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Sunday, March 26, 2023

Drug dog alert prior to opening case door sufficient here State v. Balbi

  Drug dog alert prior to opening case door sufficient here State v. Balbi

Defendant appealed the order denying his motion to suppress drug evidence after a remand. Court remanded for trial court to make specific factual findings about the movement of a K-9 dog as part of a canine sniff of defendant's car to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Trial judge heard testimony from canine handler and viewed a video of the canine sniff. Officer narrated the dog's movements in the video and confirmed the dog alerted on the front passenger door by biting the door handle. Door opened and officer reached out and closed the door. Officer testified the dog also scratched at the front passenger door pointing "to the source" of the odor. Officer testified dog never entered the vehicle and that biting, scratching, jumping and/or barking were the dog's alert signals. Trial judge found officer was credible, consistent with the video, dog never entered the vehicle, the sniff was lawful and the brief opening of the car door had no effect on the search and the validity of the warrant. Court rejected defendant's argument that the opening of the car door constituted an unlawful search, noted trial judge found dog alerted prior to any opening of the car door and found there was no evidence dog was trained to open doors during a sniff.

sourcehttps://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1678822790NJA290820/

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

NESTOR BALBI, a/k/a BALBI-CIRIACO, and NESTOR BALBI CIRIACO,

Defendant-Appellant. __________________________

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2908-20

Argued February 8, 2023 – Decided March 14, 2023

Before Judges Currier, Mayer and Enright.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 17-06-0767.

Alyssa Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Alyssa Aiello, of counsel and on the brief).

Deepa Jacobs, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; William P. Miller, Assistant

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief; Catherine A. Foddai, Legal Assistant, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
Defendant Nestor Balbi appeals from an October 9, 2020 order denying

his motion to suppress evidence after a remand. We affirm.
In our prior decision, we remanded for the trial judge to make specific

factual findings about the movements of the K-9 dog as part of a canine sniff of defendant's car to establish probable cause for a search warrant. We asked the remand judge to "address whether the canine sniff was lawful and what effect, if any, an illegal breach of the vehicle's exterior had on the search and the validity of the search warrant." See State v. Balbi, No. A-0682-18 (App. Div. June 2, 2020) (slip op. at 14-15).

The facts leading to defendant's guilty plea and judgment of conviction are set forth in our June 2, 2020 opinion and we need not repeat them here. We recite only the additional facts adduced during the August 25, 2020 evidentiary hearing after our remand.

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Consistent with our remand instructions, the judge heard the testimony of Officer Robert Marini of the Bergen County Sheriff's Office,the canine handler who, with his dog, conducted a canine sniff of defendant's car after officers assigned to the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Narcotics Task Force (NTF) lawfully stopped the vehicle. A video of the canine sniff from the officers' motor vehicle recording was introduced during the evidentiary hearing.

Officer Marini testified he was called to the upper level of the George Washington Bridge at approximately 7:15 p.m. on February 17, 2017 to conduct a narcotics sniff. After speaking with the lead officer at the scene, Detective Timothy Cullen from the NTF, Officer Marini deployed his dog to conduct a canine sniff of defendant's car. Marini explained that from the moment his dog exited the patrol car, the dog "[was] ready to work." Marini stated the "[d]river's side window was down all the way" and the rear driver's side window "was down half-way" prior to starting the sniff.Marini testified his dog alerts, or indicates, in response to the odor of narcotics by "[b]iting, scratching, barking."

In our June 2, 2020 opinion, we noted "the canine handler could have shed some light on what transpired [during the canine sniff], but [Officer Marini] was not subpoenaed by the defense or called by the State." Balbi, slip op. at 14.
While watching the video, the judge noted "for the record that the video . . . even prior to the dog going to the other side of the car[,] you can see . . . what appears to be an air freshener hanging from the . . . car. It's already moving and swaying back and forth even before any intrusion [in]to the vehicle."

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Marini narrated the dog's movements in the video while it played during the evidentiary hearing. He explained the dome light from the car's interior came on because the dog "bit the door handle" on the front passenger door and the officer "immediately closed the door, continu[ing] on."

Officer Marini explained that he conducted two passes around defendant's car with his dog. On the first pass, he went "higher on the car by the door handle, windows. . . . On the second pass[, he] went lower to see if [there was] anything under the car . . . [such as] narcotics under the seats under the vehicle."

