obtained pursuant to the Warrant


[could] be disclosed to members of the participating law enforcement agencies,


as well as any other law enforcement officer who may be assigned to


participate in [the] investigation."


      After hearing that a dark-colored sedan was involved in the Paterson


shooting, Detective Sergeant Vittorio Flora of the Task Force reviewed the


GPS data and learned that the Task Force had been tracking a stolen dark-


colored 2012 Audi A6 sedan that was parked near the scene of the shooting at


the time it occurred Flora provided the PPD detectives with GPS data and


tracking sheets recovered pursuant to the CDW that showed the vehicle's travel


path after it departed from William Street.


      After locating the stolen Audi A6, PPD detectives recovered surveillance


footage from the area. From the videos obtained, they observed the Audi A6


traveling west on Seventh Avenue and parking at 11:52 p.m. at the location


where it was recovered. Two men exited the vehicleรข€”the driver wearing a


gray hooded sweatshirt with a black line across the front, gray sweatpants, and


black shoes, and the passenger wearing a black jacket, a light-colored hood




                                                                       A-4388-18T4

                                       4

underneath, gray sweatpants, and dark shoes.        The passenger wiped the


exterior door handles with a cloth, which he then placed in a white duffle bag,


before following the driver toward East Sixteenth Street. The men turned


south onto East Sixteenth Street and then east onto Eighth Avenue.


      After reviewing the videos, the team returned to the Detective Bureau,


and lead Detective Anthony Petrazzuolo began examining the GPS tracking


sheets. He determined that the Audi A6 had been parked at 451 East Twenty-


Fourth Street from about 8:39 p.m. until 10:54 p.m. on the night of the


shooting, so the team decided to visit the area to locate additional footage.


The footage did not show the exact location of the vehicle, but it did show that


around 8:39 p.m., two men were walking south on East Twenty-Fourth


Streetรข€”one wearing the same clothing as the driver of the Audi A6, and the


other wearing all black clothingรข€”and then turned west onto Tenth Avenue.


      The team visited a liquor store near the corner of Tenth Avenue and East


Twenty-Second Street. Footage obtained from the liquor store suggested that


one of the men arriving at the scene was the driver of the Audi A6. Detective


Jimmy Maldonado reviewed the footage and determined that the driver who


entered the liquor store was Wade.


      Later in the footage, at around 10:47 p.m., a dark-colored Honda sedan


pulled up in front of the liquor store, and a man who appeared to be wearing




                                                                        A-4388-18T4

                                       5

the same clothing as the passenger/shooter exited the vehicle. A local Paterson


man identified him as Allen.     Wade and Allen then walked east on Tenth


Avenue, entered a minivan, and exited the minivan after a short period of time;


at about 10:51 p.m., the camera captured the men turning onto East Twenty-


Fourth Street, where the Audi A6 was parked.


       On October 3, 2016, Maldonado spotted Wade in front of a convenience


store on Tenth Avenue. The detectives stopped and exited their vehicle. After


confirming his identity, Petrazzuolo drew his weapon, placed Wade in hand


restraints, seized two cell phones, and told him he was under arrest for murder.


The gun that was used in this case was never recovered. A marked patrol car


transported Wade to the Detective Bureau for an interview.


       Petrazzuolo and Maldonado took Wade's videotaped statement. Wade


was not handcuffed during the twenty-minute interview. A redacted version


was played for the jury.


       First, Petrazzuolo said, "So, we told you why you're here," and Wade


agreed and nodded his head. Then, Petrazzuolo read Wade his Miranda1 rights


from a rights and waiver form. The rights read to Wade included:


             You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say

             can be used against you in a court of law. You have

             the right to speak to an attorney for advice before we


1

    Miranda v. Arizona,  384 U.S. 436 (1966).



                                                                        A-4388-18T4

                                       6

            ask any questions. Also, you have the right to have a

            lawyer with you during any questioning. If you

            cannot pay for the service of a lawyer, a lawyer will

            be appointed to represent you without cost before any

            interrogation. If you decide to answer questions now

            without a lawyer present, you will still have the right

            to stop answering questions at any time. You also

            have the right to stop answering questions at any time

            until you speak to a lawyer.


Wade watched the detective as he spoke and nodded his head several times.


      Wade orally confirmed he understood "each and every one of those


rights," then wrote his answers to the questions on the Miranda form and


signed it. Petrazzuolo next read aloud the waiver of rights section of the form:


            I have read my rights and I understand what my rights

            are. I am willing to make a statement and answer

            questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I

            understand and know what I am doing. No promises

            or threats have been made to me and nobody has used

            pressure or force of any kind against me.


Petrazzuolo then said, "So, if you want to speak to us, you're going to have to


waive your rights." The following exchange then occurred:


            MR. WADE: I have a lawyer, though.


            DET. PETRAZ[Z]UOLO: You have a lawyer?


            MR. WADE: Yeah.


            DET. PETRAZ[Z]UOLO: So you want a lawyer?


            MR. WADE: I got a lawyer. I don't -- yeah, let me

            talk to him.




                                                                        A-4388-18T4

                                       7

DET. MALDONADO: Does he have a lawyer for

something else or you --


MR. WADE: He's paid for everything. I got a case in

Delaware, a case here. He's paid for everything


DET. MALDONADO: Oh, okay.


DET. PETRAZ[Z]UOLO: All right, so youรข€”you

don't want to speak to us without your lawyer; is that

what you're saying?


MR. WADE: There's nothing to be mad at, I'm a man.


