State v Delbridge,
The state appealed from an order granting the defendants Anthony Delbridge's and Joel Lopez's motions to suppress physical evidence – controlled dangerous substances, heroin, and a handgun – obtained during a stop of Lopez's car while Delbridge was a passenger. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court, concluding the actions of the police after properly arresting and removing Delbridge from the vehicle based upon an outstanding warrant were unreasonable. Unreported Source Daily Briefing - 4/3/26
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2821-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANTHONY DELBRIDGE AND
JOEL LOPEZ,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________
Argued November 17, 2025 – Decided April 2, 2026
Before Judges Natali, Walcott-Henderson, and
Bergman.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County,
Indictment No. 24-05-0656.
Josemiguel DeJesus Rodriguez, Special Deputy
Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for appellant (Wayne Mello, Acting Hudson
County Prosecutor, attorney; Jose DeJesus Rodriguez,
of counsel and on the brief).
Stephan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for respondent Anthony Delbridge(Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Stefan
Van Jura, of counsel and on the brief).
Paul Condon argued the cause for respondent Joel
Lopez (Paul Condon, attorney, joins in the brief of
respondent Anthony Delbridge).
PER CURIAM
By leave granted, the State appeals from an April 3, 2025 order granting
defendants Anthony Delbridge's and Joel Lopez's motions to suppress physical
evidence – controlled dangerous substances (CDS), heroin, and a handgun –
obtained during a stop of Lopez's car while Delbridge was a passenger. We
conclude the actions of the police after properly arresting and removing
Delbridge from the vehicle based upon an outstanding warrant were
unreasonable, the "ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment." Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014). We accordingly affirm the court's order
suppressing the physical evidence seized in violation of Lopez's Fourth
Amendment rights.
I.
Both defendants were indicted and charged with third-degree possession
of a CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); third-degree possession of a controlled
dangerous substance with the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3); and second-degree possession of a controlled dangerous
2 A-2821-24substance with the intent to distribute within 500 feet of a public housing
facility, park, or building, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(a). In addition, Lopez was
charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(b)(1); possession of a weapon while committing a crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
4.1(a); fourth-degree prohibited weapons and devices – large capacity ammo,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j); and fourth-degree prohibited weapons and devices –
firearms without a serial number, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(n).
We derive the following largely uncontested facts from the suppression
hearing record where the State presented a single witness, Jersey City Police
Officer Jonathan Romanella.1 Officer Romanella stated he and Officer Joaquin
Rodriguez were in plain clothes and in an unmarked cruiser outside a home on
23 Woodlawn Avenue, where Delbridge once lived, looking for him because he
had an outstanding warrant for attempted murder and weapons offenses.
While watching the home, Officer Romanella observed an individual enter
the residence and exit it "after a short time." He then noticed the man walk past
him with a small white object in his hand which, consistent with his training and
experience, he believed was heroin based on the manner in which it was
1 The officer's surname is spelled differently in the transcript of the evidentiary
hearing and the court's written opinion. We employ the surname in the official
court transcript.
3 A-2821-24packaged. Officer Romanella stated he did not detain the individual because he
did not want to "foil the investigation of trying to locate [] Delbridge."
Officer Romanella then observed another individual leaving the home.
The officers followed him in their vehicle and, as they got closer, recognized
the individual as Delbridge, and observed him enter the passenger side of a
parked car on Woodlawn Avenue.
After calling for backup, the officers approached the parked car and
blocked it with their vehicle to prevent it from leaving. The officers then exited
their police cruiser and pointed their handguns at both occupants of the car—
Delbridge and the driver, later identified as Lopez—and told them, "don't
fu**ing move." Officer Romanella acknowledged that at this point neither
occupant would have felt free to leave.
Officers ordered both defendants to show their hands, then ordered
Delbridge out of the vehicle. Delbridge exited and officers shut the passenger
door behind him, leaving Lopez in the car with a small child who was sitting in
the backseat. After Officer Rodriguez confirmed Delbridge's identity, he was
handcuffed, and during a search incident to his arrest, officers recovered a
rubber band from his rear pants pocket.
4 A-2821-24Officer Romanella then re-opened the passenger door and asked for and
obtained Lopez's identification before closing the door again. He then walked
away from the vehicle, entered the unmarked cruiser, and moved the cruiser to
the side so that it no longer blocked Lopez's vehicle. After moving the vehicle,
Officer Romanella returned to Lopez's vehicle and stated to the other officers,
"let me check this area," before opening the passenger door again.
Officer Romanella then opened the passenger door and told Lopez "I'm
gonna [sic] check this immediate area," while gesturing to the passenger's seat
and floor. Officer Romanella testified he then decided to ask Lopez whether
Delbridge left anything in the car based upon the presence of the single rubber
band in Delbridge's pocket, which he had associated with drug use. In response,
Lopez reached into the small area between the driver seat and the center console,
retrieved six glassine bags and placed them on the passenger seat.
