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Monday, December 10, 2018

DNA on towel not admissible without proper foundation and chain of custody State v Mauti

DNA on towel not admissible without proper foundation and chain of custody
State v Maut i208 NJ 519 (2017)
A jury found defendant guilty of third degree aggravated criminal sexual contact and fourth degree criminal sexual contact and not guilty of first degree aggravated sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault. Defendant is a physician. The complaining witness is his sister-in-law. The court reverse and remand for a new trial. 
The court hold the trial judge should have excluded a towel containing defendant's semen based on the absence of competent evidence linking it to the alleged sexual assault. The towel also constituted inadmissible hearsay by conduct under N.J.R.E. 801(a)(2). 
  DNA on towel not admissible without proper evidential foundation
State v Mauti__ NJ Super. __ (App. Div 2017)
A-3551-12T3 
A jury found defendant guilty of third degree aggravated criminal sexual contact and fourth degree criminal sexual contact and not guilty of first degree aggravated sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault. Defendant is a physician. The complaining witness is his sister-in-law. The court reversed and remand for a new trial. 
In this appeal, defendant raised three principal issues predicated on evidential rulings made by the trial judge in the course of addressing the parties' pretrial motions. Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce a towel containing defendant's semen because this DNA material lacked a proper evidential foundation, constituted an inadmissible hearsay statement under N.J.R.E. 801(a)(2), and should have been excluded under N.J.R.E. 403 because its prejudicial effect far outweighed its probative value; (2) the trial judge abused his discretion when he permitted the State to present cumulative "fresh-complaint" evidence to bolster the credibility of the complaining witness; and (3) the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence a redacted version of a letter sent by defense counsel to the prosecutor before formal charges were filed against defendant. The court ruled certain factual assertions defense counsel made in this letter constituted adopted admissions by defendant under N.J.R.E. 803(b). Defendant argues these factual assertions were protected under N.J.R.E. 410 as statements "made during plea negotiations."
The court held the trial judge should have excluded a towel containing defendant's semen based on the absence of competent evidence linking it to the alleged sexual assault. The witness did not testify at trial. The towel also constituted inadmissible hearsay by conduct under N.J.R.E. 801(a)(2). 
The judge also abused his discretion by permitting the State to call five fresh-complaint witnesses and thereafter deciding not to instruct the jury on fresh-complaint testimony. Defense counsel’s acquiescence to the trial judge’s decision not to charge the jury on fresh-complaint did not constitute invited error. 
Finally, The court conclude that the trial court properly admitted a redacted version of a letter sent by defense counsel to the prosecutor as an adopted admission under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(3). Under these circumstances, The court reject defendant’s argument that defense counsel’s letter falls within the ambit of "plea negotiations," as that term is used in N.J.R.E. 410. Our analysis is guided by the federal courts’ review of Fed. R. Evid. 410, the source rule of N.J.R.E. 410. 
As a matter of first impression in this State, The court adopt the analytical approach used by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978) to determine when interactions between the State’s representative and defense counsel constitute protected “plea 
negotiations” under N.J.R.E. 410. This approach requires a trial judge to determine: (1) whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion; and (2) whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. The State bears the burden of proof. Because this two-tiered approach requires a fact-sensitive analysis, the trial judge should conduct an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to resolve any disputed facts.