DET. PETRAZ[Z]UOLO: All right, well you're going

to have to wait to speak --


MR. WADE: Yeah, but I got a lawyer. So you said

I'm under arrest, right?


DET. MALDONADO: No, I didn't say you're under

arrest.


MR. WADE: You just read me my rights.


DET. MALDONADO: If you -- He hasn't been

charged with anything --


DET. MALDONADO: (indiscernible)


DET. PETRAZ[Z]UOLO: You haven't been charged

with anything yet.


Mr. WADE: So then talk. I don't need to tell you shit

if I ain't under arrest. I know I ain't do nothing wrong.


DET. PETRAZ[Z]UOLO:            Are you . . . verbally

agreeing to speak to us?


MR. WADE: Yeah, I'm a man.


                                                            A-4388-18T4

                           8

          DET. PETRAZ[Z]UOLO: Without your lawyer here?


           MR. WADE: (indiscernible). He knew you.


           DET. PETRAZ[Z]UOLO: Are you verbally agreeing

           to speak to you without your lawyer?


           MR. WADE: Yeah, verbally. (indiscernible) I think

           you think I'm stupid, 'cause I got --


           DET. MALDONADO: I don't think you're stupid. I'm

           just saying that you said --


           MR. WADE: You saying the only way you need a

           lawyer is I'm under arrest, and I'm not under arrest, I

           can talk to anybody, the judge, the fucking mayor,

           whoever.


           DET. MALDONADO: All right, Jamal.


During this exchange, Wade signed the waiver section of the Miranda form,


acknowledging that he waived his rights.


     The detectives questioned Wade about what he was doing the night the


victim was shot. Wade told them he was drinking at the liquor store with some


neighborhood people, and he stayed there until 2 a.m. Around midnight that


night, he learned the victim had been shot while in a bad part of the


neighborhood. He also told the detectives that he was wearing an all gray


outfit, with a hat and black belt. When Petrazzuolo asked Wade to identify an


image of a man's profile, Wade confirmed it was him.            According to





                                                                     A-4388-18T4

                                      9

Petrazzuolo, the image was a still shot photograph derived from the liquor


store surveillance footage.


        The detectives then told Wade they knew he was lying about being at the


liquor store until 2:00 a.m. based on footage from surveillance cameras in the


area.    They told him the cameras showed that around 10:30 p.m., he was


walking near Twenty-Third Street and Tenth Avenue and then to Twenty-


Fourth Street. There, he got into an Audi, drove first to William Street, then to


Twelfth Avenue between Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Streets, where a


passenger exited the Audi and shot the victim. Wade was later observed near


Fifteenth Street and Seventh Avenue.


        Petrazzuolo told Wade, "[A]ll you can do at this point is help yourself,"


but Wade claimed the detectives were telling "fabricated stories" and requested


to speak to his lawyer because "[t]his just got bad." Maldonado continued to


speak with Wade, explaining that "[o]ut of respect" for him, they "put it all out


there," so Wade would understand what they already knew about his


connection to the shooting. Wade briefly responded but requested his lawyer


again after the detective told him, "We know you didn't do it by yourself."


The detectives ceased questioning Wade at that point and ended the interview.


Wade was then formally charged and booked.            Petrazzuolo prepared the


criminal complaint.




                                                                         A-4388-18T4

                                        10

      Detective David Posada of the Passaic County Prosecutor's Office


obtained a CDW for Wade's iPhone and related T-Mobile account records.


Posada sent the CDW to T-Mobile. T-Mobile provided a call log and cell site


data detailing which towers Wade's iPhone communicated through during


those calls. The call log showed that Wade's iPhone had been used during the


relevant hours.


      The call log, cell site data, and GPS tracking data were sent to the


Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Cellular Analysis Survey Team


(CAST) for historical cell-site analysis.   FBI Special Agent Agit David, a


member of CAST assigned to the FBI's Technical Operations Division in


Newark, was responsible for real-time cellular phone location and historical


cell-site analysis.


      David analyzed the historical cell site data for Wade's T-Mobile account


to determine whether Wade's iPhone was used in the general area of the


shooting and travel path of the Audi A6 at the approximate time of the crime.


He was also asked to determine if the cell site data was consistent with the


GPS data the Task Force had obtained. In addition, he performed drive tests 2



2

   To perform a drive test, a person drives or walks around the streets or paths

in a particular area and carries a radio scanner that collects data about the

frequencies transmitted from a cell phone tower in that area. The data shows

the effective coverage for a particular cell phone tower, which encompasses



                                                                       A-4388-18T4

                                      11

during July 2018 to provide a more accurate analysis of the coverage area of a


particular cell site.


      David focused on three calls of interest that were made at 11:49 p.m.,


11:51 p.m., and 11:54 p.m. on the night of the shooting. David created a map


for each of the three calls. The maps showed the cell tower that handled the


call, the extent of the coverage for that cell site and sector, the effective


coverage for that site and sector, the dominant coverage area, and the GPS


tracker informationรข€”all in relation to the crime scene.             Based on this


information, David determined the cell dominant phone coverage was


consistent with Wade's iPhone being present at GPS-derived locations of the


Audi A6 during the three calls. He also determined that the drive test data


confirmed that the coverage of the cell site could include at least some points


along the GPS tracker. The GPS data, in turn, showed the Audi A6 was parked


in the area of the shooting just before it occurred and the vehicle's travel path


after it departed.


