The state leave appealed the Law Division order suppressing evidence seized during a warrantless stop of a white Nissan car occupied by the defendants Nicholas S. Marrucca and Liam S. Clark. The state argued the motion court misapplied the Supreme Court's holding in State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156 (2023), and erroneously found the circumstances giving rise to probable cause to search the car were "foreseeable," thereby "effectively eliminating" New Jersey’s automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. Source Daily Briefing - 3/9/26
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0099-25
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NICHOLAS S. MARRUCCA
and LIAM S. CLARK,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________
Argued January 6, 2026 – Decided March 6, 2026
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Rose.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County,
Indictment No. 24-08-1388.
William Kyle Meighan, Supervising Assistant
Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Bradley D.
Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel
Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney, of counsel;
William Kyle Meighan, on the briefs).
Zachary G. Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent Nicholas S.
Marrucca (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender,attorney; Zachary G. Markarian, of counsel and on the
brief).
Patricia Colligan, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for respondent Liam S. Clark (Jennifer N. Sellitti,
Public Defender, attorney; Patricia Colligan, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
We granted the State leave to appeal from a July 23, 2025 Law Division
order suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless stop of a white
Nissan car occupied by defendants Nicholas S. Marrucca and Liam S. Clark on
April 13, 2023, in Jackson Township. The State argues the motion court
misapplied our Supreme Court's holding in State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156 (2023),
and erroneously found the circumstances giving rise to probable cause to search
the car were "foreseeable,
" thereby "effectively eliminating" our State's
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. For the following reasons, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
We summarize the pertinent facts and events from the motion record. In
August 2024, Marrucca and Clark were charged in a twenty-two-count Ocean
County indictment with various offenses emanating from the April 13, 2023
2 A-0099-25incident.1 Marrucca thereafter moved to suppress the evidence seized from the
warrantless search of the car and Clark joined the motion.
During the one-day evidentiary hearing, Detectives Eric Fricks and Derek
Thomason of the Jackson Township Police Department's (JTPD) Special
Enforcement Unit (SEU) testified on behalf of the State. The footage from
Thomason's body worn camera (BWC) depicting the automobile stop and
warrantless search was played during the prosecutor's direct examination of
Thomason. Defendants did not testify or present any evidence.
1 Defendants were jointly charged with: two counts of third-degree possession
of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); one count
of third-degree possession with intent to distribute cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
5(a)(1) and (b)(3); one count of third-degree possession with intent to distribute
fentanyl, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(5); two counts of second-degree
unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); two counts of second-
degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a);
two counts of fourth-degree unlawful possession of a knife, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(d); two counts of third-degree possession of a knife for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm while
engaged in certain drug activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a); fourth-degree
possession of hollow nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f); fourth-degree
possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j); and
third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7. Marrucca was
separately charged with two counts of second-degree certain person not to
possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1), and two counts of fourth-degree
certain person not to possess a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a). Clark was
separately charged with fourth-degree possession of a false identifying
document. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(d).
3 A-0099-25The detectives' testimony, credited by the motion court, was largely
consistent and overlapping. At the time of the incident, both detectives and their
supervisor, Detective Sergeant Steven Cilento, were assigned to the three-
member SEU, a "plainclothes narcotics unit primarily focused on narcotics
investigations and quality of life issues within Jackson Township.
"
Between 6:20 p.m. and 6:30 p.m., while the detectives were in their office
performing administrative tasks, a concerned citizen sent an unprompted text
message to Thomason's work cell phone. In the message, the citizen alerted
police to "suspicious activity" and "heavy foot traffic in the area" of XXX Owls
Nest Court in Jackson Township, but did not identify any individuals or vehicles.
The concerned citizen, who had provided Thomason information in the past,
wished to remain anonymous.
In response to the tip, Cilento, Thomason, and Fricks "promptly responded
to the area" – arriving around 6:45 p.m. – and conducted surveillance from
different vantage points. Police were familiar with both residents of XXX Owls
Nest Court from prior investigations. Fricks described Daniel Meadows2 as a
2 In its merits brief the State notes, in February 2025, Meadows was sentenced
to a probationary term following his guilty plea to third-degree possession of
CDS with intent to distribute. Meadows did not participate in the suppression
motion and is not a party to this appeal.