Officer Romanella then instructed Lopez to exit the vehicle and walked
with him to the unmarked cruiser. Lopez told the officer he was not in
possession of any CDS, but in response to further questioning, confirmed he had
a gun in his jacket. Officer Romanella immediately handcuffed Lopez and
placed him under arrest while a different officer on the scene seized the gun
from inside Lopez's jacket pocket.
5 A-2821-24Officer Romanella acknowledged that he was unaware if 23 Woodlawn
Avenue was a two-family home, that he did not have probable cause to arrest
either Delbridge or Lopez for any drug related offense, that he did not view any
furtive or suspicious activity between Lopez or Delbridge, and did not observe
them passing anything to each other while in the car. Finally, Officer Romanella
admitted that after he obtained Lopez's identification, he "walk[ed] around
[with] it for a while," which further prevented Lopez from leaving the scene.
The court determined the police did not possess probable cause to either
arrest or search Lopez and nothing in the record established he or Delbridge
were involved in a drug transaction at 23 Woodlawn Avenue or otherwise. The
court also found that neither Officer Romanella's earlier observations before
confronting Delbridge and Lopez, nor the seizure of the single small rubber band
from Delbridge's pocket, was sufficient to link Lopez to any criminal conduct.
It further concluded the officers' conduct rose to the level of an arrest when they:
(1) blocked Lopez's car with their police cruiser and (2) pointed their guns and
yelled, "don't fu**ing move." As the court explained:
[t]he officers possessed no legitimate observed or
corroborated information to justify such an arrest.
They had no knowledge of drugs, firearms,
ammunition, or suspicious behavior on Lopez's part –
only that he was the operator of the vehicle in which
Delbridge entered.
6 A-2821-24The court determined that even assuming that the officers were permitted
to temporarily detain Lopez to extract Delbridge and engage in an investigatory
stop, there was no justification for detaining Lopez after he provided his driving
credentials. The court found that while the officers had a right to check Lopez's
identification, the officers "continued to hold" Lopez's license and "made no
efforts to allow him to leave." Instead, the officers "extended the detention" by
taking additional steps to investigate suspected CDS activity. The court
concluded that Lopez's detention should have ended when he presented his
identification and that the police's subsequent actions were therefore
unwarranted.
Before the trial court, the State argued that in opening the passenger door
and beginning to search, Officer Romanella conducted a valid search incident to
Delbridge's arrest. The State tacitly reprises this argument before us but
primarily argues that, because Lopez was detained only for a brief time and not
subject to overly invasive treatment, his detention did not exceed constitutional
bounds.2 Defendants counter that the purpose of the stop was to arrest Delbridge
2 The State also spends significant time arguing that Lopez was not in custody
for the purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Because our
reading indicates that order on appeal did not resolve any Miranda motions, we
do not address the issue.
7 A-2821-24and once that purpose was accomplished, the police could not detain Lopez, no
matter how briefly, without violating constitutional bounds.
II.
We begin our analysis by reciting the appropriate standard of review,
followed by the applicable substantive constitutional legal principles that inform
and guide our analysis. Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion to
suppress is limited. State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021). We will defer
to the trial court's factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient
evidence in the record, setting them aside only when "clearly mistaken." State
v. Caneiro, 262 N.J. 288, 300 (2025). The trial court's legal interpretations,
however, are reviewed de novo. Ibid.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, "guarantee individuals the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Carter, 247 N.J.
488, 524 (2021). In recognition of that right, warrantless searches and seizures
are held to be presumptively invalid. State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 271 (2017)
(citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007)).
However, "[n]ot all police-citizen encounters constitute searches or
seizures for purposes of the warrant requirement." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 271
8 A-2821-24(quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 125 (2002)). A field inquiry, for
example, is "essentially a voluntary encounter," in which an individual is not
compelled to answer, or even listen to, police questions. Ibid. Such encounters
need not be proceeded by any "particular suspicion of criminal activity," but are
valid only if the defendant, "under all of the attendant circumstances, reasonably
believed he could walk away without answering." Id. at 272 (first quoting
Elders, 192 N.J. at 246; and then quoting State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483
(2001)).
In contrast, an investigative detention or "Terry stop," is a "temporary
seizure" that occurs when "'an objectively reasonable person' would feel 'that
his or her right to move has been restricted.'" Ibid. (quoting Rodriguez, 172 N.J.
at 126). Such stops must be "brief and narrowly circumscribed" and the
"intrusion on the individual [must be] minimal." State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468,
477 (1998). They must last no longer and be no more intrusive than necessary
to effectuate "the purpose that justified the stop in the first place." State v. Shaw,
237 N.J. 588, 612 (2019). Provided these criteria are met, police may conduct
an investigative detention based on objectively "reasonable and particularized
suspicion . . . that an individual has just engaged in, or was about to engage in,
9 A-2821-24criminal activity." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 263 (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J.
346, 356 (2002)).
When a seizure of a person strays beyond these bounds, an arrest occurs.
Shaw, 237 N.J. at 612. An arrest "requires probable cause and generally is
supported by an arrest warrant or by demonstration of grounds that would have
justified one." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 272.