      A Passaic County grand jury returned an indictment charging Wade


with: second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon,  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1)


(count one); first-degree purposeful or knowing murder,  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-


each location that a user can receive and make phone calls. However, a drive

test cannot identify a cell phone's exact location; it can only identify that a cell

phone was in a particular area when being serviced by a certain tower.



                                                                           A-4388-18T4

                                        12

3(a)(1), (2) (count two); first-degree conspiracy to commit murder,  N.J.S.A.


2C:5-2 and 2C:11-3(a) (count three); fourth-degree certain persons not to have


weapons,  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a) (count four); second-degree possession of a


weapon for an unlawful purpose,  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count five); and


third-degree receiving stolen property,  N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a) and 2C:20-


2(b)(2)(b) (count six). The indictment charged Allen with the offenses set


forth in counts one, two, three, and five.


      The Miranda Hearing


      Before trial, the State moved to allow admission of Wade's statement to


the Paterson detectives during its case-in-chief. The court conducted a Rule


104 hearing.    After the State played the recording of Wade's statement,


Petrazzuolo testified that he did not threaten or force Wade to give a statement


and did not make any promises to Wade. He also confirmed that Wade was


not formally charged until after the interview. Petrazzuolo described Wade as


"pretty calm" and mostly cooperative during the interview, other than when he


made statements that contradicted what the detectives observed on the


surveillance videos.


      Detective Maldonado briefly explained his involvement in Wade's arrest


and in taking Wade's statement. He explained that he misspoke when he told


Wade he was not under arrest. He "meant to say that [Wade] hadn't been




                                                                       A-4388-18T4

                                        13

charged with anything" because usually when individuals make a statement,


they ask if they have been charged. After Wade responded to Maldonado's


statement that he was not under arrest, Maldonado told him he had not been


charged yet.


       The court found that Wade voluntarily and knowingly waived his


Miranda rights and ruled that Wade's statement was admissible at trial. While


the court acknowledged it was arguable that Wade's waiver was "somewhat


equivocal," the court found it significant that: Wade had previous encounters


with law enforcement; the detectives advised him of all his rights; the


detention was brief; the time between the reading of his rights and his


statement was brief; Wade's statement was likewise brief; and the detectives


did not prolong the questioning or subject Wade to physical or mental abuse.


The court found Maldonado's misstatement that Wade was not under arrest was


immaterial, because even if not truthful, Wade "understood what was going


on."


       The Motion to Suppress the GPS Data


       On the first day of trial, Wade moved to suppress the GPS data and


tracking sheets that Paterson detectives obtained from the Task Force.


Following oral argument and a review of the CDW, the court denied


defendant's motion to suppress the GPS data and tracking sheets. The court




                                                                     A-4388-18T4

                                     14

concluded that common sense dictated that when the lead "agency authorized


by the CDW . . . contacts another agency, that's part of the investigation."


Eventually, Wade was charged with receiving stolen property, one of the


crimes listed in the CDW, which the judge found to be a further "indication of


the nexus between the State Police contacting . . . the Paterson Police


Department and then Paterson Police in turn using that information to one of


the charges that is common [to] both." The court found there was "no [CDW]


violation under the circumstances."


      The Trial


      During the ten-day joint trial, the State called fourteen witnesses,


including Petrazzuolo, Maldonado, Flora, Posada, David, Pagano, and forensic


scientist Brett Hutchinson. The State's witnesses did not provide a motive for


the homicide. Neither defendant testified nor did they call any witnesses.


      Wade's statement was played for the jury. The jury was also presented


with two photos taken from the liquor store video and signed by Wade. The


photos were of Wade's face, and during his statement, Wade agreed that the


person depicted in both photos was him


      State Police Detective Sergeant Clinton Pagano testified that his duties


with the auto theft task force were to "investigate high[-]end motor vehicle


thefts and try and develop cases against theft crews and individuals stealing




                                                                       A-4388-18T4

                                      15

motor vehicles." In his affidavit in support of the application for the CDW,


Pagano requested that the State Police be permitted: "to disclose the requested


search warrants and communications data warrants as well as the supporting


affidavit filed in this matter to members of the New Jersey Attorney General's


Office as well as other law enforcement agencies who are assisting the New


Jersey State Police." Pagano testified that he believed it was permissible to


turn over the information to "law enforcement involved in any investigation."


      The court recognized David as an expert in historical cell-site analysis


without objection.         David provided the jury with detailed information


explaining how he performed the cell site analysis. We need not repeat his


comprehensive testimony as Wade does not contest the validity of the cell-site


analysis in this appeal.


      David opined that the cell site records for Wade's iPhone could coincide


with the GPS coordinates and that the drive test "further confirm[ed] that the


coverage for that particular cell site could include at least some points along


that GPS tracker."      When then asked whether it was still his opinion that


Wade's iPhone "could have aligned with the GPS coordinates," David replied:


"Yes, it's possible."      Considering all the GPS and cell tower data, David


concluded "that the phone could have been located with [the Audi A6] at the


time that these calls were made."




                                                                       A-4388-18T4

                                        16

        The jury found Wade guilty on all counts.3 At sentencing, the trial court


dismissed count four and merged counts three and five into count two. Wade


was sentenced to an aggregate forty-year term, subject to a thirty-four-year


period of parole ineligibility and a five-year period of mandatory parole


supervision under the No Early Release Act,  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Count two


ran consecutively to any sentence defendant was already serving. This appeal


followed.