Marini confirmed that his dog alerted on the front passenger door by biting the door handle, which informed Marini that the dog detected the odor of drugs. The officer explained his dog then scratched at the front passenger door, pointing "to the source" of the odor. Marini stated his dog "never entered the vehicle." When the dog opened the car door, Marini "shut the door immediately." He further explained he had his left hand on the dog's leash and used his right hand to close the car door.

On cross-examination, Officer Marini reviewed thirty-two individual screen shots from the motor vehicle recording of the canine sniff. He explained that his dog previously opened car door handles "possibly" five times prior to this sniff, and the pair had conducted "over a thousand K-9 jobs." Marini

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testified that biting, scratching, jumping, and barking were his dog's alert signals and any one of the four actions by his dog could indicate the odor of narcotics. Marini also acknowledged that his written report never mentioned his dog biting and physically opening the car door.

On redirect, Officer Marini explained the air freshener inside defendant's car began moving when the dog put his "body weight on the vehicle, shak[ing] the car" on the passenger side door.The officer reiterated that he looked for his dog to scratch the car "to pinpoint" the odor of narcotics. Marini confirmed that his dog biting on the car door handle was "one of his indication[s]" for detecting the odor of drugs. He further testified his dog was "[n]ot agitated" during the sniff and simply displayed excitement to be working.

At the end of the evidentiary hearing, the attorneys and the judge discussed the events depicted on the video recording. The judge stated, "if you look carefully at the video, . . . it appears to me to be clear that the officer's . . . hands are on the leash and his arms are never extended to [] a point where [the officer] could have opened up the door." The judge then referred to our remand decision, where we cautioned "[a]ny attempts by counsel to try to fill the void

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eighty-five pounds.

Officer Marini's canine partner is a German Shepherd and weighed about

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by representing what appeared in the [motor vehicle recording] footage cannot substitute for . . . competent evidence [by the canine handler]." Balbi, slip op. at 14. During the colloquy with counsel, the judge also commented "there's no evidence before me that the dog has been specifically trained to open up car doors." The judge stated he would rely on Officer Marini's testimony and the motor vehicle recording in rendering his decision on remand.

About a month after the evidentiary hearing, the judge issued a sixteen- page written decision, supplementing his earlier written decision denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The judge found "Officer Marini's testimony to be credible and consistent with the video of the motor vehicle stop . . . ." In accordance with our remand instructions, the judge concluded "Officer Marini's testimony clarifie[d] and shed[] light on the specific facts and circumstances of the canine sniff and how the vehicle's front driver and front passenger side doors were opened."

Relying on the officer's credible testimony, the judge found the dog's "biting, scratching, and barking [were] indicators of the presence of narcotics." After describing his observations from the motor vehicle recording, the judge found "Officer Marini's testimony as to the sequence of the deployment of [the dog] [was] consistent with what is observed on the video." The judge further

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determined Marini plausibly testified the dog opened the car door by biting the handle because the officer's arms were "not extended in a position where Officer Marini himself could have opened the front driver side door." After reviewing the video, the judge found the dog never entered defendant's car.

In his remand decision, the judge concluded:

based on the credible testimony of Officer Marini, consistent with the video . . . , that [the dog] was not specifically prompted by Officer Marini to open either of the doors and that [the dog's] biting and scratching at the exterior of the vehicle, including the door handles, occurred just prior to the opening of the doors, and was a positive alert for the presence of narcotics consistent with the dog's training. Therefore, based on a totality of the evidence before it, this court finds that the canine sniff was lawful and the opening of the car doors was not an illegal breach of the vehicle's exterior as the positive indications for narcotics occurred before the doors opened. This court finds that the brief opening of the car doors had no effect on the search and validity of the warrant.

The judge reaffirmed his denial of defendant's motion to suppress after the remand hearing. On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

POINT I

THE REMAND JUDGE'S DECISION DENYING SUPPRESSION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE OPENING OF THE CAR DOORS DURING THE DOG SNIFF CONSTITUTED AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH.

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A. No Deference Is Owed To The Trial Judge's Findings That The Dog Opened The Car Doors Or That The Dog Gave A Positive Alert Before The Doors Were Open.

i. The video does not support the judge's finding that the officer could not have opened the driver's door.

ii. The evidence unequivocally established that the "biting and scratching of the exterior of the vehicle," which constituted the positive alert, occurred only on the passenger side and only after the driver's door had been opened.

iii. There was no sufficient, credible evidence in the record to support a finding that the dog was capable of pulling open the driver's door.