Whatever the relevant constitutional standard, "the detention must be
reasonable both at its inception and throughout its entire execution." Shaw, 237
N.J. at 612 (quoting State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 344 (2014)). In the case of a
warrantless search, in order to overcome the presumption of invalidity, "the
State must show by a preponderance of evidence that the search falls within one
of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." Caneiro, 262
N.J. at 300-01 (quoting State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 164 (2023)). Moreover, in
the case of multiple entries or searches, each must be separately justified; lawful
entry into a space does not guarantee that subsequent entries will also be lawful.
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987); United States v. Williams, 930
F.3d 44, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2019) (requiring discrete justification for each of two
consecutive automobile searches). If these requirements are not met, statements
10 A-2821-24and evidence obtained as a result are subject to suppression. Caneiro, 262 N.J.
at 300-01.
A conventional motor vehicle stop constitutes a seizure and therefore must
be supported by at least reasonable, particularized suspicion of an offense.
Carter, 247 N.J. at 524. Our courts have held that, under certain circumstances,
approaching a parked vehicle and requesting the occupant's identification may
also constitute an investigative detention. See Rosario, 229 N.J. at 273 ("It
defies typical human experience to believe that one who is ordered to produce
identification in such circumstances would feel free to leave."); see also State v.
Boston, 469 N.J. Super. 223, 249-56 (App. Div. 2021) (surveying cases).
However, a stop that begins as an investigative detention may mature into a "de
facto arrest" if it is longer or more intrusive than necessary to effectuate its
purpose. Shaw, 237 N.J. at 612. Once a stop has exceeded the "narrow" bounds
of an investigative detention, by either duration, intrusiveness, or both, it "must
be supported by probable cause." Dickey, 152 N.J. at 478.
Of course, a valid vehicle stop does not automatically confer on officers
the right to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. State v. Witt, 223 N.J.
409, 450 (2015) (outlining the criteria for the "automobile exception" to the
warrant requirement). Nor does the arrest of one of the vehicle occupants. In
11 A-2821-24State v. Cohen, 73 N.J. 331, 335 (1977), police arrested one occupant of a van,
believing him to have an outstanding bench warrant for a CDS offense. The
officers then opened the door to the van where the driver had remained. Id. at
344. Observing that at that point, the arrest "was complete" and "[n]o reason
existed to suspect or implicate [the driver] in any precedent or current offense,"
the Court held "there was no justifiable reason or probable cause for the officers
to make the initial intrusion by opening or compelling the occupant to open the
van doors." Ibid. In State v. Lark, 163 N.J. 294, 296-97 (2000), the Court held
that although the driver of vehicle had been validly arrested, police were not
permitted search or impound the vehicle because the vehicle owner, who
presented a valid license and "was not under suspicion," was present to take
possession of the vehicle.
III.
Applying these principles, we affirm the trial court's order suppressing the
physical evidence recovered from Lopez and his vehicle for two separate
reasons. First, by reopening the passenger door in order to conduct a search
after Delbridge had been removed and secured at the rear of the car, Officer
Romanella conducted an unjustified warrantless search. Second, by the time
Officer Romanella asked Lopez whether Delbridge had left anything in the
12 A-2821-24vehicle, the stop had exceeded the permissible length and scope of an
investigative stop and lacked the probable cause necessary to support continuing
detention. We address each of these constitutional violations in turn as they
independently support the suppression order.
Although one's expectation of privacy in an automobile on a public street
may be somewhat lessened in comparison to, say, a home, "it remains the law
that motor vehicles constitute areas of privacy of persons and effects within the
general protection of the Fourth Amendment and our own Constitution." State
v. Woodson, 236 N.J. Super. 537, 539 (App. Div. 1989); accord State v. Eckel,
185 N.J. 523, 539 (2006). As we have held, "[t]here can be no dispute" that
when officers suddenly and unilaterally open the door of a car, it "constitute[s]
a warrantless search." State v. Gray, 474 N.J. Super. 216, 225 (App. Div. 2022)
(citing Woodson, 236 N.J. Super. at 541). Such an action must therefore be
taken pursuant to a warrant or otherwise justified by an exception to the warrant
requirement. Ibid.; Cohen, 73 N.J. at 344.
Before the trial court, the State's sole justification for the officer's
reopening the passenger door was to conduct a "search incident to [Delbridge's]
arrest." The State argued that "[i]n New York v. Belton, 435 U.S. 454, 460
(1981), the United States Supreme Court established a bright-line rule that . . .
13 A-2821-24the lawful arrest of a motor vehicle occupant authorized the warrantless search
of the passenger compartment" and "New Jersey courts have adopted the rule
set forth in Belton." We view the State's position to be a significant misreading
of our state's constitutional jurisprudence.
In Eckel, 185 N.J. at 541, our Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-standing
decision to "decline to adopt Belton and its progeny because to do so would
require us to accept a theoretically rootless doctrine that would erode the rights
guaranteed to our own citizens." See State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 211 (1994)
(rejecting "Belton's automatic [authorization of] vehicular searches following
all arrests for motor-vehicle offenses"). Federal courts too have come to reject
the "bright-line rule." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) ("[W]e hold
that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's
arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the
vehicle.").