        Defendant raises the following points for our consideration:


              POINT I


              THE    STATE'S  MOTION    TO    ADMIT

              DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT DURING ITS CASE-

              IN-CHIEF SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED

              BECAUSE THE POLICE NEVER INFORMED

              DEFENDANT OF THE CHARGES HE WAS

              FACING, AND THEY LIED WHEN THEY

              INFORMED HIM THAT HE WAS NOT UNDER

              ARREST; PURSUANT TO STATE V. A.G.D.,4

              JAMAL WADE'S WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT

              AGAINST SELF-INCRIMIMATION WAS NOT

              VALID AND THEREFORE HIS STATEMENT

              SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.


              POINT II


              THE EVIDENCE GARNERED FROM THE GPS

              TRACKER ON THE STOLEN AUDI SHOULD NOT


3

    The jury found Allen guilty of counts one through three and five.

4

    State v. A.G.D.,  178 N.J. 56 (2003).



                                                                         A-4388-18T4

                                           17

            HAVE BEEN ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE

            BECAUSE IT WAS SUPPLIED TO THE

            PATERSON      POLICE      IN      DIRECT

            CONTRAVENTION OF A COURT ORDER, AND

            ITS  ADMISSION    AT   TRIAL   DEPRIVED

            DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.


                                       A.


      We first address the admissibility of Wade's statement to police.


Relying on A.G.D., Wade contends that he did not make a knowing and


voluntary waiver of his right against self-incrimination because Maldonado


and Petrazzuolo did not inform him of the nature of the charges against him or


that he had been arrested.         178 N.J. 56.    He asserts they materially


misrepresented that he was not under arrest, which he claims was the basis for


agreeing to waive his rights. The State contends that the detectives did not


violate A.G.D. because neither an arrest warrant nor a criminal complaint had


been issued before Wade gave his statement. Ibid. The State further argues


that, even if the court did err, it was harmless because there was overwhelming


evidence of Wade's guilt and because Wade's single admission during his


statement did not lead to an unjust verdict.


      We are guided by the following well-established legal principles. When


reviewing "a trial court's admission of police-obtained statements," we "engage


in a 'searching and critical' review of the record to ensure protection of a


defendant's constitutional rights." State v. Maltese,  222 N.J. 525, 543 (2015)


                                                                       A-4388-18T4

                                       18

(quoting State v. Hreha,  217 N.J. 368, 381-82 (2014)).              "We do not


independently assess evidence as if we are the trial court." Ibid. (citing Hreha,


 217 N.J. at 382). Rather, we "typically defer to the trial court's credibility and


factual findings." Hreha,  217 N.J. at 382. Such "findings should be disturbed


only if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand


intervention and correction.'"    State v. Tillery,  238 N.J. 293, 314 (2019)


(quoting State v. A.M.,  237 N.J. 384, 395 (2019)). "However, we owe no


deference to conclusions of law made by lower courts in suppression


decisions, which we instead review de novo." State v. Boone,  232 N.J. 417,


426 (2017) (citing State v. Watts,  223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015)).


      The record demonstrates that Petrazzuolo advised Wade of the full


panoply of his Miranda rights before subjecting him to custodial interrogation.


Petrazzuolo also advised Wade of the need to waive those rights before


questioning could begin. Wade confirmed both verbally and in writing that he


understood his Miranda rights.


      If the suspect consents to proceed with the interrogation, his rights must


be "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" waived. Miranda,  384 U.S. at

 444; State v. Hartley,  103 N.J. 252, 261 (1986).      Any evidence obtained in


violation of Miranda must be suppressed at trial. Hartley,  103 N.J. at 262.





                                                                         A-4388-18T4

                                       19

The record fully supports the trial court's conclusion that Wade voluntarily and


knowingly waived his Miranda rights and agreed to answer questions.


      Whether a defendant invoked the right to remain silent is determined


under the totality of the circumstances.     Maltese,  222 N.J. at 545.     If the


suspect invokes the right to remain silent, that invocation must be


"scrupulously honored."     Hartley,  103 N.J. at 255-56 (citing Michigan v.


Mosley,  423 U.S. 96 (1975)). If the invocation is ambiguous, the officer may


only ask clarifying questions about whether he or she meant to invoke the right


to remain silent.    State v. Johnson,  120 N.J. 263, 283 (1990) (citations


omitted).


      An ambiguous invocation can arise where a subject refuses to respond to


questioning for a prolonged period and has made statements that "convey[] an


unwillingness to respond to any questions."       Id. at 285.    An ambiguous


invocation of the right to remain silent must be clarified before authorities can


proceed to question a suspect. State v. S.S.,  229 N.J. 360, 384, 386 (2017).


      Where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the defendant


exercised his right to remain silent or to counsel, whether ambiguously or


unambiguously, the Hartley bright line rule requires Miranda warnings to be


readministered. Hartley,  103 N.J. at 267. Here, Wade did not exercise his


right to remain silent, to speak to an attorney, or to have an attorney present




                                                                         A-4388-18T4

                                       20

during questioning at any point during the interview, either ambiguously or


unambiguously.


      In A.G.D., the police had obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant


before interviewing him.  178 N.J. at 59. The Court held that a Miranda


waiver is per se invalid when police withhold the fact that a criminal complaint


has been filed against the suspect or a warrant has been issued for his arrest.