4 A-0099-25"typical drug purchaser and user," and said the female resident, who died prior
to the hearing, used and distributed narcotics. Fricks confirmed police had "no
active investigations for the residents at th[at] time."
Sometime after 7:00 p.m., Thomason saw Meadows walk from his home.
At some point, Thomason lost visual contact with Meadows, but Fricks saw
Meadows walk directly toward an ice cream truck and two white vehicles parked
on Eucalyptus Court. From his vantage point about thirty yards away, Fricks
saw "multiple individuals . . . congregated in that area."
Meadows approached the area and spoke with a few individuals, including
"a skinny black male with short dreadlocks," later identified as Kwalsky
Narcisse,
3 who then "got into the passenger seat of one of the white vehicles."
Meadows stood outside the car, whose door was open,
"and [Fricks] saw him
hunch over and lean into the car" and engage in a "hand-to-hand transaction"
with Narcisse. Meadows then walked in Fricks's direction "with his hand . . . in
his pocket" as though he were "clenching a small item." As Meadows walked
toward Fricks, Meadows removed the small item from his pocket,
3 According to the State, in June 2024, Narcisse pled guilty to certain persons
not to possess a handgun. He was awaiting sentencing when the State filed its
September 25, 2025 merits brief. Narcisse did not participate in the suppression
motion and is not a party to this appeal.
5 A-0099-25"manipulat[ed] it through his fingers,
" and threw the object "in the air like a dice
[sic]." Fricks testified he "immediately identif[ied] that it was a bundle of wax
folds of suspected heroin." Fricks radioed Thomason and disclosed his
observations. Fricks then lost sight of Meadows.
Thomason testified, from his surveillance position, he could not observe
the transaction between Meadows and Narcisse. But Thomason saw Meadows
"crossing the street towards Owls Nest Court" holding "a quantity of [suspected]
heroin in his hands." Shortly thereafter, Meadows was arrested. Although
Meadows voluntarily waived his Miranda4 rights, he "would not divulge any
assistance or intelligence towards the investigation." According to Thomason,
after Meadows was arrested, Cilento and Fricks returned to their surveillance
positions "to maintain visual [sic] on the suspect vehicle," from which police
believed heroin was distributed to Meadows.
Fricks testified, after Meadows was arrested, marked patrol units
responded and stopped both vehicles parked near the ice cream truck.5 When he
approached the car parked near Eucalyptus Court, Fricks recognized the front
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 The other car, also a white Nissan, was searched by consent, but no contraband
was found. The occupants of that car are not part of this case.
6 A-0099-25seat passenger as "the black skinny male with the short dreadlocks" who "did
the hand-to-hand transaction with Meadows." Noting the timestamp on his
BWC footage, Thomason testified Narcisse was placed under arrest at 7:52 p.m.,
"based on the totality of the circumstances and the investigation, for conspiracy
to distribute CDS." Police also arrested Marrucca, the driver of the Nissan, and
Clark, the rear seat passenger. Prior to the incident date, police were unfamiliar
with the car and all three occupants.
Fricks testified when police removed all three occupants from the car, he
saw "a backpack on the front passenger floorboard where [Narcisse] was
seated." A search incident to Narcisse's arrest revealed United States currency
in multiple denominations. During the stop, Marrucca volunteered the backpack
in the vehicle did not belong to him.
Shortly thereafter, around 8:04 p.m., police conducted a warrantless
search of the car. During the search, police found two loaded handguns, folding
knives, suspected cocaine, digital scales, and United States currency. Police
also found "within the backpack," wax folds of suspected heroin or fentanyl,
bearing the same stamps as the narcotics recovered from Meadows.
Immediately following closing arguments, the motion court issued an oral
decision, granting defendants' motion. The court initially noted defendants did
7 A-0099-25not challenge the stop, but remarked had they done so, the "[c]ourt would have
had no hesitation in finding there was reasonable, articulable suspicion to affect
that motor vehicle stop."