Before us on appeal, the State does not identify any other exception to the
warrant requirement that would justify reopening the passenger door and
searching the area around the seat. Rather, relying on State v. Mai, 202 N.J. 12
(2010), the State makes the expansive argument that because officers were
licensed to order Delbridge out of the vehicle, Officer Romanella's choice to
14 A-2821-24reopen the passenger door thereafter was of no moment. The State separately
asserts that "no meaningful difference existed between reopening the front-
passenger door . . . for the sole purpose of [asking whether Delbridge] left items
behind, and posing the same question through the rolled-down drivers-side
window." We disagree.
It is well established that a search incident to a lawful arrest is among the
exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Torres, 253 N.J. 485, 503 (2023).
But this exception is not without limit. In the case of a search conducted around
the time of arrest, the purpose of the search must be "to remove from the
arrestee's reach things that might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape
as well as to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime for which the
individual has been arrested." State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446, 461 (2002).
Thus, "[t]he scope of that search is restricted to the person of the arrestee and
the area within his or her immediate control, meaning 'the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.'" Ibid.
(quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)). Put another way,
a search incident to arrest is confined to "the person of an arrestee and the area
within his or her immediate control" at the time of the search. Ibid.
15 A-2821-24In New Jersey, police may not search a vehicle incident to the arrest of an
occupant if "the occupant of a vehicle has been arrested, removed and secured
elsewhere" and effectively lacks the capacity to injure police or destroy
evidence. Eckel, 185 N.J. at 540-41 ("To us, a warrantless search of an
automobile based not on probable cause but solely on the arrest of a person
unable to endanger the police or destroy evidence cannot be justified under any
exception to the warrant requirement and is unreasonable."). If the arrestee has
not been "removed and secured," courts must determine "on a case-by-case basis
whether he or she was in a position to compromise police safety or to carry out
the destruction of evidence," such that the particular search at issue was
justified. Id. at 541. Significantly, an arrestee need not be subject to any
particular conditions—e.g., placement in a police car or removal from the
scene—to be considered sufficiently "removed and secured" or otherwise unable
to compromise evidence or officer safety. See, e.g., State v. Carroll, 386 N.J.
Super. 143, 156 (App. Div. 2006) ("[D]efendant was secured one car length
away from the Buick after he was placed under arrest, and thus the car was not
then within his immediate control.").
In this case, Officers Romanella and Rodriguez removed Delbridge
through the passenger door. Rodriguez cuffed Delbridge while Officer
16 A-2821-24Romanella shut the car door before the two officers worked together to frisk
Delbridge. Standing near the rear of the vehicle, Rodriguez began taking items
out of Delbridge's pockets and placing them on the trunk. Officer Romanella
reopened the passenger door and asked Delbridge if a phone on the passenger's
seat belonged to him—he replied it did not. Officer Romanella then took
Lopez's ID before closing the car door.
Officer Romanella then moved his unmarked vehicle, parking several car
lengths down the street, before returning, by which point two more officers had
arrived and were surrounding Delbridge where he stood, still cuffed, at the back
of the car. Officer Romanella testified that the other officers had searched
Delbridge and notified him that they had found a rubber band. Officer
Romanella then decided to check the car again, walking back to the passenger
door, saying to his fellow officers, "let me check this area." He opened the door
again and, gesturing to the passenger seat, told Lopez, "I'm gonna [sic] check
this immediate area," before resting his hand on the seat.
These facts show that, by the time Officer Romanella opened the car door
for a third time to "check th[e] area," Delbridge was "arrested, removed, and
secured" such that he could not have reached the passenger seat. Eckel, 185 N.J.
at 540-41. Delbridge was cuffed and the car door was closed. He had offered
17 A-2821-24no resistance nor attempted to flee and was surrounded by three officers in
addition to Officer Romanella. Officer Romanella agreed that, at the time he
reopened the passenger door, he thought Delbridge "wasn't a threat to anyone"
and he was "not concerned" about him trying to destroy evidence.
In light of these facts, we cannot conclude that the passenger seat or its
surrounding area was "within his immediate control," nor can we reasonably
foresee how he would "gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence"
therefrom. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. at 461. Because Delbridge was undisputedly
secured at the rear of the vehicle, the police were not permitted to conduct a
search of the passenger compartment incident to his arrest.
We are not persuaded by the State's arguments to the contrary. First, the
fact that the officers were permitted to open the door to remove Delbridge does
not establish that they were permitted to reopen the door thereafter. Hicks, 480
U.S. at 324-25 (explaining that each discrete search and seizure must be
justified); Eckel, 185 N.J. at 541 (reaffirming that arresting an occupant of a
vehicle does not automatically permit the vehicle to be searched). Mai, 202 N.J.
at 12, on which the State relies, does not hold to the contrary. In that case,
officers responding to a call under dangerous circumstances approached a van.