 178 N.J. at 68. Here, neither of those events had yet occurred.


      In State v. Vincenty,  237 N.J. 122, 134 (2019), the Court reaffirmed its


holding in A.G.D. There, the police sought to question Vincenty about an


attempted robbery and attempted murder. Id. at 126-27. After obtaining a


signed Miranda waiver, detectives began questioning Vincenty; it was not until


later in the interview that they showed him a list of the charges that had


already been filed against him.    Id. at 127-28.      The Court concluded that


"Vincenty's interrogation is precisely what A.G.D. prohibits." Id. at 134. It


held that because Vincenty was not informed by police of the charges filed


against him until after he signed the waiver, he was deprived of "critically


important information" and could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived


his right against self-incrimination.    Id. at 135.     These facts are clearly


distinguishable.





                                                                        A-4388-18T4

                                        21

      The facts in this case are similar to those in State v. Nyhammer,  197 N.J.

 383 (2009). There, the Court considered whether Nyhammer could knowingly


and voluntarily waive his right against self-incrimination where the police


failed to inform him that he was a suspect. Id. at 387-88. The police asked


Nyhammer if he was willing to discuss allegations that his uncle had sexually


abused Nyhammer's minor niece.       Id. at 389.   The police did not inform


Nyhammer that the victim had also made similar allegations against him. Id.


at 390. Nyhammer agreed to speak with the detectives, and after being read


his Miranda rights, he agreed to waive them. Id. at 389-90. After discussing


the allegations about Nyhammer's uncle, the detective informed Nyhammer of


the allegations against Nyhammer. Id. at 391. Nyhammer then confessed to


sexually abusing his niece. Id. at 391-92.


      The Court declined to adopt a per se rule to determine whether


Nyhammer's waiver was valid. Id. at 404. In so holding, it distinguished the


matter from A.G.D.:


            The issuance of a criminal complaint and arrest

            warrant by a judge is an objectively verifiable and

            distinctive step, a bright line, when the forces of the

            state stand arrayed against the individual.         The

            defendant in A.G.D. was purposely kept in the dark by

            his interlocutors of this indispensable information.

            Unlike the issuance of a criminal complaint or arrest

            warrant, suspect status is not an objectively verifiable

            and discrete fact, but rather an elusive concept that




                                                                       A-4388-18T4

                                      22

            will vary depending on subjective considerations of

            different police officers.


            [Id. at 404-05.]


The Court concluded:


                  In the typical case, explicit knowledge of one's

            status as a suspect will not be important for Miranda

            purposes. However, explicit knowledge of one's

            suspect status, in some unusual circumstance, might

            be a useful piece of information in exercising a waiver

            of rights under our state-law privilege against self-

            incrimination. Nevertheless, the failure to be told of

            one's suspect status still would be only one of many

            factors to be considered in the totality of the

            circumstances.


            [Id. at 407.]


The Court was "mindful that the Miranda warnings themselves strongly


suggest, if not scream out, that a person is a suspect," and this "should be a


sobering wake-up call to a person under interrogation." Id. at 407-08.


      We discern no error in admitting Wade's statement at trial. Wade had


not yet been charged or indicted when interviewed.       When the detectives


located Wade, however, Petrazzuolo drew his weapon, placed Wade in


handcuffs, and told him he was under arrest for murder.        Wade was then


transported to the Detective Bureau in a marked police car, advised of his


Miranda rights, and interviewed in a locked room at the Detective Bureau.


These circumstances "screamed out" that Wade was a suspect in the homicide




                                                                         A-4388-18T4

                                      23

and under arrest. Moreover, this was not Wade's first encounter with police or


arrest.


      At one point during the interview, Wade asked: "So you said I'm under


arrest, right?" Maldonado immediately responded: "No, I didn't say you're


under arrest."    Maldonado then accurately told Wade:           "He hasn't been


charged."


      The record fully supports the findings that Wade: knew he was a suspect


for the murder; understood his Miranda rights; voluntarily, knowingly and


intelligently waived those rights; did not exercise his rights to remain silent, to


speak to an attorney, or have one present; and gave a voluntary statement to


the detectives. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that Wade's


statement to police was admissible.


                                        B.


      We next address Wade's argument that the trial court erred in denying


his motion to suppress the GPS data that Paterson detectives obtained from the


State Police. Wade contends the GPS data was inadmissible because it was


obtained pursuant to a CDW issued for the sole purpose of investigating


automobile theft and related offenses. Wade asserts that the trial court erred in


allowing the State to use the GPS data for a purpose not expressly stated in the


warrant because the PPD was not involved in the automobile theft




                                                                          A-4388-18T4

                                        24

investigation, was not designated as one of the "participating agencies" in the


CDW, and used the GPS data for an unrelated purpose.


      The State counters that the sharing of information between different law


enforcement agencies is not unlawful. In addition, since Wade was charged


with one of the crimes described in the CDW, the State Police did not exceed


the scope of the CDW when it shared the GPS data with the PPD.


      "We review the trial court's evidentiary ruling under a deferential


standard; it should be upheld 'absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e.,


there has been a clear error of judgment.'" State v. J.A.C.,  210 N.J. 281, 295


(2012) (quoting State v. Brown,  170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)). A reviewing court


applying this deferential standard "should not substitute its own judgment for


that of the trial court, unless 'the trial court's ruling is so wide of the mark that


a manifest denial of justice results." Ibid. (quoting State v. Marrero,  148 N.J.

 469, 484 (1997)).


      Defendant does not challenge the validity of the CDW and concedes he


lacked standing to challenge the GPS tracker on the stolen car he was driving


on the night of the homicide. The State Police lawfully acquired the GPS data


from the tracking device installed on the stolen Audi A6 pursuant to the CDW.


