Ineffective assistance of counsel rejected here State v Carpenter
The defendant Christopher Carpenter appealed from a Law Division order affirming his conviction and sentence after a trial in
the Andover Joint Municipal Court for driving while intoxicated, refusal to submit to breath samples and failing to install an interlock device. The defendant relied on counsel's admission that he provided ineffective assistance at trial by failing to advise him of the state's favorable plea offer due to an injury counsel suffered on the day of trial before it commenced. The Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed the lower court. Unreported State of New Jersey vs. Christopher Carpenter Jr. –source Daily Briefing - 1/29/26
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2575-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CARPENTER
JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Argued January 12, 2026 – Decided January 28, 2026
Before Judges Sabatino and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Sussex County, Municipal Appeal No. 17-11-
24.
George T. Daggett argued the cause for appellant.
Jonathan E. McMeen, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for respondent (Sahil K. Kabse, Acting Sussex County
Prosecutor, attorney; Jonathan E. McMeen, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAMIn this case, defendant Christopher Carpenter appeals from an April 16,
2025 Law Division order affirming his conviction and sentence after a trial in
the Andover Joint Municipal Court for driving while intoxicated ("DWI"),
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; refusal to submit to breath samples, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2; and
failing to install an interlock device, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.19(a). Defendant relies
on counsel's admission that he provided ineffective assistance at trial by failing
to advise him of the State's favorable plea offer due to an injury counsel suffered
on the day of trial before it commenced. We affirm.
The relevant facts are not disputed. In December 2023, defendant was
charged with the following motor vehicle offenses out of Hampton Township:
DWI; refusal to consent to submitting breath samples; and failure to install an
interlock ignition device. Defendant retained his present counsel to represent
him. Over the ensuing months, the State made several offers to defendant to
settle the case on the following dates: April 30, June 8, July 7, August 12,
September 18, and November 13, 2024 prior to the commencement of trial.
Defendant rejected all plea offers and the matter proceeded to trial as scheduled
on November 13.
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Troopers Alec Bowie and
Jeffrey Pruden, who were working as a team on the day in question, and
2 A-2575-24introduced Trooper Pruden's body-worn camera footage of the encounter with
defendant, the drinking/driving questionnaire, and the Miranda1 Rights Form,
which were entered into evidence, without objection. Trooper Bowie, the
arresting officer and State's first witness, testified that he observed defendant in
a pickup truck that was pulled over onto the side of the road with its engine
running in the early morning hours of December 24, 2023. Trooper Bowie
observed the driver, later identified as defendant, asleep in the driver seat. He
further testified that he was initially unsuccessful in waking defendant, shut off
the vehicle's engine, and removed him from the vehicle. He testified that
defendant was "very slow. . . . he had watery eyes and bloodshot eyes." Trooper
Bowie further testified he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage, but
when he asked defendant if he had any alcohol to drink, defendant responded
"no."
Trooper Bowie asked defendant to perform a series of roadside field
sobriety tests, all of which was captured on Trooper Pruden's body-worn camera
and later played for the court. Defendant was arrested and transported to the
station.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 A-2575-24Prior to Trooper Pruden's testimony, the parties stipulated that defendant
was intoxicated at the time of his arrest. The separate charge of whether
defendant refused the breathalyzer, however, remained pending before the court.
The State next presented the testimony of Trooper Pruden, who testified
regarding the implied consent form he reviewed with defendant. Trooper Pruden
recalled reading the Attorney General's statement for drinking and driving and
breath testing to defendant and asking, "[w]ill you submit samples of your
breath?" Defendant responded, "I'm trying to understand what is best for me."
As a result of this response, Trooper Pruden read the remaining language in the
additional paragraph stating, "[t]he law requires you to submit samples of your
breath for breath testing. If you do not answer with any other than 'YES,' I will
charge you with a refusal." Defendant responded, "I'm not trying to give you
guys a hard time." Trooper Pruden further testified that defendant never directly
answered "yes" or "no" to the question whether he would submit to breath
testing, but in failing to respond in the affirmative, he charged defendant with
refusal to submit to breath testing.
Defense counsel briefly crossed-examined Trooper Pruden and also asked
for an adjournment of the proceedings to allow his client to pick up his daughter
from school and for an opportunity to submit written summations. The court
4 A-2575-24denied the application and asked the parties to place their closing arguments on
the record.
