STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHARLES PURYEAR/ STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MARKUS BROWN A-2433-14T3/ A-2434-14T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHARLES PURYEAR/ STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MARKUS BROWN 

A-2433-14T3/ A-2434-14T3 

We address the admissibility of custodial statements two co-defendants gave to law enforcement. Puryear and Brown were charged with crimes related to a fatal shooting in Newark, and an armed robbery that took place several days later in Sussex County. Each of them gave two custodial statements, which they moved to suppress. 

After a hearing, the trial court initially denied suppression in all respects. Following motions for reconsideration, the court ultimately suppressed Puryear's first statement, admitted Puryear's second statement, admitted Brown's first statement, and suppressed Brown's second statement. We affirm those rulings, as the court had the authority to reconsider and change its interlocutory decisions, and properly did so because of misleading advice given by the interrogating officers. 

Puryear's first statement was suppressed because a detective told him at the start of the interview that he could not hurt himself by giving a statement. The court reasoned that the detective's statement improperly neutralized the Miranda warnings. Under the totality of the circumstances, the detective's advice was misleading and the State failed to prove that Puryear's Miranda rights were knowingly waived. 

Puryear, however, was re-given his full Miranda rights before his second interview. The court found that he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights and gave a statement. We reject Puryear's contention that his second statement, given hours later and to different detectives, should also have been suppressed. 

As to Brown, the court ultimately suppressed his second statement because when Brown asked for a clarification of what was meant by "anything you say can be used against you in a court of law," a detective told him that meant "if you lie, it can be used against you." Under the totality of the circumstances, the detective incorrectly explained one of the required Miranda warnings and, thus, the resulting waiver by Brown was not knowingly given. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DONNA JONES A-0793-13T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DONNA JONES 

A-0793-13T1 

In Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), the United States Supreme Court considered whether "the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1556, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 702 (emphasis added). Concluding that fact alone did not present a "per se exigency," the Supreme Court held, "consistent with general Fourth Amendment principles, that exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." Ibid. This matter was summarily remanded to us by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the Court's decision in State v. Adkins, ___ N.J. ___ (2015), holding that the totality of the circumstances analysis described in McNeely should be given pipeline retroactivity. 

In our earlier decision, we reviewed the United States Supreme Court's analysis in McNeely and discussion of its holding in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1836, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 920 (1966). We concluded "the application of McNeely to the facts of this case" did not warrant the suppression of the blood test results. Jones, supra, 437 N.J. Super. at 75-78. 

This was not a routine DWI case in which the dissipation of blood alcohol was the sole basis for determining an exigency existed. To the contrary, defendant caused a multiple vehicle accident at a busy intersection and crashed into a building, raising concern the building would collapse. Numerous police, firefighters and emergency medical services personnel responded to the scene, where the investigation took hours. It took one-half hour to extricate defendant, who was unconscious, from her badly damaged vehicle. Both she and a passenger in another car had to be transported to the hospital. 

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we are satisfied that an objective exigency existed and that the officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence[.]'" Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S. Ct. at 1835, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20 (citation omitted). We find no reason to disturb our prior decision reversing the order that suppressed the results of the blood sample analysis. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DATRELL T. WILLIAMS A-5953-13T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DATRELL T. WILLIAMS 

A-5953-13T3 

After concluding that a prosecution was not barred by either double jeopardy or the mandatory joinder rule, the trial court dismissed an indictment with prejudice against defendant, relying upon the "doctrine of fundamental fairness and equitable treatment." We agree with the trial court that prosecution of the cocaine charges was not barred by double jeopardy or the mandatory joinder rule, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(b) and R. 3:15-1(b). The question presented by the State's appeal is whether, under the facts of this case, the rarely applied doctrine of fundamental fairness is properly relied upon to protect the defendant from oppression and harassment. We conclude that the application of the doctrine here was a mistaken exercise of discretion and reverse. 

State v. Jamil McKinney (A-74/75-13;

State v. Jamil McKinney (A-74/75-13; 073070) 

State v. Al-Tariq Wardrick (A-76-13; 073078) 

The trial court’s references to second-degree robbery in the course of the jury instructions were erroneous. Its subsequent efforts to cure the error were confusing and ineffective. Thus, the instruction constituted reversible error. The judgment of the Appellate Division in State v. Wardrick is reversed as to his conviction for first-degree robbery, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. The judgment of the Appellate Division in State v. McKinney is affirmed. 

State v. Thomas Shannon (A-111-13

State v. Thomas Shannon (A-111-13; 074315) 

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed by an equally divided Court. The arresting officer’s good faith belief that a valid warrant for defendant’s arrest was outstanding cannot render an arrest made in the absence of a valid warrant or probable cause constitutionally compliant. 

State v. Humfrey A. Musa (A-78-13;

State v. Humfrey A. Musa (A-78-13; 073268) 

Juror Number 2’s failure to appear for the second day of deliberations amounted to an “inability to continue” under Rule 1:8-2(d)(1) and substituting an alternate juror for the missing juror was permissible. The matter is remanded to the Appellate Division to address the issue it did not reach: whether the trial court’s failure to give an identification charge denied defendant a fair trial. 