The CDW limited the use of the tracker to identifying the vehicle's location





                                                                            A-4388-18T4

                                         25

and travel; there is no evidence that the tracker identified a wider range of


information.


      We have recently recognized that "[t]he circumstances here are no


different than one law enforcement agency shares information relevant to an


ongoing investigation with another law enforcement agency in order to assist


in the apprehension of a suspect." State v. Jackson,  460 N.J. Super. 258, 274-


75 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Phila. Yearly Mtg. of Religious Soc'y of Friends v.


Tate,  519 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (3d Cir. 1975)) (noting that the sharing of


information among law enforcement agencies for a legitimate law enforcement


purpose is only impermissible if the initial gathering of that information was


unlawful).     Here, the installation of the tracking device and resulting


acquisition of GPS data were carried out pursuant to a valid CDW.


      More fundamentally, the CDW was issued to identify individuals


engaged in the crime of receiving stolen property. Wade was charged with and


convicted of receiving stolen property for traveling to and departing from the


scene of the shooting in the stolen Audi A6. Consequently, the PPD was a


"participating" law enforcement agency in the Task Force's auto theft


investigation as defined by the CDW.


      As noted by the trial court, it would "defy common sense" to conclude


that the police were required to overlook what they believed might be evidence




                                                                       A-4388-18T4

                                       26

related to the homicide, merely because homicide was not a crime enumerated


in the CDW, when a stolen vehicle being tracked via GPS by the Task Force


was used as the getaway vehicle.      As we similarly concluded in State v.


Jackson, "the circumstances here are no different than when one law


enforcement agency shares information relevant to an ongoing investigation


with another law enforcement agency in order to assist in the apprehension of


a suspect."  460 N.J. Super. 258, 273 (App. Div. 2019), aff'd o.b.,  241 N.J. 547


(2020).


      We discern no error. The trial court properly denied Wade's motion to


suppress the GPS data.


      Affirmed.





                                                                       A-4388-18T4

                                      27

Monday, January 18, 2021

The State of New Jersey v Phillips

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3341-06T43341-06T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DAVID A. PHILLIPS,

Respondent-Appellant.

_________________________________
Telephonically Argued October 23, 2008- Decided:

Before Judges Stern, Rodrรญguez and Waugh.

On appeal Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 05-12-1249.

Kelly Anderson Smith argued the cause for appellant.

Laura Kotarba, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph L. Bocchini, Jr., Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Kotarba, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant David Phillips appeals his conviction for third-degree distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and the resulting extended term sentence of five-years imprisonment, with three years of parole ineligibility. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

I

On February 23, 2005, the Trenton Police conducted an anti-narcotics operation, targeting the 500 block of Hoffman Avenue in Trenton. Sergeant Paul Gendron was in charge and Detective William Mulryne was assigned to conduct surveillance. The operation was prompted by information received by law enforcement that marijuana was being distributed from a building in that vicinity.

At approximately 11:30 a.m., Mulryne positioned himself on the roof of a building on Hoffman Avenue. Between 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m., Mulryne saw two separate vehicles drive up to 528 Hoffman Avenue. He observed the drivers of each vehicle engage in what he believed to be narcotic transactions with co-defendants Lamar Tyson and Randy Hawkins, the targets of the surveillance operation. The vehicles departed and their drivers were not subsequently identified or apprehended by the police.

At approximately 1:10 p.m., Mulryne observed a green Jeep Cherokee pull up to 528 Hoffman Avenue. The driver was a black male, but Mulryne was unable to provide any description beyond the driver's race and gender. Mulyrne subsequently identified Phillips as the driver.

Mulryne observed Hawkins, who was posted at the apartment door, call upstairs for Tyson, who in turn came down and approached the Jeep's open passenger's side door. Phillips handed Tyson a yellow plastic bag, from which Tyson removed a clear plastic bag. Mulryne testified that the clear bag was full of "suspect marijuana." Tyson quickly returned the clear bag into the yellow bag. After reaching into his pocket, Tyson handed Phillips a large amount of currency. The entire transaction lasted approximately 15-20 seconds.

As soon as the exchange was completed, Tyson shut the door to Phillips's Jeep and ran into the apartment building, where Hawkins was waiting for him. Mulryne believed that the pair then entered apartment 3C. Phillips pulled away and headed towards Coolidge Avenue.

As the Jeep left the area, Mulryne called for assistance in stopping Phillips. Officer Daniel Pagnotta stopped the Jeep at approximately 2:00 p.m. As he approached the vehicle, he observed currency "strewn about" on Phillips's lap and "stuffed in his pants." Pagnotta ordered Phillips out of the vehicle and placed him under arrest. A total of $2,026.00 was found on Phillips and in the vehicle.

After Phillips's arrest, Gendron sought and received a search warrant for 528 Hoffman Avenue, apartment 3C, as well as for Tyson and Hawkins. At approximately 6:00 p.m., the search warrant was executed, with Mulryne's assistance. Significant amounts of marijuana, and related packaging materials; a digital scale; "gang literature," containing the "[s]treet names of certain gang members"; and an illegal handgun were found during the search. The occupants of the apartment were placed under arrest, including Tyson and Hawkins. The contents of the clear plastic bag, which had been found with the yellow plastic bag, were subsequently determined to be marijuana.