B. Assuming Arguendo The Dog Opened The Doors, There Was No Basis For The Judge To Conclude That The Dog Was "Following Its Instincts."

C. Assuming Arguendo The Dog In This Case Had Somehow Developed The Ability To Open a Car Door, The Handler's Failure To Control The Dog From Doing So Rendered The Dog Sniff Invalid.

We reject these arguments as the judge's findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the remand record.

In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we afford considerable deference to the judge's role as a factfinder. Our review of a judge's factual findings is "exceedingly narrow." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). We must defer to those factual findings "so long as those findings are supported

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by sufficient evidence in the record." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015) (internal citations omitted). As part of that deference, we must respect the trial judge's assessment of credibility, given the judge's ability to make "observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474. "A trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).

Additionally, "[v]ideo-recorded evidence is reviewed under the same standard." State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 38 (2018). Even where a trial judge's fact-finding is based solely on a video recording, we will disturb the determination only "when factual findings are so clearly mistakenso wide of the markthat the interests of justice demand intervention." State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017). However, we review a trial judge's legal determinations de novo. Hagans, 233 N.J. at 38.

We first consider defendant's argument that the judge erred in determining Officer Marini's dog alerted for the odor of drugs prior to opening the car doors. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), the Supreme Court held that an exterior sniff of luggage in a public place by a trained canine "did not

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constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000), the Supreme Court extended this reasoning to an exterior sniff of an automobile, holding that such actions did not constitute a search because it "does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics." "[T]he use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog . . . during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted this same approach "for determining the manner in which an officer may conduct a canine sniff during an otherwise lawful traffic stop." State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538-39 (2007).

Here, the judge found Officer Marini's dog alerted prior to opening any of the car doors. A narcotics dog's positive alert while searching the exterior of a vehicle can give rise to probable cause. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246-47 (2013) (holding that a trained or certified drug detection canine's sniff of a vehicle's exterior and subsequent alert provides probable cause to believe it contained illegal drugs); United States v. Pulido-Ayala, 892 F.3d 315, 319 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that a dog's alert while outside the car's door, along with defendant's "suspicious reaction to the drug checkpoint," meant "police had

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probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband in the moment before [the dog] actually crossed the threshold into the interior of the [vehicle]"). Here, the judge found the dog bit the car door handle, constituting an alert

for the odor of drugs, prior to the dog opening the car door. Officer Marini described how his dog bit the car door handle, causing the door to open, and that the act of biting the door handle constituted an alert. The officer's testimony was consistent with the judge's review of the motor vehicle recording.

Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to support defendant's argument that Officer Marini opened the car door. As the judge noted, the officer's arms were not extended in a position that would have allowed him to open the door. Rather, the judge concluded the officer's body position was consistent with his holding onto the dog's leash with both hands, arms bent at his elbows, and close to his body.

Based on our review of Officer Marini's testimony and the motor vehicle recording of the canine sniff, there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the judge's determination that the dog, not the officer, opened the door. Nor did the judge abuse his discretion in concluding the dog had previously bitten car door handles during canine sniffs, resulting in the opening

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of a car door, and that biting was but one of this dog's alerts when detecting the odor of drugs.

There is no evidence in this record to support defendant's contention that the dog was trained to open doors during a canine sniff. Despite having ample opportunity to explore this theory during the cross-examination of Officer Marini, defense counsel did not do so. Even if the dog was trained to open car doors, a contention that is unsupported by this record and purely speculative, such a theory is irrelevant to the judge's finding that the dog alerted prior to opening the car door.

We also reject defendant's contention that the dog's biting of the car door handle did not constitute an alert. Officer Marini explained that a narcotics dog is trained to detect the odor of drugs and then signal an alert. Several times during his testimony, the officer explained his dog alerts, or indicates, by biting, scratching, or barking, and then "pinpoint[s]" the location of the odor by scratching. In narrating the video during the remand hearing, Officer Marini noted four occasions when his dog's actions constituted an alert or indication. According to the officer, the four separate alerts were: biting the front driver's side door handle; barking at the rear driver's side door; barking on the passenger's side of the vehicle; and ultimately biting and scratching the front

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passenger's side door. Officer Marini testified his dog pinpointed only to the front passenger side door because that was the single time the dog scratched at the car. It was this testimony, coupled with the video evidence, that led the judge to conclude the dog alerted when he bit the front passenger side car door handle before that door opened.

Nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that the dog must perform all three actionsbark, bite, and scratchto constitute an alert sufficient for establishing probable cause to obtain a warrant to search. A dog's alert may support probable cause even if the dog has not given a final indication, or pinpoint, as to the specific location of the drugs. See United States v. Moore, 795 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 2015) ("[A]n alert, or a change in a dog's behavior in reaction to the odor of drugs, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle, and that a final indication is not necessary."); United States v. Parada, 577 F.3d 1275, 1283 (10th Cir. 2009) ("We hold that probable cause was satisfied by [the dog's] alert to the odor of an illegal substance in the vehicle and that it was not necessary for the dog to indicate the exact source of that odor."); People v. Bailey, 427 P.3d 821, 823 (Colo. 2018) (finding the dog's "alert to the odor of narcotics while sniffing the exterior of [defendant]'s car, provided state troopers with probable cause to search the car. The fact that [the

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dog]'s alert was not a final indication did not render it irrelevant to the trooper's probable cause determination.").

Having reviewed the remand record, we are satisfied the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's motion to suppress the drug evidence. After considering Officer Marini's testimony and the motor vehicle recording of the canine sniff, the judge concluded the dog alerted to the odor of drugs when he bit the handle on defendant's front passenger car door, and that the car door only opened after the dog alerted. Thus, the judge properly concluded the canine sniff was lawful and the dog's alert gave rise to probable cause for a warrant to search defendant's car.

Affirmed.

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State v. Ransdell Prosecutor should not have rejected for PTI based on parking ticket suspension

  State v. Ransdell Prosecutor should not have rejected for PTI based on parking ticket suspension

Defendant appealed the denial of her application to enter the pretrial intervention program. Defendant was driving her vehicle when it was struck by a bus. Her passenger died from her injuries and defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle that resulted in the death of another while her license was suspended. Her license had been suspended because of unpaid parking tickets. Prosecutor objected to defendant's entry into the pretrial intervention program. Trial judge denied her application because he could not find prosecutor's position "amounted to a patent and gross abuse of discretion." Defendant pled guilty, State recommended a non-custodial sentence and judge sentenced defendant to a three-year probationary term. Court reversed and remanded. Court found prosecutor's denial of PTI was a patent and gross abuse of discretion. Prosecutor found six factors that he believed justified barring defendant from PTI, including the nature of the offense. Court however, noted her license was suspended for unpaid parking tickets and there was no evidence she was intoxicated, under the influence or distracted by a cellphone at the time of the accident. Prosecutor's reliance on three other factors adding nothing that the nature of the offense factor did not take into consideration. Additionally, defendant had no criminal history and two of victim's close family members favored PTI.

source https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1678481236NJA147621/

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
LAQUANA S. RANSDELL,

Defendant-Appellant. ________________________

Submitted March 1, 2023 – Decided March 10, 2023 Before Judges Haas and Fisher.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 21-03-0306.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Caitlinn Raimo, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1476-21

On August 11, 2020, defendant was driving her Ford Focus in Newark on South Jacob Street. Her vehicle was struck by a New Jersey Transit bus when it entered South Jacob Street's intersection with Springfield Avenue. Defendant was injured as was her passenger, whose injuries later proved fatal. Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle that resulted in the death of another while her license was suspended, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22, a crime of the third degree. Her license had been suspended because of unpaid parking tickets.

Defendant, a thirty-year-old single mother with no prior criminal history, sought entry into the pretrial intervention (PTI) program. The Criminal Case Manager recommended admission, but the prosecutor objected. Defendant sought relief and the trial judge, who viewed the application as posing "a very close call" and expressed he was "really troubled by this case," remanded the matter so the prosecutor could "take another hard look." The prosecutor maintained his position. The judge, in considering the matter again a few weeks later, observed that defendant had "presented a very compelling argument," but he denied the application because he could not find the prosecutor's position "amounted to a patent and gross abuse of discretion."

A few months later, the parties entered into a plea agreement by which defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment and the State recommended a non-

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custodial sentence and a mandatory one-year loss of defendant's driving privilege. The judge sentenced defendant to a three-year probationary term.