Id. at 14-15. The Court determined that the same "heightened" safety risk that
18 A-2821-24permitted the officers to order the passengers out of the van also permitted the
officers to open the van door before the passengers exited so that they could
accomplish the task more safely. Id. at 14-15, 21-23. In so doing, the Court
discerned no meaningful difference between "the grant of authority to order an
occupant of a vehicle to exit the vehicle and the authority to open the door as
part of issuing that lawful order." Id. at 22-23. Thus, Mai only granted the
authority to open a car door "as part of" a lawful effort to remove a vehicle's
occupant; it does not extend to an officer's subsequent reentry into a vehicle to
conduct an investigatory search.
Second, the State cites no authority for its alternative assertion that
speaking to a driver through the driver's window is the same as opening the
passenger door to do so. Nor can it. Speaking through an open window involves
no physical intrusion that might run afoul of constitutional safeguards. Cf.
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (explaining that looking into a
vehicle from outside "trenched upon no right secured . . . by the Fourth
Amendment"). Conversely, opening a car door involves a physical intrusion.
Cohen, 73 N.J. at 344 (explaining that opening or directing an occupant to open
a door was an "intrusion" requiring justification); Gray, 474 N.J. Super. at 223
("Opening the [car] door sufficiently partakes of an 'exploratory investigation'
19 A-2821-24as to constitute a search."). Indeed, the difference is demonstrated in this case,
where Officer Romanella's stated intent in opening the door was to perform a
search, not merely to speak to Lopez. The State's attempt to minimize the
intrusion is contrary to our case law and unavailing.
We briefly address two other exceptions to the warrant requirement that
are often invoked in vehicle-search cases but that that State has not chosen to
advance in this case. We deem this failure to be significant and not
inconsequential as our Supreme Court has instructed, "the points of divergence
developed in proceedings before a trial court define the metes and bounds of
appellate review." Witt, 223 N.J. at 419. We discuss each exception solely for
completeness and to amplify the State's failure to raise either exception both in
the trial court or before us.
First, the automobile exception, which permits warrantless searches "only
when the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to
probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous." Id. at 447. Again, the State
never argued that either prong exists in this case where officers were surveilling
and pursuing Delbridge based on an existing warrant and had no indication that
Lopez's vehicle might be connected to Delbridge's offense. As courts have long
20 A-2821-24held, probable cause to arrest a person and probable cause to search a place
entail different analyses. State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 430 (2017); see also
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205, 216 (1981) (pursuing an arrestee
into a third-party's home violated the third-party's rights); State v. Welsh, 84
N.J. 346, 353 (1980) ("The presence of an eight day-old arrest warrant does not
alone provide probable cause to search the automobile of the arrestee.").
Second, the protective sweep doctrine allows "[a]n officer lawfully
stopping a vehicle may conduct a protective frisk of the passenger compartment
if he has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is dangerous and may gain
immediate access to weapons." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 431-32 (2014).
Such searches are not designed to seek evidence, but rather to ameliorate "risk[s]
to officer and public safety" and therefore must be "cursory and limited in scope
to the location where the danger may be concealed." Id. at 433. Determining
whether grounds for such a "sweep" exist is "a fact-sensitive inquiry," that
incorporates "the context of the officer's relative experience and knowledge."
State v. Robinson, 228 N.J. 529, 547 (2017). Thus, while an officer's subjective
belief is not generally dispositive in evaluating the propriety of a search, State
v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017), we find Officer Romanella's testimony and
in-the-field actions instructive here. Officer Romanella testified that, when he
21 A-2821-24approached the car to search it, Delbridge had been removed. He also testified
that he had no reason to believe Lopez would be armed or dangerous and the
record reveals no furtive or unsettling behavior. This is consistent with officers'
choice to leave Lopez alone in the vehicle for several minutes, returning to
conduct a search only after finding the rubber band on Delbridge, which was the
animating reason he entered the vehicle. Further, at no point in these
proceedings did the State ever argue that Officer Romanella's subjective belief
was incorrect.
We add these remarks to underscore that our decision, like, presumably,
the State's selection of what arguments to make and not make, is dictated by the
record before us. Cf. State v. Terry, 232 N.J. 218, 252 (2018) (Rabner, C.J.,
dissenting) (observing that "[b]ecause the police lacked probable cause" and
"could not make [the] showing" to support a protective sweep, "the State [did]
not rely on" either exception). On these facts and arguments, we find that, by
reopening the passenger door, Officer Romanella conducted an unwarranted
search of Lopez's vehicle and that the State has not demonstrated that any
exception to the warrant requirement applied.
22 A-2821-24IV.
This violation would be sufficient reason to affirm the trial court's grant
of suppression. In the interest of completeness, we also address the
investigatory stop of Lopez and, because we find that it exceeded permissible
constitutional limits, find that it provides an alternate basis for suppression.
As noted, investigative detentions based on reasonable suspicion
constitute a narrowly circumscribed exception to the general rule that authorities
may only seize a person based on probable cause. Dickey, 152 N.J. at 477.