All of those arrested at the apartment were taken to the police station for processing. When they entered the processing area, they came into contact with Phillips, who was sitting on a bench. They exclaimed that Phillips had "set them up" and that "[t]hey were going to get him." Phillips did not respond, and was later released on bail.

Phillips was indicted on December 8, 2005, as part of a fourteen count indictment including eight other defendants. Phillips was charged with the following offenses: fourth-degree possession of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count 3); and third-degree distribution of CDS, 57 N.J. 325, 336-37 (1971). "Under that standard, '[a] reviewing court may reverse on the basis of unchallenged error only if it finds plain error clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'" State v. Bunch180 N.J. 534, 541 (2004) (quoting State v. Afanador151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997)).

Phillips argues that the statements by the co-defendants "suggested that [he] was very familiar with all of the individuals who had just been arrested." He also contends that, "[b]y permitting testimony, which is irrelevant and extremely inflammatory, the jury [was] left with the impression that [he] was part of the Sex Money Bloods Gang, and therefore, guilty by association."

We agree that the wholly unnecessary and inadmissible testimony had the potential to lead the jury to the conclusion that Phillips had a closer relationship to the gang and the gang member co-defendants than the admissible evidence would have warranted. The possibility of such a result was, we believe, enhanced by the equally prejudicial and largely irrelevant testimony, N.J.R.E. 403(a), about the gang activities of the other defendants and the gang paraphernalia found in apartment 3C, which was offered by the State during the trial. See supra Phillips's Point III. Leading the jury to conclude that Phillips had such a relationship with the co-defendants also had the potential to lead the jury to conclude that he was part of their ongoing drug operation.

Although Phillips does not himself raise a constitutional issue, we find that the State's presentation of testimony consisting of out-of-court statements by the co-defendants who did not testify at the trial raises a serious confrontation clause issue. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art I, ¶ 10. Phillips had no opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendants, whose statements were clearly offered in evidence against him by the State. State v. Branch182 N.J. 338, 350 (2005) ("[B]oth the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule are violated when, at trial, a police officer conveys, directly or by inference, information from a non-testifying declarant to incriminate the defendant in the crime charged."); State v. Bankston63 N.J. 263, 268-69 (1973); State v. Taylor350 N.J. Super. 20, 33 (App. Div.), certif. denied174 N.J. 190 (2002) ("The principle distilled from Bankston and its progeny is that testimony relating inculpatory information supplied by a co-defendant or other non-testifying witness identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime deprives the accused of his or her constitutional rights." (quotation and citation omitted)).

The problem was further compounded by the prosecutor's reiteration of the improper testimony in his closing statement.

MR. MCMURTY: Now, what else have we got in this case, ladies and gentlemen? We have some other information that I think is quite telling for your consideration when you deliberate. We know that the defendant was taken back to headquarters for processing because Detective Mulryne says he saw him there when they went back after the praying was over, and everybody in 3C was under arrest, and they were being taken to police headquarters as well.

And when Rambo, Capone, Mar-Mar and the others are taken into headquarters and they see the defendant sitting there, what is their reaction? You set us up. You're dead. That's what they said, ladies and gentlemen.

MS. SHIMIZU: Objection.

THE COURT: There was testimony to that effect.

MS. SHIMIZU: That wasn't the exact quote.

MR. MCMURTY: Well, ladies and gentleman, they shouted at the defendant, you set us up.

Although the objection did not raise directly either the admissibility of the co-defendants statements or the constitutional issue, it should have alerted the trial judge to those issues.

We are satisfied from our review of the whole record in light of the applicable law that the State's introduction of the out-of-court statements of the co-defendants was a confrontation clause violation under Bankston and its progeny. The violation was compounded when the prosecutor reiterated the statements in his summation and described them as "telling" evidence in support of the State's case against Phillips.

Although there was little doubt that Phillips was at the location in the Jeep, the defense had questioned Mulryne's ability to have actually seen the exchange of CDS and cash from his vantage point on the roof and had also questioned his credibility based upon a prior inconsistent statement as to his actual location. By using inadmissible evidence to emphasize Phillips's apparent connection with the co-defendants, their gang activities, and then their suspicion that he "set them up," the prosecutor improperly enhanced the State's case against Phillips.

Consequently, we find that the improper admission and use of the statements was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Bunchsupra, 180 N.J. at 541. In any event, we are satisfied that, in the aggregate, he did not receive a fair trial. State v. Oreechio16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954). We therefore reverse Phillips's conviction and remand the matter to the trial court for a new trial.

III

A.

Because of the need for a retrial, we add the following. At the new trial, the jury will be selected under the provisions of Administrative Directive #21-06, as supplemented by Administrative Directive #4-07, and they will govern the questions to be asked of prospective jurors.

B.

Because we have reversed Phillips's conviction, we need not reach the issue of the propriety of the State's application for an extended term under N.J.S.A. 26:35-5 addresses possession of a CDS with the intent to distribute.

Phillips filed pre-trial motions, including motions to suppress, which were denied, but have not been raised on appeal.

In connection with the forfeiture complaint, Mulryne had stated under oath that he was in a different location than the one he testified about at trial. He explained during the trial that the discrepancy was the result of a typographical error.

State v. Brimage153 N.J. 1 (1998).