Turning to the warrantless search of the car, the motion court chronicled
the development of federal and New Jersey law concerning the automobile
exception, including our Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Witt, 223 N.J.
409 (2015), and Smart. The court recognized the Witt Court authorized
warrantless automobile searches when: "(1) the police have probable cause to
believe the vehicle contains evidence of a criminal offense; and (2) the
circumstances giving rise to probable cause are both unforeseeable and
spontaneous." Quoting Smart, 253 N.J. at 173, the court further observed, the
Supreme Court "'emphasize[d] . . . the question of whether the circumstances
giving rise to probable cause were unforeseeable and spontaneous is a fact-
sensitive inquiry that should be analyzed case by case,' by the trial judge." The
court found the circumstances in the present matter fell "somewhere in between"
those in Witt and Smart.
Rhetorically questioning whether the spontaneous and unforeseeable test
must occur before police "leave headquarters," the court found the detectives'
response to the concerned citizen's tip was "[t]o some extent . . . spontaneous"
8 A-0099-25and, because the tip was "so vague," "at that point it was unforeseeable what
was to occur."
Detailing the timeline of events that followed, the motion court
distinguished the circumstances in Smart, finding "[t]he difference here is the
police had probable cause before they even pulled over the white Nissan." The
court found "the spontaneity and unforeseeability ended at the latest when
Meadows was arrested, found in possession of these wax folds, the hand-to-hand
[transaction] was confirmed, and the officer articulated credibly that he believed
the white Nissan had distributed the heroin." The court concluded: "At that
point, however, the law requires him to then secure that vehicle, the occupants,
impound it, . . . and get a warrant, whether it be a telephonic or a traditional
warrant."
II.
Generally, our review of a trial court's decision on a suppression motion
is circumscribed and deferential following a testimonial hearing. See State v.
Fenimore, 261 N.J. 364, 372-73 (2025) (reiterating appellate courts defer to a
trial court's factual findings when they "are supported by sufficient credible
evidence in the record"(quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007))).
"A
trial court's legal conclusions, 'however, and the consequences that flow from
9 A-0099-25established facts,' are reviewed de novo." State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512, 532
(2023) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)).
Well-settled principles guide our review. The Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution protect against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and generally
require a warrant issued upon "probable cause." U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J.
Const. art. I, ¶ 7. "[A] warrantless search is presumptively invalid" unless the
State establishes the search falls into "one of the 'few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.'" State v. Edmonds,
211 N.J. 117, 130 (2012) (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004)).
When a defendant moves to suppress evidence seized without a warrant,
the State bears the "burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish" an
exception to the warrant requirement applies and that "the warrantless search or
seizure of an individual was justified in light of the totality of the
circumstances." State v. Bard, 445 N.J. Super. 145, 155-56 (App. Div. 2016)
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). "[T]he 'touchstone' for
evaluating whether police conduct has violated constitutional protections is
'reasonableness.'" Id. at 157 (quoting State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 476
(2015)). "The reasonableness of police conduct is assessed with regard to
10 A-0099-25circumstances facing the officers, who must make split second decisions in a
fluid situation." Ibid.
To conduct a search under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, the State must satisfy the test set forth in Witt, 223 N.J. at 446-48,
"pro[of] that probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or other
evidence of unlawful activity arose spontaneously and unforeseeably." State v.
Courtney, 478 N.J. Super. 81, 93 (App. Div. 2024) (citing Witt, 223 N.J. at 446-
48). The requirements of unforeseeability and spontaneity ensure police "could
not sit on probable cause and later conduct a warrantless search, for then the
inherent mobility of the vehicle would have no connection with a police officer
not procuring a warrant." Witt, 223 N.J. at 431-32. Thus, "police officers who
possess probable cause well in advance of an automobile search should get a
warrant." Smart, 253 N.J. at 174 (citing Witt, 223 N.J. at 431).