Defendant appeals, arguing:

I. THE PROSECUTOR'S DENIAL OF PTI WAS A PATENT AND GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ACCORDINGLY, THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ADMIT DEFENDANT INTO PTI OVER THE PROSECUTOR'S OBJECTION.

II. A THREE-YEAR PERIOD OF PROBATION IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS.

We agree with defendant's first point and, therefore, need not reach the second. We start by recognizing, as is well established, that PTI is a "diversionary program through which certain offenders are able to avoid criminal prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative services expected to deter future criminal behavior." State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 240 (1995). Acceptance into PTI requires an initial recommendation by the criminal division manager and the prosecutor's consent. The prosecutor is required to make an "individualized assessment," State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621-22 (2015), by considering the defendant's "'amenability to correction' and potential 'responsiveness to rehabilitation,'" State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008) (quoting N.J.S.A.

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2C:43-12(b)), and the many other statutory factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 12(e).

While the prosecutor is imbued with "great discretion," and a defendant's diversion into PTI constitutes "a quintessentially prosecutorial function," State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582 (1996), we must also be mindful that the prosecutor's discretion "is not unbridled," ibid., and a prosecutor's objection may be overcome if it is "clearly and convincingly establish[ed] that the prosecutor's refusal to sanction admission into the program was based on a patent and gross abuse of [] discretion." State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 382 (1977); see also State v. Johnson, 238 N.J. 119, 128-29 (2019); Wallace, 146 N.J. at 582-83. When the decision to keep a defendant out of PTI has gone "wide of the mark . . . fundamental fairness and justice require judicial intervention." Watkins, 193 N.J. at 520. We believe this is one such case.

The prosecutor found six factors that he believed justified barring defendant from PTI. The first was "the nature of the offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 12(e)(1). The prosecutor asserted that "defendant acted with total disregard for the safety of her passenger, as well as all other pedestrians and motorists, by driving with a suspended license and causing a serious motor vehicle collision" that caused her passenger's death. But, as observed earlier, her license was

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suspended for unpaid parking tickets, not any conduct that evinced or suggested a disregard for safety. There is no evidence that defendant was intoxicated or under the influence of any substance, that she was distracted by using a cellphone, or any other similar conduct that would suggest she was anything but carelessly or recklessly operating her motor vehicle in bringing about the accident and the unfortunate death of her passenger.

The prosecutor's reliance on three other statutory factors adds nothing that the first factor did not take into consideration. That is, in relying on the second statutory factor – "the facts of the case," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(2) – the State asserted that defendant acted "purposeful[ly]" and that her conduct was egregious because her license had been suspended for approximately four months. The State's position on this factor does little more than rely on the same circumstance that it urged in support of the first factor. Moreover, the purposefulness that the prosecutor relied on was the allegation that she knowingly drove while her license was suspended, not that she knowingly caused the accident.

In relying on these same factual circumstances, the State invoked the seventh statutory factor – the "needs and interests of the victim and society," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(7) – by referring to the license suspension and that the

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accident resulted in a death. In invoking the tenth factor – "whether or not the crime is of an assaultive or violent nature, whether in the criminal act itself or in the possible injurious consequences of such behavior," N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 12(e)(10) – the State argues that "defendant's behavior constituted a very real danger to the victim" and that "continuing to drive despite her license being expired for months shows an overwhelming absence of regard for the rules of society, the victim, other motorists, and pedestrians." Again, in suggesting this factor in support of its position, the prosecution has done nothing more than reworded what it said in support of each of the other factors mentioned above.

In alleging the fourteenth factor – "whether or not the crime is of such a nature that the value of supervisory treatment would be outweighed by the public need for prosecution," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(14) – supports the opposition to PTI, the prosecution claims there is a "significant need" to deter defendant because she "attempted to downplay her role." The fact is, however, that defendant claimed "no recollection of the accident" and "no knowledge of her license being suspended." The trial judge rejected the prosecutor's position, observing that defendant had no obligation to speak with the police and that her claim of not remembering the accident was credible because she too was severely injured in the crash. Similarly, the prosecution relied on the seventeenth

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statutory factor – "whether or not the harm done to society by abandoning prosecution would outweigh the benefits to society from channeling an offender into a supervisory treatment," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(17) – through the assertion that the victim's "family and friends deserve justice," that defendant must "be held accountable for her actions," and that forgoing prosecution here "may have the opposite effect of deterring this type of offense." The record, however, shows that while it is true the victim's mother was opposed to defendant's entry into PTI, the victim's father and brothers favored PTI because they recognized that defendant and the victim were "best friends" and that the death was accidental.