There is no simple, easily reducible test to determine when a detention has
strayed into impermissible territory, but "important factors include unnecessary
delays, handcuffing the suspect, confining the suspect in a police car,
transporting the suspect, isolating the suspect, and the degree of fear and
humiliation engendered by the police conduct." Shaw, 237 N.J. at 612-13.
Viewed in light of all relevant circumstances, a permissible investigative
stop must be no longer or more intrusive than necessary to effectuate the initial
purpose of the stop, and officers should "act diligently to minimize" the length
of the detention. Dickey, 152 N.J. at 478, 481. Thus, police may neither extend
the stop after its objective is complete, nor delay completing that objective, in
23 A-2821-24order to conduct an investigation. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348,
357 (2015).
We begin by establishing the bounds of our analysis. First, the parties
appear to agree that when Officer Romanella and his partner pulled their vehicle
alongside Lopez's parked car, exited, drew their weapons, and ordered the
occupants not to move, Lopez was seized. We agree since, self-evidently, an
"objectively reasonable person would feel that his or her right to move has been
restricted" under these circumstances. Rosario, 229 N.J. at 272. We next find
that Officer Romanella continued that seizure by taking and holding Lopez's
driver's license, without which Lopez would not have felt free to leave the area,
particularly by car.
The parties also appear to agree that the initial seizure was authorized
solely by the warrant for Delbridge's arrest on attempted murder and related
charges. Thus, the question for our purposes is whether the officers detained
Lopez longer than was necessary to facilitate Delbridge's arrest.
The State frames the issue differently, arguing that "because a valid arrest
warrant for attempted murder can give rise to reasonable suspicion that the
person named in the warrant committed a crime . . . officers were entitled to
conduct an investigative stop that was no more intrusive than necessary to gather
24 A-2821-24information on their attempted-murder suspect." We believe this misarticulates
both the record and the governing legal standard. A Terry stop must be no more
intrusive than necessary to achieve "the purpose that justified the stop in the first
place." Shaw, 237 N.J. at 612; see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 348-49
(explaining that a stop's "tolerable duration is determined by the seizure's
mission"). Here, Officer Romanella testified and the State acknowledges that
the purpose and justification for the stop was to execute an arrest warrant. That
is the purpose that establishes its constitutional bounds.
In concluding that effectuating the arrest, not investigating the arrestee
and the car he had recently entered, was the permissible scope of the stop, we
consider it instructive that in cases where officers initiate a truly investigatory
stop based on reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, the stop must last
no longer than necessary "to confirm or dispel" that suspicion. Dickey, 152 N.J.
at 477. The desire to gather information beyond that purpose cannot justify a
stop, especially of a third party. State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 523 (2020) ("A
law enforcement officer cannot use an automobile stop merely for the purpose
of a police interview."). In a case where an arrest warrant has been issued, any
suspicion has already escalated to the level of probable cause, State v. Brown,
205 N.J. 133, 144 (2011), leaving no room for further information gathering.
25 A-2821-24Having established the bounds of our inquiry, we next review several
factors relevant to our analysis. First, an investigatory stop is not automatically
rendered unconstitutional because an officer has asked questions—even
questions unrelated to the initial purpose of the stop—during its pendency.
Officers may ask questions about matters unrelated to the initial stop "so long
as such questioning does not extend" the stop. State v. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super.
623, 636 (App. Div. 2000); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 334
(2009) ("An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the
traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not
measurably extend the duration of the stop."). Our Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court alike have emphasized that these "incidental"
inquiries cannot add to the time the stop would otherwise take "absent the
reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.'"
State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 533-34 (2017) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
355).
For example, in Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. at 628, 635, officers pulled over
a vehicle and discovered that none of the three occupants were licensed
drivers. Because no one could legally drive the vehicle from the scene, officers
26 A-2821-24had an "objectively reasonable basis" and, indeed, little choice but "to detain the
car and its occupants" at the roadside. Ibid. Before the issue could be resolved
and the stop completed, an officer noticed that one of the passengers appeared
"nervous", "refused to make eye contact", and "shifted his weight from one side
to another," prompting the officer to ask if the passenger possessed a weapon or
contraband. Id. at 628. In response, the passenger confessed that he had a small
bag of CDS. Ibid. The questioning, however, did not make the stop last any
longer than it would have had the officers been silent throughout; thus, no
probable cause was required. Id. at 635; see also State v. Pegeese, 351 N.J.
Super. 25, 32 (App. Div. 2002) (approving of questions asked while an officer
awaited a vehicle status check being performed by another officer).
A question, however, even one which might be permissible under other
circumstances, is not permissible if it extends a stop beyond its constitutional
limits. For example, "[i]n the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a
person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment." Hiibel v.
Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004). Indeed, a lawfully stopped
driver may be required to display a valid license. N.J.S.A. 39:3-29. Yet even
such anodyne inquiries have been found to unconstitutionally extend a stop.
See, e.g., State v. Williams, 254 N.J. 8, 41 (2023) (holding that police were
27 A-2821-24required to terminate a mistaken traffic stop rather than continuing to check the
driver's credentials); United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2019)
(demanding a passenger's identification unnecessarily extended the stop); cf.
