Lack of Jurisdiction of Municipal Court rejected State v . Howey
The defendant Michael A. Howey appealed from a Law Division order affirming his conviction and sentence in the Frankford Joint Municipal Court for the improper use of a wireless phone, obstruction of windshield, failure to possess a driver's license and registration and insurance identification card, obstructing administration of law and disorderly conduct. The defendant raised several procedural and constitutional arguments, including lack of jurisdiction and violation of his due process rights. The Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed the lower court. Source Mun lack of jurisdiction Unreported source Daily Briefing - 1-22-26
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APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0962-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL A. HOWEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted December 8, 2025 – Decided January 21, 2026
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Sussex County, Municipal Appeal No. 08-04-
24.
Michael A. Howey, self-represented appellant.
Sahil K. Kabse, Acting Sussex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Shaina Brenner, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAMDefendant Michael A. Howey appeals from a November 8, 2024 Law
Division order affirming his conviction and sentence in the Frankford Joint
Municipal Court for the improper use of a wireless phone, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3,
obstruction of windshield, N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, failure to possess a driver's license
and registration and insurance identification card, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, obstructing
administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), and disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A.
2C:33-2(a)(2). Defendant raises several procedural and constitutional
arguments, including lack of jurisdiction and violation of his due process rights.
Rejecting these challenges, we affirm.
I.
In January 2023, Trooper James R. Lodema of the New Jersey State Police
was patrolling the area of Clove Road in Montague Township, when he observed
defendant operating a black Jeep Wrangler while holding a cell phone. Trooper
Lodema also observed that the vehicle's windshield was obstructed by various
mounted cameras and a radar detector, the rear window was covered with a flag
and writing, and the absence of a front license plate. The trooper initiated a stop
of defendant's vehicle, which ultimately led to defendant's arrest.
At the municipal court trial, the State presented the testimony of Troopers
Lodema, Robert Hoffman, and Kyle Weiss, who all responded to the scene, and
2 A-0962-24introduced the troopers' body-worn camera footage and defendant's own
photographs into evidence. Defendant was self-represented and did not testify.
He, however, informed the court that he was there "as a special appearance"
while "under duress, coercion and threat of arrest."
Trooper Lodema testified that he initiated the stop of defendant's vehicle
because he observed him utilizing a cell phone while driving in the opposite
direction. He further testified that he observed other violations as well,
including the vehicle's obstructed windshield and back window, and absence of
a front license plate. More particularly, Trooper Lodema recalled that the
vehicle's windshield was obstructed by multiple cameras and a radar detector,
and the rear window was approximately eighty to ninety percent covered by an
upside-down American flag, a bible verse, and a statement that "all police are
tyrant pigs."
After initiating the stop of defendant's vehicle, Trooper Lodema stated he
approached defendant from the passenger-side of his vehicle—for his own
safety—and asked him to roll down the window. Trooper Lodema repeated this
request multiple times, but defendant refused to comply, prompting Trooper
Lodema to call for additional units. In fact, defendant refused to submit to any
3 A-0962-24of Trooper Lodema's commands and he never produced his driver's license,
vehicle registration, or insurance documents.
Instead, defendant claimed he did not have to comply because "he wasn't
traveling in commerce" and persisted in his efforts to challenge Trooper
Lodema's commands. According to Trooper Lodema, defendant's statements
did not make any sense to him. Defendant cross-examined Trooper Lodema,
challenging his recollection of the sequence of events and his observations that
defendant was using his cell phone while operating the vehicle. On re-direct,
Trooper Lodema clarified that he contacted dispatch after defendant denied his
request to roll down his window and continued talking with dispatch after he
returned to his trooper vehicle. Dispatch confirmed the vehicle was registered
in Maine under a different name.
The troopers' body-worn camera footage was played for the court, which
showed the arrival of Trooper Hoffman on the scene. Trooper Hoffman testified
that he was the first back-up unit on the scene and went to the passenger-side of
the vehicle to talk with defendant to try to de-escalate the situation. He also
asked defendant multiple times for his license, registration, and insurance, to no
avail. At one point, he advised defendant that he was not under arrest, "but it's
a traffic stop, you have to identify yourself." He then advised defendant to put
4 A-0962-24his hands on the steering wheel and eventually moved to the vehicle's driver-
side window where defendant persisted in his refusal to comply with Trooper
Hoffman's multiple requests to provide his driving credentials.