The argument that defendant should be held "accountable" for her actions, as the prosecutor argued, would likely be true in any criminal prosecution. But there is nothing more here than the suspended license and a motor vehicle accident, which tragically caused a death; neither circumstance, individually or collectively, would suggest this defendant is not amenable to "the deterrence of future criminal behavior through the receipt of early rehabilitative services." State v. DeMarco, 107 N.J. 562, 567 (1987). Sadly, human error is such that auto accidents will occur, so it is difficult to imagine how prosecuting this defendant would deter future auto accidents.

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In short, we cannot help but return to the essence of this matter: that the prosecutor was desirous of prosecuting this defendant for a fatal car accident only because her license was suspended for unpaid parking tickets. Considering the defendant's age and circumstances, and the lack of any prior criminal history, it is difficult to conceive of a case more amenable to PTI. To be sure, our courts are required to give prosecutors considerable leeway in such matters, but that doesn't mean the prosecutor's position may never be overcome.

An appropriate example for overriding a prosecutor's objection can be found in Roseman, where the Court found the prosecutor grossly and patently abused his discretion when the two defendants – Roseman, who was the mayor of Carlstadt, and Lewin, his ex-wife – sought entry into PTI. 221 N.J. at 629-30. These defendants were charged with second-degree official misconduct, third- degree conspiracy, and third-degree theft charges, id. at 617, because for seven years following their divorce, id. at 616, Lewin wrongfully continued to receive benefits through the health coverage to which Roseman was entitled through his employment with the municipality, id. at 616-17. The trial judge overrode the prosecutor's objection and ordered that the defendants be enrolled in PTI. Id. at 619. As to Roseman, we reversed, finding no patent or gross abuse of the prosecutor's discretion particularly because the defendants had been charged

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with a second-degree offense; as to Lewin, we remanded for an individualized assessment of her circumstances. Id. at 619-20. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court order that allowed the defendants into PTI. Id. at 630.

There is, of course, at least one difference between the Roseman matter and this case. Here, someone died. But the Roseman defendants were charged with a second-degree offense as well as other third-degree offenses, while defendant here was charged only with one third-degree offense. The wrongdoing in question in the Roseman matter occurred over the course of seven years, during which the defendants received numerous statements from Roseman's health insurer revealing that Lewin had received benefits to which she was not entitled, while defendant's wrongdoing – the suspension of her license – had only occurred four months earlier, and, unlike the Roseman defendants who should have been aware of their wrongdoing, defendant denied knowledge of her suspension. The Roseman defendants arguably had a motive for the crimes for which they were charged – pecuniary gain – while defendant here had no motive in operating her vehicle in such a way as to severely injure herself and in causing fatal injuries to her passenger and friend. Moreover, while, as we have already observed, the Roseman defendants' conduct occurred over the

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course of many years, the act that brought about the tragic death of defendant's passenger started and ended in the blink of an eye.

Other differences would include the fact that Roseman was the mayor of a small but affluent suburban community, while defendant here was a single, thirty-year-old, unemployed mother, living in Newark. Even though one of the factors the prosecutor should consider is the defendant's standing in the community, Watkins, 193 N.J. at 520, we cannot imagine this means that suburbanites of means or political stature are entitled to PTI while unemployed city dwellers are not. Considering all these circumstances, we cannot understand why – if Roseman and Lewin were, as the Supreme Court held, entitled to entry into PTI – defendant should not be.

In the final analysis, the prosecutor's objection to defendant's entry into PTI – despite his invocation of numerous factors – is based almost entirely on the fact that defendant's license was suspended for unpaid parking tickets when the unfortunate and tragic motor vehicle accident occurred. Considering all other factors, including defendant's lack of a prior criminal history, we are satisfied – as the Court was in Roseman – that the prosecutor's objection constituted a gross and patent abuse of discretion and "subvert[ed] the goals underlying" PTI. 221 N.J. at 630 (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979)).

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The order under review is reversed and the matter remanded for entry of an order vacating the judgment of conviction and permitting defendant's entry into PTI. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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