(continued)

Saturday, January 16, 2021

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. C.W.H. (16-07-0617, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-5254-17T1)

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. C.W.H. (16-07-0617, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (A-5254-17T1)

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of sexual assault related offenses stemming from the sexual abuse of his daughter from the time she was five to the time she was twelve years old. The victim reported the molestation to police when she was thirty-one years old and, four years earlier, disclosed the abuse to her sister-in-law who testified at trial that the disclosure seemed credible to her because of defendant's "weird vibes" and her "intuition." During the investigation, detectives conducted a lengthy interrogation of defendant following the administration of Miranda warnings. In his recorded statement, despite repeated denials of the allegations, defendant made incriminating admissions relying on the fact that the victim had said "it happened." During the trial, after detailing his training and experience conducting interrogations, the interrogating detective assessed the veracity of defendant's denials during questioning after the recorded statement was played for the jury. Defendant produced eight character witnesses, each of whom testified at trial about his impeccable reputation in the community and was asked on cross-examination whether the witness' opinion of defendant would change if he or she knew that defendant had admitted to police inappropriately touching his daughter, the very allegations that were the subject of the trial.

The court reversed the convictions, reasoning that the evidentiary errors raised by defendant for the first time on appeal, either in isolation or in combination, were clearly capable of producing an unjust result pursuant to Rule 2:10-2 in the circumstances of the case. Specifically, the court found that the detective's testimony, which clearly conveyed the impression that defendant was being deceptive during questioning and, given the detective's expertise, impermissibly colored the jury's assessment of defendant's credibility, constituted impermissible lay opinion mandating reversal notwithstanding the trial judge's sua sponte curative instruction. Additionally, the testimony of the victim's sister-in-law did not satisfy the reasonable time requirement of the fresh complaint rule and injected inferential propensity evidence into the case in violation of N.J.R.E. 404. Finally, the prosecutor's inquiry into defendant's character witnesses' knowledge of defendant's alleged criminal conduct not evidenced by a criminal conviction was impermissible under N.J.R.E. 608 and 405.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WALTER A. TORMASI (97-04-0234, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3534-17T4)

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WALTER A. TORMASI (97-04-0234, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (A-3534-17T4)

In 1996, when he was sixteen years old, defendant fatally shot his mother. Defendant was waived to the Law Division, tried as an adult, and convicted of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2), and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). Following merger, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment subject to a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. The court has previously affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal and the denial of four petitions for post-conviction relief.

In May 2013, defendant moved to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5). He argued that the sentencing court did not consider his youth and associated mitigating factors and that his life term deprived him of an opportunity to earn his release through demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. He further argued that it is likely that he will serve much longer than thirty years because the State Parole Board can repeatedly deny parole even if demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.

Defendant further argued that mere eligibility for parole does not amount to a meaningful opportunity for release because the State Parole Board regularly contravenes the intentions and expectations of sentencing judges, thereby overruling sentencing decisions and usurping the power of sentencing judges. Defendant asserted that the State Parole Board's decision-making process is statutorily and constitutionally deficient because it is not required to consider the court-accepted brain science that children are constitutionally different and not deserving of the most severe punishments.

Defendant claimed he was entitled to resentencing under State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), and Article I, Paragraph 12, of the New Jersey Constitution, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments" Defendant will be eligible for parole in 2026 at age forty-seven.

The court affirms the denial of defendant's Rule 3:21-10(b)(5) motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that defendant's sentence is not illegal or the functional equivalent of life without parole. The court adheres to the holding in State v. Bass, 457 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2018), concluding that defendant is not entitled to resentencing under Zuber, even though the sentencing court had not considered the factors enumerated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-78 (2012), when it imposed the sentence. Any rehabilitative actions undertaken by defendant while incarcerated were matters for the State Parole Board to consider and did not render the sentence unconstitutional. The court thus rejected defendant's argument that he is entitled to resentencing under Zuber.

The court also holds that defendant's challenges to the parole process are not ripe since he is still serving the statutorily mandated thirty-year period of parole ineligibility and is not yet eligible for parole. The court notes that if defendant is eventually denied parole and receives a future eligibility term, he may appeal that decision and challenge the constitutionality of the statutory and regulatory framework governing parole at that time.

State v. Donnell Gideon (083178)(Camden County & Statewide) (A-31-19

 State v. Donnell Gideon (083178)(Camden County & Statewide) (A-31-19; 083178)

Pierre applied existing jurisprudence to a specific set of facts. At a PCR hearing, an alibi witness’s false or inaccurate testimony may bear upon the witness’s credibility and, while not dispositive, the claimed alibi witness’s credibility must be weighed against the strength of the evidence presented at trial and offered post-conviction. Here, considering the strength of the State’s case and the weakness of Gideon’s alibi -- including the extent to which his proposed witnesses would have contradicted his own account of the relevant events -- the PCR court’s finding that Gideon failed to demonstrate prejudice should not have been disturbed.

In re Petition for Expungement of the Criminal Record¬Belonging to T.O. (084009)(Hudson County & Statewide) (A-55-19; 084009)

 In re Petition for Expungement of the Criminal Record¬Belonging to T.O. (084009)(Hudson County & Statewide) (A-55-19; 084009)

Pardons remove legal disabilities linked to the conviction itself but do not erase the underlying facts of an offense. Here, T.O. faced a statutory bar that prevented him from being eligible for expungement. That legal disability came into play solely because of his prior convictions. The pardon -- which removed the legal disabilities that arose from those convictions -- therefore dissolved the statutory bar. With the bar removed, T.O. is eligible to be considered for expungement on the merits. In light of the State’s concession and the trial court’s agreement that T.O. would qualify for expungement in the absence of a statutory bar, the Court grants T.O.’s petition for expungement.