1
Thereafter, Trooper Weiss arrived on the scene. Trooper Hoffman
testified that he told Trooper Weiss to go to his car and get a window break to
get into the vehicle and remove defendant. Trooper Weiss testified that he broke
the driver-side window of the vehicle and they "reached in, [] unlocked the
interior of the door, opened the door and proceeded to extract defendant."
Defendant was subsequently handcuffed, placed under arrest, and transported to
the Sussex Station where medical personnel were summoned to evaluate and
treat defendant for minor cuts sustained as a result of the broken glass during
the extraction process.
Defendant was charged with improper use of a wireless phone, obstruction
of windshield, failure to exhibit a driver's license, registration, and insurance,
obstruction of the administration of law, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest,
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1), and careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.
1 Trooper Hoffman estimated that he asked defendant for his credentials "well
over five" times.
5 A-0962-24Following the presentation of the evidence, the municipal court judge
issued an oral decision finding defendant guilty of all but two of the charges,
resisting arrest and careless driving, concluding the State had not met its burden
of proof for those offenses. Based on his convictions, the judge imposed various
corresponding fines and penalties.
The judge began by reviewing the charges and the applicable law with
respect to each charge. He next summarized the troopers' testimony, noting that
they were specific in their testimony, "did not embellish any testimony,
maintained proper eye contact, [and] did not exhibit any nervousness or
reluctance to answer any of the question[s]." He found all three troopers
credible.
More particularly, the judge concluded, based on Trooper Lodema's
testimony, defendant operated his motor vehicle while holding a cell phone in
his left hand and was guilty of that charge beyond a reasonable doubt. He further
concluded that the State had met its burden of proof that defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt as to: obstruction of the windshield and rear window,
failure to exhibit his driver's license, registration and insurance card, disorderly
conduct, and obstructing administration. In sentencing defendant, the court
6 A-0962-24assessed applicable fines and penalties and sentenced him to a period of
incarceration of fifty days and suspended forty-seven days of that term.
Defendant filed an appeal to the Law Division and also moved to vacate
his convictions, arguing the court lacked personal jurisdiction, constitutional
and procedural defects, and lack of due process.
2 Following oral argument, the
municipal judge denied the motion to vacate defendant's conviction in its
entirety, finding probable cause for Trooper Lodema's stop, and rejecting
defendant's jurisdictional and constitutional challenges. The judge explained to
defendant that there is no right to operate a motor vehicle on New Jersey
highways without a valid driver's license, and that the municipal court had
jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Frankford Township's shared municipal
court agreement under N.J.S.A. 2B:12-1.
Defendant appealed the judgment to the Law Division and the matter was
assigned to Judge Michael C. Gaus. Judge Gaus reviewed "the full record of the
municipal court trial, the written submissions of the parties; [and] . . . the oral
presentations of both parties,
" and issued a comprehensive and well-reasoned
decision affirming all aspects of the municipal judge's decision.
2 The record includes a March 11, 2024 Law Division order dismissing
defendant's February 2024 municipal appeal without prejudice pending the
outcome of defendant's motion to vacate the judgment.
7 A-0962-24Judge Gaus began his de novo review by conducting an exhaustive
analysis of the testimony of each of the troopers. He found that the troopers
asked defendant multiple times to produce his driving credentials and defendant
"[was] extremely argumentative and belligerent with the officers."3 He found
the troopers' testimony credible, and the evidence adequately substantiated
defendant's guilt as to each offense.
Judge Gaus also found the underlying stop was lawful based on the
Trooper Lodema's observations, defendant was provided with notice and ample
opportunity to present his defense, and that no procedural or constitutional
violations occurred in the underlying proceedings. Judge Gaus accordingly
imposed the same sentence as the municipal judge.
Before us, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
ISSUE I
THE MUNICIPAL (TRIAL) COURT LACKED
JURISDICTION.
ISSUE II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT AND THE SUPERIOR COURT
3 The order issued by Judge Gaus erroneously cited failure to exhibit a driver's
license, registration, and insurance under N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 as N.J.S.A. 39:3-29a,
N.J.S.A. 39:3-29b, and N.J.S.A. 39:3-29c, respectively.