United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404, 406-08 (3d Cir. 2018) (questioning of
vehicle occupants on various topics).
In such cases, it is the context, not the content, of the question that matters.
An officer may ask additional questions if he does so during the normal
pendency of the stop. If those constitutionally permissible questions yield new
suspicions, an officer may "broaden the scope of his inquiry." Hickman, 335
N.J. Super. at 637. However, if the initial question increased the length of the
stop, it was not permissible, nor was any detention that occurred thereafter.
Dickey, 152 N.J. at 482.
Second, neither an extension nor the stop as a whole must be lengthy to
violate the applicable constitutional principles. In Williams, 254 N.J. at 18, for
example, a police officer stopped a car because its registered owner, a woman,
had a suspended license, only to realize that the car was occupied by two men.
The officer nonetheless took the driver's credentials and called for a drug
sniffing dog. Id. at 18-19. Although the stop was extended by "only a few
minutes" - three minutes for the credentials request, five additional minutes for
28 A-2821-24the dog to arrive—the Court held that was too much and the occupants "should
have been already permitted to leave." Id. at 19, 45. In Landeros, 913 F.3d at
867, officers spent "several minutes of additional questioning" to ascertain the
identity of a passenger during a vehicle stop. The court, applying Rodriguez,
575 U.S. 348, held that even this extension was impermissible since it exceeded
the narrow confines of the investigative detention. Landeros, 913 F.3d at 868.
In Clark, 902 F.3d at 401, 401 n.4, 411, the court emphasized that "[t]here is no
de minimis exception" to Rodriguez and held that twenty seconds of additional
questioning unconstitutionally extended a stop. See also United States v.
Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 885 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (finding an extension of
"approximately twenty-five seconds" unconstitutional).
Similarly, in Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 353, the Court dealt with an eight-
minute extension resulting in a stop lasting no more than half an hour. The court
dismissed the notion that an "incremental[ly]" prolonged stop is permissible so
long as "the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the
duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances." The Court
explained that the relevant question was not whether the length of the stop was
of a piece with other similar stops but rather "what the police in fact do" in a
given case. Id. at 357. Thus, any additions not necessary to effectuate the stop's
29 A-2821-24"mission" violate the constitution, regardless of the net length of the encounter.
Ibid.
Third, while much of the caselaw surrounding investigative detention
developed from cases involving motor vehicle stop, the principles are of general
applicability. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4, 17-18 (1968), from which the
concept of the limited-scope investigative detention derives, concerned
"confrontation[s] on the street between the citizen and the policeman
investigating suspicious circumstances." Our Supreme Court has continued to
apply the doctrine to street encounters. In State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460, 463,
473 (2017), for example, the Court held an initially valid street stop by officers
investigating a noise complaint exceeded the "narrowly drawn" limits of Terry
when they followed the suspect into his apartment to retrieve identification. The
Court held that the officers thereby failed to use "the least intrusive means
reasonably available" to investigate, contrary to the limited authorization of an
investigative detention. Id. at 473.
In State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 327, 344 (2014), the Court held that police
who stopped a burglary suspect on the street could detain him long enough to
conduct a showup identification but could not continue the detention in an effort
to search his home once the showup failed to identify him. In reaching this
30 A-2821-24conclusion, the Court reiterated that a detention "must be reasonable both at its
inception and throughout its entire execution," must "use the least intrusive
means" and "last no longer than is necessary" to effectuate the purpose of the
detention, and that police must "diligently pursue[]" those means. Id. at 344.
In Shaw, the Court applied the same rules to an investigative detention
that, as in this case, only nominally involved a vehicle. 237 N.J. at 598-99. As
police were pursuing a suspected drug dealer, they located the suspect's vehicle
as she pulled into the parking lot of the hotel at which she was staying. Ibid.
The suspect was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a patrol car. Id.
at 599. The officers also removed Shaw, a passenger, and performed a warrant
check, which yielded no results. Id. at 600. Nonetheless, officers detained Shaw
at the scene while a dog sniff was performed, during which time Shaw revealed
incriminating information. Ibid. The Court held that Shaw's "mere presence in
the car of a suspected drug dealer" was no basis to detain him and thus concluded
"there was no particularized suspicion that Shaw was engaged in criminal
activity that would justify Shaw's further detention." Id. at 613. In sum, the
same analysis applies even where police are investigating offenses significantly
more serious than garden-variety traffic violations.
31 A-2821-24Against this legal backdrop, we begin our analysis of this case by noting
that police had no independent basis to stop Lopez beyond his proximity to
Delbridge. Lopez was not suspected of committing any offenses, nor was he
thought to be dangerous. Had the officers initiated the arrest a moment earlier,
while Delbridge was walking, Lopez would never have been seized. Even so, it
was necessary to temporarily seize him to allow officers to safely execute the
warrant for Delbridge's arrest.