Following closing argument, the court issued an oral decision finding
defendant guilty of all offenses as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The court
discussed the troopers' testimony regarding the roadside stop, including that
defendant was found sleeping in a running vehicle, the body-worn camera
evidence, showing defendant was unable to follow the troopers' commands, the
parties' stipulation to defendant's intoxication, Trooper Pruden's testimony that
defendant never consented to the breathalyzer test, defendant's driver's abstract
showing that an interlock device was required to be installed in his vehicle by
November 9, 2023, which defendant failed to do. After discussing the evidence,
the court found defendant was convicted of all charges beyond a reasonable
doubt and the court sentenced him as follows:
As to the DWI [c]onviction . . . $757[ ] fine and fees,
$33[ ] in costs, $50[ ] Violent Crimes Compensation
penalty, $225[ ] DWI surcharge, $75[ ] Safe
Neighborhood assessment, two-year driver's license
suspension, thirty days of community service, two
years ignition interlock device, and [forty-eight] hours
in the [Intoxicated Driver Resource Center].
[]As to the Refusal to Consent to a Breath Test
[c]onviction . . . $507[ ] fine and fees, $33[ ] in costs,
$100[ ] Drunk Driving Enforcement Fund, and a one-
5 A-2575-24year driver's license suspension to run consecutive to
the suspension on the DWI conviction.
[]As to the failure to install the ignition interlock device
[c]onviction . . . $207[ ] fine and fees, $33 in costs, one-
year driver's license suspension consecutive to both the
DWI conviction suspension and the Refusal to Consent
conviction suspension, and two-year ignition interlock
device installation concurrent to the DWI conviction
ignition interlock device requirement.
Within weeks, defendant moved before the municipal court for a new trial,
citing counsel's medical issue.2 More particularly, defendant averred that he was
entitled to relief from his conviction and sentence due to trial counsel's injury,
which occurred on the morning of trial, resulting in representation that was
ineffective because counsel "was not all there." Defendant principally argued
and counsel certified that he was ineffective by failing to explain the favorable
terms of the State's plea offer, "not realizing all of the consequences," and as a
result defendant received a sentence well beyond the one-year suspension offer
the State had extended. Defendant offered as further proof of his ineffectiveness
the trial record showing that his counsel repeatedly asked the same questions
during the trial, prompting the court to correct him.
2 The municipal court noted there was no brief submitted, only a certification
of counsel, stating that he struck his head on the way to court and believes he
suffered a concussion.
6 A-2575-24The municipal court denied the motion and issued an oral decision finding
no factual or legal basis to grant the relief sought. The court noted that, despite
the relief sought, counsel's certification did not include any discussion of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The court explained there is no
doubt that counsel fell that day, however the plea offer "should have been taken
six months ago if it was [going to] be taken at all," referring to the multiple times
the plea offer had been extended to defendant in 2024. The court further stated
that at no time during the trial did counsel indicate to the court that he was
physically or mentally unable to proceed, request an adjournment, seek medical
treatment, or report a concussion diagnosis.
Defendant appealed to the Law Division, arguing ineffective assistance
by counsel and essentially seeking a new trial.3 The Law Division judge
acknowledged the "uniqueness of defense counsel's arguments," stating "[i]t's,
essentially, a post-conviction relief argument that's styled as what had been a
motion for a new trial." Defense counsel argued that he had in fact hit his head
when he fell before trial in November 2024, and as a result he failed to explain
3 It is unclear whether this was an appeal from the municipal court's conviction
and sentence of defendant, but we can fairly glean from the record that this was
trial counsel's intent.
7 A-2575-24to defendant that there was no defense to his motor vehicle charges, stating
"[t]he case shouldn’t have been tried. . . . There [were a lot] of things I should
have said and I didn't." The State opposed the motion, arguing "there was
nothing to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and this is
[unusual] because . . . [it's] not being filed by the defendant as having an
ineffective assistance of counsel, it's being filed by [counsel] as being
ineffective.
"
Following oral argument, the Law Division judge issued a detailed oral
decision denying the application. The judge explained he had no doubt that
counsel truly believed that he did not do the job for his client to the degree that
he is normally capable of doing but acknowledged that is not the end of the
inquiry. The judge relied on the municipal judge's findings in the motion for a
new trial, including that there was no showing at all that counsel's performance
was deficient and that his performance prejudiced defendant. The judge agreed
that counsel's performance that day "was above any objective standard of
reasonableness. He was competent, he was effective, he asked the appropriate
questions, he explored issues." The judge found the "[t]he [s]uggestion that the
record demonstrates that counsel was, to any significant degree, suffering from
8 A-2575-24the effects of his fall to the point that it impacted his trial performance is belied
by the record."
The Law Division judge next discussed counsel's argument that he did not
adequately represent his client's interests by getting his client to accept the plea
agreement the State was offering. On this point, the judge concluded only that
defendant had multiple opportunities to take the plea before the trial date.
Lastly, the judge noted that counsel did not disclose that he had any type of
physical or mental issue on the day of trial, did not suggest in any way that he
was not feeling well, request an adjournment, or seek medical attention.