8 A-0962-24(MUNICIPAL APPEAL) ERRED IN UPHOLDING
SAID CONVICTION.
ISSUE III
THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS UNLAWFUL AND
WITHOUT REASONABLE SUSPICION.
ISSUE IV
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE ITS CASE
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
ISSUE V
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.
ISSUE VI
FAILURE TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
THE ALLEGED OFFENSES.
ISSUE VII
RETALIATORY NATURE OF THE STOP
VIOLATED FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
ISSUE VIII
FALSE CHARACTERIZATION OF APPELLANT AS
A "SOVEREIGN CITIZEN" IS LIBELOUS,
DEFAMATORY, AND UNSUPPORTED.
ISSUE IX
FABRICATED CLAIM OF "DANGEROUSNESS" IN
9 A-0962-24ALLEGED POLICE FLYER VIOLATES DUE
PROCESS AND DEMONSTRATES
CONSPIRATORIAL BIAS.
ISSUE X
THE STATE FAILED TO PRODUCE AN INJURED
PARTY, RENDERING THE CHARGES
CONSTITUTIONALLY AND LAWFULLY
DEFICIENT.
II.
Appellate review of a de novo conviction in the Law Division, following
a municipal court appeal, is "exceedingly narrow." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J.
463, 470 (1999). We focus on "whether there is 'sufficient credible evidence
. . . in the record' to support the trial court's findings." State v. Robertson, 228
N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).
Further, under the "two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not
undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations
made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of
error." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at
474). Our function is limited to determining whether the findings made by the
Law Division "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible
evidence present in the record.
" Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471 (quoting Johnson, 42
N.J. at 161-62).
"[I]f the appellate tribunal is thoroughly satisfied that the
10 A-0962-24finding is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the interests of
justice demand intervention and correction,
" then we can independently make
new factual findings. Ibid. (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 161-62).
On appeal, defendant principally argues the municipal court lacked
jurisdiction because neither the presiding judge, nor the prosecutor, nor the
testifying officers could produce on demand documentation of their oaths of
office, surety bonds, or other so-called "public artifacts." Likewise, he argues
the stop was unlawful because Trooper Lodema lacked reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, asserting that this criminal claim was never corroborated with
additional evidence outside of "a law enforcement officer's mere speculation or
unsupported observations,
" and thus the State failed to meet its burden in
proving all the elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. He seeks a
reversal of his convictions, vacatur of the judgment, and dismissal of all charges
with prejudice.
As a preliminary matter, we reject defendant's arguments as meritless and
affirm Judge Gaus' thorough and well-reasoned decision, which is amply
supported by the trial record. We add the following brief comments to amplify
our opinion in certain key areas.
11 A-0962-24A.
We first turn to defendant's argument that the municipal court lacked
jurisdiction. Defendant contends the municipal court lacks jurisdiction because
the judge, prosecutor, and testifying officers did not produce their oaths of office
or bonding documentation upon request. He further contends the State failed to
establish statutory and constitutional authority because the presiding judge,
prosecutor, and testifying officers did not produce documentation of their oaths
of office or official credentials when requested, and the court did not address his
repeated jurisdictional objections.
Municipal courts are generally courts of limited jurisdiction, but they
possess jurisdiction over claims of disorderly conduct, motor vehicle stops, and
all "cases arising within the territory of that municipality . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2B:12-
16(a). As the Law Division correctly found, no statute requires such materials
to be produced to a litigant as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Moreover, defendant
was stopped in Montague Township, a municipality served by the Joint
Municipal Court of Frankford, which is statutorily authorized to exercise
jurisdiction over violations within that township. See N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16. The
offenses at issues—namely motor vehicle and disorderly conduct violations—
12 A-0962-24squarely fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the municipal court. See
N.J.S.A. 2B:12-17(b). Thus, defendant's argument is without merit.
B.
As to defendant's argument that the traffic stop itself was unsupported by
reasonable and articulable suspicion, we similarly reject this argument as
meritless.