State v. Michael A. Maltese (A-96-13

State v. Michael A. Maltese (A-96-13; 073584) 

Because defendant’s statement to his uncle occurred after officers violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, that statement is inadmissible. Defendant’s subsequent statement to police was fruit of the unconstitutionally obtained statement to his uncle and must also be suppressed. Thus, defendant’s convictions for manslaughter and murder are reversed. His other convictions are affirmed because they are supported by evidence independent of the suppressed statements. On remand, the trial court shall conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether the physical evidence obtained as a result of defendant’s suppressed statements is admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. 

In the Matter of the Expungement Petition of J.S.

In the Matter of the Expungement Petition of J.S. (A-84-13; 073376) 

In the Matter of the Expungement of the Criminal Records of G.P.B. (A-2-14; 074541) 

The plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) precludes expungement of convictions when the petitioner has been convicted of multiple crimes, even when those crimes occurred within a short span of time. 

State v. Elise N. Munafo (A-6-14;

State v. Elise N. Munafo (A-6-14; 074142) 

When the Legislature enacted the endangering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2, it chose to punish a defendant’s knowing behavior -- leaving the scene under circumstances that might well lead to greater harm to a victim -- but did not require a showing of increased risk of further harm. Because the jury charge in this case tracked the statute as written, it was not error to omit the element defendant now requests. 

State v. Dontae Hathaway (A-69-13;

State v. Dontae Hathaway (A-69-13; 073770) 

Viewing the events as they appeared to an objectively reasonable police officer, and based on the evidence presented by the State at the suppression hearing, the police acted within the scope of the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, and the gun should not have been suppressed. 

State v. Duran C. Keaton (A-92-1

State v. Duran C. Keaton (A-92-13; 073564) 

 law enforcement officer was required to provide defendant with the opportunity to present his credentials before entering the vehicle. If after giving a defendant that opportunity, he or she is unable or unwilling to produce the registration or insurance information, only then may an officer conduct a search for those credentials. Here, because defendant was never provided with such an opportunity, the seizure of the contraband was unlawful under the plain view doctrine. Further, the community-caretaking doctrine was inapplicable because there was no need for an immediate warrantless search to preserve life or property. 

State v. James Buckner (A-22-14;

State v. James Buckner (A-22-14; 074390) 

Defendant has failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the Recall Statute is clearly repugnant to the New Jersey Constitution. To the contrary, the current law, in effect since 1975, is consistent with both the language and the history of the modern State Constitution, and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. 

State v. Evan Reece (A-79/80-13

State v. Evan Reece (A-79/80-13; 073284) 

The emergency-aid doctrine justified the officers’ warrantless entry into defendant’s home. Based thereon, defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest is affirmed, and defendant’s conviction for obstruction is reinstated. 

Eric Morillo v. Monmouth County Sheriff’s Officers (A-88-13;

Eric Morillo v. Monmouth County Sheriff’s Officers (A-88-13; 073978) 

The civil rights causes of action against the officers should have been dismissed based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. 

In the Matter of Registrant N.B. (A-94-13;

In the Matter of Registrant N.B. (A-94-13; 073613) 

A 2004 amendment defining the term “sole sex offense” indicates that the household/incest exception applies to the conviction here: a single conviction for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), “under circumstances in which the offender [is] related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree,” notwithstanding the offender’s admission to multiple acts of sexual contact against the victim. Therefore, N.B. is within the household/incest exception of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2). The matter is remanded to the trial court for a determination as to whether N.B.’s registration record should be made available to the public, notwithstanding the applicability of the household/incest exception. 

State v. Marc A. Olivero (A-83-13

State v. Marc A. Olivero (A-83-13; 073364) 

A fenced-in and locked lot is a “structure” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 when the lot is secured from the public and is used for business purposes. Here, when defendant entered the lot to remove metal rollers, he entered a “place … adapted for carrying on business,” as a “structure” is defined under the statute. Defendant’s conviction for third-degree burglary is affirmed. 

State v. Darien Weston (A-61-13; 073032)

 State v. Darien Weston (A-61-13; 073032) 

Given the content of the statements, and the strength of the other evidence presented by the State, the trial courts’ decisions permitting the juries access to the pretrial statements did not constitute plain error. 

State v. Terrell L. Hubbard (A-56-13

State v. Terrell L. Hubbard (A-56-13; 073539) 

Where a trial court relies on evidence in addition to a videotaped statement, including testimony presented to it, traditional rules of appellate review control and require deference to the findings of fact and credibility assessments made by the trial court. An appellate panel must therefore review the entire record to determine if the factual findings are supported by substantial credible evidence, rather than engage in de novo review of the record. Under this deferential standard of review, the trial court properly concluded, based on its review of the entire record, that defendant was the subject of a custodial investigation and therefore should have been given Miranda warnings. 

Conditional Dismissal Program in Municipal Court. Ken Vercammen testifie...

State v. Ivonne Saavedra (A-68-13;

State v. Ivonne Saavedra (A-68-13; 073793) 

The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss her indictment. The State presented to the 

grand jury a prima facie showing with respect to the elements of each offense charged in the indictment and the State did not withhold from the grand jury exculpatory information or a charge regarding a defense that it was compelled by law to present. Defendant’s indictment does not violate due process standards or New Jersey public policy by conflicting with this Court’s decision in Quinlan, which does not govern the application of the criminal laws at issue in this appeal.