"[W]hether the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were
unforeseeable and spontaneous is a fact-sensitive inquiry that should be
analyzed case by case." Id. at 173. "Probable cause is a well-grounded suspicion
that a criminal offense has been or is being committed." State v. Hammer, 346
N.J. Super. 359, 366 (App. Div. 2001); see also State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377,
387 (1964). "Whether probable cause existed is to be determined by the
11 A-0099-25objective reasonableness standard." State v. Judge, 275 N.J. Super. 194, 201
(App. Div. 1994).
In Smart, police stopped a GMC vehicle "two months" after "a concerned
citizen . . . connected a particular residence – and a vehicle like the GMC – with
drug deals." 253 N.J. at 172. The following month, a confidential informant
(CI) told police the defendant "previously utilized the GMC for drug
distribution." Ibid. Prior to stopping the GMC, police surveilled the defendant
"for forty-seven minutes before the stop" and saw him engage in behavior that
"provided reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the GMC." Ibid. After
the stop, the driver denied consent to search the GMC, and a pat down of the
defendant yielded no contraband. Ibid. "[P]olice then called the canine unit to
conduct a canine sniff of the GMC to establish probable cause to search the
vehicle for drugs." Ibid. (emphasis added).
The Court concluded, "[t]hose combined circumstances, which together
gave rise to probable cause, can hardly be characterized as unforeseeable." Ibid.
The Court reasoned even though police were "not one hundred percent certain,"
they "reasonably anticipated and expected they would find drugs in the GMC."
Ibid. The Court noted police "invested almost two hours investigating,
surveilling, and utilizing five officers." Ibid. Further, police "made the decision
12 A-0099-25to conduct a canine sniff to transform their expectations into probable cause to
support a search." Id. at 173.
The Court in Smart also concluded "the circumstances giving rise to
probable cause were anything but spontaneous; that is, they did not develop, for
example, suddenly or rapidly." Ibid. Instead, the Court found "the
circumstances unfolded over almost two hours while investigating long-held
information from a CI that defendant had utilized the GMC for drug trafficking."
Ibid. Addressing the canine sniff, the Court was persuaded that police tool "was
just another step in a multi-step effort to gain access to the vehicle to search for
the suspected drugs." Ibid.
By contrast here, as the motion court correctly found, the circumstances
giving rise to probable cause were spontaneous because the citizen's tip was
"vague," revealing only that there was "suspicious activity or heavy traffic" at
Owls Nest Court. We further note, unlike the circumstances in Smart, the
citizen's tip did not identify any suspects, vehicles, or specific crimes. Although
we recognize Meadows and the female resident were known to police for their
drug involvement, the citizen's tip did not tie those individuals or any potential
targets to any vehicle, let alone the white Nissan. We therefore agree with the
motion court's spontaneity determination.
13 A-0099-25We part company, however, with the court's finding that the circumstances
leading to probable cause were foreseeable. As the State persuasively argues,
unlike the development of probable cause in Smart, here the "events rapidly
unfolded in less than an hour and . . . defendants were not the target of an
ongoing investigation." Unlike the circumstances in Smart, where the police
received information from the concerned citizen and CI connecting the GMC to
drug deals months before the stop, 253 N.J. at 172, in the present matter, law
enforcement did not receive any information that Narcisse distributed CDS from
the Nissan until Fricks observed the hand-to-hand transaction minutes before the
stop. And it was not until police stopped the Nissan that Fricks confirmed
Narcisse was the individual who "did the hand-to-hand transaction with
Meadows.
" We agree with the State the circumstances giving rise to probable
cause were unforeseeable.
In summary, based on the undisputed motion record, we conclude the
circumstances giving rise to probable cause to search the Nissan were both
unforeseeable and spontaneous. Accordingly, police were not required to secure
the Nissan and its occupants, impound the car, and obtain a search warrant. See
State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. 13, 23 (App. Div. 2019) (footnote omitted)
(reasoning Witt "afford[s] police officers at the scene the discretion to choose
14 A-0099-25between searching the vehicle immediately if they spontaneously have probable
cause to do so, or to have the vehicle removed and impounded and seek a search
warrant later"). We are therefore satisfied the State established the warrantless
search was permitted under the automobile exception.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
15 A-0099-25