A traffic stop is lawful when based on a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that a traffic or other offense has been committed, and the State has
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such suspicion was
present. State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207, 211 (2008) (citations omitted); see also
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979) (recognizing the constitutional
propriety of warrantless traffic stops if based upon articulable police suspicions
of illegality). Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause and
hinges upon the officer pointing to "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also State v. Nishina, 175
N.J. 502, 511 (2003).
Here, both the municipal and the Law Division judges specifically
credited the testimony of Trooper Lodema, who described defendant traveling
13 A-0962-24northbound and "utilizing a cell phone while he was in the course of operating
his vehicle." Trooper Lodema also noted additional direct observations of traffic
infractions, including how the "front windshield was obstructed because there
were . . . cameras, and a radar detector mounted on the windshield," the rear
window was also obstructed by writing and a flag, and the vehicle had no front
license plate. Following these direct observations, Trooper Lodema executed a
lawful traffic stop of defendant's vehicle. The municipal court credited Trooper
Lodema's testimony as "very credible" and "without embellishment,
" and the
Law Division judge found no reason to depart company from the municipal
court's credibility findings as to the "credible testimony of the witnesses." We
do not second-guess credibility assessments made by the two lower courts unless
there is a "very obvious and exceptional showing of error,
" which we are not
persuaded is present on this record. Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474 (citing Midler v.
Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 128-29 (1952)).
C.
With respect to defendant's argument that the State failed to meet its
burden of proving all the elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt,
we conclude that both the municipal court and Law Division relied on sufficient
credible evidence in the record to find defendant guilty of each offense. Again,
14 A-0962-24our review is deferential, particularly where, as here, both courts concur in their
factual and credibility findings. See State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 559 (2009);
State v. Medina, 147 N.J. 43, 49 (1996); Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471, 474.
As to the improper use of a wireless device charge, both courts credited
Trooper Lodema's testimony that he observed defendant driving while holding
a cell phone. Credible police observations alone suffice to establish this offense.
State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429, 441-43 (App. Div. 2017). Regarding the
obstruction of the windshield charge, both courts found that the multiple
cameras and radar detector affixed to the windshield materially obstructed
defendant's view, a conclusion supported by testimony and defendant's own
exhibits.
Likewise, the failure-to-possess credentials charges were amply supported
by the consistent testimony of the troopers and video evidence showing
defendant repeatedly refused numerous lawful requests to produce his license,
registration, and proof of insurance. The record before us also demonstrates that
defendant purposefully obstructed the administration of law by repeatedly and
consistently refusing the troopers' commands, failing to comply with document
requests, and physically resisting removal from the vehicle, resulting in his
forcible extraction.
15 A-0962-24Lastly, the disorderly conduct charge is supported by ample evidence of
defendant's refusal to comply with the troopers' commands throughout the stop,
which created a hazardous condition without a legitimate purpose. Accordingly,
we observe no basis to disturb the Law Division's well-supported and thorough
decision and affirm the judgment and sentence entered by Judge Gaus.
D.
As to defendant's argument that the trial and municipal proceedings
violated his due process rights, we are similarly unpersuaded. Due process
under both the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, para.
1 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantees fundamental fairness in judicial
proceedings, including the right to notice, the right to be heard, and a meaningful
opportunity to present a defense. D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 609 (App.
Div. 2013) (citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995)). In criminal and quasi-
criminal proceedings, due process requires: advance and fair notice of the
charges, the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses, the right to present
a defense, and proving all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Gibson, 219 N.J. 227, 239-40 (2014) (citations omitted).
Here, defendant received constitutionally adequate process at every stage.
He was notified of all charges against him and appeared before the municipal
16 A-0962-24court, where he cross-examined the State's witnesses and introduced exhibits.
Defendant also moved to vacate and supplement the record, advancing several
legal, jurisdictional, and evidentiary challenges, all of which were considered
and rejected by the municipal court. Moreover, defendant's claim of an improper
plea entry before the municipal court is meritless, as the court properly entered
a not-guilty plea only after defendant refused to enter any plea, as authorized by
Rule 7:6-2(a)(1). We are thus satisfied defendant suffered no prejudice after
having been afforded a full and fair opportunity to defend himself and file an
appeal of his conviction, which he also availed himself of in the Law Division
and before us. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and sentence entered by
Judge Gaus.
To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining
arguments, we conclude that it is because they are without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
17 A-0962-24