Delbridge was then quickly removed and secured. We cannot discern, and
the State has not provided any reason that Lopez's continued detention was
necessary to complete Delbridge's arrest, "the purpose that justified the stop in
the first place." Shaw, 237 N.J. at 612. Tellingly, Officer Romanella appeared
to share our impression. He testified that, after Delbridge was arrested and
before Lopez turned over the suspected CDS, Lopez was "technically free to
leave." This view is incongruous with the notion that Lopez's continued
detention was "necessary."
For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded by the State's reliance on
Hickman. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. at 628, established that defendants may be
questioned during a valid and ongoing stop; Lopez was questioned after the
reason for his stop, and therefore its permissible duration, had concluded. As
32 A-2821-24we recognized in Hickman, 575 N.J. Super. at 636, even otherwise permissible
police action, including questioning, violates the constitution if it "extend[s] the
duration of the stop." We apply that holding here.
Officer Romanella also acknowledged that, having previously told Lopez
not to move, he did not tell him that he could leave. In fact, he took his driver's
license. It is not clear from the record why he chose to do so. The vehicle was
parked when the stop began, meaning Lopez was not driving. Moreover, despite
taking the license with him when he returned to his own vehicle, Officer
Romanella did not run a check or call the information in. Instead, he "walk[ed]
around with it for a while" while Lopez waited. Despite Officer Romanella's
testimony that he viewed Lopez as "technically free to leave," this behavior had
the effect of tethering him to the scene, extending the initial stop.
On this record, we conclude that Lopez's continued presence at the scene
was not necessary. The officers did not suspect him of any offense, nor perceive
him as dangerous. Delbridge had been secured. Thus, his continued detention
was without justification.
The State argues that the continued detention was permissible because it
was short, Lopez was neither handcuffed nor removed from his vehicle, and
33 A-2821-24"there [was] no indication of even minimal fear or humiliation."3 We are
unpersuaded.
First, as discussed, the length of a stop is not dispositive and even brief
unconstitutional detentions are not permitted. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 535;
Williams, 254 N.J. at 18. Where the purpose of a stop has been achieved, our
courts have drawn a hard line. Ibid. Length is a more helpful factor in cases
like Dickey, 152 N.J. at 477, where officers are pursuing an amorphous goal like
the confirmation or denial of certain suspicions. In such cases, a stop can
conceivably continue indefinitely without the initial objective having been
achieved, requiring courts to weigh in on "how long is too long." The facts of
this case do not require such an analysis. In this case, the initial purpose of the
stop had been achieved, and Lopez's continued detention could not further that
purpose. Thus, any further detention lacked constitutional support.
Likewise, the State is correct that Lopez did not suffer the intrusion of
handcuffs or sequestration in a police car. On the other hand, as we have
3 The State also asserts that Officer Romanella moved his vehicle to avoid
blocking Lopez's. The relevance of this claim is not entirely clear, and, in any
event, it is unsupported by the record. Officer Romanella testified that his
vehicle was parked such that it blocked traffic on Woodlawn Ave and he moved
it so that other cars could pass by, not so Lopez, whose license Officer
Romanella was still holding, could drive away.
34 A-2821-24discussed, Officer Romanella twice opened the passenger door—a search under
our Constitution—after Delbridge had been arrested and secured. Thus, the
officers "use[d] more intrusive means than necessary" to "effectuate the
purpose" of the stop, to wit, the already-completed arrest of Delbridge. Shaw,
237 N.J. at 612. Moreover, as discussed, Officer Romanella "walk[ed] around
with" Lopez's license for some time without calling in the license or checking
its validity. We see two ways to interpret these actions. If Officer Romanella
felt it necessary and prudent to check Lopez's identification and yet delayed, he
did not "diligently pursue[]" the investigation such that it could conclude in a
timely fashion, contrary to Dickey, 152 N.J. at 477, and Rodriguez, 575 U.S.
357. If Officer Romanella held Lopez's identification with no intention of
checking it, his actions deepened the intrusion upon Lopez.
Finally, although Lopez did not testify so as to "indicate" his "fear or
humiliation," we note again that this encounter began when officers pointed guns
at Lopez's vehicle, yelling at him not to move. Unbeknownst to the officers,
there was a young child in the back seat. We do not question the propriety of
this approach, but we have no difficulty inferring that it induced some measure
of fear.
35 A-2821-24In sum, we conclude that the officers in this case exceeded the authorized
scope of the investigative stop. Lopez was detained longer than necessary
because Delbridge had already been arrested. The detention was more intrusive
yet less diligent than necessary because, among other things, Officer Romanella
repeatedly opened his vehicle door and seized but did not run his license. Terry
stops represent a strictly limited exception and the State has not demonstrated
that it applied to Lopez's continued detention here.
Certainly, neither the length nor the conditions of the detention were
particularly arduous. Under the appropriate circumstances, a short detention and
a simple questioning would no doubt be permissible. But we are confined to the
circumstances of this case. On these facts, Lopez's continued detention was
impermissible. We hold that the trial court correctly suppressed the physical
evidence recovered from Lopez and his vehicle.
Affirmed.
36 A-2821-24