Whether viewed under Strickland or the new trial standard of manifest injustice,
the judge remained unconvinced that relief was appropriate or that a new trial
was warranted. Applying Strickland's two-part test, the judge noted again that
counsel's performance was not deficient. The judge found persuasive the
municipal court's statement that it would not have accepted the plea agreement
on the day of trial and noted that it did not know whether counsel would have
been able to prevail in having his client accept the plea offer when defendant
had turned it down four previous times. The judge also noted that there appears
to have been a trial strategy to potentially challenge the issue of defendant's
9 A-2575-24operation, or lack thereof, of the vehicle when troopers found him parked
alongside the roadway.
The judge thus conducted a de novo review of the municipal trial record
and concluded it was satisfied that all the elements of the drunk driving statute
were found: defendant was intoxicated; and he was operating the vehicle. See
State v. Thompson, 462 N.J. Super. 370, 375 (App. Div. 2020) (upholding a
DWI conviction when a defendant is found running his vehicle's engine without
moving). Turning to the refusal charge, the judge found probable cause for
detaining defendant for the purpose of undergoing the breathalyzer and
concluded that based on Trooper Pruden's actions in reading the Attorney
General's statement, and defendant's refusal to set forth an affirmative answer,
the trooper correctly charged defendant with refusal. The court concluded that
the "State established all the elements for refusal beyond a reasonable doubt and
the defendant is guilty of that charge."
On the failure to install the interlock device in his vehicle, the judge found
based on Trooper Bowie's testimony and defendant's driving abstract—showing
he was required to install the interlock device as of November 2023—that it is
beyond dispute that defendant failed to install the interlock device and thus, was
guilty of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Law Division judge
10 A-2575-24therefore denied counsel's motion and affirmed defendant's municipal
conviction and sentence.
Defendant appealed, arguing the following single point for our
consideration:
POINT I
THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION
OF THE DEFENDANT WAS SUFFICIENT DESPITE
COUNSEL'S FALL AND INJURY IMMEDIATELY
PRIOR TO THE TRIAL.
Appellate review of a de novo conviction in the Law Division, following
a municipal court appeal, is "exceedingly narrow." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J.
463, 470 (1999). We focus on "whether there is 'sufficient credible evidence
. . . in the record' to support the trial court's findings." State v. Robertson, 228
N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).
Further, under the "two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not
undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations
made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of
error." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at
474). Our function is limited to determining whether the findings made by the
Law Division "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible
11 A-2575-24evidence present in the record." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471 (quoting Johnson, 42
N.J. at 161-62). "[I]f the appellate tribunal is thoroughly satisfied that the
finding is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the interests of
justice demand intervention and correction," then we can independently make
new factual findings. Ibid. (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 161-62).
As a preliminary matter, we agree with the Law Division judge's
characterization of counsel's appeal as "unique" given that counsel raises an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim seemingly on his client's behalf solely
based on his own certification. Defendant and counsel argue counsel should not
have tried the case because he had suffered a fall immediately preceding the
trial, which impacted his ability to represent defendant effectively. Counsel
avers that the "decision to try the case was ineffective assistance," because
defendant's exposure was to a four-year loss of license, rather than the one-year
loss of license, which was the plea offer the State had offered.
We reject these arguments and affirm the Law Division's denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief for the reasons expressed in the court's
thorough and well-reasoned decision. We note that neither the municipal court
nor the Law Division judge found these arguments persuasive. In fact, the
judges found these arguments were belied by the trial record, which showed
12 A-2575-24counsel's performance satisfied any objective standard of reasonableness. In
reaching this decision, the judge discussed counsel's effective cross-examination
of the State's witnesses, his exploration of issues and his attention to defendants
due process rights.
In particular, the Law Division judge found no showing at all that
counsel's performance was deficient and concluded defendant's rejection of the
State's plea offer to a one-year license suspension was indicative of "rolling the
dice," concluding that "he had multiple opportunities to take the plea if he had
wanted to." Based on this record, we are hard-pressed to conclude counsel's
representation of defendant was constitutionally deficient because he did not
persuade his client to accept a more favorable plea offer. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689.
Like the Law Division judge, we are unpersuaded by counsel's argument
that had he not suffered the apparent injury, he would have been able to convince
defendant to accept the State's offer when in fact, the same offer had been
extended and rejected by defendant multiple times prior to trial.
In sum, notwithstanding counsel's admission of ineffective representation,
the State established defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant
was found asleep in a vehicle with the ignition running, failed the field sobriety
13 A-2575-24tests, and later refused a breathalyzer test after having been advised that he had
no legal right to do so and if he did, he would be charged with refusal. He also
did not have an interlock device in his vehicle although he had been ordered to
do so prior to his arrest. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied the court
properly affirmed defendant's conviction of these charges and imposed an
appropriate sentence.
Affirmed.
14 A-2575-24
